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BY

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UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

THIRD EDITION

D. APPLETON-CENTURY COMPANY
INCORPORATED
NEW YORK LONDON

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301
R73p

46,936
May 1964

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION

After a cataclysm which has destroyed in battle seven and a half million men and set civilization back at least a lifetime the world ought to be interested in the scientific study of human relations. Sociology was young what time the World War was incubating, but—it is a satisfaction to recall—her unregarded voice was ever lifted in protest against the dance toward the abyss. Nowhere in Europe was she so contemned as in Germany, where her few champions in the Universities were utterly browbeaten by the arrogant professors of *Staatswissenschaften.*

Sociologists follow the methods of Science but they are by no means content to seek Knowledge for her own sake. They are not ashamed to avow an over-mastering purpose and that is—*to better human relations*. They confess that they are studying how to lessen the confusion, strife and mutual destruction among men and to promote harmony and team work. A quaint idea—but after watching civilized humanity tear at its vitals for four and a quarter years one wonders if there may not be something in it!

The sociologists have been taken in by none of the evil doctrines which have brought the world to its present desperate plight. On the other hand, they listen with patience to those who really have at heart the amelioration of man's lot, but they accept no panacea. They do not pin their hopes of social progress to putting "God" in the Constitution, Sabbath protection, prohibition, collective bargaining, single tax on land values, syndicalism, public ownership, or guild socialism. Knowing that humanity must advance along many roads they keep their program broad.

This book I am offering has been of slow growth. Seventeen years have elapsed since I laid out the chapter scheme and began collecting material for it. It contains *a system* of sociology, i.e., the parts are fitted to one another and taken together they are intended to cover the field; but I do not put it forward as *the* system. While it is that organization of knowledge about society which helps me the most, no doubt other equally valid systems

are possible. True systems will, of course, not contradict one another, but they may differ in perspective. Sociologists equally sound may differ as to which truths deserve the foreground and which should be relegated to the background. A system is a way of making some aspect of reality *intelligible,* and we differ as to how to present social reality so as to make it intelligible for the most people. In time sociology will discover, as the older sciences have done, the best perspective for exhibiting its results. Then the systems of sociologists will come into closer agreement.

This book aims to light up the major problems of society at the stage of development which has been reached in about a third of the human race. It is, of course, a pleasure to understand human relations just as it is a pleasure to understand the motions of the planets even though we cannot influence them. But this book is furthermore intended to help people arrive at wise decisions as to social policies. The will of enlightened man is so bent on directing, or, at least, influencing, the course of society, moreover the possibilities of social amelioration are so tempting, that the chief object in explaining society is to help people determine the best thing to do.

While the emotions supply much of the driving force behind social betterment, and while moral indignation and moral enthusiasm are among the more powerful beneficent emotions, I have given as little characterization as possible to the conduct or conditions I describe. I have sought to explain rather than to praise or blame; so that in my description of the most sinister and detestable social phenomena I preserve an objectivity which I hope the reader will not mistake for indifference.

I wish to acknowledge my debt to Miss Sidney Horsley (now Mrs. Olin Ingraham) for valuable aid in gathering materials for this volume.

Edward Alsworth Ross.

Madison, Wisconsin

PREFACE TO FIRST REVISION

Two reasons have prompted me to rewrite *Principles of Sociology*. One is that in the decade since it appeared I have learned much from the wonderful advance in social research and social thought. The other is that in the interval I have profited from watching the course of development in Western societies and from fresh observations and inquiries made in Mexico, Portuguese Africa, South Africa, India, Java, Siam, Egypt and Palestine.

Among the features of this revision are:

1. Less material drawn from the Past and more from the Present.
2. More attention to the tendencies in contemporary population.
3. Junking of the instinct psychology.
4. Incorporation of the chief findings of the cultural anthropologists.
5. Seven more varieties of inter-group conflict have been described and analyzed.
6. Recognition of the aspect of society ably set forth by Sorokin in his *Social Mobility*.
7. Revolution has a larger place in the picture.
8. Much freer use of diagrams.
9. In order to help the reader find his way about the subject has been treated in eleven parts instead of five.

The following fourteen chapters have been dropped although in some cases their pith has been built into other chapters: "The Original Social Forces," "The Derivative Social Forces," "The Race Factor," "Preliminary Socialization," "The Genesis of Society," "Selection," "Super-Social Control," "Individuation," "Institutionalization," "The Family," "Industry," "The Public School," "The Recreation Center," and "The State." On the other hand, sixteen quite new chapters have been introduced: "Population Pressure," "Folk Sculpture," "Human Nature,"

"Culture," "Communication," "The Conflict of Ages," "Race Conflict," "Town-Country Conflict," "Intra-Class Conflict," "Industrial Conflict," "Sectarian Strife," "Conflict Between Learned and Ignorant," "The Social Circulation of Individuals," "Society and the Occupations," "Revolution," and "Institutions." The forty-three chapters retained have all been rewritten and several of them completely revamped; note particularly revised chapters I, II, V, XIX, XXII, XXVII, XXXII, XXXVIII, XLVI and LII.

Edward Alsworth Ross.

Madison, Wisconsin

PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION

Here I go still further into social processes; for, with society as with organisms, it is insight into *processes* that counts rather than acquaintance with structures, tissues and organs. This involves, to be sure, rather skimpy treatment of social units and products. To do simple justice to family, neighborhood, local community, voluntary associations and the like, I should have to expand this volume by a quarter.

Which is not my idea of how to make sociology appealing!

It is catching the rhythm of *repetitive* phenomena that gives rise to the typical natural science. But the development and world-wide spread of Western culture now going on are *unique,* so knowledge of them opens no door to prediction. Inferences from passing stages of our culture run the risk of soon being as obsolete as is the chipping of flints into arrowheads!

So I make no attempt to forecast the state of society a century hence or a millennium hence. Since the social future hinges chiefly on the new techniques and insights that will be injected into our culture, successful prognostication of it would require one to make inventions and discoveries before they have actually been made!

We sociologists are in the same fix as the astronomers. While seasons, tides, eclipses, comets and star showers *recur,* therefore can be accurately foretold, the one Universe we know is found to be "exploding," so that no astronomer dares predict its fate. In the same way most of mankind in my time have been sucked into a vast vortical process, the course of which no man can foresee since nothing of the sort ever occurred before!

Yearn as I may for ageless truth, my sociology cannot but be colored in places by the extraordinary time I live in. For this is the era of the Great Whack-up of the peoples and resources of the globe. The sated Powers want to hang on to all they have; the hungry Powers aim to "git while the gittin's good." None can foresee to what mad lengths the appeal to force will go. No people can be sure of keeping out of the *mêlee.* So, while the cul-

tural gains of the day afford glimpses of a paradise on earth, we *may* run into horrors unspeakable.

Moreover, this is the era of superheated nationalism. Perhaps there has been half a thousand times as much effort put into stimulating nationalism as has been put into stimulating internationalism. Governments and powerful groups constantly foment nationalism, while the just appreciation of other peoples and cultures has been pushed by only a few liberal organizations. And it is nationalist sentiment that keeps the peoples quiet while their imperialists shackle them with competitive armament and war.

In the advanced societies *internal* conditions are not so discouraging. Such pictures of "the new slavery," "the new feudalism," as met my youthful eye are no longer painted. Signs abound that, more and more, the welfare of the common people will have to be provided. Downright capitalist domination of society can no longer be maintained as it was through much of the last century. The battlers for the people's cause did not die in vain.

The breadth of outlook sociology inspires bids fair to end the "panacea" cult. Not one of the Utopists of the last century-and-a-half "delivered"; *all* of them were more or less wrong. Nevertheless, they *did* fire myriads with the idea, most of man's ills admit of remedy. Each of the social movements that made a big stir —secularism, anarchism, "back to Nature," single tax on land values, trade unionism, socialism—launched something of value; but we see now that the Social Good has more sides than any of them dreamed.

Edward Alsworth Ross.

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PART I

THE SOCIAL POPULATION

CHAPTER

I. The Make-up of the Population
II. The Movement of Population
III. Population Pressure
IV. Folk Sculpture
V. City and Country

CHAPTER I

THE MAKE-UP OF THE POPULATION

The traits and tendencies of a society are greatly affected by its make-up in respect to sex, age, nativity, marital condition, and mental capacity.

Sex. In old countries the sexes nearly balance, but in the course of settling a new country they become in some degree sepa-

FIG. 1

BRITISH COLUMBIA 1891



rated. Thus in our Mountain and Pacific states (Fig. 3) there were in 1920 about three men for every two women. In mining and cattle-raising states the ratios ran: Nevada, five to three;

Montana, four to three; Wyoming, three to two. In British Columbia (Fig. 1) and Hawaii (Fig. 2) the disproportion is even greater.

A population at grips with rude Nature will be strongly male, although it makes a difference whether the attack is on forests and

FIG. 2

HAWAII 1920



minerals or on the soil. Agriculture is more able to use women than is lumbering or mining.

Less hedged about than women, men are readier to break home ties and tempt fortune in a strange land. In our earlier immigration males were to females as three to two; but in the later immigration, which came for high wages rather than for land, they were as three to one. In the graph for the foreign-born whites in the United States 1910 (Fig. 4), notice the much greater inequality of the sexes in ages 20 to 50 than in the ages above 50. The latter are mostly the earlier immigrants.

Districts losing by emigration have more women than men.

FIG. 3

RATIO OF MALES TO FEMALES IN TOTAL POPULATION, BY STATES: 1920



Massachusetts (1920) shows 18 women to 17 men and, for the native stock, 14 women to 13 men. Due to migration to the United States, there were in Italy in 1911 17 women to 16 men.

Cities are magnets as well as new regions, and with their offer of personal security and opportunity of self-support they lure women more than the rude frontier. Hence, there are more men in the flow to new regions, but often more women in the

FIG. 4



current to the cities. Cities, however, differ greatly in their attraction for women. *Commercial cities* abound most in opportunities for men. Very naturally Duluth in 1920 had 114 men to 100 women; Seattle, 117; Galveston, 118; San Francisco, 121. No wonder such cities are marked by energy, daring, and prompt decision! Because of their demand for personal or domestic service, *residence cities* show an excess of women. Washington, Richmond, Cambridge and Nashville have (1930) 113-118 women for

every hundred men. *Manufacturing cities* lure now men, now women, according to the character of their industry. Metalworking cities like Bridgeport, Gary, Butte and Detroit draw more men; while textile cities like Lowell, Fall River and Paterson draw more women. Not that comparative economic opportunity dictates the sex composition of any community. The numerical inequalities between the sexes are but a residue which has not been overcome by sex attraction. Cupid abhors "he" towns and "she" towns, so that automatically an excess of one sex sets up a demand for the other.

In some ways men and women are still *distinct sorts of people.* Remark those pioneers in mental sex-testing, Lewis M. Terman and Catherine Cox Miles.[1]

In modern Occidental cultures, at least, the typical woman is believed to differ from the typical man in the greater richness and variety of her emotional life and in the extent to which her everyday behavior is emotionally determined. In particular, she is believed to experience in greater degree than the average man the tender emotions, including sympathy, pity, and parental love; to be more given to cherishing and protective behavior of all kinds. Compared with man she is more timid and more readily overcome by fear. She is more religious and at the same time more prone to jealousy, suspicion, and injured feelings. Sexually she is by nature less promiscuous than man, is coy rather than aggressive, and her sexual feelings are less specifically localized in her body. Submissiveness, docility, inferior steadfastness of purpose, and a general lack of aggressiveness reflect her weaker conative tendencies. Her moral life is shaped less by principles than by personal relationships, but thanks to her lack of adventurousness she is much less subject than man to most types of criminal behavior. Her sentiments are more complex than man's and dispose her personality to refinement, gentility, and preoccupation with the artistic and cultural.

We do not know what traits an all-women community would develop, but we *do* know that the all-men community has a character of its own. In case it is too remote or rude to attract home-making women, *e.g.,* in the Far North or on civilization's "rim," the population is in continual flux, for the men tire of a womanless life and presently return to "God's country" to marry and "settle down." Such a community becomes the theater of a ruthless greed, for its denizens do not treat it as *home,* but

[1] *Sex and Personality,* 1937, p. 2.

merely as *a place for making money*. Since they do not think of it as *their children's country,* they butcher the land, waste the resources, and maltreat the indigenous population. No one cares for the future of the region; each is in haste to gather the spoil and return home. This is why Kipling sang,

"There runs no law of God nor man to the north of Fifty Three."

In the men's community law is weak, public opinion scarcely exists, and each does what is right in his own eyes save in so far as he is checked by respect for the other man's gun. Life, one's own as well as another's, is held cheap and is staked on trifles. Suicide is frequent since too often "nobody cares." The daredevil spirit prevails; men resort gleefully to a saloon which calls itself "The Bucket of Blood." Few pay any attention to religion. It used to be said in our Northwest, "No Sunday west of Bismarck, and west of Miles City no God." Every one thinks of making his "pile" and getting away. There will be time enough then to "look after one's soul."

With the coming of women, homes and children the temper of the community changes. A sense of responsibility for his dependents makes the man slower to risk his own life or take another's. A new-born love of peace and security causes brawl and duel to be frowned on. Men begin to lay deep foundations for law and morality when they expect to rear their children in the community. Getting "soused" ceases to be a joke after women teach their men folk to look upon it as deliberate self-poisoning. As wives and mothers make their influence felt, the adventuress, queen of the men's community, is discrowned, becomes the "fallen" woman. From women, who love security and abhor the wanton creation of risk, emanates a sentiment against the reckless gambling by which the men's community relieves its *ennui.* Unable to use the saloon as a social center and seeing in this demoralizing male resort its deadliest enemy, the home wars on the saloon. In the wake of women come schools, churches, and shops to help them make homes that will outpull the bar-room.

The law that the value of anything varies inversely as the supply holds for the sexes. Communities with an excess of adult females are ungallant. Men keep their seats before standing women in public conveyances, ridicule coeducation, bar the other

sex from the professions and let human hyenas prey on defenseless girls. On the other hand, in our male mountain commonwealths men pay chivalrous homage to women. They raise the "age of consent," protect their property rights, give them the ballot, grant them facile divorce, open college doors to them, let them help manage churches and societies and make them jurors, school directors and trustees of charitable institutions.

Age. The age make-up of a population is important. When the proportion under fifteen is near two-fifths, there is either the

FIG. 5



stimulus of an underdeveloped country (Argentina, Cuba, Colombia, Hawaii) or else women are in subjection and unchecked disease has left an unusually small contingent of the middle aged and old (India, Mexico, Porto Rico, Bulgaria, Greece). On the other hand, peoples with less than a third of their number under 15 years of age know how to curb infantile diseases, regard woman as an end in herself, and feel free to practise birth control. To this group belong the United States, Great Britain, the Scandinavian peoples, Belgium, Holland, France, Switzerland, Finland, Australia and New Zealand. Intermediate between the two groups stand Spain, Italy, Japan and pre-war Germany, Austria, and Hungary.

A population structure like that of the native whites of Oklahoma in 1900 (Fig. 5) indicates that people trust the future and are multiplying freely. But that for Sweden in 1920 (Fig. 6) shows

FIG. 7


ENGLAND AND WALES
1851, 1921
1921
1851
OVER 85
80 84
75 79
70 74
65 69
60 64
55 59
50 54
45 49
40 44
35 39
30 34
25 29
20 24
15 19
10 14
5 9
UNDER 5
MALES
FEMALES
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PERCENTAGES

FIG. 6


SWEDEN, 1920
OVER 85
80 84
75 79
70 74
65 69
60 64
55 59
50 54
45 49
40 44
35 39
30 34
25 29
20 24
15 19
10 14
5 9
UNDER 5
MALES
FEMALES
6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
PERCENTAGES

that the economic outlook is not reassuring and married couples are cautious.

It is instructive to compare the graph of England and Wales in 1921 (Fig. 7) with that of 1851. The pinching-in at the bottom of the 1921 graph indicates that in recent years fertility has been sharply curtailed. The greater thickness of the 1921 graph in the age groups above thirty-five testifies to the success of public health measures in prolonging human life.

FIG. 8



When you lay the population graph of Germany in 1920 upon that of 1900 (Fig. 8) a story leaps to the eye. The much smaller contingent of women in 1900 reflects the heavy emigration from Germany 1881-1892. The excess of females in 1900 in ages 55-75 echoes the loss of men in the Franco-Prussian War thirty years earlier. The deep dent in the male side of the 1920 graph in ages 20-35 was made by Thor's hammer. In comparison with the women 25-29 the men of this age group show a deficit of 27

per cent, which means that more than a fourth of German youth fell in the World War!

Eloquent, too, is Ireland's 1901 graph (Fig. 9). The smallness of the age group, 55-59 is a reminder of the loss of infants and the shortage of births in the Great Famine of 1846-7. The wasp waist of the graph is owing to the vast outflow to the United States. The age-group 50-54 is bigger than for 45-49 and the

FIG. 9

IRELAND, 1901



age-group 60-64 exceeds that for 55-59 because the illiterate old folks, not knowing their exact age, give the nearest round number. That each of the three lower blocks is shorter than the one above it shows that after the famine of 1881 there was a constant fall in fertility owing partly to the emigration of young adults and partly to the deferment of marriage. Warned by their terrible famines not to multiply rapidly, and by their clergy not to practise birth-control, the Irish postpone marriage as no other

people. Less than half the Irish women at age 35 are married, whereas among us the proportion is 82 per cent.

Rapid shrinkage up through the early age groups signifies high mortality among the young. The graph for the American Negroes in 1880 (Fig. 10) proves clearly that the bulk of them were poor hands in bringing up their children.

FIG. 10



Population Index for July, 1937, presents a very significant chart.

Comment the editors:

The chart . . . illustrates the distributions generated in populations that have had radically different rates of increase for some years. In Japan the death rate has been falling rapidly. The birth rate has also declined somewhat, but compared with the birth rates of Western industrial countries it has remained extremely high—probably one of the largest in the world. The resulting population structure is a broad-based pyramid.

In Austria the mortality rate is substantially lower, but the

birth rate is extremely low and has been falling rapidly for several decades—fewer persons 0 to 4 years of age than 5 to 9, and fewer 5 to 9 than 10 to 14. The deficiency of age 15 to 19 reflects, of course, the shortage of births during the War years, and the deficiency of males from 35 to 59 is largely the result of war casualties—Austria is developing the typically top-shaped age structure which points to the early onset of a decline in numbers.

The death of children and the low mortality rates account for the larger proportion of Austrians between 15 and 65 years . . .

FIG. 11



This group represents 68 per cent of the total, contrasted with 59 per cent in Japan. However, Austria's larger proportion of potential workers stems almost entirely from the latter half of the productive period. In two decades this group will have passed 65 years of age and will be creating added problems of old-age dependency for a population in which . . . the number of young workers will be seriously reduced.

About a generation ago the age structure in most Western countries was quite similar to that of Japan in 1930. The 1934 Austrian population typifies the present structure in many of these countries and that to be expected in more of them in the near future. The development of such distributions will inevitably have profound economic, political, social, and psychological consequences.

Generally, almost a quarter of a population will reach the age of 45 years. France, however, shows 29 per cent, because her children groups are not well filled. Where, as in Brazil, Mexico, Porto Rico and India, only a seventh or an eighth of the people have arrived at middle age, we can be sure that life has been hard for the masses and that they have had little aid from hy-

FIG. 12



giene. The wonderful strides advanced peoples have made in overcoming the foes of human life are seen when we note the increase in the numbers of old people. In England and Wales the proportion above 50 years of age is a third greater than it was seventy years ago, while in the United States it has doubled.

Flight from religious, racial, or political persecution depletes *all* the age groups; but a migration prompted by *economic* motives withdraws those in the earlier productive years who are least

burdened by dependents. Comparison of the graphs of the foreign-born in the United States, 1880 (Fig. 12) and 1910 (Fig. 4) sug-

FIG. 13



gests that in the intervening time immigration has become much more economic in motive. The graphs of the negroes of Delaware, Mississippi, and Nebraska in 1900 (Figs. 13, 14, 15) exhibit the

FIG. 14



age distribution of *normal, emigrant,* and *immigrant* communities. The hollow sides of the graph for Mississippi show that she has lost not a few of her young adult negroes, while the small

proportion of children in Nebraska shows that the negro element there is a recent arrival.

In a people losing by an economic emigration the ratio of dependents to supporters becomes unfavorable, while a people absorbing such a migration gains in industrial and military strength.

As Fig. 16 shows, the age make-up of our people has significantly changed in the last eighty years and is headed to change

FIG. 15



still further. The great shrinkage in the ratio those "under 20 years of age" bear to those in the productive stage (between 20 and 60 years of age) suggests that as a people we should be amply able financially to release all children under 15 from industrial labor and to provide for them far better educational and recreational opportunities than were provided in 1850.

In view of the vanquishing of many diseases which cut people off before their time, the proportion of the population above 50 years of age, above 60, above 70, is bound to grow. This creates such problems as the "hiring and firing" policy of employers, the utilization of the elderly worker in industry, the safe investment of savings for old age, and the setting up of pension systems for the superannuated.

Age make-up affects the group spirit. A community made up chiefly of persons in their early productive years, is likely to display unusual fluidity, energy, initiative and adaptability. On the other hand, an excess of young children and of the elderly

FIG. 16

AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE



In 1870 about half the population was under 20 years of age, but in 1930 less than 40 per cent. By 1950 these children and young people will constitute only 30 per cent of the population, and by 1980, or before, only 25 per cent. In 1870 about 5 per cent of the population was over 60 years of age. By 1930 the proportion had risen to 8.6 per cent. By 1950 these old people will constitute 13 per cent of the population, and by 1980 about 20 per cent. In 1870 about 45 per cent of the population was between 20 and 60 years of age, which may be considered, taking the people as a whole, the productive years of life. By 1930 people in these productive ages constituted 52.6 per cent of the total population. By 1950 they will constitute about 57 per cent, and by 1980 perhaps 55 per cent. During the next few decades, when population will be almost stationary, a larger proportion of the population will be of productive age than in the past, or probably, in the more distant future.

lessens venturesomeness, sharpens the craving for security and makes for timidity and indecision.

Communities with many young voters are less swayed in their political choices by partizanship and prejudice, more critical of party management, less governed by feelings from the past, and more hospitable to progressive ideas. A community dominated commercially by men 20-45 years of age will reflect the *money-making* or *business building* spirit and will sympathize with every form of legitimate enterprise and individual initiative. If, on the other hand, men above 45 hold the baton, the *money-keeping* or *business-keeping* spirit will get the upper hand. The community will sympathize with the demand for stability, for safety of investments and freedom from business disturbance, rather than with the plea of the enterprising individual for a free hand and a square deal.

Nativity.[2] A stream of immigrants may be *representative*, *sub-representative* or *super-representative* of the nation from which it comes. Religious or political oppression is likely to start up a current of *super-representative* migrants because it is chiefly the superior who refuse to bend. The English Puritans, Quakers and Catholics, the Scotch Covenanters, the French Huguenots, the German sectaries who settled Pennsylvania and the refugee German Liberals of 1848 were among the *super-representative* elements which came to America. Discrimination against a people or a race will cause a *representative* outflow, *e.g.*, the Scotch Irish and the Scotch Highlanders of Colonial days, as well as the Armenians, Syrians and Russian Hebrews which came to us latterly.

In energy and venturesomeness wilderness tamers generally surpass their kinsmen who stay on where they were born. It is the trout rather than the carp that finds their way out of the pool into swift water. The American pioneering breed had rare courage and initiative, and the European immigrants who came to settle in the Great West may well have topped the average of their people in these traits. Those who follow the lure of high wages

[2] At the outbreak of the World War a third of the American people were of foreign parentage, while the foreign-born numbered between sixteen and seventeen millions. Certainly this was the largest body of strangers any people have ever engulfed. Never before did the old-American element constitute so small a proportion of the whole.

in a foreign labor market will be *sub-representative* in ability. The educated, the propertied, the established, the well-connected, having fair prospects at home, are loth to expose themselves to the risks of a strange land. The heirs of success abide in their fatherland; only the children of the poor migrate, and it is very

FIG. 17
PRINCIPAL TYPES OF FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES: 1930



unlikely that such a stream can be a good sample of the beauty, brains or initiative of the stock.

The first-comers probably have more initiative than those who come later, when the channels of immigration have been worn deep and straight and smooth. The poorest stuff is that which migrates in response to a ticket-selling campaign by steamship agents who go about and excite the ignorant and gullible with

fairy-tales. Woe to the land which lets itself be the dumping ground for a commercialized emigration!

Bringing his own inherited low standard of living, the foreign-born outbreeds his native competitor, whose standard of living reflects the better conditions in the newer country. The former will be ready to marry before the latter feels justified in doing so. The former will beget eight children while the latter does not see how he can "do right" by more than four.[3] The higher standards of cleanliness, decency and education cherished by the native element act on it like slow poison. William does not leave so many children as 'Tonio because he will not huddle his family into one room, eat macaroni off a bare board, work his wife barefoot in the field, and keep his children weeding onions instead of at school. Subjection to the competition of immigrants with low standards of living appears to be the root cause of the mysterious "sterility" which has stricken in turn the Americans and each of the Americanized immigrant elements. Down to 1830 the Americans were as fertile a race as ever lived and their decline in fertility coincides in time and locality with the arrival of the immigrant flood.[4]

A democratic society, in which government, laws and moral standards are the outcome of common understanding, suffers damage as it becomes a hodge podge. The unworthy slip into power because groups of worthy citizens are pulling different ways. When a people is so in accord politically that fundamentals are

[3] In 1900 in American cities a thousand foreign-born women could show 612 children under five years of age to 396 children shown by a thousand native women.

[4] F. S. Crum in the *Bulletin of the American Statistical Association* for Sept., 1914, p. 216, offers the following significant table:

AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN PER WIFE

(Statistics Based upon Twenty-two Genealogical Records of American Families)

Marriage Periods	*Number of Wives*	*Number of Children*	*Average Number of Children per Wife*
Previous to 1700	276	2,034	7.37
1700-1749	802	5,478	6.83
1750-1799	1,966	12,649	6.43
1800-1849	5,530	27,320	4.94
1850-1869	3,062	10,630	3.47
1870-1879	1,086	3,004	2.77
Totals	12,722	61,115	4.80

taken for granted, it is ready to tackle new questions as they come up. But if it admits to citizenship myriads of foreign-born who insist on thrashing over old straw, the relation of church to state, or church to school, or state to parent, then the ripe sheaves ready to yield the wheat of wisdom under the flails of discussion lie untouched. The more vital and pressing questions, such as public hygiene, the conservation of natural resources, the control of monopoly, the protection of labor, go to the foot of the docket.

Marital condition. (Fig. 17.) The Americans are one of the most married peoples on the face of the earth; in all Europe only Slavs and Magyars surpass them. Their high marriedness reflects rural life, ease of making a living, smallness of the servant class and a social position of woman which prompts her to scorn irregular sex relations. Moreover, contrary to common opinion, the fondness of Americans for wedlock *is growing*. From 1890, when first the needful data were gathered, to 1930, the percentage of the population over 15 years of age married rose from 55.3 to 59.9 —a twelfth! And marriage *is earlier;* among those of age 15-19 years there were 15 more married out of every 1000 in 1930 than in 1890 and of those of age 20-24 there were 73 more married out of every 1000. So in spite of all we hear about "bachelor maids" and "the high cost of supporting a wife" young people are marrying earlier than they did a generation ago. Confidence in their ability to regulate the size of the family encourages them; also, thanks to easier divorce, marriage seems less like a steel trap.

The census of the Colony of New Hampshire in 1773 gives a glimpse into the era of the "simple life," when most families lived on the farm and girls lacked chances of earning money outside the home. Nowadays nearly a quarter of our girls and women are working outside the home; yet it appears that the proportion of marriages in New Hampshire then was *only a tenth greater* than it was in the whole United States in 1920. So the opening up of paying jobs has made little difference in girls' willingness to accept wifehood.

One is surprised, too, at our young men's willingness to marry early. Owing to the migration of industries from household to factory, the wife is far less able to contribute to the maintenance of the home now than she was in olden times. More and more the

home-staying wife is literally "supported" by her husband—one who takes a wife shoulders a burden. If, nevertheless, more men marry and marry earlier, it is a sign that selfish prudence is not triumphing over sex attraction.

Cupid is still a real god!

However, the fact that one man in eight and two women in five marry before the age of 21 and that two-thirds of the women and only half the men are married under 26, reflects the very unequal pressure of the matrimonial yoke. Since it is the husband who assumes the legal obligation of support, men generally marry two or three years later than women.

Normality. The degrees of ability within a population are of immense social importance. The *supernormal* provide society with leaders, misleaders, inspirers, pathfinders and directors. Under fair competition the "star" persons will be of this type. On the other hand, the *subnormal* largely contribute to crime, pauperism, vagrancy, and prostitution. Probably a *third* of the prostitutes in America, from a *quarter* to a *third* of the paupers, and *half* of the chronic inebriates are victims of a bad heredity. The proportion of criminals who are mental defectives is doubtless many times larger than that of the general population.

The measurement of mental differences is still in its infancy. Its technique is, however, rapidly developing and ere long we may be able to ascertain with a fair degre of accuracy the natural mental capacity of an individual. When that time comes it may be possible to gauge the comparative brain power of races and of hybrids, to discriminate at immigration stations between the desirables and the undesirables, to discover what youths are worthy of being aided to a higher education, to find for each profession the grade of capacity requisite for success in it, and to sort out of a body of employees the ones fit for responsibility and direction. Society will then be able to locate its stock of superior ability, discover whether much of it is running to waste, see whether it is reproducing itself, find when and why a community becomes impoverished in respect to ability, and trace the routes and causes of the migrations of the capable.

CHAPTER II

THE MOVEMENT OF POPULATION

Our species was outfitted with a fecundity which got it through most of the straits it met; otherwise we should not be here! Thousands of times, no doubt, local areas were depopulated owing to a piling up of calamities, but were repeopled later with the overflow from other places. Man has been prolific enough to get past the cave bear, the Ice Age, the disease microbes and all his other afflictions. That this fecundity is excessive for subsequent easier times gives rise to the "population question." After every victory over the enemies of human life this question becomes urgent again.

Origin of man's excess fecundity. At the close of the eighteenth century a young English clergyman, T. R. Malthus, showed that babies come so fast that, as a regular thing, a people "tends" to outgrow its food supply.[1] It cannot do so because certain "checks" generated or aggravated by overpopulation—undernourishment, famine, the deficiency diseases, and war— get so bad that deaths overtake births and further growth is arrested.

Half a century later Darwin read Malthus at a time when he had been impressed with the huge proportion of spores, seeds, eggs and young which in a state of nature never mature and he perceived that not man alone but *every* species is equipped with excess fecundity. Hence, the "struggle for existence," which leads up to the process of "natural selection" [2] by which each form of life becomes better and better adapted to its environment.

In Malthus's time everybody supposed that a benevolent God, some six thousand years ago, created man to be happy. As an

[1] Malthus's demonstration of the necessity of a brake on human fecundity effectually disposed of the communistic proposals of his time. For any system that encourages people to behave irresponsibly in the having of children is bound to be broken down soon from overpopulation. Since the great post-War resort to birth control this point has lost its force; so now the chief argument against communism is that it will not be able to organize production effectively.

[2] By way of "survival of the fittest."

orthodox clergyman Malthus was therefore hard pushed to account for our species being launched into the world with a sex thirst likely to produce from ten to twenty pregnancies per couple—which can but result in widespread misery!

In the light of what we now know as to man's past, his fecundity does not appear so excessive as it has proved to be in his later history. Like every species man was provided with a "margin of safety" to see him through emergencies, so that in ordinary times some of his fecundity is superfluous. Then with every advance in peaceful association, hygiene, medicine and sanitation, he finds himself with a bit more excess fecundity on his hands; in the future this will run him into still greater embarrassment. Unless the problem is solved by general resort to birth control, human beings will be called upon some day for prodigies of self-restraint in respect to sex-gratification.

Peak rates of human increase. In a healthy population of normal make-up as to age and sex, whose only check on fertility is monogamous marriage, births will range from 50 to 60 per thousand per annum. Thus we come upon rates of 49 in Russia, 1886-95, and in India at about the same time. It is so difficult to get a prolific people to register all births that these figures need revising upward. Nowhere do we find higher fertility than in the province of Quebec where the devout *habitants* dare not attempt any form of control over the size of their families. Quite often a priest after returning for his parish a number of births which shows a rate of from 50 to 55 per thousand adds the caution, "Many births are not recorded."

In the first decade of the nineteenth century, when foreign immigration was negligible, the rate of increase of the American people was 31.5 per thousand a year. Yet it must have been subject then to an annual death-rate of 20-22. Armed with modern medical knowledge such a people could bring its death-rate down to 16 or 17, thus achieving an annual growth of 3½ per cent. This would double it in about twenty years; at the end of a century there would be *thirty-two times* as many people as at the beginning!

The muzzling of famine. Periodical famine has been a great remover of excess population; yet among the advanced peoples famine has been quite put out of business. In England, thanks to better farming and improved roads, real famine has been un-

known for three centuries. France, less sea-girt than England, suffered longer from local food shortage; not until the last quarter of the eighteenth century was internal trade so active that nowhere in France was the price of food double its price at some other place. It is safe to say that a third of mankind is no longer shadowed by famine. What saves them from the gaunt wolf is:

1. *Improved means of transportation.* How much a crop failure will cause dearth depends on the distance from which you can draw supplies. When ten leagues is the limit, one season in twenty may be so bad that the local price of food will be doubled. When rails give you a radius of 500 miles, this may occur but once in a century. When it is possible to tap overseas sources, none may *ever* starve save from poverty. Hence, every extension of interregional or international trade puts famine further off.

2. *The perfecting of the art of food preservation.* Drying, canning, and chilling have been brought to such perfection that there is now hardly a time limit to the keeping, and therewith to the shipping, of food.

3. *Stabilization of agriculture by water control.* The leading of streams to parching fields is becoming general in lands of uncertain rainfall. Great engineering works which impound flood-waters in high valleys to release them when distant river plains are athirst, insure crops against drouths. Where, as in the Punjab of India, five rivers are yoked by canals and turned upon the desert the cultivator laughs at the brazen sky, for back of his moisture is the precipitation upon the whole Himalayan uplift!

4. *A high standard of living.* The average Indian agriculturist lays out on food 94 per cent of his total expenditure; the carpenter, 83.5 per cent; the blacksmith, 79 per cent. The American wage earner, on the other hand, lays out 38-45 per cent of his income on food. In a pinch, the American worker's family could more than double its outlay on food, while the Indian worker's family could not add more than a sixth. Hence, in a time of dearth Oriental wage earners may not be able to tolerate a rise in prices sufficient to draw in food from sources more than a hundred miles distant; whereas American wage earners might meet the cost of bringing food from the ends of the earth.

5. *The combatting of famine by improved social organization.* Even teeming British India, thanks to Western humanitarian ideas and administrative skill, now eludes the bony fingers of

famine. In olden times every local crop failure meant starvation to the poor; but, in these days, local officials keep a watchful eye on the state of the crops, the course of food prices, the reports of deaths. Prepared programs of relief work are put into operation the moment the volume of distress reaches a certain point.

The conquest of diseases. Not only has famine been muzzled, but many of the diseases which used to keep down population have been put out of action.

Observes President Vincent, of the Rockefeller Foundation:

> The presence of smallpox is now a disgrace to any civilized community or country; cholera and plague have disappeared from the leading nations; typhoid fever has been enormously reduced; malaria and hookworm disease are giving ground; yellow fever is being narrowly restricted; typhus is practically unknown among the cleanly peoples; the fear of diphtheria has been largely allayed. Such victories as these, together with advances in general sanitation, higher living standards, and more attention to individual health habits, have resulted in steadily falling death rates in all the more progressive countries.

Results of life-saving. The expectation of life at birth has risen to 50-67 years among the most advanced peoples,[3] while among the backward peoples it lingers in the twenties. Our grandparents, if city dwellers, lost one child in four in its first year. That still holds for South-Eastern Europe, while in the teeming Orient one-half perish. On the other hand, there are now fourteen peoples which get more than nine-tenths of their babies through the first year!

In all its million years, humanity never had such a marvelous streak of luck as it has had in the last two-thirds of a century; it has found how to cut its mortality in two! Hence, much of the doctrinal hardtack cherished by our ancestors wandering in the stony wilderness may be thrown away, now that vine and fig tree are in full view. For example: that life is and ever must be " short and uncertain"; that sickness is "sent," or is a "visitation"; that an epidemic is God's chastisement; that the earth is still in need of "replenishing" as it was right after the Deluge; that the dull begetter of sixteen morons has earned "his country's

[3] According to the 1930 census, all but one of our seven West North Central States "have expectations of life of over 65 years for white females and all but two have expectations of life of practically 63 or over for white males." New Zealand leads the world with 67.88 for females and 65.09 for males in 1931.

FIG. 18


INFANT DEATHS PER 1000 LIVE BIRTHS
INFANT MORTALITY RATE
275
250
225
200
175
150
125
100
75
50
25
0
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
CHILE
INDIA, BRITISH PROVINCES
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
POLAND
JAPAN
ITALY
GERMANY
FRANCE
U. S.,
ENGLAND AND WALES
SWEDEN
NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND

DEATH RATES FROM CAUSES SHOWING THE GREATEST PERCENT DECLINE BETWEEN THE PERIODS 1911-1915 AND 1931-1935. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INDUSTRIAL DEPARTMENT. AGES 1 TO 74 YEARS

Cause of Death	*Percent Decline 1931-1935 Since 1911-1915*	*Averages of Annual Death Rates* per 100,000*				
		1931-1935	1926-1930	1921-1925	1916-1920	1911-1915
ALL CAUSES OF DEATH	37.3	802.3	905.8	925.1	1,273.7	1,279.6
Typhoid fever†	90.2	1.7	3.2	5.2	9.9	17.4
Malaria	87.8	.5	.7	1.1	2.0	4.1
Diphtheria	87.2	3.0	7.8	14.6	19.3	23.4
Diarrhea and enteritis	82.7	4.7	8.3	11.6	21.2	27.2
Measles	77.0	2.0	3.7	4.6	7.8	8.7
Whooping cough	71.7	1.7	3.0	3.7	6.1	6.0
Tuberculosis—all forms	70.2	66.8	91.7	112.8	183.3	223.9
Scarlet fever	69.2	2.8	2.6	4.4	4.3	9.1
Pellagra	65.0	1.4	2.2	1.5	3.0	4.0
Acute rheumatic fever	60.0	2.6	3.1	3.8	4.7	6.5
Erysipelas	59.3	1.1	1.4	1.5	2.1	2.7
Cirrhosis of the liver	58.3	8.0	7.9	7.4	12.4	19.2
Alcoholism	52.5	2.9	4.3	3.1	3.7	6.1
Accidents (excluding automobile and war deaths)	50.1	38.3	48.8	51.0	65.8	76.7
Epilepsy	48.6	1.9	2.3	2.5	3.6	3.7
Puerperal state	47.3	9.6	13.1	16.7	19.9	18.2
Influenza and pneumonia	44.2	71.7	95.3	94.7	252.7	128.4

* Standardized for color, sex, and age.
† Including paratyphoid fever.

gratitude"; that "God sends babies and He will take care of them"; that "when God sends mouths He sends meat"; that woman is here for maternity and for nought else; that her foreordained lot is to bear a dozen, half of whom will die in the cradle; that for her to crave any other lot is impious and unwomanly; that mental defectives have a "natural right" to breed their kind; that man has a "natural right" to migrate; that for this reason every people is under solemn obligation to leave its doors open to whatever population surplus develops anywhere on the globe!

The growth of population. In 1696 an English pioneer in vital statistics calculated that the most people England can support is twenty-two millions, which figure should be reached about 3500 A.D. "in case the world should last so long." His figure was

reached in 1¾ centuries instead of 18! Our Census experts calculate that the 4,400,000 whites in the United States in 1800 had 37,290,000 living descendants in 1900—an eightfold increase in a century. The English-speaking whites of the world have increased nearly eightfold since 1800 and form now a fourth of all European blood instead of an eighth.

FIG. 19



Europe, which is supposed to have had 30 millions of inhabitants at the beginning of the Christian era, had 125-30 millions in 1750 on the eve of the Industrial Revolution. By 1800 it had 180 millions, now has 500 millions. It has been estimated that between 1650 and 1929 the folk of European blood in the world expanded from 100 millions to 642 millions.

There has been a prodigious growth of the native population in the tropical colonies and dependencies of the Great Powers.

In the sixty years before 1920 they added to themselves *105 millions,* a twelfth of all mankind in 1860. In forty years of British occupation the population of the Nile Valley doubled, thus neutralizing most of the benefits brought within reach by the reforms the British introduced! In half a century the natives of Algeria, Jamaica and Ceylon have doubled. In the quarter of a century of American occupation the Filipinos nearly doubled. The Javanese are nine times as numerous as they were in 1800. In forty years the people of India have increased their numbers by 50 millions, or 20 per cent. So it goes. Better life? Hardly! Just more people at the old wretched level! Such is the outcome of applying to colonial problems physical science and economics, but not sociology.

The fact is, *the white race is serving as midwife to the blacks and the browns;* for when it comes to "wringing out" Nature the white man has a tall bag of tricks. He sets coolies to clearing jungle and, lo! tea gardens, cocoa groves, coffee orchards, pineapple fields, cane plantations, and rubber groves. He has them build roads, dig for minerals, dam rivers, and cut irrigation ditches. Moreover, he squelches intertribal wars, puts down "leopard" societies, bans witch "smellings," curbs epidemics, and heals the sick like a magician. Result: a herring-like increase which threatens the world balance of races. There will be stronger pressure some day on the protecting dikes reared by the white peoples because their sun-helmeted sons in the tropics casually summon into existence myriads of blacks and browns in order to make a profit off them!

Mankind is reckoned at 450 millions in the days of Cromwell. For 1800 the estimate is 850 millions; the League of Nations computed it at 2028 millions in 1930. Had man increased all along as he was increasing just before the World War, then all the present inhabitants of the globe might be descended from a single couple set down on an uninhabited planet 483 B.C. Daily about 100,000 die and 150,000 are born; each sun sees fifty thousand net increase! The annual growth is 1.2 per cent., which means a doubling every sixty or seventy years. Keep this up and at a date no more distant from us than is the capture of Jerusalem by the Crusaders humanity may with perfect justification hang out on our planet the sign "Standing Room Only."

Yet probably not one man in a thousand realizes that this happy-go-lucky procedure cannot go on forever!

Here is the explanation of the opinion rife among the intellectuals that *Science* has not fulfilled the hopes she raised; that *Invention,* for all her enchanter's wand, has not made life much easier for the masses. The simple truth is, perhaps four fifths of the enormous gains from the subdual of new lands and the harnessing of the forces of Nature by labor-saving machinery

FIG. 20



have gone not to help people live better but to sustain more lives. In winter you build a fire in your chilly cabin—neglecting, however, to close the door—then complain that you are not warmed!

The decline of fertility. Some vital statisticians see looming the specter of race extinction where others can see only an overcrowded planet. This is due to the rapid diffusion of the practice of birth control, which probably is resorted to now by 10-15 per cent. of the world's women. Perhaps three million fewer births occur in Europe each year than would occur if the birth-rates of 1876 still prevailed. In England the birth-rate has been cut in two in fifty years; in the United States the ratio of children under 5 to 1000 women of child-bearing age is less than three-

eighths of what it was in 1820. In all of Europe west of a line drawn from Trieste to Danzig and north of Italy and Spain, and in the countries largely settled by immigrants from this area within the last three hundred years, the birth-rates are falling faster than the death-rates and the population will be stationary or declining within a decade or two. In Italy, the Slavic peoples and Japan the death-rate is falling more rapidly than the birth-rate and their margin of growth is rising. Most of

FIG. 21

NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER 5 YEARS OF AGE PER 1,000 WOMEN 16 TO 44 YEARS OF AGE (INCLUSIVE) UNITED STATES, 1800-1930 AND ESTIMATE FOR 1934



*ESTIMATES OF PROF. WALTER WILLCOX PRIOR TO 1880. SEE PUBLICATION AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION, VOLUME XII PAGE 495 BOSTON 1912 A CHILDREN-RATIO OF BIRTHS 1928-1933 TO CENSUS 1930, APPLIED TO BIRTHS 1923-1933

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the rest of mankind exhibit an old-fashioned birth-rate compensated by a frightful death-rate to balance the population with its food resources!

"More babies" policies. The subject of population now lies in sociology's "hurricane belt." You daren't halve deaths without halving births; you don't halve births by persuading the married to be ascetic, but by acquainting them with contraception. But, once couples feel free to resort to it, you have no guarantee that it will be used just enough to keep population in due balance. If with it couples cut births from 50 per thousand a year to 20, how do you know that they will not cut them to 15? To 10? Each couple aims to have only the children it wants and pays

FIG. 22

THE ANNUAL INCREASE OF POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES, BIRTHS, DEATHS, AND IMMIGRATION OR EMIGRATION, 1910 TO 1933



small heed to population statistics; yet, if many fertile couples stop at a first or a second child, population will shrink and extinction will not be far away. With such a prospect we may be sure that the aroused instinct of collective self-preservation will support very drastic measures to reverse the trend. Remarks Professor F. H. Hankins: [4]

The control of conception by the married pair has many grounds of justification within the scheme of social values cherished by civilized peoples. On the other hand, experience indicates that when contraception becomes a general folkway, births become too few to maintain even a stationary population. International and interracial rivalries then lead to restriction of efforts at family regulation. There is, in fact, a deep-seated opposition between fertility and a civilization founded on the ideals of individual liberty and personal achievement currently dominant in Western civilization. It is a very real question whether social values can be so manipulated as to preserve, and even extend, the liberty of private determination of family size in the full light of the growing knowledge of contraception and, at the same time, guarantee the maintenance of both numbers and quality of population.

Since the World War the "family allowance system," under which employees receive an addition to their salary or wage for each dependent child—or each child after the second or third—has been extensively applied in Central European countries and has become well rooted in France, Belgium, New Zealand and Australia. Whether it has stimulated births is debatable, but it has certainly lessened infant mortality.

Nazi Germany has made the most rational effort we know of to reverse a downward population trend. In 1933 there were less than half as many births in Germany as there had been thirty years earlier when the population was ten million fewer. Girl babies in the first year of life were no more than equal in number to women at age forty-five. There were only 70 per cent as many children under six as there had been in 1910.

One major device employed for increasing births is the marriage loan. The minimum loan is $120, maximum $400, and the loans bear no interest. They are to be repaid at the rate of one per cent a month and the birth of a child cancels ¼ of the loan; four births wipe the loan out. Loans are denied to persons

[4] *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XLII, p. 652.

FIG. 23

POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1850-1920 AND ESTIMATES OF POPULATION, 1930-2000 A.D.


MILLIONS
180
170
160
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1850 '60 '70 '80 '90 1900 '10 '20 '30 '40 '50 '60 '70 '80 '90 2000
Based on estimates of Pearl and Reed, Johns Hopkins University
Based on methods suggested by Sloan, Bureau of the Census
(BOTH ESTIMATES ABOVE WERE MADE IN 1921)
Medium estimate of Thompson and Whelpton, Scripps Foundation for Research in Population Problems.
Low estimate of Thompson and Whelpton. This and the medium estimate include allowances for immigration.
Estimate of Dublin of Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. Based on birth rate of 14 and 70 years expectation of life. No immigration.
(THESE THREE ESTIMATES WERE MADE IN 1932)
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In 1921, Pearl and Reed, projecting population trends on the basis of a logistic curve, estimated that the population of the United States would be about 190,000,000 by the year 2,000, and would increase slowly for several decades thereafter. But births began to decline in 1922, and by 1932 an estimate made by Dublin, also the "medium" estimate of Thompson and Whelpton, indicated that the population of the United States probably would never exceed 156,000,000 and that the stationary condition would be reached about 1980. The Thompson and Whelpton "minimum" estimate indicated a maximum population of 136,000,000 about 1956. This "minimum" estimate appears now (1938) the safest. Should the average decrease of 50,000 in number of births each year during the past decade continue, the population will reach a maximum in about 1950, and then begin to decline. But the decline will be slow for a decade or more.

showing hereditary defect or deficiency, and to wives retaining jobs outside the home. To the end of 1936 about 700,000 marriage loans had been granted, averaging $240.

Vigorous attempt has been made to enforce the anti-abortion law of 1926. The medical profession has been purged of known professional abortionists. There has been a very great decline in the number of abortions, which previously numbered around 600,000 annually. While in 1929 less than half of the pregnancies coming to the attention of the Berlin *Ortskrankenkasse* resulted in normal births, in 1935 the proportion had risen to more than nine-tenths.

Observers agree that German births have very decidedly increased in number despite the fact that a loan of $240 falls far short of balancing the cost of rearing four children. It may be that the rise in birth-rate reflects the "afflatus attending the Nazi triumphs" rather than the bait of marriage loans. In view of the problems that may confront most of the modern peoples within a decade or two, we may be sure that these experiments will be watched very closely.

CHAPTER III

POPULATION PRESSURE

There is population pressure, "overpopulation" some call it, *when in normal times the hardworking and frugal have difficulty in obtaining the necessaries of life.* To be sure, temporary general destitution does not spring from overpopulation. Resulting from flood, drought, frosts, insect pests, civil disorders or the dislocation of war, it is no sign of a bad man-land ratio; nor is the distress of the lazy, the vicious, the sub-normal, the invalid, the crippled, or the aged. But when regularly many sober and able-bodied, who are neither exploited nor jobless, are hard put to it to feed their families, then there really *is* population pressure.

Population pressure is no figment of the imagination. You do not exorcise this demon by showing that if food-growers were more knowing or skilful there would be plenty. At this rate we should *never* meet with true population pressure; for *no* people is farming so well that the yield of its soil could not be increased by applying more capital or more science. So do not airily wave aside the ugly symptoms of population pressure by pointing to some ideal technique of food production!

Two great revolutionary economic ideas are at large: Henry George's contention that the poverty of the masses is due to the private ownership of land; Karl Marx's contention that it is due to private ownership of the means of production ("capitalism"). Single taxers and communists are one in denying that a people ever propagates itself into misery; they insist that, given good soil and climate, the chronic poverty of the hard-working is due *always* to some form of exploitation.

If you point to the dire straits of the Irish in 1845, when twice the present population were struggling to make a living on the Green Isle, they remind you that a fifth of their produce was being remitted abroad to absentee landlords. If you cite Java, where one-third of the area of California is made to feed *seven times* California's population, they remark that the Javanese

yield a large revenue to the Dutch. So with other notorious hunger areas—China, Bengal, Korea, Porto Rico. They will not admit the existence of genuine population pressure *until you show its presence in a society in which labor gets the whole of its produce.* And where is there such a society?

The fact is, *either exploitation or reckless multiplication can cause mass misery.* If a prudent people were freed of all dues to landowners and capitalists, it would devote most of this windfall to raising its standard of living rather than to rearing more children. On the other hand, if a blindly prolific people, stalled by a misery mortality, were suddenly relieved of all charges for the use of land or capital or else such charges were taken by the State in *lieu* of taxes, its death-rate would fall, population would start forward, presently all the "slack" would have been taken up and life would be as hard as ever!

SOME CHARACTERISTIC SIGNS OF POPULATION PRESSURE

1. *Laborious earth sculpture in order to extend the food-growing area.* In the heart of the ancient Incan empire in Peru you find narrow terraces one above another for perhaps fifteen-hundred feet up the mountain slopes. These agricultural terraces are often supported by stone walls and I have seen a wall ten feet high built in order to gain a cultivable strip *a yard wide.* In China human sweat has been poured out like water to carve the hills into level rice fields. On a single slope I have counted forty-seven such fields running up like a staircase for Titans. In Mexico I have seen men rejuvenating a field by turning it entirely over to a depth of five feet by spading. In Japan the area of fields graded to a water level for rice culture amounts to 11,000 square miles.

2. *Completeness of land utilization.* In China there is no pasture or meadow, for land is too precious to be used for growing food for animals. Even on the boulder-strewn slopes there is grazing only for goats; for where a cow can crop herbage a man can grow a hill of corn. The cattle never taste grass save when they are taken out on a tether and allowed to browse by the ditches or along the banks of the rice fields.

3. *Extreme utilization and economy of materials.* In China no resource is too trifling to be turned to account by a teeming population. The sea is strained for edibles; seaweed and kelp have

a place in the larder; great quantities of shellfish no bigger than one's finger-nail are opened and made to yield a food that finds its way far inland. The fungus that springs up in the grass after a rain is eaten. Fried sweet potato vines furnish the poor man's table. The roadside ditches are bailed out for the sake of fingerlings. No weed nor stalk escapes the bamboo rake of the autumnal fuel-gatherer. The sickle reaps the grain close to the ground, for straw and chaff are needed to burn under the rice kettle. Tree leaves are a crop carefully gathered. One never sees a rotting stump or a moldering log. Bundles of brush carried miles on a human back heat the brick kiln and the potter's furnace.

4. *Killing labor for a pittance.* Hunger-driven the poor Chinese spend themselves recklessly for the sake of a wage. The lumber sawyers are exhausted early. The planers of boards, the marble polishers, the brass filers, the cotton fluffers, and the coolies who work the big rice-polishing treadles, are building their coffins. The term of a chair-bearer is eight years, of a rickshaw runner, four years; for the rest of his life he is an invalid.

5. *Low standard of living.* In India about one-third of the people "are living at a rate of about two cents per day or less, are permanently underfed and ill-nourished, are so short of food that they do not get proper growth, and are generally too weak to do a fair day's work."

Apropos of an official estimate of 20,000 homeless children on the island of Porto Rico, we are informed:

> The "family" and the "home" do not exist among the poorer classes of Porto Ricans in the sense in which these terms are used ordinarily. The degree of poverty which prevents a family from having more than one small room, and that virtually without furniture—with perhaps a hammock or a poor bed for the man, no chairs and no other conveniences—makes the "home" only a room where the family sleeps in a mass on the floor at night. Privacy does not exist. Life is lived on the street, and only a people of unusual kindness and clean instincts could make of the situation one in which sordidness was not the rule.

PROVOCATIVES OF POPULATION PRESSURE

1. *The early marriage of females.* For two-thirds of mankind the typical girl is a wife at puberty or two or three years thereafter. In West-European society, however, the age of brides at first marriage ranges from twenty-two to twenty-eight years. This

means that nearly a third—and that third the most fertile—of the female's reproductive period has passed unutilized. Moreover, maids that put off marriage until they are twenty or more are likely to have ideas of their own as to how many children they should rear!

2. *Female subjection.* The sacrifices which unlimited child-bearing imposes on the mother so far exceed the burden a large family imposes on the father that family limitation is chiefly the concern of mothers. When their minds are enslaved this natural brake fails to work. It is slavery of wife to husband, and of the female sex to the male, which has brought upon wise old Asia a crowding ever more stifling, distressing and intolerable since the curtailment of the folk customs of infanticide and abortion and the curbing of the great epidemic diseases.

3. *Ancestor worship.* In China to die without leaving a son to perpetuate the worship of the family's ancestors is considered a dire misfortune. Every man marries; if his wife has reached her fortieth year without bringing him a son, it is his religious duty to take a concubine.

4. *Reliance upon children as an old-age insurance.* The Chinese rely upon the earnings of their sons to keep them in their old age. A man looks upon his sons as his old age pension. A girl baby may be drowned or sold, a boy never. In a society so patriarchal that a teacher forty years old with a family still turns over his monthly salary to his father as a matter of plain duty, the parents of one son are pitied while the parents of many sons are congratulated.

5. *The joint family.* The director of education of an Indian native state tells me:

> I live in a household of five brother families—thirty persons in all. We dwell in one house, eat at one table and are looked after by one staff of servants. Every month I give my salary to my father and all my brothers do likewise. Thus all the incomes form a single fund. All are for each and each is for all. The family is a mutual insurance association, a buffer between the individual and misfortune. If one of us is sick or out of work, he and his will not come to want. If one couple has six children and another but two, the children will be equally well-fed, clothed and educated.

Since the burden of rearing offspring is shared by the larger group, parents feel no concern as the size of their family grows.

6. *Want of prospect of rising in the social scale.* On the very

eve of her Revolution, Arthur Young, the famous traveler, declared that France was decidedly over-peopled. It was not until the Revolution had swept away the old exactions and abuses and ordinary peasants saw a chance to gain comfort or property, that the French became notorious for small families.

7. *The saving of life by measures from without.* The public health commissioner of British India says in his 1925 report:

> Much of the economic loss and human suffering going on in India today is avoidable. . . . The campaign so assiduously waged against ignorance of malaria in the Malay States during the last 25 years . . . has now borne fruit. . . . Java has found it a paying proposition to banish cholera largely by inoculation and to control plague by seriously tackling the housing question . . .; the provision of abundant and pure water has made the control of cholera, dysentery and enteric, even in the Tropics, a comparatively simple matter.
>
> Hong Kong has become a comparatively healthy sea-port; Colombo is a modern city with up-to-date sewage and waterworks; Palestine since the war has been hygienically revolutionized. West Africa, East Africa, Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika and the Soudan have presented opportunities for the control of yellow fever, malaria, syphilis and tse-tse fly disease.

These peoples marry young and have never heard of birth control; so they have children about three times as fast as Western peoples. Their European administrators can do nothing to check births but can work wonders in curbing certain diseases. Their extensive life-saving, while a popular "stunt," upsets the man-land balance and intensifies population pressure until in the end more of the people succumb to misery and hunger. So, the benefits from public health measures in the Orient are largely a pleasing illusion which nobody is interested in exposing. There can be no lasting lightening of the folk misery of the Orient until their culture and education have been utterly transformed.

CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE DEGREE OF POPULATION PRESSURE

In general, the self-regulative power of a population is likely to be low when:

1. The masses are custom bound and new wants are slow to sprout.
2. The lowly never presume to ape the style of life of their social superiors.

3. The social economy is so changeless that everybody sees there is great difficulty in escaping the lot one was born to.
4. Caste barriers shut people up in the occupation and social cell of their parents.
5. Education is out of the question for the children of the toiling masses.
6. The bulk of the people are servile, ignorant, and superstitious.
7. Abortion, infanticide, and contraception lie under the ban of religion.
8. A sacerdotal value attaches to male posterity.
9. The government is unconcerned as to the lot of the masses.
10. The female sex is generally regarded as inferior to the male sex.
11. The schooling of daughters is deemed to be needless, even dangerous.
12. The mating of young people is in the hands of parents.
13. The girl is married at puberty or shortly after and is years younger than her husband.
14. Clan or large-family communism weakens a man's sense of responsibility for maintaining his offspring.

On the other hand, these influences which beget in people *foresight* and a *feeling of responsibility,* i.e., which *individualize,* serve as brakes:

1. The ready downward percolation of new wants inspired by the example of the social superiors.
2. Wide diffusion of literacy and instruction, revealing purple horizons.
3. Many doors stand open to poor youths desiring to gain an education and enter the higher walks.
4. Enhancement of the self-respect of the masses by their being admitted to share in political power.
5. A democratic type of social organization which encourages the capable lowly to aspire to any station or distinction.
6. Abundance of opportunity for the empty-handed but industrious and frugal to accumulate property.
7. Security, especially of the petty property-holders, in the enjoyment and transmission of their property.

8. General acceptance of a high standard of what parents ought to do to further the success of their children.
9. A low economic value of children to their parents.
10. Deferment of marriage till daughters reach full womanhood.
11. Prevalence of the opinion that the daughter is entitled to as good an education as the son.
12. The romantic conception of love between the sexes.
13. Freedom of matrimonial choice on the part of young people.
14. Equality of the sexes, particularly of wives with husbands.
15. A religion which offers a *personal,* rather than a *family,* salvation.

Population pressure and war. In the hunting stage men dare not resort to close hunting, for if too much game be taken in one season there will be scarcity in the seasons to come. So, when a tribe has too many mouths for its take of game, it goes to raiding the hunting grounds of a neighboring tribe. But the latter well knows what will happen to it if such encroachment goes scatheless; hence, there is bloody warfare until numbers are so reduced that there is game for all. Then there may be a spell of peace.

Nothing can be done by pastoralists to add to their grass crops, so, if their expanding herds cannot find food at home, they have no recourse but to drive them upon the grazing grounds of others —which brings on a fight. Moreover, herdmen become embroiled because they yield to the temptation to raid the pastures of another tribe and drive off its live stock.

In the agricultural stage man *produces* his food rather than gathers Nature's bounty. When population pressure is felt the remedy that suggests itself is to bring more land under the plow or to cultivate fields more intensively. More food may always be had at the price of severer toil. Because they are pressed against an elastic spring rather than a stone wall, growth of numbers rarely prompts an agricultural people to attack a neighbor in order to win more land. This is why the congested peoples of the East have generally dwelt in peace with one another.

The type situation which invites aggression has been a prospering agricultural people living within easy striking distance of hardbitten hunters or pastoral nomads whose land hunger obliges them to take desperate chances. What is more natural than for

them to fling themselves upon the agriculturists in the hope of conquering them and setting themselves up as lords of the land? The settled peoples of Egypt, Babylonia, Syria, China, Palestine, Persia, India, Italy, and Mexico have met thousands of such onslaughts; ever and anon their Great Wall or frontier cordon has been broken and they fell under an alien yoke.

In the modern industrial stage there comes a time when the home market cannot absorb all the output of the mills nor home development fructify all the capital seeking investment. Then capitalists, reaching out for new foreign markets, fresh sources of raw materials, and virgin fields for the profitable investment of surplus capital, involve their governments in imperialistic rivalry. There follows a struggle among the Powers for concessions, tropical dependencies, strategic points and secure sea routes; which is very likely to bring on war.

Unless peasant and worker voters can be brought to imagine benefit for themselves or their children from national aggression, parliamentary opposition may bring the dangerous game of the imperialists to a sudden halt. So, although those in the nation who secretly egg on the government to risky foreign policies are not themselves in distress, population pressure is a gilt-edged asset in winning the masses to imperialism and militarism.

Population pressure and economic progress. No doubt it was population pressure that pushed early man on from stage to stage of economic life. Of the Navajos we read:

> Indian corn . . . was known to them apparently from the earliest times, but while they remained a mere hunting tribe they detested the labor of planting. But as their numbers increased, the game, more regularly hunted, became scarce, and to maintain themselves in food necessity forced them to a more general cultivation of corn and the regular practice of planting became established among them.

Pastoralists love their easy life and nothing but hunger induces them to resort to back-breaking cultivation. Thus we read: "Necessity has forced Rajputs and others to take to agriculture." "Only the poorest Kirghises, driven by want, engage in tillage." "When hemmed in by impassable barriers or invincible enemies, pastoral tribes under the pressure of increasing population slowly become agricultural."

One might conclude that population pressure has been the gadfly

driving our ancestors from reliance on Nature's offering of edibles to the regular production of food, forcing adoption of more painstaking methods of agriculture and exacting an intenser utilization of natural resources. Had men known how to limit the size of their families in those far days, what would have pushed them from hunting into herding, from herding into farming, and caused rough wild land to be cleared, smoothed, diked and drained?

However, population pressure has not been the only goad; there is "want pressure," *i.e., demands for things other than the necessaries of life.* Generally, to be sure, want pressure has not been urgent enough to prompt herdsmen to settle and dig their living out of the soil. Even now in many regions the standard of living is so inelastic that, if wages be doubled abruptly, laborers will work only half as many days! So is it with the *peons* of Latin America and the toiling masses of the Orient. But in enlightened societies hunger is no longer needed to save a people from lying becalmed in the doldrums, for never were wants so whipped up as to-day. Among the major stimuli are: spread of ability to read; weakening of the power of custom; immense development of advertising; perfecting of the art of selling; ambition to live better than one's parents did; the caprices of fashion; aping the style of the well-to-do; ambition to rise in the social scale; acquaintance, *via* shop window, screen and novel, with the manner of life of the pace-setting classes.

Desire for comforts and decencies is now the spur to economic progress rather than the quest for bare necessities. Man seems no longer to need population pressure as a whip to lash him into making use of Nature's resources. Instead of being prodded into activity by hunger as an animal is, he is quitting the bed of sloth roused by cravings which have their seat in his memory and imagination.

Population pressure and political democracy. Men absorbed in procuring the necessities will not willingly divert any of their scanty resources to public purposes. Hence, in a crowded land there is no way for a costly permanent source of light or beauty to come into existence other than by exercising the power of taxation, that is, forcing people to give up income which otherwise would go to feed an over-large family. Income thus exacted may be spent by the holders of temporal power, the holders of spiritual power, or by those in whose favor they wield this power;

in other words, by the princes, the priests, or the propertied. They may spend it, to be sure, on fleeting private gratification; but again they may choose to create a lasting thing of beauty or a perennial fount of enlightenment, *i.e.*, a noble temple or church, a beautiful public building, a university, public baths, a public park, a state forest, a botanic garden or an art collection.

But where population pressure is intense these costly things which elevate human life above a scramble to keep body and soul together, will never be created so long as the toiling, tight-fisted millions have the say. The urgent needs of their families claim all they can earn and not one stiver will they forego in order that an enduring source of enjoyment or inspiration be opened. Never will they furnish the means of rearing a noble palace of justice or creating a college or science unless they are *made* to do so by those in power. If they have their way, they will pour all they can produce into the hopper for grinding out endless numbers!

Furthermore, when the food struggle is sharp the people will resort to practices which wreck their resources and mortgage the social future. For the sake of a few extra mouthfuls they kill every bird in sight, with the result that insect pests multiply and devour their crops. They kill off the game and take fish so greedily that their fisheries disappear. They so lay waste the native forests, that their grandchildren will not know whither to turn for wood and fuel. They cultivate the steep slopes until these slopes are stripped of soil, while the rivers below, choked with silt, are no longer navigable. Only government can curb these suicidal practices, but no government will be allowed to do so if it is really under the control of the hard-pressed millions whom it ought to restrain. Would a popular government have brought one fifth of the area of British India under the Forest Department?

It is coming to be granted that popular control over government will not yield good results if the bulk of the people are illiterate and ignorant. Why not go farther and recognize that the grant of a wide suffrage is no blessing in an over-peopled country? For there is good ground to fear lest under democracy the less obvious but more permanent interests of society will suffer. This is why, despite the current eagerness of young Oriental leaders to borrow the political institutions of the envied West, the arrival of general popular control over government, such as we know, is likely to be greatly delayed in the "man-stifled" Orient.

CHAPTER IV

FOLK SCULPTURE

It used to be held that species are immutable; but, considering the importance that biologists since Darwin have attached to variations within a species, the diverse types presented by a people take on a new significance. Species quality cannot but change if regularly certain types are multiplying faster than others. Hence in the last forty years there has been much scrutinizing of birth and death differentials among human types to discover in what directions traits are being modified. Recognition that it is these differentials that make a people plastic and hold out the possibility of evolving better breeds fills dreamers with hopes for a glorious social future based upon a purged and select humanity.

SELECTION

Professor Karl Pearson has shown that in England, Denmark and New South Wales the 25 per cent of families with the greatest fertility have one-half of all the children; this one-half produces 78 per cent of the following generation; this 78 per cent in turn produces 98 per cent of the third generation. Doubtless this formula applies to us as well; so a quarter of our couples will be the forbears of nearly the whole American people of a century hence! Naturally it makes a great difference to posterity who compose this Abrahamic one-fourth. Is it from the superior strains or only from the average? Which contribute more freely to it: farms or cities? alleys or avenues? hovels or mansions? How does the genius figure in it? the weakling? the moron? the malefactor? In this superfertile fourth what place have the pioneering? the cautious? the devout? the routine-loving? the enterprising?

We are sifted in many sieves, those held back by any one sieve make no contribution to later generations. There is the *lethal* sieve. Among the advanced peoples a fifth perish before they are old enough to marry; in the Orient a half are cut off untimely. There is the *mating* sieve. In India all marry save deformed persons,

saints and prostitutes; among ourselves more than a tenth pass mateless through their reproductive period. There is the *self-perpetuation sieve.* An eighth of our couples produce no children while a large proportion of the rest produce too few to replace themselves.

Let none suppose that these sieves always hold back chaff and let through wheat. A ship founders or a building falls; strong and weak, shrewd and foolish share the same fate. On the whole, those who never marry attract or are attracted by, the other sex less than those who wed; but myriads of a certain generation of young women may remain unmarried because their sweethearts fell on the battlefield!

LETHAL SELECTION

In pre-scientific times untimely death was looked upon as a mark of God's displeasure, or else as "a mysterious dispensation of Providence." The Mohammedans said: "Allah has bound each man's fate about his neck." The newer view that death like any other natural event *has a cause* gave opening at first to an over-emphasis on the *selectivity* of untimely death. Death was figured as an archer launching his arrows at the weaker. We now know that Death shoots many of his arrows at random. Pearson found that only three-fifths of the deaths in a large group of English Quaker families were selective, while Ploetz discovered that two-fifths of the mortality among the royal and noble families of Europe had nothing to do with defects in their natural inheritance. The more that an element in the population is on the anvil, the more selective its deaths will be.

Acquired immunity. Long lethal selection may account for the striking immunities enjoyed by certain races. That malaria is two hundred times as destructive among whites in Sierra Leone as among the natives indicates that from exposure to malaria through countless generations the Negroes have acquired a certain immunity to it. In the Terai, a wet forested belt along the southern foot of the Himalayas, the Indian settlers brought in lose all their children, but still the forest folk survive! Thanks to no-one-knows-what shocking eliminations, the Chinese appear to be peculiarly resistant to typhoid, the Jews to tuberculosis. To most simple children of nature, however, it is we whites, long churned together and exposed to other peoples' diseases, who are tough. We have a

resistance to pneumonia unknown among the Eskimos; measles, a jest among us, has depopulated islands in the South Seas! That tuberculosis is slinking away, *not only where we have fought it but elsewhere,* leads some to suspect that we whites are acquiring a constitutional immunity to it, like our resistance to measles.

Alcoholic selection. By wiping out those who could not withstand its lure alcohol has been a potent sculptor of our species. At

FIG. 24

COMPARISON OF PERCENTAGE EXCESS OF MALE OVER FEMALE MORTALITY AND PER-CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF PURE ALCOHOL.



Courtesy of "The Survey"

first access all peoples go wild over intoxicants. The weakness of the natives of the New World for "fire water" is proverbial. To ply Eskimos or Australian Blacks with strong drink is a quick way of exterminating them. But when, ages ago, the Mediterranean peoples gradually became acquainted with "the blood of the grape," they began to undergo "alcoholic selection." Those who could not "let it alone" drank themselves to death early or left few offspring. The sober survived and handed on to their descendants their indifference to intoxicants; so in a few centuries you had

a temperate stock. As soon as the nomad Israelites settled down in the Promised Land and came to dwell each "under his own vine and fig tree," wine began to sift them. Hence, the Old Testament abounds in warnings against wine, but not the New Testament, for by then the Jews had become the wine-proof people we find them to-day. The early Greek lawgivers were so aghast at popular drunkenness that they struck at it with a severity we have never matched; yet in a few centuries rum addicts had all but disappeared from the Greek strains. In such wise the bulk of the South European peoples came to be constitutionally sober.

Many Teutons turned wild wassailers on their first contact with wine; but in time vineyards crept over their hills and now, after a thousand years of alcoholic selection, they have become relatively temperate. To-day alcoholism is worst among the North Europeans—the Irish, the British, the Scandinavians, the Russians—who could never grow wine grapes and amongst whom alcoholic selection became effective only with the arrival, two centuries ago, of cheap intoxicants from grain (Fig. 24). What mockery to advise these peoples: "You don't need to shackle the liquor traffic. Just cut out strong drink and take to beer and light wines as the Mediterranean peoples have done!"

Medical advance and the unfit. There are Jeremiahs who wail that medical advance "is putting natural selection out of business." The fact is, so far the spectacular gains have been made against the *least selective* maladies, *viz.*, the contagious and epidemic diseases; for immunity to these is little correlated with general constitutional vigor. Indeed diphtheria, influenza and typhoid seem to *love* to lay low the strong constitutions. There are, to be sure, killers related to inheritance: haemophilia, pernicious anaemia, Huntington's chorea, epilepsy and many forms of insanity, diabetes, Bright's disease and arterio-sclerosis, but these are just the ones we cannot handle by means of serums, vaccinations and disinfectants. So, however brilliant our victories over the swordmen of Azrael, "there will remain many causes of death, highly selective in their effect, which will always be working to keep our native vitality up to the standard." For example, our humane care of mental defectives by no means exempts them from natural selection. A study of four thousand feeble-minded and idiots shows the mortality of the feeble-minded to be *double*, that of the idiots to be *eight times*, that of the normal. As for plain

fools their strains are eliminated not so much by their own mishaps as by bungling in caring for their children; for doctors agree that nothing insures babies like "the intelligent character of the mother."

In grandfather's day, the world over, infant mortality ran from a fifth to three-fifths; now a people which does not get nine-tenths of its babies through their first year hangs its head. But is it not blocking natural selection to save three-fourths of the infants that would have died? Not altogether; the high death-rate of the *first month* of life has not been lowered and most of these deaths betoken *something wrong with the infant's constitution.* It is the deaths of infants *over one month old* that have been reduced and these reflect *something wrong with the outside*—poor milk, improper feeding, bad surroundings—which might kill any baby. For when it is very young a strong child succumbs almost as quickly as a weak one.

Nevertheless, next to the weak who will die anyway lies a belt of delicate youngsters, who can survive under the best of care but perish if conditions are "not just right." Among the infants saved many are of this type and their lack of constitutional stamina is certain to raise their death-rate later on. Some think our wonderful saving of infants explains why the expectation of life of the middle-aged has risen scarcely at all. Their better protection is about offset by the presence in their ranks of many of low vitality who formerly would not have got past the reefs to their thirties or forties.

Our growing dependence on aids. With the advance of civilization, more and more we find ourselves on an artificial basis. The greater the proportion of parents whose lives were preserved by appendectomy, the greater the number in generations to come that will need this operation. Children that come into the world *via* the Cesarian operation will have more female descendants that cannot bring forth their infants naturally than other people do. The greater the success of the medical profession in finding digestives and laxatives to correct the shortcomings of one's digestive tract, the larger eventually will be the contingent in the population who inherit an alimentary system rather below par. The like is true of the contingent that withstand infectious disease only with the aid of inoculation.

So the stock of inherited resistances and immunities built ages ago into our hard-bitten ancestors is in course of being dissipated. Fewer of us can survive certain shocks without prompt medical attention. Fewer women can bring their child into the world as the red woman does, without obstetrical aid. In every generation, apparently, the proportion of mothers that can suckle their children declines. Unless something is done to give those of strong and

FIG. 25

PROBABLE DECLINE OF THE MORTALITY DIFFERENTIAL IN PAST FIFTY YEARS



The population elements are ranged from left to right in order of diminishing social value.

resistant constitution some substantial advantage in leaving progeny over the delicate, the proportion of the hardy will become less in every generation.

Beware of calling this trend "degeneration"; for those who at some time in their lives needed medical or surgical aid in order to survive may be just as worthy, efficient and attractive members of society as those able to dispense with such aid. Style "degenerate" only those who are so deficient in bodily or mental inheritance that they cannot "make good" in their society and time. The latter are but a handful compared with the contingent not quite able to stand alone, that lean at times on modern medicine, surgery and hygiene.

Slowing down of elimination. One of the great movements of our time is the spreading of the blessings of medical and surgical advance by public and philanthropic agencies, *i.e.*, public health

departments, clinics, health centers, infant welfare stations, visiting nurses and health propaganda. No doubt this has brightened the survival prospects of the stupid and the careless more than those of the bright and the responsible. *All elements have benefited but the socially less valuable elements have benefited the most.* Seventy years ago the difference in prospect of growing up between the children of the wise and those of the foolish, the offspring of the able and those of the incompetent, the progeny of the successful and those of the casual laborers, must have been much greater than it is to-day. Suppose we range the chief elements in the community according to their value to society. At the extreme left set the stable and talented, at the extreme right set the pauper, the defective and criminal stocks. Two generations ago the line defining the death rates of these elements would have tilted steeply from right to left. Nowadays the mortality line has been brought down, but most of all toward the right-hand end of the scale (Fig. 25).

So death is not combing out the less fit as searchingly as it did before the philanthropists and the public authorities set out to socialize health. The sifting process has been damped down; gone is most of the differential mortality that once kept us "up to the mark." Hosts are now growing up and breeding their kind who would have failed to get by the sterner tests of two generations ago, *i.e.*, persons of poor constitution, of feeble vitality, of low natural resistance to disease, inheritors of sense defects or mental defects or weakness of character. Not that we should deplore this thinning of the differential in mortality; by all means let us bring the blessings of medical science to everybody's doorstep. *But certainly other means of selection should be substituted!*

REPRODUCTIVE SELECTION

Until means of regulating family size had been discovered, blockheads and intellectuals differed little in fertility. Moreover, the wife of the Victorian professional man or captain of industry was likely to bear about as many babies as the wife of the shoveler or mill-hand. One notes no tendency on the part of the rich or college-bred Chinese to have fewer children than the unlettered peasants in the rural villages. Probably this is the case over the world to-day save in Western and Northern Europe, the United States and the British Dominions.

Low fertility invades first the higher social levels. Here, however, the picture is altogether different. What happened in England was set forth twenty years ago by Dean Inge:

> Until the decline began, large families were the rule in all classes. . . . Since 1877 large families have become increasingly rare in the upper and middle classes, and among the skilled artisans. They are frequent in the thriftless ranks of unskilled labor, and in one section of well paid workmen—the miners. The highest death rates at present are in the mining districts and in the slums. The lowest are in some of the learned professions.[1]

About 1910 a survey of England north of the Humber showed that "it is the less healthy parents, the men and women with the worse habits, and the fathers with the lowest wages who have the largest families." Nor is this differential overcome by a selective death-rate. The large industrial center Bradford furnishes data which show that "at all ages the parents with bad habits have more children alive than the parents with good habits." "Well-ventilated and clean homes have fewer children in them." The report sees the prolific unfit as a "swamp which is threatening to rise and engulf the nation."

In England and Wales in 1911 there were 119 births per thousand married males under fifty-five years in the upper and middle class, 153 among skilled workmen, and 213 among unskilled workmen. After allowing for unequal infant mortality rates, the babies surviving the first year in the three classes would be 110, 136, 181. It is interesting to observe that while solicitors, physicians, and Church of England clergymen had about 100 births a year, costers and hawkers had 175, earthenware workers 181, and dock laborers 231.

The more capable leave fewer children. Consider the Federal annual report on *Births, Stillbirths, and Infant Mortality Statistics*. From the 1923 report is appears that in families in which the birth of a child was registered in 1923 the number of living children averaged 5.45 for fathers fifty to fifty-four years of age who were bootblacks, boiler-washers, engine hostlers, longshoremen, stevedores, draymen, teamsters, coal-mine operatives, and common laborers. But the number of living children averaged only 3.54 for fathers of the same age group who were engineers,

[1] W. R. Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, 1919, p. 70.

teachers, physicians, lawyers, judges, inventors, dentists, clergymen, chemists, authors, newspaper men, architects, bankers, and railway officials. This means about two more children left by handworkers than by brainworkers, by unskilled laborers than by men of the learned professions, by the privates in the industrial organization than by the officers (Fig. 26).[2]

A study [3] of the fertility of about forty thousand native white married women in 33 Northern cities and of about thirty thousand native white married women in the rural parts of 74 neighboring

FIG. 26

STANDARDIZED CUMULATIVE BIRTH-RATES FOR EACH URBAN AND RURAL CLASS. MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND



counties, as disclosed in data collected for the Census of 1910, showed that "the rural population represented by this sample is definitely more fertile than the urban population" and "in both the urban and rural populations studied, there is a definite inverse relation between fertility and the customary ranking of the broad social classes." The same is shown by Fig. 27 embodying the findings of Dr. Frank W. Notestein of Princeton University.

[2] My researches with Professor Baber (1921-23) upon the completed families of living couples show that in the Middle West a hundred dependent couples of native stock, taken at random, had had 649 children, while 2500 couples of native stock having a son, daughter, nephew or niece in college, averaged 280 children to 100 couples. Of the families of 10,455 retarded children in the public schools of Massachusetts those whose retarded children were dullards had had an average of 6.24 children.

[3] By the Milbank Memorial Fund.

Low fertility becoming general. However, there are signs that this fertility contrast between classes is vanishing. In France for some time there has been no great difference in family size between handworkers and *bourgeoisie*. Since the World War in places the European masses have sharply cut their fertility. In pre-war years the birth-rate of Wedding, the great working class quarter of Berlin, was twice that of the Thiergarten, the rich residential district; now they are the same. In Zurich, in eighteen years, the birth-rate among the rich has fallen a quarter, but that

FIG. 27



Relative differentials in fertility of urban occupational classes for marriages of virtually completed fertility and for those of 5–9 years' duration: 1910. From the 1910 census schedules for the native white population of selected Northern cities.

of the poorer has fallen a half. In Basel, the fall was from 17 to 11.5 for the rich and from 26.5 to 12 for the poorer. In Stockholm the fertility of the wealthiest class is 45 per cent above that of the industrial workers and that of the well-to-do is 17 per cent above. At the World Population Conference in 1930 the German delegate stated that in German cities the number of children increases consistently as you go from the lower-income groups to the higher-income groups.

The application of intelligence tests to parents in 19 towns in rural Vermont, Massachusetts and New Hampshire indicated:

The more intelligent parents begin to give birth to children slightly later than the less intelligent; the children born to older mothers, however, appear to be just as intelligent as those born to younger. The period of child-bearing is equally long among

intelligent and unintelligent; as is also the average natal interval between successive offspring. . . . It is concluded that family size is non-differential.[4]

No snapshot of grade fertilities while the practice of birth control is spreading down through society discloses permanent trends. In two decades the whole picture may have greatly changed for the better. Parenthood control is a new thing in human experience and there is no telling what will be done with it. No one can foresee what the fertility of different character and intelligence grades will be when they have all become self-conscious and knowing in the matter of family.

SOCIAL SELECTION

Social customs, institutions, policies and practices decidedly affect the make-up of future generations.

War. Hand-to-hand fighting favored the survival of the stronger, quicker, braver and more adroit. Modern war, however, calls to the trenches and airplanes the pick of the young men, leaving the culls to stay at home and beget. Then, thanks to lethal machinery, battle no longer spares heroes as it did in the days of personal combat, but mows men down indiscriminately. No doubt the World War caused a vaster destruction of the sound than any other event in history.

The doctrine that warfare is a precious intergroup test of fitness to survive is a Mumbo-Jumbo superstition. *Of course* folk quality is *one* factor in winning a war. But in view of the *other* factors—comparative size of the fighting peoples, their natural defenses, their access to the highways of commerce, their mineral resources, their stage of industrial development, their attention to military matters, above all their *alliances*—the assumption that the victors in modern warfare are a "superior" breed, whereas the vanquished are "inferior," is absurd.

The cityward flow. As a rule the bright boy who quits the farm to become banker, railroad official, or professional man, leaves fewer children than his duller brother at the plowtail. The farm family whose members push on to college and rise into the higher callings does not multiply like the commonplace family that sticks

[4] H. S. Conrad and H. E. Jones, "A Field Study of the Differential Birth Rate." *Journal of the American Statistical Association,* June, 1932.

to the soil. The reason why you meet oftener with gifted individuals among Russian peasants than in the English countryside is that the latter *has been about fished out.*

Occupational celibacy. A priesthood is much better endowed than the general population from which it is recruited; its celibacy therefore causes a superior current of heredity to be lost to the race. How serious this loss is may be gauged by noting what science and letters would have missed had the Protestant churches followed the Catholic Church in requiring sacerdotal celibacy. Agassiz, Berzelius, Encke, Euler, Jenner, Linnaeus, Emerson, Hallam, Hobbes, Addison, Ben Jonson, Lessing, Richter, Swift, Thomson, Wieland, and Wren, as well as a host of lesser stars, were sons of Protestant clergymen!

In the United States, education is served by more than half a million women school teachers who in point of native ability and character belong probably in the superior fourth of the population. The school board policy of employing only unmarried women and of "firing" them if they marry, enforces a celibacy which cannot be good for the race. The courts should uphold the woman teacher's right to marry, to take leave of absence and bear children, without loss of job. On eugenic grounds preference should be given to married rather than to single teachers, there should be many half-time positions enabling a teacher to be at the same time wife and mother, and there should be no talk of "a moral obligation" of women normal school graduates to teach when they prefer to marry!

Social work. Misery, disease and vice, although rather indiscriminate, do attack sub-normals with peculiar virulence. This will not deter the wise from doing their best to rid society of these cankers, for they realize that "gangrene is not the best caustic." But if they banish alcoholism, kill the infections spread by sex promiscuity and raze the slums and "dumps" which the sub-normals haunt, they have removed certain natural filters from the human current. Unless other and better filters are substituted the not-much-good will live longer and raise more children—which spells race deterioration! Among such filters are: the custodial care or sterilization of the feebleminded; relief of the chronic-pauper type on terms which exclude their further increase; instruction and social pressure to deter from propagation persons with transmissible bodily defect; and the forcing of minimal standards of

cleanliness, decency, child care and schooling upon those congenital incompetents just above the line of self-support.

Mammonism. When the power and the will to rise in the social scale have become diffused, the extravagance of the rich has a baleful effect upon the fertility of the capable. The luxurious living developed among the rich bedazzles many of the ambitious capables and they strain themselves to follow it. To do this on their limited income obliges them to keep the family small. Happy is the society in which the achievers constitute the social apex, for achievement—at least male achievement—is no enemy of progeny; but when the rich are the topmost, their valuation of everybody in terms of spending tends to sterilize the ambitious.

Capitalistic individualism. Nowhere is there less practical sympathy with the struggles of intelligent couples to rear families of fine children than in the United States. Under the general property tax the home is taxed to the quick because our business class have resisted the income tax[5] For the water, gas or electricity it uses the home pays about twice the rate paid by a profit-seeking enterprise. Charges for the medical, surgical, dental and ocular services children require are a terror to parents of modest income, because the professions are organized while the parents are not. In some foreign countries wise enough to value and protect the family the best professional services are available to families for a mere fraction of what American parents have to pay, because experts on salary are retained to render indispensable services to specified groups. In Europe and Australasia millions of employees both public and private are paid a salary or wage which rises with the number of dependent children.

For a hundred years our lawmakers have been willing to do almost anything for those out to make money (business men), but nothing for those out to rear superior children!

The higher education of girls. Women now enjoy equal access with men to higher educational institutions so that to-day perhaps one American young woman in forty is within college walls. Some day there will be one in thirty, one in twenty, perhaps even one in ten! One may suppose that college women are recruited chiefly from the brightest fourth of each generation of girls. If this is so and if the time is coming when a third or even a half of this

[5] A pro-family policy would be to exempt from taxation (say) $2000 of the value of every home.

élite will attend college, it is a matter of great moment how college affects their reproduction.

College women marry two years later than other women of the same social class and for this class marriage occurs two or three years later than for women in general. Furthermore, only one out of two college women marries, whereas in the general population nine women out of ten marry. Moreover, the average number of children born to a married alumna of our famous women's colleges in no case runs as high as two, and for some colleges the average is less than one. Since college life occupies a woman's May, her time of greatest physical attractiveness and of strongest mating impulse, it cannot but interfere with reproduction. What then must be the effect upon the superior stocks when one girl in twenty or even one in ten goes to college? The eugenist can welcome such a tide into college halls only in case the average girl student can graduate at twenty.

The emancipation of women. The rush to the colleges is only part of a vast movement of women to emerge from the home and share in the life of society. Women now have many opportunities for preparation and achievement; to what extent should they avail themselves of them? Obviously, maternity plays havoc with a career. The mother who bears five children spaced about 2½ years apart and stays at home until the youngest enters school has invested sixteen years of her life in her family. What of her professional advancement?

So there is a clash between motherhood and what is called "achievement." Realizing this the gifted young women dedicate themselves to a career while the others marry. The "pass" woman is much more likely to marry within four years after graduation than the "honors" woman. Of girls who write the examination for a teacher's certificate those who fail will probably marry sooner than those who succeed! If the emancipation of women results in the talented turning away from motherhood, talent will become scarcer in every generation!

The eugenist would have the first-rate women marry their kind and bear gifted children, leaving the second-raters to become teachers, social workers, physicians and newspaper writers. The right way to cope with the infecundity of the superior women is not to bar them from any walks now open to them but to *shift the*

social emphasis. Brilliant girls covet careers because the career is honored. Many of them would be content as mothers if motherhood were equally honored. But this is impossible until *superior* motherhood is differentiated from *commonplace* motherhood, which in turn depends on discriminating *superior children* from *commonplace children.*

SOME PRACTICAL EUGENIC MEASURES

The sterilization of mental defectives. Twenty-five American states have provided for sterilizing (*not* asexualizing) those with grave congenital mental defects. Nearly thirty thousand such official sterilizations have been performed, most of them in the last decade and two-fifths of them in the State of California.[6] In most cases the operation is willingly submitted to. In 1934 Germany adopted the policy and within two years sterilized 70,000 deficients. The sterilization of 350,000 others that geneticists consider unfit for parentage is contemplated.

We should not expect quick results from this measure. The bearers of defective genes in their germ plasm are supposed to outnumber many times the sub-normals. So feeble-minded will continue to be born—in tapering numbers, to be sure—for many generations after this type has been stopped from breeding. Eugenists think in terms of millennia!

Making birth control information generally available. The brighter wives learn about birth control technique and apply it (sometimes frivolously, to be sure); the less alert fail to learn of it even when they have the best of reasons for desiring to use it. Hence many eugenists advocate the multiplication of free clinics where any married woman who has good grounds for it may be instructed in birth control technique. Some 400 such clinics are maintained out of private resources in the United States.

What happens when death control is introduced without birth control is illustrated in Puerto Rico. Jungle sex habits had been

[6] In 1935 a committee appointed by the American Neurological Association to investigate eugenical sterilization recommended that compulsory sterilization should apply only to selected cases of (1) Huntington's chorea, hereditary optic atrophy, family cases of Friedreich's ataxia and other disabling degenerative diseases recognized to be hereditary; (2) feeble-mindedness of the familial type; (3) dementia praecox (schizophrenia); (4) manic depressive psychosis; and (5) epilepsy.

required to maintain a population under River Congo conditions and they persisted among the negro slaves transported to Puerto Rico. Then with the American occupation forty years ago came America's white-uniformed army surgeons. Smallpox was downed. Mosquito control ended yellow fever. Chlorination of drinking water cut typhoid rates. Nature's equilibrium was upset, population doubled and now with 470 inhabitants to the square mile the island is one of the worst large poverty areas in the world. No wonder its Governor is the first official in history to recommend openly birth control!

Propagation of sounder ideas of marriage. Among the "Ten Commandments for the choice of a spouse" issued by the highest health authorities of Germany and the racial-population department of the National-Socialist ("Nazi") Party are such maxims as:

Thou shalt not remain single if thou art by inheritance healthy.
In thy choice of a spouse ask about his or her ancestors.
Health is the condition for external beauty.
Marry only for love.
Seek no playmate, but a companion for marriage.
The meaning of marriage lies in a healthy posterity.

These excellent maxims ought to be diffused among young people everywhere. In the nobler the eugenic ideal kindles that enthusiasm and devotion which in the past has been inspired only by religion. A study of the attitudes on mate selection of 321 young men and 321 young women (Students taking the course "Marriage and Family Life" in New York University, 1929-1935) shows:

. . . these college girls want the young men they marry to have a good disposition, to be intelligent and well-educated, to be of sound health, to belong to their own religious faith and to maintain good moral standards. The young men seek practically the same qualities in the girls and in addition—if it is not asking too much—a little beauty, please. Wealth, family status and age are definitely out of the running.[7]

Encouragement of births among the superior. In Germany, municipalities have become "sponsors" of the third and fourth children in the more competent families. This means that the city pays to the parents a monthly allowance of Rm.30—for the first

[7] R. E. Baber, Publication 967, American Social Hygiene Association, 1936.

year and Rm.20—for the following thirteen years. It is too early yet to be sure that these aids will result in more births.

Among ourselves have been suggested: free maternity costs in public hospitals for mothers who hold for themselves and their husbands state-medical certificates of freedom from serious transmissible physical or mental defect; the encouragement of marriage and parentage in the (economic) middle class by the dowry system; automatic increase of pay for regular salaried employees with marriage and with each additional child; marrying fellowships, encouraging the type of young scholars now awarded fellowships to marry and have children before permanent appointment.

CHAPTER V

CITY AND COUNTRY

In 1890 but a third of the American people lived in cities; now the proportion is three-fifths. And the tide to the cities is stronger than ever. Since 1920 about six and one half millions of us have quit country for city. Up to two-score years ago there was an agricultural frontier—ever moving west—which braked the rush to the cities. Every decade the opportunity to make farm homes in the public domain saved hundreds of thousands from the reaching tentacles of the city. Now the frontier is gone and the farm population constitutes only a little more than a quarter of the American people. (Fig. 28.)

The cityward movement is well-nigh world-wide. New York, to be sure, has increased tenfold since 1850, but London, Paris, Leningrad, and Bombay multiplied their population by five in the course of the nineteenth century. "At the beginning of the twentieth century about ninety-seven million lived in two hundred and fifty great cities, *i.e.*, approximately six and one-half per cent. of the total population of the world were in places numbering over one hundred thousand inhabitants." [1] The strongest urban growth is not to be found where you would first look for it—in the most crowded lands. Only 16.7% of the people of Japan, 2.6% of that of India and 2.1% of the Javanese live in cities of over 100,000 inhabitants; on the other hand, a fifth of the Canadians, a quarter of the Germans and the Americans and more than two-fifths of the Britons live in such cities. Only in a country like Australia, where the climate is stimulating, good soil is plentiful, and farmers are intelligent and progressive, can they produce enough food to permit 42.3% of their population to live in cities, making and importing all sorts of manufactured goods and luxuries.

Although the philosophers steadily "run down" the city, while

[1] From a manuscript treatise *The Metropolis*, by Professor Howard Woolston, to be published in 1938.

FIG. 28

RURAL-URBAN DISTRIBUTION OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE



the poets are always idealizing the country, the flow to the cities keeps right on because its causes are fundamental.

CAUSES OF URBAN GROWTH

1. The power age has so cheapened carriage that the interchanges of goods between areas, regions and countries have waxed like Jonah's gourd. Ever greater is the share of our consumables

brought to us from beyond the hundred-mile zone, from beyond the thousand-mile zone, from overseas, from the ends of the earth. Gulf Streams of traffic pour between zones and continents. Wherever there is a break in transportation (*i.e.*, cargoes shift between truck and rail, land and water, canal and river, river and sea) and wherever traffic brooks join to form a river or a traffic river is split among canals, there a city is bound to spring up.

FIG. 29

GAINFUL WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES IN FOUR MAIN OCCUPATIONAL CLASSES—AGRICULTURAL AND NON-AGRICULTURAL: 1820 TO 1930



These swelling streams of trade permit an ever-larger proportion of us to make a living from handling, storing, exchanging and forwarding a volume of goods which grows faster than the population, faster even than total production, and makes an ever-longer journey in order to reach its consumers.

2. Two lives ago our typical farm family produced a large part of the manufactured goods it consumed. The women, busy with hand card, spinning wheel and loom, worked up into clothing the fleeces of the farm flock of sheep. "Rag" carpets covered the floor and home-made quilts and comforters the beds. The hide of the

beef killed for family consumption as well as those of a calf or two were taken to the tannery and after six months brought home and worked up into foot gear, sometimes by the men of the family but more often by a traveling shoemaker. In the smoke house were curing hams and bacon, while from the ashes in the leech was drained the lye which, boiled with refuse fat, furnished "soft soap" for the family. Candles were molded from the tallow of the slaughtered beef. The orchard supplied fruit, cider and vinegar. "Sweetening" came from the "sugar bush" or the patch of sorghum cane. Farm machinery did not exist, and the wooden parts of the farm implements were made on the place, the iron parts being furnished by a cross-roads blacksmith.

Since this period we have seen a development of machine production which has drawn to factories in the towns at least seven-eighths of the household industries which formerly ministered to the wants of the farm family. Nor can we foresee that any rural working up of raw materials except the manufacture of food products for the family larder will escape the reach of the power-driven machine. To be sure, as a result of girls' canning clubs, sewing clubs and the like, the farmers of the grain-growing regions may become a bit less dependent on the factory for their food and clothing. Nevertheless, it appears likely that there will remain in the open country few who do not give their entire attention to some purely extractive industry like agriculture, fruit growing, stock raising, mining, quarrying, or lumbering.

3. The introduction of power-driven implements on the farm lessens the call for hands in agriculture and releases a part of the rural population to seek employment elsewhere.

4. Of late oil wells and refineries are taking the place of the pastures, meadows, and feed crops which formerly generated the power embodied in the draft animals bred and raised by farmers.

5. The very abundance of modern production gives the city more to do. The poor buy mostly farm products; but, as they prosper, their gain in purchasing power goes more and more to support town industry rather than rural industry. This is because, the better the ware, the more of its value lies in workmanship, the less in material. Compare pastry with bread, the business suit with blue jeans, fine shoes with brogans, porcelain with crockery! The coarser goods embody extraction, the finer goods elaboration.

Hence, as people live better, their consumption calls for things more elaborated, *i.e.*, for city labor rather than for country labor.

6. Thanks to the host of new duties taken up by the government of to-day, public service grows rapidly, and the proceeds of taxation go chiefly to maintain city dwellers; for few are the public servants who live in the open country.

7. Generally people must reside where they get their living. Nevertheless, social, esthetic and educational advantages influence the local distribution of population. Both city and country are coming to be better places to live, but which is improving faster? In our time the city has gained electric street railways, electric lights, asphalt pavements, rubber tires, pure water, parks, playgrounds, public baths, social centers, housing regulation, palatial free high schools and municipal universities. The open country has gained better roads, the oiled highway, the automobile, the autobus, rural mail delivery, the telephone, the radio, the electric current, and in a few places the township school and the community house. On the whole, town life has made even greater gains than country life, so the town's lead in attractiveness constantly broadens. It is nothing nowadays for industrial workers to live miles away from their place of employment—so that there is no longer any excuse for urban slums. There is no good reason why the modern city should be characterized in any degree whatever by congested living!

8. Once the country was a magnet for the wealthy because feudal traditions had haloed the life of the country gentleman. The townsman who retired rich acquired an estate in the country if he aimed to "get anywhere" socially. This exodus of the leisured with their retinue to the country offset a little the cityward rush of the ambitious. But, the world over, the rôle of the country gentleman now appeals less, while the passion of the wealthy for city splendor, excitements, amusements and dissipations is growing.

MAKE-UP OF THE POPULATION IN COUNTRY AND CITY

The sexes. With us farming is so male an occupation that rural spinsters and widows who undertake self-support are likely to seek the cities. In rural America there are 11 men to 10 women, whereas in urban America the sexes are about equal in number. The like holds for Western Europe, but not for Russia where women accept field work, nor for Asia where woman is not a free

agent and no woman migrates to the city save with her son, husband or father.

Age composition. It is as *producer* or *earner* rather than as *consumer* that one betters himself by removing to the city. A man with several dependents will be wary of taking them where living is dear. The city therefore attracts from the farms young, unencumbered adults who leave behind them an excess of children and aged. This is why urban population has the figure of a top; rural population, that of a spindle. In comparison with city dwellers a third more of country dwellers are under fifteen years of age, a quarter less are in the producing period, 25-44 years. No wonder the growing city hums with energy and glows with hope, while the countryside is slow-pulsed, deliberate and conservative!

Marriedness. Who is more to be pitied than the lone man or the lone woman on the farm? Since obviously farmers can't be cared for in boarding-houses, but must live near their stock and their growing crops, farming *bids* people marry. "The city," Ogburn tells us, "discourages marriage about ten per cent." Perhaps we should put it, "The country *en*courages marriage about eleven percent." For aren't city young people *doing more as they like* in the matter of marrying than young farmers who marry just in order to have a housekeeper? Anyhow, in the country people marry younger, as a rule, than in the large cities, stick together longer and, in case the union is broken by death or divorce, are more likely to remarry. Family life rules because on the farm the family is the natural unit for life and work.

There may be a *social* cause for less marriage in city dwellers. To starve for company in the "man-stifled" city seems like thirsting at the marge of a lake; yet cities are made up of rather distinct social groups, the members of which may have little to do with those of other groups. These groups in turn are composed of smaller circles or of individuals, whose opportunities for normal companionship with those of the other sex vary greatly. This is why farm young people who migrate to the city may actually be more famished for companionship than they were on the farm!

In view of such thwartings of the mating instinct, no wonder prostitution springs up in the city. Comments a U. S. Census expert on the data for 1900:

The foregoing figures showing the much smaller proportion of married persons in large cities, especially in the earlier years of

adult life, would support the belief that where married life is so much less prevalent, the unlawful indulgence of sexual desires is probably more prevalent.

Size of family. Of old the city showed fewer children because in walled congested towns infant-and-child mortality was frightful. Now the city family which practices birth control has fewer children than the farm family because children are more of a burden to it and less of an asset. The rearing of a large family costs a farmer much less than it costs the city dweller unless the latter works his children when they should be in school. In our South the size of the town family (white) is about half that of the farm family. In our North it is nearly four-fifths as large, for many of the foreign-born in the cities retain their peasant attitude toward the wife and are ignorant or afraid of birth control.

IS THE CITYWARD DRIFT IMPOVERISHING THE FARM FOLK?

Is it *milk* or *cream* that the city draws from the open-country population? Obviously, not *all* cream! The physical weaklings, the crippled or handicapped, seek the city in order to find something they can do. The restless and vagabond quit the farm rather than the steady-going. Young people from poor families make for the city rather than those from well-to-do families. The "well-fixed" farmer who can outfit each of his sons and sons-in-law with a farm holds them better than the small farmer whose sons would have to start on the first rung of "the agricultural ladder," *i.e.*, as "hired hands." Zimmerman's studies lead him to conclude: ". . . the average types of persons tend to stay in agriculture, whereas, on the whole, the extremely competent and the extremely incompetent tend to go more to the cities." On the other hand, study of migration from country to city in a sample of Albemarle County, Virginia, representing three social classes—upper, middle and lower—shows that the upper group sustained decidedly the largest proportion lost to the cities, the middle group the next heaviest and the lower group the least.[2] Gee and Corson, from examining the rural population elsewhere in Virginia, conclude: "The results indicate a selective migration distinctly in favor of the cities."[3]

[2] Wilson Gee and Dewees Runk, "Qualitative Selection and Migration," *American Journal of Sociology*, Sept., 1931.

[3] Wilson Gee and J. J. Corson, *Rural Depopulation in Certain Tidewater and*

Looking into the movement of rural people in New York State, Young finds: "Seventy-seven per cent of the men who had attended college, 35% of the men who had attended high-school, and 27% of the men who had attended elementary school (only) had gone into occupations other than farming." [4] The Fifth Report of the Eugenics Survey of Vermont observes: "The emigration movement is also selective in drawing away people of more than average education and vocation training. More emigrants than either residents or immigrants have received education above that provided in the elementary school and more have received vocational training in addition to their schooling." Investigating the same problem in Ohio, Lively and Beck discover, "A half more of those children who had started for themselves with a year or more of high-school training than those with no high-school training left the farm for other occupations." [5]

A quarter of a century ago on the basis of a fortnight's walking trip through parts of New England which had been losing population for generations, during which I talked with everybody whose opinion might have weight, I arrived at the conclusion: "The root of the trouble is not *rural degeneration* (the phrase of the day) but *folk depletion.* The continual departure of young people who might in time have become leaders results eventually in a visible moral decline of the community. . . . The knots of gaping tobacco-chewing loafers that haunt the station platform in some parts of the Middle West prove that the natural pacemakers of that locality have gone to create prosperity elsewhere."

Later I came to suspect that this skimming of the rural folk has been going on since cities began. Traveling in China, the moment our caravan entered the gate of a walled prefectural town I began to come upon refined intellectual faces such as I had not once seen in days of travel through the open country. Perhaps this pattern of cityward migration was that of Egypt, Babylonia, Persia, Hellas, the Dark Ages! If so, what a dissipation of the original eugenic capital of our race the flow to the cities may have caused!

Piedmont Areas of Virginia ("Monographs of University of Virginia Institute for Research in the Social Sciences," No. 3), 1929, p. 102.

[4] E. C. Young, "The Movement of Farm Population," *Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin,* No. 426.

[5] C. E. Lively and P. G. Beck, "Movement of Open Country Population in Ohio" (Progress Report, *Ohio State University, Rural Sociology Mimeographs,* No. 3, January, 1928), pp. 35-36.

The hemorrhage of leader material. The distinguishing trait of those who thrill most to the call of the distant city is the *spirit of initiative*. Had they never left home, they might have been among the first in the country-side to better their way of farming, test a new crop, start a new industry, or push some community enterprise; so their going leaves their neighborhood poorer in natural leaders.

This is bad because *natural leaders are key persons*. Not only is it they who start good things, but they keep up to the mark the various agencies which minister to the higher life of the country community, such as the church, the school, the debating society, the grange, the rural club. Often one notes a sad slump in the religious, social, and recreative life of the neighborhood after a few families of unusual initiative have moved away. Usually those who insist upon and know how to get good schools, strong churches, and wholesome merry social gatherings are a *minority,* often a *very small* minority. The loss of even its best tenth may cut down by one half the support the community gives to higher interests.

Decadence of the country-side. In country localities which have been losing in population for a long time the draining away of young people who would have become leaders results at last in a visible decline. The local roads are neglected, which means less resort to school and church and town. The school is allowed to run down, for farmers of the cruder sort fall for the idea that it always pays to hire the cheaper teacher! The church gets into a rut and fails to start up the organizations and activities which bind young people to it; presently it ceases to be a force, or even dies. In such backward localities, the young people give themselves up to drinking, dancing and sex because no one takes the lead in initiating athletic meets, singing schools, glee clubs, literary societies or debating clubs. If the drain continues a generation grows up that has missed the uplifting and refining influence of school and church. Beyond question they are not up to the standard of their forefathers; they are *yokels,* coarse in their tastes and careless of the higher things.

So the double pull, of city and of frontier, propagated by schools and newspapers has acted on the rural population in the older parts of the country like a cream separator. Along the Atlantic seaboard there are rural counties which have been losing most of their bright minds for three or four generations. In parts of

southern Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin and even as far west as Missouri there are communities which remind one of fished-out ponds populated chiefly by bullheads and suckers.

Remedies. Loss of natural leaders, then, is the root of that "problem of the country" which has been so much mooted among us since President Theodore Roosevelt called attention to it in 1904. It explains why farmers are thwarted regularly when they go after anything which the business men of the cities seriously object to their having; whereas the farmers with all their votes cannot prevent manufacturing and commerce from getting any privileges or advantages they are set on having. There is no effective remedy, all that can be done is to give the young people on the farms more social and recreative opportunities; to tie up the rural school with the life on the farm; to stir the rural church to get a new vision of her task; to dispel the false glamor in which the distant city is seen; and to show the bright country youth the best ways of gearing his superior brains and knowledge to farming.

CITY SOUL AND RURAL SOUL

Handicaps of the city-bred. The Hiram House study of the sleep of 1535 Cleveland children reveals that up to 11 years the children miss from one to eight hours of their normal sleep. Those of two or three years are sleeping 11 hours, whereas 16 hours is desirable. The young children have taken on the sleep habits of their elders! The diets of 1554 children showed that 45% have no milk, 73% have no eggs, 71% have no butter, and 54% have no green vegetables. Not poverty altogether, but parental ignorance! Such deficiencies may have a startling aftermath. Insufficient manganese in the diet of a pregnant woman may show up in her lack of mother love. "The calcium intake," declares a psychologist, "affects the divorce rate."

Apparently a far smaller proportion of city-bred than of country-bred grow up under conditions favorable to the development of a sound and stable *psyche*.

Quick tempo of the city. Everywhere human nature develops according to its surroundings; and the biggest contrast in surroundings, one that affects millions, is that between open country and city. The pace of the city mind is quicker. It skates on surfaces, life being so full of impressions that there is little time

for reflection. Compare the multitude of sights and sounds which hail one in the city street with the thin file met in the country lane! Compare the big headlines, color, dramatic posters, and winking lights which have to be used in order to capture attention in the city with the modest sale notice posted at the crossroads! The things the city dweller noticingly looks at or listens to in a day, must be twenty times as many as those that engage the farmer's mind. As a result, one farmer stagnates; another reflects but never gets anywhere, for he is mulling over his personal experiences, his little stock of inherited political or theological dogmas, the scraps of information gleaned from his weekly newspaper; and he lacks the education that would enable him to sit at last triumphantly upon the top of the heap! Then there is the farmer of trained mind who, furnished by his schooling with orderly knowledge and supplied with trustworthy current data, arrives at sound conclusions by means of his own thinking.

Urbanites relatively mercurial. The city rush gives mental alertness and a quick "come-back"; also snapshot judgments and shallow thinking. You may long ply country folks with facts and ideas without eliciting a response; but the impressions accumulate and after a while a fixed purpose has been built up. Once you have brought them to distrust liquor, the party machine, the demagogue, or big business, they will retain that distrust. City dwellers, on the other hand, are sooner hot and sooner cool. Many never arrive at a conviction or a purpose of their own, but drift along obeying the impressions uppermost in their minds at the moment.

However, there are factors at work which seem likely to wipe out much of this immemorial difference between city mind and country mind. Telephone, hard roads, automobile and radio are linking the farmer closely with other farmers and with the city. But even if the psychology of the isolate vanishes from the open country it will remain the home of the rural mind, marked by love of the open, intimacy with Nature, sympathy with growth processes, self-directed labor, and skill in dealing with *things* rather than in dealing with *people*.

City suggests "spend." Certain economic contrasts between rural and urban may persist. The city does not favor the basic economic virtues, such as foresight and frugality. Among country folk one is rated according to his tokens of *production:* his big barns, tight fences, weedless fields, and fat stock. In the city one

is rated according to his scale of *consumption:* his clothes, residence, furnishings, style of entertaining, fix his social status. Country life, then, suggests "Save!" City life suggests "Spend!"

Again, one is most stimulated to thrift when one's present savings will lighten future labor. The farmer pinches now so that next year a windmill may relieve his aching arms, or the horse-fork take the strain off his shoulders. Besides, his saving is invested under his eyes and earns him much more than a paltry seven per cent. The tiles he lays through his slough may pay for themselves in three years; likewise, the new barn, the improved dairy herd, the "combine." On the other hand, the typical city dweller rents his savings to some one else and is rewarded, not in a vivid personal experience, but in an annual five or six per cent from some remote company whose directors he does not know and whose business he has never seen and would not understand.

City runs to extreme types. The rural neighborhood holds up its backward and wobbly members better than the city. It has one standard for all, if you don't come up to it you're an outcast. So each does his best to behave as his community expects him to behave. In the city, however, there is not one community but hundreds. If you want to scatter money, you get "in" with spend-thrifts; if you want to gamble, you go with the "sports"; if you would live by crime, there is the "underworld." On the other hand, if you have a bent for study or saintliness or poetry, you get into circles that will give you an encouragement you would never get in the ordinary country community. In the city, then, each is more stimulated to go to the limit of the demands of his own nature than in the rural community.

As a moral being the man on the land has his own way of reacting. Remarks an anthropologist: [5]

The countryman understands the complex interdependence of people, land, and animals. "Live and let live" is the fundamental law of his existence, and of his progress. He cannot hire and discharge like the urban employer without thought of issues involved. He knows the relation of his labourer to other people in the village, and understands precisely the results in the general economy of the community of leaving him stranded. He is exercised with compassion at the plight of a landless man, and will help his neigh-

[6] T. K. Penniman, *A Hundred Years of Anthropology,* The Macmillan Company, 1936, pp. 101-2.

bours' animals as soon as his own if he finds them in difficulties. Nothing touches the countryman more deeply than the dying out of families who have always farmed the land in his community, or a farm falling into the hands of strangers.

The city is cosmopolitan, whereas the country is nationalistic and patriotic. As a rule city folk do not take their cue from their ancestors, they are always glad to hear of some new thing. Peasants or farmers, on the other hand, keep alive the memory of what their ancestors said and did and accept them as models or guides. More than city denizens they identify themselves with a particular farmstead or roof-tree. Perhaps this is why the citations for bravery made in the American army in the World War seem to show "that the rural private is somewhat braver than his urban brother."[7] As we get wiser do we not esteem more highly the rural soul? I suspect that many city-bred thinkers who at forty rate city soul above country soul will reverse themselves before they are sixty; but I have never come upon minds moving in the contrary direction.

[7] Wilson Gee, "Rural-Urban Heroism in Military Action," *Social Forces*, October, 1931.

PART II

PRIMARY SOCIAL FACTORS

CHAPTER

VI. The Geographic Environment
VII. Human Nature
VIII. Culture

CHAPTER VI

THE GEOGRAPHIC ENVIRONMENT

The characteristics of the immediate physical environment—climate, soil, minerals, topography, elevation, contour, waterways, coast line, harbors, etc.—dictate the size and local distribution of a population, the key industries, the basic occupations, the lines of specialization, the mode of life, the routes of migration, the channels of transportation and the character of commerce. In a word, *Nature determines the general economic features of society.* But there remains the question, What is her influence upon human relations, social organization, institutions, moral and esthetic standards, artistic, religious and intellectual development?

Climate conditions human energy. The hot, humid tropics discourage exertion, either physical or mental. The soil is often rather poor owing to much of its fertility having been leached out by warm rains, while the growth of vegetation is so exuberant that it threatens to stifle man's endeavors to achieve something lasting. When to these discouragers are added the ravages of malaria, sleeping sickness, hook worm and yellow fever, we should not marvel that the dwellers in the wet tropics have never done anything of mundane importance.

In the polar regions, on the other hand, where there can be no stock-raising, agriculture, or mining, where the food basis is extremely narrow and the woods, fibers, clays and metals we rely on are not to be had, where life is an eternal struggle with cold, darkness and famine, culture remains low and society stalls in its rudimentary stage. So it is in the *intermediate* climes that such traits flourish as energy, ambition, self-reliance, industry and thrift. In the temperate belt Nature offers few free gifts, to be sure, but she *does* recompense man for the sweat of his brow and for his exercise of self-control and forethought. She braces him for labor and does not relax his good habits with enervating heat or a long benumbing winter.

The coldward course of civilization. Mark the migration within historic time of the major centers of human energy *away from* the warm belt. When the curtain of history rises the brilliant foci are in Egypt, Palestine, Crete, Mesopotamia and India. During the classical period the peninsulas of the Mediterranean are the brightest spots. In the Middle Ages northern Italy, France and Germany house the busiest hives. Modern times have seen Holland, England, Scandinavia, Russia, Canada, the United States, and Argentina forge to the front. One cause of this secular movement toward the less clement climates is *the development of the arts of conquering cold,* which permits man to avail himself more and more of the stimulus afforded by the bracing winter and the sharp seasonal changes of the temperate zone. Had the *art of cooling* kept pace with the *art of heating* the story might have been different. Only our own time has seen the beginning of *a technique of cooling* ("air conditioning") which may yet enable man to conquer the tropics instead of succumbing to them.

Climate and politics. In the wet tropics there is no real self-government nor is there prospect of it. The natives lack the energy and the self-control to provide themselves with such government as they require. If they come under the hand of some "power" in the temperate zone, their white residents constitute an *upper caste* and become the real rulers. The natives, although an immense majority, have little or no voice in their own government. Moreover, the white rulers, if permanent residents, tend to lose in time the standards and ideals they may have brought with them and in technique of rule sink toward the level of the natives rather than lift them to their own plane.

Climate, no doubt, is the key to many of the invasions and conquests which have bent the current of history. Peoples living at ease in the warm lowlands have been overrun by hardier races bred in climates farther north or higher up. After a time the invaders in turn become slack and fall before the onslaught of another people from a harsh environment. The descent of the Aryans into India, the conquest of the Chinese by Mongols and Manchus, the recurrent barbarian invasions of Greece and Italy, the southward movement of Toltecs and Aztecs in Mexico, the northward pressure of Kaffirs and Patagonians, the absorption of

Africa into European "spheres of influence," illustrate the equatorward drive from the less kindly climates.[1]

Religion and environment. Climate and scene write themselves clearly into the *middle* stages of religion. After fetichism is by, religion takes the rôle of accounting for and controlling those natural phenomena which hold lordship over human life. The mysterious annual rise of the Nile was a matter of life and death to the people of Egypt, so the adoration of the Nile became a part of their religion.[2] On the lofty plateaus of the Central Andes where it is always cold, sun-worship was quite natural. In ancient India the chief god was, of course, *Indra,* the rain-giver. On the other hand, in Egypt the Satan was *Typhon,* the malevolent deity that sent the parching wind, while in India the Satan was *Vritra,* who holds back the rain. In Norway the evil gods were the frost giants and the mountains.

"In Norse mythology," says Whitbeck, "heaven was a place of warmth and hell a place of cold and mist, but in the religions of Palestine and Arabia hell is a place of heat—eternal fire. To the Arab of the desert paradise was dreamed of as an oasis, or a garden, always having flowing water, shade trees, and fruit." To the ancient Hebrews, a settled people surrounded by marauding desert tribes, walls were the symbol of safety and hence heaven or the "New Jerusalem" is a walled city with gates of precious stones and streets of gold.

Whether a people conceive of heaven as a place of eternal rest or as a garden with shade and flowing water, or as a happy hunting ground, or a walled city or a great hall like the Norse Valhalla where those who die in battle continue to fight for Odin, will naturally depend on what that particular people regards as the acme of happiness; and this in turn will depend upon the special kinds of discomfort, privation, unhappiness, want, and suffering to which that people is subjected—in short the adverse elements of its environment.[3]

Both Greek and Norse mythologies sprang from old Aryan sky worship. But Greek mythology turned on the recurrence of day and night, while in Norway, where the contrast of the seasons is far more dramatic than in Greece, the mythology turned on

[1] R. DeC. Ward, *Climate,* 1918, Ch. VIII.

[2] R. H. Whitbeck, "Religion and Environment," *The Geographical Review,* April, 1918.

[3] Whitbeck, *op. cit.,* p. 321.

the alternation of winter and summer. When the Aryans, a pastoral people, entered India their chief deity was *Dyaus* (sky); *Indra,* his son, the rain-giver, was of minor rank. But after they turned farmers and became vitally interested in rainfall, *Dyaus* shrank to a secondary deity and *Indra* took the highest place. No wonder Keary concludes "the creed of a people is always greatly dependent upon their position on this earth, upon the scenery amid which their life is passed and the natural phenomena to which they become habituated; that the religion of men who live in woods will not be the same as that of the dwellers in wide open plains; nor the creed of those who live under an inclement sky, the sport of storms and floods, the same as the religion of men who pass their lives in sunshine and calm air." [4]

Sex relations and environment. Sex relations bear witness at times to the power of the environment. The inhabitants of an infertile mountain mass or plateau are ever threatened by overpopulation. Fear of this may beget the custom of late marriage or send a large part of the adults into monasteries, as we find in Thibet. Polyandry, so galling to the male with his jealous instincts, nevertheless appears quite frequently among mountain peoples as a means of avoiding the further division of plots so small that already each barely supports a family.

On islets (*e.g.,* Polynesia) there is soon no more room and everyone can see the necessity of throttling down. Hence, infanticide is common, in some cases is even enforced by law. Polyandry flourishes, or perhaps an elaborate system of prostitution springs up. The result is a breaking down of sex morals and a decay of the finer sentiments of the family. Moreover, the haunting dread of overpopulation causes a low value to be set on human life, manifesting itself in neglect of the aged, cannibalism, human sacrifice, slaughter in warfare and a free resort to execution.

Nature and government. Nature is no mean factor in shaping the *political* destiny of a people. The cutting and maintaining of irrigation canals calls for big-scale coöperation and for this reason high political organization first appears along rivers traversing deserts like the Nile, the Euphrates and the Riobamba. Along the Yellow River in China the necessity of controlling the flood waters seems to have forced an early development of the state. Among agricultural people in an open plain, a strong gov-

[4] C. F. Keary, *Outlines of Primitive Belief,* 1882, p. 325.

ernment soon develops partly because the people crave protection from hungry raiding hill tribes, partly because the law breaker has no safe refuge to fly to and there is no natural barrier to shelter local resistance. On the other hand, in mountain country like the Scottish Highlands, Corsica, Albania, Macedonia, the Caucasus, and Afghanistan, natural barriers split up the people into petty groups each independent of the others.[5] Only late, and generally in consequence of subjugation by an outside power, do highlanders emerge from a condition of chronic intestinal warfare, brigandage, and lawlessness. Switzerland is one of the rare instances of mountain dwellers attaining political unity of their own free will.

Is our mastery by environment growing? As society progresses does man become *less* dependent on his geographical environment or *more* dependent? Some hold for the latter. The roving tribe is hardly more attached to the land than the tumbleweed of the prairie. But civilized men strike their roots deep. They clear, level, drain, fence, plant, bridge, cut roads, sink shafts, canalize streams, build levees, dam rivers, and in a thousand ways sink their roots into a particular land, from which they cannot be dislodged save by a cataclysm.

As for steam transportation and commerce emancipating men from their local environment, it may be demurred that locality never left a sharper impress on economic life than it does to-day. Formerly a community *had* to diversify its production in order to provide for its wants. But cheap carriage sets a community free to import everything it requires and to concentrate upon the one industry in which its locality has the greatest advantage. Whatever be its best profit-maker—raising cranberries or oranges, oyster-tonging, celery growing, turpentine gathering, or digging iron ore—it gives itself up to it whole-heartedly. And since occupations leave their own stamp on character, e.g., horse-trading, vine-growing, gold-mining, etc.—the dominant industry marks the whole life of the community, so that more than formerly it is molded by its immediate environment.

[5] In Swanetia in the Caucasus, isolated most of the year by snow-filled passes, until lately there has been no organization above the clan; feuds between families and villages have raged unchecked. Hence each family lives in a small fortification consisting of a low windowless stone building adjacent to a square tower of forty to eighty feet in height.

Man's dependence on local environment lessening. Nevertheless, as man perfects his techniques, more and more he frees himself from the dictate of his local environment. He pierces, digs, hews, dredges and blasts away many of the natural obstacles to his intercourse with other men. Of water barriers he makes liquid highways. On the wide seas he goes about at will in defiance of wave, trade wind, currents, tempest and ice floes. He rushes the desert in a few hours with an iron camel carrying fifty times the fodder it consumes. Now that he is leaping up into aerial highways he spurns the rivers, mountain ranges, wastes, jungles, swamps and tundras which once shut communities in so many cells. *More and more the obstacles to friendship, mutual helpfulness and coöperation are in men's mind rather than in Nature.*

Modern transportation and communication free men as consumers from the limitations of their place and let them draw upon the whole world. Amid Alaskan snows the miner enjoys fruits from the tropics, tea from China, coffee from Brazil, sugar from Cuba. Besides, if he likes, he may read poetry inspired by palm trees and coral islands, listen to music that takes its *motif* from shepherd's pipe or temple bells.

A religion springs up bearing a deep impress from a particular scene. Elsewhere one springs up with a different stamp. Here one is born with a pastoral twist, and there one with an agricultural slant. When these religions meet, as they are bound to do in time, what will happen? Obviously a people will be slow to take up with a religion of an utterly alien climate and scene. Hence many will disappear, while others will fuse or develop in such a way as to lose the sharp impress of their birthplace. Thus as tribal cults give way to universal religions the geographic stamp grows fainter, for the winning faiths are not those adapted to external Nature—which is various—but to human nature—which is everywhere much the same.

The *marriage customs* of nature peoples obviously took shape from locality—the aging effect of the climate on women, the comparative value of men and women in the chief occupations, the food possibilities, etc. But in the course of social evolution the institution of monogamous marriage develops, gains prestige, begins its triumphal march. Finally it is able to pull communities in the most diverse climates and situations into one plane of

practice, to exert a hydraulic even pressure without heed to geographic or climatic differences.

Crowded and anxious on their little islands in the South Seas, the Polynesians resorted to nauseating practices—infanticide, abortion, man-eating, the sanctioned murder of the aged and infirm. In the same strait, however, the civilized ease the strain by such innocent means as postponing marriage or emigrating. The Thibetans solve their problem of population increase by polyandry; but Christian mountaineers accept no such dictate from their inhospitable environment. With them the marriage institution is granite, whereas with nature peoples it is wax. So, as civilization develops, social processes and institutions are shaped more by products of human thinking and less by impressions from Nature. Ideas, dogmas and doctrines play a greater rôle, climate and scene a lesser rôle. Man becomes a citizen of the world rather than of his parish; *psychology* and *the advance of knowledge,* rather than *geography,* furnish the keys to social evolution.

Man tends to devastate and wreck his natural environment. In the last century or so man's treatment of Mother Nature has entered on a new and sinister phase. Dynamite, the steam shovel, the electric crane, the donkey engine, the power saw, the log railroad, the steel plow, the pneumatic drill, the steam trawler enable him to get at, rip out and lay waste natural wealth with a speed unknown to the past. Greedy and heedless he releases forces which in five or six generations may consign his posterity and his works to oblivion. Rivers which ran clear when our country was sparsely peopled by nature men are now laden with irreplaceable elements of fertility, carrying them forever beyond our reach. Just as cubic miles of black mold which grew the food of millions of Chinese now lie under salt water where the Yellow River and the Yang-tse-Kiang join the sea, so, where the tawny Mississippi meets the Gulf of Mexico, are being buried the means of nourishing millions of Americans who *might* be but never *will* be.

One hundred and sixty-five million acres of seriously depleted grasslands, eighty-three million acres of devastated or poorly stocked forest lands, thirty-five million acres of land destroyed by erosion, with an immensely greater area well on its way to ruin by the same process—America carelessly dancing her way into

eventual impoverishment and depopulation along the downward path of unrestricted private ownership!

The thoughtful element of every civilized people has well understood that one thing the state is for is to take charge of the *enduring* interests of society, to safeguard the life-chances of posterity. But when the claims of the state come before the newly-franchised masses, the idea that "caught on" was that the state is just an umpire among contending private interests. Its rôle is to keep the peace. That it may be the business of the state to apply a brake to the ruthless gouging and wasting of our natural wealth by shortsighted greed never occurred to the average citizen. It must be recognized that for seventy-five years (1829-1904) we Americans were working with a far less pregnant and fertile idea of the state than were the peoples of western and central Europe.

CHAPTER VII

HUMAN NATURE

Within its physical setting the social drama unfolds conditioned partly by man's original nature, partly by his cultural heritage. The latter comes in early and affects nearly everything; only as through smoked glass can we make out native bents.

ORIGINAL TENDENCIES AS SOCIAL FORCES

Identifying inborn proclivities is no easy matter. Bernard cites some six hundred ways in which the word "instinct" has been used, while three hundred lists of so-called "instincts" have been drawn up. Then from birth on, inborn tendencies are rapidly modified into *habits,* so that rarely does an adult act on pure instinct. All I shall attempt here is to offer enough samples to show that *the original nature of man never drops out of the social drama.*

Socializing forces. Sumner and Keller[1] find the "socializing forces" to be *hunger, love, vanity* and *ghost-fear.* "Hunger" covers everything which relates to self-maintenance; "love" includes not only sex love but also mother love and parental affection; "vanity" not only takes in pride, sense of honor, and ambition, but extends even to interest in art, gaming, use of narcotics, etc. "Ghost-fear" involves all motives which hinge on belief in supernatural beings.

The four wish patterns. Thomas and Znaniecki[2] discern four general patterns of wishes, namely: (1) for *new experiences;* (2) for *security;* (3) for *response;* and (4) for *recognition.* The first is seen in the bent for adventure and travel.

It ranges in moral quality from the pursuit of gain and the pursuit of pleasure to the pursuit of knowledge and the pursuit of ideals. It is found equally in the vagabond and the scientific

[1] W. G. Sumner and A. G. Keller, *The Science of Society,* 1927, Vol. I, pp. 21-25.

[2] *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America,* 1927, Part IV, Introduction.

explorer. Novels, theatres, motion pictures are means of satisfying this desire vicariously . . .

The second shows itself in defense, insurance, the power of tradition, the conservative temper. It lends strength to such organizations as family, community, church, guild, trade union, mutual benefit society, which enable their members *to feel safe.* The third is seen in mother love, romantic love, family affection, comradeship, friendship. Thwarted it gives the ache of loneliness and homesickness. The fourth takes in vanity, ambition, thirst for fame, the "will to power." Anger, fear, jealousy and hate are emotions about objects which may frustrate any of these desires.

The struggling response. Most persons react so vigorously when physically restrained or molested that we must inherit impulses to struggle. They show up stronger in males than in females, in the boy than in the man, and in fights between individuals than in fights between groups. Note what MacDougall [3] observed in central Borneo.

The people are very intelligent and sociable and kindly to one another within each village community; but . . . the neighboring villages and tribes live in a state of chronic warfare; all are kept in constant fear of attack, whole villages are often exterminated, and the population is in this way kept down very far below the limit at which any pressure on the means of subsistence could arise. This perpetual warfare, like the squabbles of a roomful of quarrelsome children, seems to be almost wholly and directly due to the uncomplicated operation of the instinct of pugnacity. No material benefits are sought; a few heads and sometimes a slave or two are the only trophies gained; and if one asks of an intelligent chief why he keeps up this senseless practice of going on the war path, the best reason he can give is that unless he does so his neighbors will not respect him and his people, and will fall upon them and exterminate them.

The popularity at times of cock-fighting, stallion-fighting, bull-fighting, gladiatorial "games," tournaments, duels, prize-fights and boxing matches testifies to the general delight in vicarious combat. Averse to such rousing of the elemental, the thoughtful would like to substitute popular diversions of a more innocent character. Duly guided, struggle impulses might find scope in attacking wilful blockers of human progress, and in fighting off the

[3] W. MacDougall, *Social Psychology,* 1909, p. 280.

crooks, grafters, and organized predatory interests which harm the general welfare.

Pugnacity cropped out plainly in American politics after the Jacksonian movement had saturated the electorate with raw uninstructed voters. The citizens divided into hostile camps, filled political discussion with fighting words like "campaign," "battle," "enemy," "slogan," "banner," and imported military features such as uniforms, marching companies and torch-light processions. The one dread of politicians was a cool judicial attitude, their one hope was "spirit," *i.e.,* a groundless hatred of opponents. The winning party celebrated a "victory," chanted "To the victors belong the spoils," and with the general approval of the voters of both parties proceeded to convert the salaried offices to private or party advantage. Perhaps women voters, with their distaste for pointless fighting, will rid our politics of these puerilities!

Beware of seeing in native fighting impulses the driving force behind modern war; for usually what happens is this. Each of two governments, secretly swayed perhaps by small groups intent on power or gain, finds the other in its path and neither will give way. Thereupon, machinery provided in advance grasps the peace-loving citizen, uniforms and drills him, fills him with atrocity stories and sets him down gun in hand in front of an equally decent fellow in a different uniform who also is a victim of a military machine. In connection with the ensuing endeavors to kill tigerish emotions will be aroused, but it is silly to blame the war upon this side of human nature. How do we know that Scot and Welshman, Breton and Norman, Yankee and Plainsman will never make war upon one another? Because their pugnacity cannot be played upon? No, but because being under *one* government, not two, they will never be set on one another. This case shows the rashness of tracing particular social phenomena to unmodified human proclivities. The pliability of man's nature should be ever in mind. *Civilizing* rests upon the capacity of human beings to be conditioned to almost any social requirements.

Social services of the parental motive. No doubt philanthropy, anti-vice crusades, the prevention of cruelty to animals, and the organized protection of children owe something to the balked parental impulse. Many of the leaders are childless or

have lost their children, so that, finding no fit object at home, their tenderness goes out to the waifs or put-upon in the community. Moreover, such movements find support chiefly among those who in their own homes show strong parental feelings.

The possessive bent. Squirrels and magpies not only gather and guard things which appeal to them but some animals have their feeding grounds from which they drive intruders. Children collect and hide things long before they can have any clear notion of the advantages to be had from ownership. Mark the fracas that follows the child's taking something another child regards as his own! Long ago economists recognized in private property a "magic which turns sand into gold." Where land monopoly or communal ownership denies the cultivator scope for his possessive bent, he usually fails to develop that industry, thrift and hopefulness which are common when each has, or can look forward to, a farm of his own. In all advanced countries statesmen seek to bring about the widest possible gratification of this craving for ownership, which is taken into account even under communism.

Social rôle of curiosity. The itch of curiosity was the original driving force behind the extension of knowledge; it was also behind the religious speculations which, when they hardened into dogmas, blocked further inquiry. The passion *to probe deeper* so rules the stronger intellects that every severe persecution of research and skeptical speculation has called forth martyrs. The foiling of this passion, whether by violence or by the prestige of the ancients (as in the Silver Age of Greece, in China, and under ecclesiasticism) leaves the intellectual *élite* unhappy and restless.

The drive for self-expression. The strength of the impulse to "give vent" to one's feelings may be gauged from what happens when it is released after having been long frustrated. After the Revolution of 1917 the Russians interested in political ideas went on a "spree." There was no end of public meetings and speakers.[4] People ran from one meeting to another all Sunday and never tired of listening to utterances which but yesterday would have brought arrest. There was a veritable passion for "demonstrating." Every political group delighted to parade the street carrying banners or transparencies blazoning its senti-

[4] E. A. Ross, *Russia in Upheaval*, 1919, p. 114.

ments. Aside from the joy of spreading one's ideas there was sheer pleasure in self-expression, like the gleeful whooping of children just let out of school.

Leading and following. Explorers of human nature find in some individuals an impulse to take the initiative, to go on ahead, to *lead;* in a much larger number they find an impulse to submit, to *follow,* to feel pride in the prowess of their leader. In their "principle of leadership" the Fascists have erected these primary impulses into a system which aspires to displace democracy, *i.e.,* the wielding of power by deliberately-chosen representatives of the people. The system should be admirable for a population in rompers!

Anti-social impulses require collective curbing. In many of us lurk unsuspected impulses toward grab, rapine, destruction and cruelty, so the cravings for security latent in us all have to be roused, summed, and organized to block them. Thanks to self-discipline, or early training, or cultural molding, we have been so successful in bringing under these anti-social impulses that it is easy for us to forget we ever had them. But perhaps in a moment when we have been thrown out of the grooves of habit, or are sheltered by the anonymity of the crowd, or are out-of-ourselves from fear or rage or jealousy, or have been swept off our feet by mob passion, they gain the upper hand—to the subsequent horror of the everyday self! Not fear of jail but *the inherited culture* is society's chief buckler against these reversions.

Prolonged blocking of many elemental drives depresses. The moroseness and drunkenness of the Indians of the Andean uplands from Ecuador to Bolivia testify to bafflement of their cravings for self-assertion and liberty. Even to-day Cuzco Indians, women as well as men, doff hat to every white man they pass. In the remoter districts the Indian who sees a white coming along the trail will make a long detour to avoid him. If you approach an Indian abruptly he will fall on his knees, put up his arm to shield his face, and cry, "Don't hurt me, master!" The old brutalities are about gone but fear still checks self-assertion, so that this heart-broken race misses the happiness it enjoyed ere the Spaniard set heel on its neck.

Through most of the Orient and particularly under Islam, women are so denied the gratification of innocent primary impulses that their faces are shadowed. On the other hand, nowhere

do women's countenances bear less trace of "balked disposition" than in America; and the faces expressing bafflement have become far rarer in my own time. College girls to-day chatter and bubble and laugh more than did those of half a century ago. Japanese and Chinese girls in American schools show in the countenance a light and joy strange to the faces of Oriental women.

Two generations ago the schoolmaster dealt repressively with child nature, deeming the child's propensities to play, rove, hunt, collect or fight signs of "the Old Adam." He felt no obligation to make learning interesting but forced the child by fear of the ferule to "get" his lessons. Such repression worked no great harm when those who abominated school could generally escape it. Now, however, that society insists on keeping the child in school for eight or ten years, it behooves educators to make learning palatable by linking it to his native interests. Less task work and more play work, less memorizing and more doing, less study of books and more of things, is the order of the day. By the best teachers cravings for rhythmic, dramatic, expressive, mimetic, constructive and emulative activities are frankly recognized and appealed to.

For many of the Western-educated of India, life is clouded by the realization that it is always an alien, the British official, who has the last word. They agitate for home rule with a passion not to be accounted for by the faults of British rule. In Siam, on the other hand, the Western-educated are all smiles, for they are "running their show." The university-bred Filipinos are likewise cheerful, for they see their influence widening and national independence approaching.

Repression and revolution. A social order which flouts many demands of human nature is over a powder magazine. Sorokin [5] finds the cause of revolution in the "growth of repression of the main instincts of the majority of society and the impossibility of obtaining for these instincts the necessary minimum of satisfaction." One symptom of coming revolution is that, "People come to feel that their legitimate aspirations and ideals are being repressed or perverted, that their entirely proper desires and ambitions are being hindered and thwarted. . . . Discouragement becomes widespread. Work becomes unsatisfactory and monot-

[5] P. A. Sorokin, *The Sociology of Revolution*, 1925, p. 367.

onous to great numbers of people. Life itself becomes stale and objectless." [6]

Bootless repressions in our midst. Frenzied prison outbreaks indict our practice of shutting an offender up in a tiny cell in a great steel cage, which so violates our horror of restraint that alienists recognize a specific disease, "confinement insanity."

Bent on cheapening production *industry holds apart the sexes* as never before. One industry will have men workers while another located elsewhere will have only women. In a certain collar-and-cuff manufacturing center only 46 per cent. of the population are males while in a neighboring electrical manufacturing center 54 per cent. are males. Here a few miles apart are two groups of unwilling celibates whose mating instincts are needlessly thwarted. Consider, too, how seasonal industries condemn millions of migratory workers to a wifeless existence and a like number of women to go husbandless!

Less and less is *the contrivance motive* stimulated as minute subdivision of tasks makes many jobs nothing but a monotonous repetition. Craftsmanship gives way to machine-tending, so unstimulating that, it is said, mental deficients make the best machine tenders! Nor can workers feel much zest when they do not perceive the relation of their own product to the finished article. Finally comes "scientific management" which takes all planning away from the worker, leaving him a meaningless mechanical job which calls for no skill and from which no joy can be had. The worker's restlessness, seen in frequent wilful change of employment, reflects his hatred of "the assembly line."

Exclusive capitalist control of industry thwarts the worker's self-assertive impulse stirred as it is by the democratic ideas of our time. This one-sided fixing of conditions which vitally affect the lives of the workers, as well as the experience of being spied upon, "fired," and blacklisted for any endeavor to organize, make for an unrest which no concessions as to wages and hours can allay. Behind the movement for a more democratic control of industry lies not mere agitation, but *a balked demand for scope.*

ACQUIRED INTERESTS

There are certain great complexes which contribute to satisfy a number of our innate cravings. Among them are Wealth, Gov-

[6] L. P. Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolution*, 1927, p. 30.

ernment, Religion, and Knowledge. Each of them appeals to so many sides of human nature that for most men it becomes an object of abiding concern. These derived complexes may be called *interests*. They so mightily determine the attitudes and exertions of men that the interests of a people or an age give it a distinctive stamp. The forces which alter from time to time the comparative strength of interests are among the veritable makers of history.

Roots of the wealth interest. This has its tap root in the pangs of hunger and cold which incite man to crave material goods. In time other cravings, native or acquired, put in requisitions for such goods and thus whet greed to a keener edge. When personal emulation takes the form of "conspicuous waste," rivalry prompts to acquisition. When in maidens' eyes gold "gilds the straitened forehead of the fool," gold will be prized as a means of winning the wanted girl. When entertainment is expensive, money is sought in order to gratify one's need of fellowship. When it is believed that the gods covet rich presents, men will seek the wherewithal for costly sacrifices and sanctuaries. When wealth gives lordship over others, the ambitious will rowel hard in the pursuit of fortune. When the artist works for the highest bidder, the lover of beauty will turn his hand to money making. When Dives is more honored, stands better with God, is a more formidable suitor and finds bigger meshes in the law than the better man with the lighter purse, many streams of desire pour into the wealth-wanting channel and avarice will swell to monstrous proportions.

The value of wealth fluctuates. Naturally the itch for wealth varies directly with its capacity to promote the satisfaction of one's desires. Since this capacity varies from place to place and from age to age, it follows that the *value of wealth is subject to rise and fall*, not, of course, in terms of any kind of material good but in terms of the things against which wealth may be balanced.

For there are markets in which such balancing occurs. There are streets where woman's virtue is sold for money, communities where there is a ruling price for votes. From the pay scale of occupations which differ in respect to independence, safety, and good repute, one can compute the amount of money which will overcome the love of independence, of safety, and of good repute.

We see individuals sacrificing health, or leisure, or mating, or offspring, or friends, or liberty, or truth, for gain. The relative volume of such higher goods Mammon can lure into his market at a given time and place measures the power of money. By the choices men make in such cases and by the judgment others pass upon such choices we can arrive at the current social estimate of wealth. When gold cannot shake the nobleman's pride of caste, the statesman's patriotism, the soldier's honor, the wife's fidelity, the servant's loyalty, the scholar's veracity, the official's sense of duty, the artist's devotion to his ideal, *wealth is cheap.* But when maidens wed senile moneybags, youths swarm about the homely heiress, judges take bribes, experts sell their opinions to the highest bidder and genius champions the course it does not believe in, *wealth is dear.*

What makes wealth appreciate. The advance of technique adds constantly to the list of material goods. Thus the introduction of perfumes and spices gave new sensuous gratifications, spirituous liquors provided a short-cut to social pleasure, armor offered safety in battle, and the coming in of cattle enabled heads of kine to be trophies as well as scalp locks and captives. The discovery of medicaments gave new weapons against disease. The art of embalming met in a way the longing for immortality. The origination of art products provided new embodiments of beauty. Since by exchange any material good may be converted into any other, each of these changes added to the desirability of wealth in general.

When in China one marks how much more the treaty port missionary gets from his slender income laid out on the products of Western knowledge and skill than the rich mandarin from his wealth of Chinese products, one realizes how invention has multiplied the categories of material goods. In his medicine case, eyeglasses, microscope, field glass, camera, talking machine, motor cycle, swivel chair, vacuum cleaner, fruit orchard, driven well, etc., the missionary has values all the money in China cannot procure from native skill.

Shiftings of custom and opinion sometimes lift and sometimes lower the importance of material goods.

At times the power of wealth and consequently the craving for it have been augmented by the custom of wife-purchase; the system of *wergeld* or money compensation for crimes; the ac-

ceptance of damages as a salve for injury; the passing of prestige from trophies of personal prowess—such as heads, scalps, and bears' claws—to herds, acres, and bonds; the reliance upon clothing instead of tattooing as a means of charming the opposite sex; the belief that burnt-offerings win the favor of the gods or that masses deliver the soul from purgatory; the passing of political power from the Elders or the Fighters to the Wealthy; the decay of the distinction between "noble" and "mean" employments; the yielding of patrician ranks to the pressure of the newly rich; the lapsing of birth as a ground of social superiority; the gaining of "conspicuous consumption" on "conspicuous leisure" as a means of good repute; the enlistment of the artist in the service of Croesus instead of temple or church.

What makes wealth depreciate. On the other hand there are movements which have shorn lucre of some of its power. Woman's resumption of free disposal of herself, the rise of romantic love, the custom of courtship, and the dispensing with the "marriage portion," have nearly freed Cupid from Mammon! "Justification by faith," the suppression of masses, pilgrimages and indulgences, the dispensing with altar and image, the open Bible, the "lay chalice" and the unadorned "meeting house" have well-nigh separated the favor of God from the payment of money. The protection of the law is no longer exclusively for those who can pay for it. Public hospitals and free dispensaries socialize the healing art. The printing press and the free library have popularized the sweets of literature. The abolition of hireling armies, of imprisonment for debt, of child labor, and of property qualifications for the suffrage are so many dykes reclaiming smiling stretches from dreary commercialism.

Roots of the religious interest. A primary factor in the *religious interest* has been the desire to experience ecstasy. Primitive peoples know and highly value this dilation of consciousness and no one who has seen persons "getting happy" at a camp meeting will doubt the seductiveness of such states. Then the wonder aroused by the more arresting phenomena of Nature sets up speculations as to their causation which gratify curiosity. Moreover, man's sense of helplessness before the personal powers he conceives as causes of fear-inspiring natural events excites in him submissiveness and puts him in the attitude of self-abasement. Intimidated he seeks by acts and gestures of propitiation

to assure his safety. In time he conceives the idea of utilizing these imagined personal powers. He covenants with them that in return for regular praise and sacrifice they shall grant increase and prosperity. Thus the gods acquire economic importance. Becoming more fully domesticated they are approached with confidence and worship prompted by love and gratitude as well as by fear or expectation of benefits. With the advent of collective worship, religious feasts endear themselves as occasions of intense social pleasure. Moreover, the common worship of the gods for public ends makes them agents of social discipline, props of order, bulwarks of family, property, and state. As ethical thought ripens the gods are conceived as deliverers from temptation rather than from misfortune. Philosophy blends with the theory of the gods and religion provides answers for the *Why? Whence?* and *Whither?* of the restless intellect. In the priestly cults religion becomes a stepping stone to power and so enlists ambition. The Hebrew prophets incorporate into religion their passion for social justice. Thus a great variety of human passions, impulses, and yearnings have at one time or another helped magnify religion to the dimensions of a history-making force. No wonder that at times one has looked upon all co-worshipers as friends and all deniers of one's god as enemies.

Ups and downs of religion. The religious interest waxes and wanes with men's necessities. The gods are remembered in danger, forgotten in security; valued when the state rests on authority, ignored when government is founded on consent; adored as guardians of the right, but neglected after Justice gains her sword. Every forward stride in man's mastery of Nature and control over men lessens his dependence on the Unseen. A sense of security from violence, plague, calamity, and future torment weakens the fears behind religion. As people come to look to the policeman for protection, to the physician for healing, to the inventor for victory and to themselves for worldly success, their anxious zeal in worship abates. Religion abides, purer and nobler to be sure, but less potent as a maker of history.

Roots of the political interest. At certain epochs people have worried as much about keeping a whole skin as about getting the next meal. Hence, for the bringers of security they feel emotions as deep as their feelings for wealth or for the gods. In fear of having their throats cut by the enemy they cheerfully

submit to the will of the war leader. In dread of evildoers they rally round those who can make law respected. They come to feel intense loyalty toward the state-building kings and dynasties and hate recalcitrants.

Lust for power, however, impels the masterful to supply *too much* government. In time the absolute state reveals its "true inwardness" and men start back in affright. Then ensues a struggle to wrest from arbitrary government guarantees of individual liberties and rights. The next step is to dispense with governing families and classes and organize a state whose master is the people. Finally the people's state is used for a multitude of services undreamt of in an earlier day.

Fluctuations of the political interest. The intensity of feeling about the state varies with its apparent importance to the good life. Political loyalty is strongest when enemy blows rain harmless on the shield the state holds over its people. The flame of patriotism rises or sinks with the approach or retreat of violence. To the degree that peace and order, individual liberty and democratic control are attained, the old fears and passions die. Free associations take over the promotion of culture. Public opinion comes to be the chief regulator of conduct and law but reflects public opinion. The nonpolitical side of society comes forward and politics ceases to be an arch joiner and sunderer of men.

Roots of the intellectual interest. The *intellectual interest* has far outgrown simple curiosity. For one thing intellectual subtlety serves as a means of self-assertion. Even in the early stages of culture a reputation for extraordinary wisdom brings the sage fame, favor and wealth. Later, learning confers distinction and has a value in bread winning and mate winning. As for real knowledge, it has been a means as well as an end. Its branches were first cultivated as badges of the superiority of the leisure class. Later the sciences were promoted because they relieved pain, prolonged life, brought military victory and vastly augmented the production of wealth.

Why science has been tolerated. Down to about the middle of the eighteenth century it was a question whether organized supernaturalism might not crush or enslave science; but since then science has so won the favor and confidence of the people by her triumphs over disease and her conquest of the forces of

Nature, that it does not seem possible for the dogmatists to bind her again in chains. Although to the great majority of men their traditional religious beliefs are dearer than the quest of truth, they have been made to see that they cannot have from science the immense practical services she is rendering them unless they tolerate free inquiry. So, although *the craving to find out* is a very weak thing in human nature in comparison with the passions and interests which fear and hate it, it enjoys immunity because the world has learned that knowledge is power. Science labors ever with the noose about her neck; but it will not be drawn while she grants the health vainly besought by the worshiper; turns aside the pestilence; insures the husbandman his increase; and overcomes one's enemies.[7]

One-sided theories of social determinism. The dominance of this interest and that, creates the illusion that some one force is the shaper of social destiny. At the moment when the State attains its broadest significance the military and political interests seem to be the swaying force in history. At the moment, when Religion reaches its broadest significance the religious interest appears as the chief uniter and divider of men. Now it happens that in modern times certain influences have weakened the political and religious interests and thereby thrown into bolder relief other interests, chief among which is the economic. Economism, so helpful a key to the evolution of modern society, is now offered as the "Open sesame!" to the locked chambers of the past, the one magic formula for the interpretation of history. Its one rival is Intellectualism which pivots the whole social life of an age on its knowledge and beliefs. But these are one-sided theories and cannot explain the past as successfully as they explain the present.

The worries as determiners of history. It is reasonable to suppose that men's attitudes and actions depend most *on what worries them most.* When they worry chiefly about what the Unseen will do to them, the course of society will be most affected by developments in the field of religion. When they lie awake for fear their property or their lives will be taken, their attitude toward everything will depend on how it is related to

[7] "Why," some ask me, "is not the powerful sex interest listed among the history-making forces?" They should reflect that while at times food or safety are to be had only by collective effort this is never true of sex satisfaction.

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the security-furnishing organization, *i.e.*, the State. When their supreme anxiety is where the next meal is coming from, they will be for everything that promises to promote economic success and against everything which appears to hinder it. As soon as one worry is soothed it ceases to shape the course of history and some other supreme worry takes charge.

CHAPTER VIII

CULTURE

Given the geographical environment of a people, we cannot tell how they will fit themselves into it or utilize it unless we know their *culture, i.e., the total of acquired behavior patterns transmitted by imitation or instruction.*

Geographical environment or culture. The flaw in the environmental explanation of social destiny is that huge changes occur without change in sky or scene. Greece accounts for the Greeks? Why, for centuries Turks dwelt in the lovely home of the classic Greeks but did it give them a turn for poetry or philosophy? What a cultural gamut Britain has run—Neolithic, Celtic, Roman, Anglo-Saxon, Norman, Modern—yet climate and soil have been the same! Compare the Indian culture of pre-Columbian North America with the civilization that now thrives here. So the snow house of the Eskimo is determined by his Arctic surroundings and the elaborate wood industry and carving of the Northwest-coast Indian comes from the nearness of great cedar forests? Yet the Chukchees of northeastern Siberia never build snow houses, while the California Indians with the finest forests in the world at hand have practically no wood industry! Badly in need of a beast of burden the American Indians did not, for all that, tame the bison as the Asiatics did the water buffalo. Nor did the Eskimos domesticate the caribou as the Chukchees did the reindeer, an almost identical species. Many South African tribes rely on the milk from their cattle but never eat their flesh, while the people of eastern Asia maintain large herds for meat and leather but rarely make use of their milk!

An indented coast encourages seafaring and many peoples living on such coasts are, in fact, maritime; but with just such a coast the Tasmanians were without any form of water craft. Islands, it is said, are bound to become centers of a seaborne commerce; look at Crete, Great Britain, Japan. Crete *was* a case in point but is not so to-day. The British never were much on

the sea before the days of Queen Elizabeth. Japan's great maritime rôle is a matter of the last sixty years. Then how about islanders—Corsicans, Sardinians, the Gaunchés of the Canary Islands—who never took to seafaring?

In all these horoscopes the missing item is *culture*. A third of a century ago I declared: [1]

> What *experience* is to the individual, *culture* is to the race. Just as, on the higher levels of individual life, physical and physiological causes retreat in favor of psychic causes, so, on the higher levels of social life, geographic and racial factors lose in significance, and social destiny is shaped more by such bodies of organized experience as language, religion, morals, law, the arts and the sciences.

Culture contrasts. Culture begets changes and contrasts; for there are many cultures and they are by no means headed in one direction. Lowie [2] concludes:

> Environment cannot explain culture because the identical environment is consistent with distinct cultures; because cultural traits persist from inertia in an unfavorable environment; because they do not develop where they would be of distinct advantage to a people; and because they may even disappear where one would least expect it on geographical principles.

Man is one; civilizations are many, declares anthropology. What makes one people or one age terribly alien to another is its *culture*. We Americans find it "queer" that in Japan the man walks ahead of his wife and is served first at meals, the woman's marriage is arranged by others, the wedding reception is usually held at the bridegroom's house, white is worn at funerals and black at weddings, the carpenter *pulls* at a saw or plane while the sailor *pushes* at his oar, wayfarers pass on the left, writing is vertical and is read from right to left, footnotes are at the top of the page, the book begins where ours ends, garden and best rooms are at the back of the house, one slips off footgear on entering a house and one smiles on announcing a death. Our ways, of course, seem just as strange to the Japanese. Ours is a culture that gives rise to itinerant revivalists, "ad men," "sob-story" reporterettes, "Marathon" dancers, "crooners," football

[1] *The American Journal of Sociology,* January, 1904, p. 534.
[2] R. H. Lowie, *Culture and Ethnology,* 1917, pp. 62-63.

"heroes," and "flag-pole sitters"—all of them marvels to the Chinese. On the other hand, China has diviners, astrologers, religious pilgrims, hired mourners, professional matchmakers, and begging ascetics, which seem just as queer to us!

Human nature or culture. Noticing how in tropical South America no gentleman will carry his bag from cab to train, no *caballero* will lug his saddle between house and corral, no self-respecting person will appear on the street with a parcel in his hand, the chemistry pupil disdains to perform with his own hands the chemical experiment and the mining engineer will not lay hand to the levers that control the mine machinery, one used to infer that there is something in climate or strain that makes these people unusually lazy. Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that the root of the trouble is in *Hispano-American culture*. From the parasitic colonial society reared upon the backs of thralls, has descended the crippling notion, "Waiting on yourself stamps you as inferior!"

Many contrasts once supposed to be secondary sex characters turn out to be products of *culture*. Women, it is held, are by nature absorbed in personal affairs and relationships, while men are more interested in the impersonal and objective. However, we note that custom restricts women to home and family, while "the work of men takes them more into the world of events, social movements, and business"; so the social inheritance denies women the chance to develop the impersonal outlook. It is "feminine," we are told, to resort to deceit and subterfuge to attain one's ends, whereas men are by nature forthright. But we find that *any dominated element develops guileful ways,* while in the degree that women grow up under freedom they become frank and "square-shooting." Again, the greater "modesty" of women in comparison with men, usually assumed to be inborn, has probably been trained into them by our man-made culture; for observation of nature peoples does not show that women are instinctively shy and tight-lipped about their sex impulses. Of late our bathing beaches bear witness that in "getting back to nature" women can outstrip men.

Oriental people have a far lower opinion of women than we do because *their* inherited culture has dwarfed woman much more than *ours* has dwarfed her. Hence, big surprises are in store for them. There are still hundreds of millions of men in

the world *who do not know and never will know* what an unrepressed unwarped human female is like!

Living in a culture in which the individual's feeling for his clan, community or tribe has become greatly weakened, we regard as normal the "economic man," who will work only for self and family, and will not work at all unless assured of enjoying the fruit of his labor. But step outside our culture and consider with Malinowski the yam-grower of the Trobriand Islands.

The Trobriander works in a round-about way, to a large extent for the sake of the work itself, and puts a great deal of aesthetic polish on the arrangement and general appearance of his garden. He is not guided primarily by the desire to satisfy his wants, but by a very complex set of traditional forces, duties and obligations, beliefs in magic, social ambitions, and vanities. He wants, if he is a man, to achieve social distinction as a good gardener and a good worker in general.

Since we have been "brought up" to vie, we imagine that emulation is the very breath of life, that it is human nature *not* to do your best unless you see a chance to beat. But the Nicobar Islanders have been bred in a different culture. Writes Langdon-Davies: [3]

The Nicobarese delight in regattas, and an observer has described a race between two village crews and his conversation before the race with the chief of one of the competing villages. I wanted to know which he considered the stronger team. "They are both excellent," he replied. In answer to my further inquiries I was told that there was no difference in skill between the two teams—neither party could be better. I also found out . . . that there is no starting point, and no winning post; and that whilst they competed side by side struggling for all they were worth, if one side begins to find that it is getting a little ahead of the other it will very soon slacken off a bit and let the others get ahead, that neither the hosts nor the guests may shame one another.

Unable to "see over the top" of our culture, we are "stumped" on learning that among the Australian blackfellows a personal quarrel is not followed by fisticuffs.

The elemental Australians settle their disputes in a manner more difficult to sustain than our modern court procedure. With but one club between them, they take turns at knocking each

[3] *Harper's Magazine*, 153: pp. 640-5.

other on the head, and the man who remains standing under the blows is the winner.[4] The formality of this practice indicates that the instinct of pugnacity in this case, at least, has ceased to operate with a promptness which is regarded as essential to instinctive behavior. It is obvious that an inhibiting factor is present.[5]

The head-hunting cultivated among the Melanesians has usually been interpreted as a manifestation of blood revenge, *i.e.*, human nature running wild. Yet Pitt-Rivers, who has studied it carefully, finds that vengeful motives *do not enter into the practice at all;* it is the outgrowth of a rather elaborate social ritual!

Race or culture. Vast as is the literature setting forth supposed "mental differences" among races, little of it is trustworthy; behind most of it one discerns nationalism or racial self-conceit masquerading as love of truth. In the name of science scholars, knowing and esteeming their own race better than any other, have built elaborate theories of history or cultural evolution which exhibit their own race as unique or superior. It is now apparent that neither the dogma of a clear hierarchy of races, nor yet the opposing dogma of a virtual equality of races, possesses scientific validity. Half a century ago it seemed reasonable to suppose that backward peoples lack natural ability, "do not have it *in* them" to progress. Of late, however, we have waked to the importance of the culture factor and we perceive how unfair it is to stigmatize one race as "low" because we find it with only a low culture and to rank another race as "high" because its culture is high. Credit Greek civilization altogether to the genius of the Greeks? Only recently has research brought to light how much the Greeks borrowed from the peoples north, east, and south of them!

A capable people may have but a crude culture because it is in a poor physical environment; because it has been shouldered off into a bad habitat and lost much of its earlier cultural assets; because owing to isolation it has missed stimulating contact with cultures developing elsewhere on other lines; or because it has lacked advanced neighbors from whom it could borrow higher culture elements. There have been enough instances of individuals

[4] Among our ancestors a millennium ago a public ritualized exchange of buffets between two men "at outs" was not uncommon.

[5] Herskovits and Willey, "The Cultural Approach to Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology,* XXIX, p. 191.

of supposedly "inferior" races making good in competition with members of "superior" races, once they have come into possession of a superior culture, to forbid racial snobbery. At our present stage of knowledge we have no right to insist on a definite linkage between race and cultural level. Some time will pass before anthropologists will be certain whether or not there exist among races worth-differences which would bar any of them from adopting and profiting by the highest type of culture.

The culture complex. The smallest unit is the "culture trait"; several such traits may cohere into a "culture complex." The "complex" functions as a whole, is valued, loaned or lost as a whole. Thus bridle, saddle, harness and cart are distinct culture traits, but what gives them meaning is being linked with another trait, the domesticated horse; together they form the "horse complex." There spread from Asia to Europe in early historic time not just the tamed horse but the *horse complex* including bridle, quirt and saddle. The use of mare's milk as a food was lost on the way while stirrup and horseshoe were added in Europe.

In clearing up relationships among cultures much light has come from mapping the distribution of certain complexes, *e.g.,* the *sun dance* of the Plains Indians, the *hunting complex* of the eastern Algonquins, the *cattle complex* of the East African Negroes, the *reindeer complex* of the tribes of northern Asia, the *maize complex* originating in Middle America and spreading as far north as New England and as far south as the pampas of Argentina. As a complex wanders further from its source of dispersion it may lose traits or take in new traits until it becomes at last hardly recognizable.

Our culture includes many culture complexes, such as the factory system, the dairy industry, the family, public education, the newspaper, the political campaign, business, golf, horse-racing, polite society. The fir tree lit with candles, "Santa Claus" with his reindeer, the hanging up of stockings, the giving of presents, the singing of carols, constitute the Christmas complex. The American college is a complex which includes many features—hazing, glee club, football, Greek-letter fraternities, freshman-sophomore "rush," "cap" bonfires—which have nothing to do with education. The automobile and what goes with it, such as garages, filling stations, speed laws, and "traffic cops," make up

a culture complex. And complexes link up with other complexes until you get American culture, itself a loose unity.

The cultural framework. According to their logical affinities the components of a culture may be variously grouped. Thus Spencer in his *Principles of Sociology* (1876) recognized six groups of social institutions: Domestic, Ceremonial, Political, Ecclesiastical, Professional, and Industrial. Thomas in his *Source Book for Social Origins* (1909) classified his material under: Relation of Society to Geographic and Economic Environment; Mental Life and Education; Invention and Technology; Sex and Marriage; Art, Ornament and Decoration; Magic, Religion and Myth; Social Organization, Morals, and the State. Wissler in *Man and Culture* (1923) grouped the facts of culture under nine heads, namely: Speech, Material Traits, Art, Mythology and Scientific Knowledge, Religious Practices, Family and Social Systems, Property, Government, and War. In his *Introduction to the Study of Society* (1937) Hankins offers the following:

1. Language and Communication
   (a) Gestures and Symbols; (b) Spoken Language; (c) Writing.
2. Practical Knowledge and Industrial Arts
   (a) Food; (b) Clothing; (c) Shelter; (d) Tools and Technique; (e) Property; (f) Personal Services; the Professions; (g) Barter; (h) Transportation.
3. Genetic Groups and Mores
   (a) Love; (b) Marriage; (c) Family; (d) Blood Relationship Groups, their Rights and Duties.
4. Ideas and Practices Regarding the Nature of the World and Man
   (a) Myth; (b) Magic; (c) Theology and Religious Practices; (d) Medical Beliefs and Practices; (e) Scientific Knowledge and Experimental Methods.
5. Ideas and Practices Governing Private Relations of Individuals
   (a) Manners and Ceremonial Forms; (b) Private Morals; (c) Voluntary Associations; (d) Play and Sports.
6. Ideas and Practices Governing Public Relations of Individuals
   (a) Ethical Customs and Institutions; (b) Juridical Forms and Institutions; (c) Political Organizations and Institutions.
7. Art and Decoration
   (a) Personal Adornment; (b) Drawing, Painting, and Sculpture; (c) Music; (d) Architecture.
8. War and Diplomacy

Acceleration in the growth of culture. Archæologists calculate that the Old Stone (Paleolithic) Age began perhaps 500,000 years ago, the New Stone (Neolithic) Age, say, 8,000 B.C., the Bronze Age about 3,000 B.C. and the Iron Age 1,000 B.C. Plotted on a graph as long as a city block the culture line would rise a few inches in the first ninety-eight per cent of the distance. In the last two yards it would climb sometimes inches in a single century and in the last foot or two it would shoot up almost perpendicularly to the height of a skyscraper! Lowie [6] has cleverly put this progressive acceleration of the growth of culture.

> We may liken the progress of mankind to that of a man a hundred years old, who dawdles through kindergarten for eighty-five years of his life, takes ten years to go through the primary grades, then rushes with lightning rapidity through grammar school and college.

Why a culture races for a time then stalls, why one culture shoots up while another stagnates, was a teasing mystery forty years ago but of late it is clearing up. To-day the sociologist can list a dozen conditions of rapid culture-building. Foundations have been set up for the express purpose of converting money into scientific, esthetic or social progress. If the social sciences are encouraged and allowed to develop undisturbed, in a generation we shall know how to promote progress along chosen lines as a scientific plant breeder knows how to develop a grain or a fruit with specified virtues.

Material and Non-material. The knowledge and skill that lie back of tools, instruments, and machines (not, of course, the things themselves) constitute *material* culture; religions, sciences, the fine arts, *mores*, systems of law, social institutions, make up *non-material* culture. The former spreads faster and farther, its appeal is wider, its merits are more measurable and provable. But to the thinker *non-material* culture is the more fascinating because it involves *man's attempts to domesticate himself*. Imagine watching a zebra acquire by effort an equine character! What feat is more heaven-storming than to exorcise the "ape and tiger" in us? Then, too, the building up of justice, good-fellowship and coöperation is less understood than the building up of industry and the practical arts. We Americans glory in our

[6] R. H. Lowie, *Culture and Ethnology*, 1917, p. 78.

material achievements (as well we may), but do we hang our heads (as we should) at our budget of crime and intolerance?

Culture diffusion. Appealing culture traits, such as the use of superior viands, beverages, medicines, pets, musical instruments, tools and weapons are borne like spores on the air and are quickly taken up by all manner of people. This is why in the words of Boas: "There is not a single people in the primitive world that has developed its culture independently." Mueller-Lyer testifies: [7]

> The vine comes from the Caucasus; the apricot from Armenia; the plane tree, peach and mulberry, and the rose and lily from Persia; melons, cucumbers, pumpkins from Turkestan; and date palm from Phoenicia and Arabia; cypresses, tomatoes, caraway seed, mustard from Asia Minor; cherries from Cerasus in Pontus; shalots from Askelon; maize, potatoes, tobacco, chocolate from the New World; peas from Greece, lentils from the Romans, coffee from the Arabians, tea and silk from the Chinese; the domestic cat from Egypt; the domestic fowl from India; the peacock from Ophir; the pheasant from Phasis. The fatherland of the taming of domestic animals is to be found in Western Asia, in Mesopotamia as Hahn's searching investigations have made probable. We obtain soap from the Celts through the Romans, glass making from the Egyptians, and the violin and the guitar from the Arabs. For metals we are originally indebted to the East; for numbers, weights, and measures to the Babylonians; for astronomy to the ancient Chaldeans; for writing to the Egyptians; for our system of numeration to the Indians, for our modern natural science to the Arabs; for the science of history, art and philosophy to the Greeks; for our law to the Romans; for our religion to the Jews, etc. A complete enumeration of all our borrowings and accretions of culture would fill volumes. . . .

Culture-spread wipes out many discords which unlikeness of race, geographical environment and economic stage tends to produce. By diffusion fishermen, nomads and tillers of the soil come to cherish the same notion as to woman's ineptitude; on the other hand, half Asia is getting infected with Western ideas of government and education. Diffusion spares the backward from having to climb the same long toilsome path up; from a higher

[7] *The History of Social Development*, 1921, pp. 313-14. See also chapter, "The Diffusion of Patterns," in W. I. Thomas's *Primitive Behavior* (N. Y., 1936), 137 pp. A treasury of illustrations of the spread of particular items of culture.

culture they borrow traits which become wings floating them over stretches of heavy going which they might have required ages to negotiate!

Still, stiff-mindedness may hinder the adoption of a foreign culture trait even when there are the best of reasons for taking it over, *e.g.,* the religious conservatism of Islam which held it back from accepting from China the art of printing; the failure of the Chinese to adopt the use of milk and milk products from the pastoral nomads along their western and northern frontiers; the refusal of the Anglo-Saxon peoples to take over the metric system; the slowness of Americans to put the simplified court procedure of England in place of their cumbersome system which lets so many rascals escape their just deserts.

Culture traits differ much in speed of diffusion. Material traits spread fast and far for their merit lies where any one can see it. Religions are winged for they make tremendous affirmations regarding the Unseen, which no one is able to "check" on. Institutions and features of the social organization are not very catching, for they threaten vested interests so the influential oppose their adoption. Avers Professor Hu Shih, the Chinese philosopher, who deems that the Indianization of China's early culture "furnishes the most extensive material that can be found for the study of cultural borrowing on the grandest scale":

> Chinese borrowings from the culture of India were made in two main instalments. The first portion of the borrowings came as a result of the period of mass conversion to Buddhism. . . . The second portion consisted of more subtle elements of the Indian culture,—the philosophy of the world and of life, the moral and social standards, the intellectual habits,—things to which the believing masses were indifferent, and which had much resistance to encounter from the age-long cultural make-up of the Chinese people.

Among the favorite vehicles of culture diffusion are *trade, group migration, piracy, warfare, conquest, intermarriage, diplomatic intercourse,* and *travel.* Romantic examples of far diffusion are the spread and modification of the arch, the dome, the numerals, zero, the alphabet, the week, the double-headed eagle, the zodiac, printing and tobacco.[8]

[8] See A. L. Kroeber's *Anthropology,* 1923, and R. B. Dixon's *The Building of Culture,* 1928.

Cultural lag. The taking over from outside of improved automatic machinery, large-scale production, factory management, selling technique or a telephone system can come about *individually,* the open-minded leading, the close-minded waiting until the benefit from adoption can no longer be doubted. But a better highway administration, control of the liquor traffic, tax system, or regulation of public utilities can be adopted only *collectively.* From this results a deplorable *cultural lag,* the things which create a need for reform or regulation passing freely from one society to another while the corrective measures are kept from passing by the machinations of selfish, special interests. Ogburn [9] shows that the lag in adopting workers' compensation for industrial accidents after the accident-causing machinery had been adopted here was about half a century! Compulsory schooling and child labor laws were hindered arriving for several decades after the children of the poor had been sucked into the factory.

Backslidings. The natives of Torres Straits, once expert in making and handling canoes, now rely on wretched bamboo rafts. How can such a loss come about? Well, migrants may settle down in a place where certain of their culture traits atrophy from disuse; thus the art of metal working is lost in a region without metals. As the Polynesians drifted farther and farther into the vast Pacific they "lost textiles, pottery, metal working, and gave up the use of the bow," although they gained the outrigger and the double canoe. Again, if the wielders of a culture are enslaved, their own social organization being destroyed, they lose the means of carrying on the higher elements of their culture. Thus the negroes brought into this country as slaves lost their West-African culture. So perished much of the Incan and Mayan cultures. After the barbarian overrunnings of the fifth and sixth centuries A.D., it was impossible for the Romans to keep up their schools, libraries, law courts, roads, temples, gymnasia and administrative machinery. The slump into the Dark Ages was inevitable.

Disastrous results of a sudden break-up of a people's culture. In the fairylands of the South Seas, the contact of the islanders with the whites has brought about a rapid decay of native culture and therewith an appalling shrinkage of numbers. Extinction became so imminent that near the close of the last century careful statistics began to be kept and much ink has been

[9] W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change,* 1922, Part IV.

shed in showing what they might mean. After weighing the various alleged factors of depopulation—such as alcoholism, the ravages of introduced diseases, European clothing, labor recruitment, and the segregation of the sexes on plantations—the anthropologists reached the startling conclusion that the peoples of Melanesia are *dying from lack of interest in life.* Overwhelmed by the manifest superiority of the white man's culture (yet without hope of being really initiated into it) they give up their inherited ideas and values, lose confidence in their future, and cease to take the trouble to raise enough children to keep the race going. Declares Pitt-Rivers: [10]

> The inevitable result of destroying all the old culture-forms and environmental conditions in the endeavor to impose too dissimilar a culture upon a people specialized by a long process of adaptation to particular conditions is actually to exterminate them.

The intolerance of most Christian missionaries toward the native culture moves him to say: [11]

> The majority of field-ethnographers, sympathetically anxious to learn all about the customs and religion of a people and working in all parts of the world, have been driven, often against their inclinations, to the conclusion that Christian proselytism has done irretrievable harm to native races by disintegrating their culture.

[10] G. H. L. Pitt-Rivers, *The Clash of Culture and the Contact of Races,* 1927, p. 14.

[11] *Ibid.,* p. 240.

PART III

THE GENESIS OF SOCIETY

CHAPTER

IX. Association

X. Communication

XI. Domination

XII. Exploitation

CHAPTER IX

ASSOCIATION

Human nature in isolation. The old romancers trying to imagine what one would be like who had grown up without human companionship always portrayed a being with our faculties and reactions, though quite without culture. But a child with only animals for nurses and playmates would not develop the distinctively human traits at all; it would be arrested on a plane but little above that of an imbecile. Observations upon human beings of "wild" upbringing who at various times have been brought to notice show them to be characterized by a vegetative type of existence, automatic reactions, unconsciousness of self, inability to learn the use of language, absence of social emotions, and indifference to human companionship. We now know that self-consciousness, the rise of personality and the ordinary capacity for thought and emotion are impossible in the absence of association with human kind.

Early in the last century, from observing the mutual contamination of prison inmates, some came to advocate the solitary confinement of prisoners, at least for the first part of their term. It was argued that in the silence of his cell the offender would come to see his misconduct in a new light and would resolve to change his ways. But how little these reformers understood the social side of human nature! In 1821, by act of the legislature of New York, eighty convicts in the Auburn prison were put into solitary cells without labor. At the end of a year five were dead, one had killed himself, another was mad, and the rest were melancholy. The next year the experiment was abandoned. In 1842, in England, Pentonville prison began to confine the prisoner in solitude for the first eighteen months of his sentence. For the next eight years the insanity rate among Pentonville prisoners was ten times as high as in other English prisons!

Victims of long-enforced solitude generally become the prey of melancholia, delusions, and hallucinations. They cease to have

emotions, shrink from the sight of others, and perhaps return willingly to their cell as to a grateful shelter. Hermits, too, exhibit a variety of forms of mental disintegration. The biographies of the anchorite saints record strange noises and mysterious voices which the devout of their time deemed supernatural, but which were really sense-hallucinations in no wise different from those which visit to-day the isolated lighthouse keeper, or the lonely shepherd.

The struggles of the social self against death are pathetic. In an Italian prison Pellico gained new life when he could wave a handkerchief at a fellow-prisoner, and his spirits rose at the mere sight of a human being. In cellular confinement prisoners devise many ingenious signals to convey sympathy. In Russian prisons the "politicals" developed a clever code of taps on walls or pipes as a means of communicating. In their mad thirst for companionship the immured make pets of mice, rats, and birds, even spiders, ants, and flies. In lieu of anything better, a flower or a struggling plant may furnish support to the starving social self. Incorrigible prisoners have been softened and transformed by having small animals to pet or even a flower box to tend.

Phantasy is used to compensate for lack of companionship. One of the early "finds" of child study was that not a few children have imaginary companions with names and clearly marked traits, with whom they talk, play, quarrel, and make up. Sometimes the isolated child projects a number of imaginary playmates with distinct personalities, who have varied experiences, develop life histories, and live on with their creator into adult life. One investigator brought to light fifty cases of children who have invented such companions. Akin to this is the practice of "talking to one's self" which grows up in hermits, trappers, prospectors, and other solitaries, and which seems due to the fact that the lonely soul finds a faint companionship in the sound of the voice just as the timid boy is heartened by hearing his own whistling!

Even the making of objects which other human beings might admire, enjoy, or use holds comfort for the solitary. Small says:

> They go to work without squares, gravers, stamps, patterns, or models. Every scrap of glass or metal, every nail and pin, turns to account as a tool. Waste from the shop, bones from the kitchen, walnut, cocoanut, acorn shells, feathers, locks of hair, the bark of trees, pebbles, every kind of fragment, afford materials. Tin plates, the bowls of spoons, stone jugs, old bottles, dippers,

bed posts, table tops, cell walls, and the bottoms of chairs serve for canvas and parchment.[1]

The prisoner finds relief from his loneliness by tearing pictures out of books and newspapers and fastening them on his walls. If he has a latent artistic talent he lines his cell with drawings which almost always represent human heads or figures. If he writes he is likely to produce autobiography, the most intimate of all literary forms. Thus, "Every trifle wrought in confinement; every color stain upon prison walls; every nonsense couplet; and every attempt at biography or philosophy, represents an effort of loneliness to people the waste of hours to which the physical presence of others is denied. It is an effort to multiply the spirits of one's own personality when all other avenues of intercourse are closed." [2]

Genius and solitude. Terrible as solitude is, some prefer it to overmuch society. Men of genius turn recluse to create original works. "An artist," says Ruskin, "should be fit for the best society and should keep out of it." Thoreau puts it, "The reason of isolation is not that we love to be alone, but that we love to soar; and when we soar the company grows thinner and thinner until there is none left." Even when they crave communion, geniuses are so bored by the chatter of "fools" that they prefer to be alone. In his *Letters,* Wagner confesses, "I always feel it to be a useless and utterly resultless proceeding to converse with any one." "Nothing agrees with me like solitude." Schopenhauer thought that "Who does not love solitude loves not freedom." Goethe observed, "Talent develops in solitude, character in the stream of life." Thoreau thought one person to the square mile is enough and wrote, "I never found the companion who was so companionable as solitude."

On the other hand Hume confesses, "I feel all my opinions loosen and fall of themselves when not supported by others," and George Sand cries, "I care but little that I am growing old but that I am growing old *alone.*" De Senancour, author of "Obermann," renounces the world, yet wishes there might be at his end one friend to "receive his adieu to life." Cowper detects the social under his passion for solitude.

[1] M. H. Small, "Psychical Relations of Society and Solitude," *Pedagogical Seminary,* VII, p. 53.

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 58.

How sweet, how passing sweet is solitude.
But grant me still a friend in my retreat
Whom I may whisper, Solitude is sweet.

Men far above or ahead of their time are likely to be so neglected or persecuted that in despair they turn misanthrope. The biographies of genius are full of tragedies of expansive souls, yearning for communion and sympathy, yet finding their offerings ignored or rejected, so that they end eating out their hearts in loneliness. *The world never forgives their being different.*

Society and solitude. The *sociable man* joins any crowd he happens upon, is glad to be one of a great congregation, a procession, a regiment, enjoys moving in step or cheering in concert with a thousand others. If he possesses a weighty secret, he is impelled to communicate it and if he curbs the impulse he falls mentally ill. The *individualist,* on the contrary, prefers the trackless wood to the beaten path, empty rooms to full ones, small congregations to large ones, wilderness to towns, fields to thoroughfares. Such was the American backwoods type who, when he could hear the sound of a neighbor's ax, reckoned "Folks is gittin' too crowded," and moved on.

What is it the sociable man craves? The mere sight of others? No, "a crowd is not company." Not the presence of others but *response* relieves the ache in the breast.[3] That one is dear who seems to care about us. One of the worst forms of college hazing is the "silent treatment," feigning that the obnoxious messmate does not exist. To the friendless newcomer the loneliness of the great city is hardly less cruel than that of the far hill farm. Hosts of acquaintances or admirers cannot still the thirst of the heart like a single friend. The high-placed executive, commandant, or employer may live as lonely as a castaway on a coral reef.

But our taste for society like our taste for salt is soon cloyed, few get more satisfaction out of a hundred friends than out of a dozen. The value of companionship, like that of other necessaries of life, falls rapidly as the supply increases. Denizens of the backwoods or the desert are hospitable chiefly because there the wayfarer has a scarcity value. In the wilderness the lone prospector's delight in coming upon another human being is, one might almost

[3] For a fine study of an individual whose life is conditioned chiefly by his craving for response see Thomas and Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America,* 1927, pp. 2228-2236.

say, as the square of the number of days since he saw a countenance. In a crowd the countryman quickly assumes personal attitudes toward those about him whereas the townsman holds aloof. City congestion has bred in him the habit of regarding the ordinary fellowman as a mere moving bulk to be avoided as one avoids a rolling stone.

The stimulus from association. One will laugh more frequently and heartily in a large group than in a small group. Children never get so "wild" as when playing with others. The "only" child at times goes dull, cannot "think of anything to do," and begs to "go over to Jimmie's." When visiting children unexpectedly arrive, he becomes another being, laughs, shouts, jumps about, and shakes with eagerness as he excitedly exhibits his playthings and accomplishments.

Experiment confirms Emerson's saying: "Concert [4] fires people to a certain fury of performance they can rarely reach alone." Mayer measured the difference between the mental work of pupils in a group and the isolated pupil. In general, they did better *in groups,* the superiority showing itself not only in decrease of time but also in improvement of the work. One pupil who took 10 minutes and 25 seconds to do some work alone did it in class in 7 minutes and 30 seconds. Another who took 13 minutes and 11 seconds took 6 minutes and 45 seconds in a group. Schmidt, testing children in their home work as compared with their school work, found that for most kinds of work the product in the classroom was superior. Allport found that over two-thirds of his adult subjects did more mental work in a co-working group than alone. Sen Gupta and Sinha, taking subjects at a level of practised efficiency, found that when grouped they showed an increase in output of from 14 to 23 per cent above their performance when working privately. Weston and English reveal the beneficial effect of working at psychological tests in groups rather than alone.

Triplett tested the influence of the presence of a co-worker on a simple physical act, the turning of a reel as fast as possible. The pupil always worked more rapidly when in company with another child. Neumann's experiments corroborated Triplett's. Seven pupils of the ages of thirteen and fourteen were tested repeatedly with the dynamometer and the ergograph. In the case of the test of the pupils separately, with no one else in the room,

[4] *Society and Solitude.*

the amount of work done was always less than when others were present. If the experiments were made in the presence of the teacher alone, the pupils did less than when they were all together without the teacher. Testing the memory of pupils alone and when working together, he found the difference remarkably large in the case of the younger children. On an average with the individual test the children remembered considerably less than in the class. Not a child was found who remembered more in the individual test than in the class test.

The "only" child. Studies of "only" children show that, instead of outstripping other children owing to their association with adults, they fall behind them. They not only enter school from one and a half to two years later, but they are markedly inferior to other children in school performance. About half of the "only" children in school were reported as getting on badly with other children, usually because they were loath or did not know how to make concessions or were set on having their own way. In a fourth of the four hundred "only" children reported on selfishness was set down as the dominant trait. The "only" child is likely to be morbidly self-centered and introspective. "In later life," affirms a neurologist, "he is extremely conceited, jealous and envious. He begrudges the happiness of friends and acquaintances, and he is therefore shunned and disliked. The fact that he is peculiarly subject to hysteria, neurasthenia, and kindred maladies is attributed to faulty habits of thought fixed in childhood, the chief of these being an excessive preoccupation with thoughts of self."

Without experience in a system of selves, the "only" child is easily teased, does not know how to stand being the butt of a joke, cannot bear to be "it" in a game in which "it" is the laughing-stock. Such children spend too much time reading and with grown-ups because they lack the art of adjustment. One says: "I was always disturbed by the prospect of going to a children's party . . . for the first half of the time I was certain to stand about on the edges of the crowd, merely because I could not get into the spirit of the merry gathering."

Childhood is the seedtime of character, for it is then that the subconscious is planted with suggestions which become nuclei for whole systems of thought which later ripen into habits. The suggestions the "only" child receives from too exclusive associa-

tion with doting overanxious parents "tend to engender in him a mental attitude out of which may afterward spring, according to the subsequent circumstances of his life, a cold, heartless, calculating selfishness, or a morbid self-anxiety, perhaps eventuating in all sorts of neurotic symptoms." On the other hand, extensive playing of team games with children of about his own age fixes in his subconsciousness suggestions of "fair play," "give-and-take," "turn about," "follow," "lead," "obey," and "true blue," which help to build in time the "good fellow" and the "good citizen."

Solidarity and suicide. There is a strange saving power in being knit to others. The suicide rate of bachelors is half as great again as that of married men of the same average age *without* children and three times that of married men *with* children. The rate for widowers *without* children is a third greater than for widowers *with* children. Family life thus protects against self-murder probably because it shifts the focus of interest from one's personal experiences and fate to that of the family group. A man's attitude toward his life is determined less by what it is worth to him than by what it is worth to his children; so he goes on with it when otherwise he would cast it away.

In Switzerland the suicides in the Protestant, mixed, and Catholic cantons are respectively 326, 212 and 86 per 100,000 persons. The Jews show an even lower rate than the Catholics. The reason is not in any difference in the teaching as to the sinfulness of suicide, but in the fact that the Catholics are more firmly knit into a religious community than the Protestants, while the solidarity among Jews usually exceeds that among Catholics.

Suicide is rare in young, vital, strongly organized societies but frequent in decaying disintegrating societies. Wars and revolutions by vivifying the sentiment of national or class solidarity lower the suicide rate. Whatever stirs group, party, or patriotic feeling helps men forget their private troubles. Hence Durkheims's law, *Suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration of the social groups to which the individual belongs.* Men are like mountain climbers, some making their way over the glaciers roped to the members of a large party, others going alone and depending on eye and alpenstock. The latter mount more quickly and can go farther if they are strong; but woe to them if the crust breaks!

Social sympathy. In the "suicide clinics" maintained in certain cities it appears that persons contemplating suicide are more

in need of sympathy than of succor. The mere confessing their troubles to a kindly stranger instead of brooding over them alone relieves them and gives them courage to battle on. Sympathy has, indeed, an almost magical value. After the San Francisco fire families that had lost all and were camped in the parks were by no means downhearted; the universal sympathy and helpfulness were meat and drink to the starved social self. The sudden fellowship that springs up in hours of disaster—like the sinking of the *Titanic* —is found so sweet that the survivors form an association and meet annually in order to revive it! Just as the loveliest flowers grow nearest the toe of the glacier, so the sweetest intimacies spring up among those sharing the most terrible experiences. In war "comrade" becomes a sacred word, and the bonds uniting trenchmates and messmates often last through life. So comforting is this perfect fellowship that soldiers will joke and whistle amid horrors that would drive a solitary man out of his wits. The journals of Polar expeditions bear witness to the cheerfulness of the men during the long Arctic night. With companionship but without sunshine they were far happier than the mountain shepherds who have sunshine but lack companionship. In the Ludlow tent colony of Colorado "the striking miners of a dozen different nationalities suffered destitution together in midwinter, half-starved and exposed, with their wives and children, to all the adversities of cold and want and armed inhumanity; yet through all their stories of their misery there is the evidence of an extraordinary good fellowship that gave a gala air to their encampment, the happiness of a society united in sympathy, a delightful concord between alien races that were glad to find their old prejudices unfounded."

What calls forth the we-feeling? One is *crisis,* which breaches conventional barriers and gives free play to the social demands of deeply moved persons. Another is *harmony of interests.* In the trenches, the exploring party, the sit-down strike, the strikers' colony, one loses that habit of eyeing the fellow-man as an actual or potential competitor which grows up in a society like ours characterized by pecuniary emulation. *Conversation* brings to light differences of view as well as resemblances, but, on the whole, gives birth to more sympathies than antipathies. *Pleasuring together* favors the spread of the *we*-feeling. Eating, drinking, acting, playing together, the enjoying in common of music, drama, or

spectacles are time-honored means of fostering good fellowship. Owing to its loosing of inhibitions, drinking together has been greatly relied on for thawing egos and setting up warm currents of good feeling. *Concerted rhythmic response* is especially powerful in creating social sympathy. Cheering, singing, and stamping together are used to evoke "college spirit" and the choral singing of patriotic hymns is encouraged among soldiers to fan their *esprit de corps*. From early tribal days the dance has been used to release social emotion, and those attempting to create a community spirit in our polyglot American cities rely on getting people to sing in immense choruses and take part in great public dances in the streets and parks. *Touch,* although narrow in range of operation, is a great quickener of sympathy. Shaler says: [5]

> It has been my chance to help many wounded men. In all such cases when I first look upon the sufferer I am filled with a disquiet which impels me to seek protection in flight. There is, of course, sorrow for the afflicted, but this is overmastered by the intense desire to spare myself the pain due, so far as I can see, to the shock to my ideal of what a man should be. The moment I touch the sufferer all that horror immediately vanishes and he becomes that dear thing, the actual neighbor. The fact seems to be that the impressions of sight have little awakening effect upon the sympathies as compared with those of touch.

This is recognized in the "grip" of friends, the handclasp of circling merry-makers, the interlacing figures of dancers, and perhaps the ceremonial laying on of hands.

How the sense of inferiority conditions us. Social status means everything to us. An early sense of inferiority to others may poison us, drive us to a world of phantasy; or it may stir us to "compensate" by overcoming defects or by scoring so high elsewhere that our defects are overlooked. The man who talks in a loud voice, brags and shows off may be seeking escape from a tormenting sense of inferiority. The individual most cocksure and aggressive may be "compensating" for a secret doubt of his own worth. Dignity = "something you stand on when you are short."

One hag-ridden by an inferiority complex wields a heavy hand in home, school, shop, or barrack room. The person haunted by self-doubt constantly gets into hot water. He is quick to take offense, imagine a slight, resent criticism, grab credit he is not

[5] N. S. Shaler, *The Neighbor,* 1904, p. 293.

entitled to, or concoct plausible "alibis." On the other hand, the immense drive of Theodore Roosevelt to score high in many fields of endeavor was really over-compensation for a boyhood sense of inferiority due to bad eyes!

The tardy recognition of our sociable nature. Most of us marvel that any one should go mad in solitude, or kill himself starved for sympathy, or that a girl should smother her infant rather than face shame. Romancers have made much of such things but the reigning theory of human nature has been too narrow to take them in. Psychology early got an individualistic turn from its probing of the senses and the intellect; only lately is it plumbing the drives and emotions that constitute man's social side. Philosophy, ever intent on dignifying man, has ignored our dependence on others as if it disclosed a shameful weakness.

So prison reformers fancied that solitary confinement regenerates. The benevolent tolerated the almshouse with its separation of aged couples and its walling off paupers from the common life. The discovery that what the poor most need is "not alms but a friend" gave half a century ago the shock of an entirely new idea. Later came the scientific study of boys, resulting in the discovery of the "gang" and the "boys' club" as builders of character. Individualistic assumptions so governed early Americans that, giving up the compact settlement of the New England town, they practised "homestead" settlement, which few European peoples have found to be congenial. One result of this, and of the neglect to provide for social and recreative life in the open country, is a loneliness which so tortures young people on the farms that they rush to the cities with a recklessness hardly to be matched in any other part of the world.

Not all the lions are out of our path. Still common, among fundamentalists, is the idea that religion is something altogether between man and his Maker and does not relate man to man. "Scientific management" extremists see the workman as a mere implement, while some devotees of "the efficiency cult" drop every human relation and reject every claim that does not contribute to "success." There is rife, too, a grotesque caricature of Darwinism, invented to justify the ruthless practices of business, which insists that "struggle is the law of life" and you have no choice but to devour the fellowman or be eaten by him!

Then there are untoward social tendencies. The growth of

tenancy under a form of lease which allows the tenant no compensation for disturbance or for the unexhausted fertility he has added to the soil results in a shifting rural population (2,865,000 families!) unwilling to invest in the roads, schools, churches, playgrounds, and community halls which facilitate social enjoyment. The commercial spirit, which prompts people to associate on the basis of reciprocal entertainment and service, taints fellowship with calculation and inhibits that generous self-abandon which is the finest flower of friendship. Again, the wealthy have to guard their circles against the intrusion of touts, leg-pullers, notoriety-seekers, and exploiters of social connections for financial, professional, or political advantage; but this raising of the money barrier is responsible for the hollowness and dullness that lies like a pall upon plutocratic society.

The struggle of personalities in association. Much social life is a veiled struggle to expand at another's expense. One ego *eats* another. Children, whose bents lie near the surface, plainly strive to convert their play-fellows into an admiring circle, to use them to intensify their feelings of self. They keenly compete for the notice of companions or superiors. Boys swell up and swagger about, talk in unnatural tones, "play big," and "show off." They do "stunts" eagerly shouting "Looky" as they stand on their heads or hang by their toes. They thrill with superiority as they stalk about on stilts or on tin cans tied to their feet. They vie in boasting, "daring," playing the "smart Aleck," and making up tall stories of their wonderful feats or hairbreadth escapes. It is significant that the bragging lies of boys usually relate to what they can do, while girls are more apt to lie about their possessions.

Says Dr. Thaddeus Bolton:

> The use of secrets by children is full of interest. Small boys put their arms around one another's necks and whisper in the ear, pretending to tell something that the others shall not know. This exalts the selves of those that hear the secrets and at the same time shrinks up the onlooker and flushes him with envy. Such an act calls for a countermove in the same direction. The other boys get together and tell secrets among themselves and make extravagant claims that their secrets are much more worthy of knowing. . . . Young people of the lower classes of society who associate much together give up a large part of their conversation to noisy claims about secrets or what they know that some one else does not; they make veiled references to past good times and to other

times in which things transpired that would be a terrible humiliation if told. Each one tries to get a secret with every other and then to make noisy claims about keeping it from all the rest. Servant girls with their company at the back door indulge in this kind of conversation, making veiled references to secrets most of the time. With them social life is always a sharp contest among personalities in which severe thrusts are given and countered just as severely.[6]

To the same end young people invent "dog-Latin" and other lingoes. They are prized less as a vehicle for secrets than as a means of triumphing over the puzzled listener. Many of the games of children, such as "needle's eye," "drop the handkerchief" and "Virginia reel," owe their charm to their giving each in turn an opportunity to be the chief actor. In the flushed cheeks and glistening eyes of the child that for the moment holds the center of the stage one marks the intoxication that flows from feeling the "I" glorified. The rest find their compensation in the pleasure of marching, dancing, or singing in concert.

To *shrink* or *put down* the selves of others gives much the same satisfaction as to exalt one's own self. In the teasing, badgering, and hectoring of small children, red-haired girls, cross-eyed or harelipped boys, peddlers, outlanders, and Chinamen, the object is not always the infliction of pain; it may be the exalting of one's self-importance by mortifying and depreciating another. The delight of "taking down" one who is throwing us into the shade is very evident. Schoolboys on the playground "take it out" of "teacher's pet," bespatter the best-dressed child, and pursue the prize pupil, chanting some incantation rhyme built about his name. Girls try to take down the girl all the boys are fond of and the uncouth lads join to humiliate the boy that the girls favor. In the same way young men who are boon companions are on the watch to "get something" on one of their number. Playing tricks and "practical" jokes is a favorite means of "getting the laugh on" another, *i.e.*, shrinking him. Hazing and fagging pleasantly enliven the self-feeling of older schoolboys. The ordeals of initiation imposed by some fraternal orders give the lodge members the pleasure of making a worthy fellow-citizen a laughingstock, while the victim later salves his wounded pride in watching other initiates "ride the goat." Games like "prisoners' base," "blindman's

[6] *The Journal of Pedagogy*, XIX, pp. 35-36.

buff," "I spy," are built on the plan of shrinking the players one at a time. The child who is "it" feels smalled and wins back his self-respect only by catching another, who in turn becomes "it."

Then there are the tactics of *self-protection* designed to prevent or turn aside a thrust at one's self, and the tactics of *self-recovery* aiming to expand the self after a humiliating experience. Thus the savage, who mainly identifies his personality with his name, is careful to keep secret his true name. There is the same caution about one's image. Once I tried in vain to find a Bedouin who would let himself be sketched; each feared lest in some mysterious way I should gain a hold on him. Catlin had to use all the arts of diplomacy in order to get his Indian chiefs to sit for their portrait. Nature peoples have a like horror of being photographed.

From fear of a rebuff one refrains from the direct question, but "supposes," or "wonders," queries to the ceiling, or ends a statement with a rising inflection. An invitation is couched in the negative statement: "You wouldn't care to . . . ?" or is conveyed by a lifting of the eyebrow or a pointing of the thumb. A request takes the form of a hint. One answers an embarrassing question with a shrug or a grimace which, while expressing enough, cannot be quoted. Refusal is met with "I don't care," or "Like as not I'm better off without it." Repartee parries gibe and the innuendo is turned by irony. The use of that double-edged weapon, the apology, gives scope for great dexterity in exalting one's self or putting the other in the wrong.

Egoistic association. Braggarts must have listeners, skinflints will have their cronies. The self-conceited by no means resign themselves to solitude. The wholly selfish mental invalid may be an utter cormorant for sympathy. In such cases the individual foregathers with others not from love but to gain a sounding-board for his "I," to exalt himself by bringing under and exploiting other selves. Many egoists of the purest water are on the constant lookout for sympathizers, admirers, or satellites. In a pinch such vampires can find satisfaction even in one another, for each endures the plaint or brag of the others for the sake of having attention when *his* turn comes to blow the trumpet.

Egoistic society apes good-will association, but its hollowness shows in a variety of ways. Under velvet endearments women stretch their claws and scratch like cats. Stingy beldames calculate it costs less to attract company by spiced gossip than by spiced

refreshments. Roistering egoists watch that no one skips his turn to "stand treat." Cronies who are not good fellows show their yellowness when one of them falls into trouble; then he is given to understand that no one cares to see his long face or listen to his tale of woe. "If you're out of health or money you needn't come around."

Manners. What good manners do is to soften and refine the struggle among the "I's." The well-bred refrain from such irritants as conspicuousness in dress, loudness of speech, boasting, self-display, monopoly of the conversation, controversy, rudeness, and humiliating others. The best-mannered constantly subordinate the claims of one's self to the claims of the selves of others. When all in a circle act up to this standard, association becomes delightful provided that real congeniality exists. In the best circles of our South the harmonization of the demands of different egos has become a fine art. The way in which a well-bred Southerner will let the conversation take any direction you seem to wish, always playing up to your lead and suppressing his own preference, explains the oft-noted "charm" of Southern society. In eighteenth-century France the higher social class developed manners of a suavity before unknown and the spread of these over the world has put many peoples in debt to the French. Throughout Latin America one finds an older, unselfish but less sympathetic, manner that grew up among the *hidalgos* of Spain.

The percolation down through the people of the gracious manners wrought out in a *noblesse* is a great step in socialization. Politeness is, to be sure, a poor substitute for good-will and respect for the rights of others, but where these traits do not yet exist it is most valuable. Its function is not to sweeten the relation of kinsfolk, friends, or lodge brothers but to lessen the chafing between strangers, colleagues, or rivals. Wherever, as in South America, good manners have become the heritage of all classes, even *peons,* muleteers and deckhands, the contacts of men give rise to few quarrels and brawls. Good manners cannot, of course, do away with such hostility as arises from conflict of interests; but they go far to prevent troubles which have their origin in the naïve assertion of the "I" in human intercourse.

Handling persons. Questing in outlandish parts for social information, the writer has arrived at the following first-interview technique for winning the good will of a Japanese official, a

Chinese mandarin, a Dutch Resident in Java, a Brahmin leader, or a British Administrator in Palestine.

a. Open by alluding to some acquaintance, experience, or interest you and he have in common.

b. Let fall a remark which will apprise him that you have noted or heard of some proficiency, exploit or achievement of his in which he takes pride.

c. "Tell one" on yourself, *i.e.,* refer with chuckles to some minor blunder or *bêtise* which has recently caused you embarrassment. By thus giving him for the moment an agreeable feeling of superiority to you, you strike a spark of good-will toward yourself.

d. Request of him some small favor which will cost him little trouble. Every favor he bestows emphasizes your dependence on him and deepens his interest in what you are doing.

e. Allude gratefully to the aid you have had from individuals of rank equal or superior to him in countries you have already visited. This will make him reluctant to be outdone in helpfulness and convince him that you appreciate what one does for you.

f. Seek his elucidation of local problems already clear to you or ask his advice even as to the matters on which you have already made up your mind.

g. Never let on you doubt what he is telling you. If you let him think that he has "pulled the wool" over your eyes in matters which he doesn't wish you to see into, he will be the more willing to put himself out for you in other matters.

h. Avoid showing yourself knowing and sharp; you will get more aid from him by seeming a bit naïve and trusting.

The mirrored self. For many children the first experiences of figuring in the minds of another are extremely upsetting. Some, unable to bear an unfamiliar eye, cover the face or hide themselves. Under the stranger's gaze the bashful child blushes, makes random movements, twists his body, pulls at his clothing, puts his finger in his mouth, or bites his nails. Muscular coördination goes by the board, so that he drops or spills things, stumbles over trifling objects, and finds his hands and feet become alien. He may giggle, laugh nervously, stammer, or even lose voice and word memory. In stage fright the symptoms match closely those of extreme fear. Even the experienced speaker finds discomfort in the "cold" or "unsympathetic" stare.

However, if closer acquaintance reveals a kindly attitude in

others, children cease to shrink from their attention and even begin to court it. "In the youngest children," say Hall and Smith,[7] " 'showing off' seems to be the simple, openly expressed desire for recognition and sympathy, the step in the extension of the consciousness of self which naturally succeeds the baby's development of self through the investigation of the limits of its own body." Says Cooley: [8]

The child appropriates the visible actions of his parent or nurse, over which he finds he has some control, in quite the same way as he appropriates one of his own members or a plaything, and he will try to do things with this new possession, just as he does with his hand or his rattle. A girl six months old will attempt in the most evident and deliberate manner to attract attention to herself, to set going by her actions some of those movements of other persons that she has appropriated.

The human looking-glass in which the infant sees its little "I" reflected furnishes it a powerful stimulus to do things. Children brought up in foundling asylums, where they receive good physical care but no loving personal attention, learn to walk and to speak much later than those whose baby efforts call forth the encouraging "ohs" and "ahs" of an admiring family. Cooley observes: [9]

Strong joy and grief depend upon the treatment this rudimentary social self receives. In the case of M., I noticed as early as the fourth month a 'hurt' way of crying which seemed to indicate a sense of personal slight. . . . The slightest tone of reproof would produce it. On the other hand, if people took notice and laughed and encouraged, she was hilarious. At about fifteen months old, she had become 'a perfect little actress,' seeming to live largely in imaginations of her effect upon other people. She constantly and obviously laid traps for attention and looked abashed or wept at any signs of disapproval or indifference. . . . If she hit upon any little trick that made people laugh, she would be sure to repeat it. . . . She had quite a repertory of these small performances, which she would display to a sympathetic audience or even try upon strangers.

No one ignores his mirrored self, but people differ greatly in sensitiveness. The wise man schools himself to be content with the approval of the discerning. The strong man cares only for the

[7] *Pedagogical Seminary*, X, p. 160.
[8] C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, 1902, pp. 164-5.
[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 166-7.

handclap of his peers and will not be looking every minute for fear his social image has changed. Those born in the purple give themselves little concern over what the commonalty think of them. We perceive Haman was an upstart when we read: "But when Haman saw Mordecai in the King's gate, that he stood not up nor moved for him, he was full of indignation against Mordecai." After telling over his honors he adds: "Yet all this availeth nothing so long as I see Mordecai the Jew sitting at the King's gate." [10]

A man may think he turns on his own axis, but, as Cooley wrote:

> If failure or disgrace arrives, if he suddenly finds that the faces of men show coldness or contempt instead of the kindliness and deference that he is used to, he will perceive from the shock, the fear, the sense of being outcast and helpless, that he was living in the minds of others without knowing it, just as we daily walk the solid ground without thinking how it bears us up.[11]

The "self-sufficient" is not outside society nor independent of social approval. He may be a massive deep-draft character that from past approval has gained enough headway to go on through the slack-waters of indifference and the eddies of blame. He may be so discriminating as to smile at the catcalls of the multitude provided only the wise appreciate him. He may be serene when all men revile him because in his imagination he sees himself vindicated before some high tribunal of the worthies of the past or the *élite* of the future. As Ibsen puts it, "The strongest man in the world is he who stands most alone," *i.e.*, for corroboration he relies least on numbers or contemporaries. This is why faith in God is so bracing to the disinterested champion of an unpopular cause; imagined Divine approval enables him to hold his course amid general execration.

In a light-draft mind preoccupation with one's reflected self shows itself as *vanity*. The vain man, unlike the constructive and stable sort, cannot hold steadily to an idea of his worth. He cannot fix past social approval as a durable part of his thought of himself, cannot get the habit of taking his merits for settled. Hence his self-feeling is subject to great ups and downs. Let people show admiration or envy for him and he treads on air; but in a trice some slight or rebuff has cast him into the depths. He cannot keep up

[10] *Book of Esther*, V: 9.13.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 177.

his self-confidence with the huzzas of last year or even last month; he needs his praise fresh. Hence the vain man who happens to be rich or powerful or influential is an easy mark for toadies, for he swallows gratefully the flattery that buoys his soul in hours of self-distrust. One who skilfully feeds the vain man his needed ration of "taffy" makes himself indispensable.

To pant for recognition is the essence of *ambition.* The ambitious youth thinks he thirsts to "do something" or to "be somebody," but his thirst would not be slaked by a success nobody noticed or acknowledged. Really what he craves is to figure potently in the minds of others, to be greatly loved, admired, or feared. The mere notoriety-seeker hankers to be read about or talked about even if the self reflected is far from impressive.

Less dependent than the ambitious is the *power-seeker* who slakes his thirst for self-effectuation by molding the destinies of others but cares nothing for recognition by them. The retiring financier or unofficial Warwick, who secretly pulls the wires that make politicians dance, finds his pleasure in seeing the puppets obey his will. Beyond him is the *achiever,* careless whether the public he benefits ever learns of his existence; but even *he* needs an inner circle who appreciate his achievement.

It is a fine type that is captivated by the idea of recognition by the unborn. A man who shrinks from newspaper publicity may revel in imagining his name in a stained glass window, carved on a portal, or attached to a street. As between wide fame and lasting fame the more imaginative prefer the latter, counting it better to be remembered by posterity than to be the idol of one's time.

In a time like ours, when money can work wonders, men exaggerate its power over souls. Just as there are fools who think they can buy true love, and silly rich who actually find satisfaction in the deference paid them by their lackeys, so there are some who think to insure commemoration of themselves by paying for it. One rears himself a useless monument. Another welds his name to the philanthropy he founds or with his benefaction stipulates a memorial. The sage has no such childlike faith in the power of money, but realizes that he must leave to the unforced gratitude of his fellows the cherishing of his name and service.

Uncurbed, the passion to fix and greaten one's social image leads to pomp, ostentation, fashion, heart burning, jealousy and fawning. The mania to impress others may lead to the worst forms of anti-

social conduct—as when a king brings on a war for the sake of prestige, or a proprietor squeezes his tenants in order to make a splurge on the boulevards or a splash at Monte Carlo. The scheming social climber sacrificing old friends and risking countless snubs in the hope of ultimate recognition by people of high position is about as social as a lizard; others interest her only as looking-glasses to reflect a pleasing image of herself. In the evil trinity religion bids us renounce, "the world, the flesh, and the devil," the "world" stands for the faults that spring from undue solicitude for one's social image, *i.e.*, worldly ambition, affectation, vanity, vainglory, boastfulness, and arrogance.

The mirrored self is a poor thing to stake one's happiness on. Like one's image in a still pool one's pleasing reflection in the minds of others may vanish with a breath. Ambition, to be sure, may lift the sluggard from his bed, the clod from his rut, the sensualist from his sty; but it overstimulates the mettlesome while the sensitive fret themselves ill over their standing in the eyes of others. That is why "withdrawal from the world" has always found favor among some choice spirits. The woods, the sea, or the cell afford asylum from the sharp suggestions that prick the flanks of ambition. One wearied of perpetually scoring to keep his prestige alive, his credit from beng smirched by jealous rivals, longs to quit the "world," at least for a season.

A finer remedy is to quit the game without withdrawing from that common life which is, after all, the place for most of the work that is to better the world. Thus Thomas à Kempis exhorts:

> Son, now I will teach thee the way of peace and of true liberty. . . . Study to do another's will rather than thine own. Choose ever to have less rather than more. Seek ever the lower place and be subject to all; ever wish and pray that the will of God may be perfectly done in thee and in all. Behold such a man enters the bounds of peace and calm.

How our society gives recognition to the mirrored self. In many ways society formally recognizes the value to one of his mirrored self. Damages for libel allow for the "mental anguish" of being brought into public contempt; for breach of promise to marry take into account the mortification of the jilted. Although the duel has been outlawed, insult not only goes a long way toward excusing violence but more and more it affords a ground of legal action, the German courts having gone farthest in this direction.

It is contended that "peaceful picketing" does not exist, seeing that the picket's tongue-lashing of the "scab" is a weapon of intimidation. The designating of workmen by numbers instead of their names is held to be intolerable. Many old punishments—such as stocks, pillory, ducking-stool, scarlet letter—assumed social sensitiveness in the culprit. Like tar-and-feathers, whipping at the cart's tail hurt spirit more than body, and ears were cropped not so much to pain the offender as to make him a butt. Malicious prison keepers "break" the more sensitive prisoners with indignities rather than hardships, while shrewd wardens offer the removal of stripes and numbers as an inducement to good conduct.

CHAPTER X

COMMUNICATION

Communication embraces all symbols of experience together with the means by which they are swung across gulfs of space or time. It takes in facial expression, attitudes and gestures, tones of the voice, speech, writing, printing, the newspaper, telegraphs, telephones, radios, railways, automobiles, airplanes, and whatever else facilitates mental contacts. "Culture" is mistress of our lives and culture includes "habits of thought and action acquired by interaction with other members of one's group. This interaction is, however, almost wholly on the psychic plane and is mediated by suggestion, imitation, and the more definite forms of communication, such as language." [1]

The improvements in means of communication occurring in our time constitute the greatest progress man has ever made in the wiping out of distance as a barrier to the meeting of minds. In a few years, perhaps, one will be able to call up on "long distance" almost anyone on the globe—John Smith of Nairobi or Knut Hansen of Reykjavik—*and see him while talking with him.*

In the words of Willey and Rice,[2]

> An interconnected system of communication has come into existence whereby the individual is enabled at scarcely a moment's notice to place himself in contact with almost any other person in the nation. Speed and distance concepts, again, have been totally recast. No longer do men in any part of the world live to themselves alone. For an increasing majority in the United States and for a substantial fraction in the whole western world, the telephone bell is always potentially within ear shot, the postman and telegraph messenger are just around the corner and the cable and wireless may bring messages which are dated the day after they are received.

We are the beneficiaries of two series of facilitations of human intercourse, *i.e.*, improvements in transportation and improvements

[1] C. A. Ellwood, *The Psychology of Human Society*, 1925, pp. 10-11.
[2] *Recent Social Trends*, 1933, Vol. I, p. 216.

in communication. The former is exemplified in the trolley, the automobile, the airplane; the latter in newspaper, telephone, motion film, and radio. In the one case the human being is carried to the social stimulus, in the other case the social stimulus is brought to him. The automobile carries the people to the concert; the radio carries the concert to the people.

When communication is poor. The mental insulation of islanders, bush-dwellers, jungle tribes, desert clans, hinterlanders, and backwoodsmen results in dependence for companionship upon one's family or kin, suspicion of and hostility towards strangers, want of interest in what happens elsewhere, dread of the unfamiliar, fear of change, and intolerance of difference. Like a stream at the bottom of a canyon the emotional life of such an individual runs narrow but deep. Into those of such a background it is well nigh impossible to build a wider civic or national consciousness unless they are "caught young." In the Middle Ages national consciousness was so little developed that troops would sometimes fall to looting their fellow countrymen as soon as they passed beyond the confines of their own province!

Improved communication and enlargement of consciousness. Decades ago, when China was first at war with Japan, the bulk of the population of inner China did not know that a war was going on. When our Federal Government was framed no one foresaw that remote citizens might learn of occurrences at the seat of government almost as soon as they happen and arrive at opinions thereon which they promptly communicate to their representative. They imagined the debates of congressmen going on far above the heads of their distant constituents, who would have but the faintest idea "of what it was all about." Political philosophers from Plato to Montesquieu insisted that only small states could be free, for only they could dispense with a dynasty or a governing class. Now, however, "the new communication has spread like morning light over the world, awakening, enlightening, enlarging, and filling with expectation." [3]

I have tarried in far-away shut-in valleys in which the principal topics of talk during the long Sunday visits of relatives are: who has become engaged, how the cattle are doing, and how the servants are behaving. For thousands of years personal and neighborhood affairs have been the staple of conversation. Choked with

[3] C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, 1912, p. 88.

this weed of gossip, the channels of intercourse permitted little of value to flow from mind to mind. With the growth of general interest in significant events these channels have greatly cleared. The secret of the seemingly unlimited elasticity of public attention, which enables it continually to observe and react to a larger number of remote happenings, is its withdrawal of attention from the petty, private matters that formerly engrossed it.

A century ago, with reference to matters of deep public import the people were like a jury with one or two members paying attention, the rest asleep, musing, or gossiping. Now they are like a jury with half or two-thirds of the members following the proceedings. As more and more this jury sits up and takes notice, it becomes a better tribunal to appeal to. Even the friends of victims of injustice as remote as the terrorized rubber gatherers of the Congo or the Putumayo deem it worth while to reach and inform the American public. How much more easily will the wrongs of maltreated fellow citizens be pressed upon its attention!

To-day the public pays heed to outcries that formerly fell on deaf ears. By thrusting out much gossip and trashy fiction it has made room in its mind for the dramas of social life. So many readers have found truth, when movingly presented, more enthralling than the yarns spun by story-tellers, that the newspaper, magazine, or book which readably recounts a true tale of contemporary oppression, and uncovers some sepulchre of corruption whited by pious legal phrases or sanctimonious pretext, is likely to gain both glory and money.

Professor E. W. Burgess has well brought out the significance of improved communication for the development of a vast society.[4]

The disorganizing and reorganizing effects of these modern instruments of transportation and communication may be realistically stated in terms of the decline of neighborhood and traditional influences and of the rise of cosmopolitan and modern influences. The motion picture, the aeroplane, and the radio have perhaps accomplished as much for world solidarity as has the League of Nations. At any rate, they are becoming indispensable instruments for the successful functioning of a world-society. The motion picture, accused of Americanizing the world, is, without doubt, making the peoples of the earth acquainted with one another. And the radio, with its vivid, concrete, and accurate reporting of dramatic events, is serving not only as a valuable check upon its

[4] *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXXIV, p. 1080.

rival, the newspaper, but also as an instrumentality by which citizens may intelligently participate in a democracy. Through these newer forms of communication the individual is participating imaginatively and actually more and more fully in the great society.

Improved communication and congenial association. When communication is difficult and slow, you accept as intimates your blood kinsmen and neighbors, because you see them often, you know them best, and they are right at hand in case you need them. Even if they are dour and touchy, even if their ways and ideas grate upon you, you fraternize with them for there is no one else to consort with. Even though with them you cannot quite be yourself or follow your bent, you adapt yourself to them from dread of becoming a social outcast. But with the aid of modern facilities for communication you may discover distant choice spirits who are more congenial and stimulating to you than your near relatives or next-door neighbors. Accordingly you ignore Cousin Ben or the neighbor on the Ridge in order to find your real social existence with persons with whom you communicate by letter, or telephone, or visit. Yet the individuals you turn from may be prized cronies of some one in the next valley.

Improved communication and individuality.[5] Two rival theories. One is that the freer you are to go where you will, hobnob with whom you like, foregather with kindred spirits, and lay hold on such knowledge and stimuli as appeal to you, the more your native bents will work themselves out. Thus it is that children born on adjoining farms arrive finally at the most diverse social positions and become so specialized that when they meet in later life they find they have nothing to say to one another. The gifted youth, who in Sleepy Hollow or on Deer Creek met with no encouragement for his elemental urges, acts like a famished being when, on first visiting college or city, he learns there exist persons and influences that can help him develop into the kind of person he was born to be.

The other theory is that the removal of obstacles to communication sweeps away coverts of individuality, just as a prairie fire sweeps away the cover of the ground-nesting birds. Therefore most of us vibrate in one of the planes laid through society—crowd behavior, conventionality, fad, fashion and craze. In the words of

[5] See C. H. Cooley, *op. cit.*, Ch. IX.

John Burroughs, "Constant intercommunication, the friction of travel, of streets, of books, of newspapers, makes us all alike; we are, as it were, all pebbles upon the same shore washed by the same waves."

The singularities protected by insulation are indeed vanishing. Schools, intercourse and travel snuff out local dialects. Local peculiarities of dress, speech or culture—such as in the Middle Ages might spring up in any barony—do not spring up to-day. Shut-in communities bearing the stamp of the sixteenth century, or even the thirteenth, are no longer to be found in the Alps, the Apennines or the Pyrenees; if you care for them you must go farther afield, ransack the Caucasus, the Himalayas, the Andes. Modern conditions are averse to the kind of accented local individualities that grew up in the old Greek city states, in the Italian hill towns, in the commercial republics of medieval Italy, or in the trading towns of North Germany. But if one has a special taste, affinity or gift, one's prospects of nourishing it, indulging it, bringing it to the bearing point, are far brighter to-day than they were when most men led their lives within the parish in which they were born. Nowadays surely there must be fewer etiolated stalks, fewer blasted buds, than in the old days of less contact.

As for the utterly commonplace, they will never in any case arrive at a true individuality. In olden times they accepted the culture patterns current in their parish; now they take on the hue of what their newspaper prints, what they see on the screen, what they hear in the tavern, at the bridge table or in the luncheon club. Theirs it is to be always borne along by the current, to drift like chaff in the breeze; creating the current or the breeze is not for them.

Decay of neighborhood in the country. The American pioneer settlement constituted a mutual-aid community where exchange of work, barn raisings, husking bees and neighborly nursing prevailed. Large families stowed in a four-seated farm wagon would make visits of several days with kinfolk. With the arrival of the automobile visiting is dispersed over a wider area but the stays are shorter. Telephone, automobile and hard roads lessen sociability among rural neighbors; who cares for propinquity when the farm family can board their car and within twenty minutes be on the doorstep of friends ten miles away? With every extension of smooth highways rural neighborhoods

disintegrate, the more alert and restless members finding satisfying acquaintance in other neighborhoods and in town. If neighborhood consciousness survives it is due to centering "round a school, a church, a Grange, a neighborhood business as a cheese factory or a creamery, or to likeness of nationality, or to kinship, or to the fact that houses are clustered in a hamlet and the families know each other as do the families on a village street." [6] Hence the low rate of growth of many small communities. During the period 1900-1920 about two out of five villages had little or no increase in population and many, especially those badly located, actually lost ground.

For American farmers a new social pattern is developing. Professor J. H. Kolb [7] finds that:

> Rural groups are more largely conditioned by interests, deliberate intent, skillful promotion, or purposeful action of people. Locality groups have lateral or geographic dimensions. Interest groups have perpendicular or psychocultural dimensions. Locality groups depend upon 'common' life, proximity, identification with a recognized physical area. Interest groups depend upon polarity, promotion, 'special' concerns, leadership, determined effort. Polarity implies fields of magnetic influence. When released from locality restrictions and from patriarchal forms of family government, certain people are attracted to certain of these poles of interest.

Interest groups are taking such forms as farmers' clubs, parent-teacher associations, boys' and girls' clubs, poultry associations, home-makers' clubs, shipping associations, coöperative creameries, dramatic societies and glee clubs.

Decay of neighborhood in the city. Study [8] made of a "traditional, middle class, residential district" of Los Angeles shows persistence of old-fashioned "neighboring," that is, calling on neighbors, kindnesses in times of distress, care of children, lending and borrowing, visits, talks, greetings, etc. "Association of nigh-dwellers . . . must be reckoned with in any appreciation and understanding of present-day social organization." Nevertheless:

> Identity of interests and a concern for the conditions of the neighborhood, except as they clearly affect personal, economic and

[6] J. M. Williams, *The Expansion of Rural Life*, 1926, p. 154.

[7] "Family Life and Rural Organization," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, XXIII, p. 148.

[8] Bessie A. McClenahan, "The Changing Urban Neighborhood," 1930, *University of Southern California Studies, No. 1.*

social affairs, tends to disappear. Modern methods of communication and transportation make possible a wide psycho-social and territorial range. The person's activities are not necessarily located in his home community nor are the participants in these activities, his neighbors. Locus becomes significant as a place of retirement from the varied stimuli of social activity, and neighboring tends to be redefined as unwarranted intrusion.

The neighborhood, the members of which invested their entire selves in the relation, has pretty well disappeared; in its place are a variety of single-interest groupings which have little or no connection with the local area. It is no longer necessary to live close to those with whom, having common interests, you share or wish to share common activities. Supplementary to the neighborhood or community is being developed a type of association which may be called the "communality," the membership of which is not confined to any local area. The Los Angeles study:

consistently points to the decreasing significance of the local area as a base for personal associations and the substitution of that of specialized interests. Individualization of activity and partial forms of association supplement and tend to replace the earlier common shared social experiences in which the whole of the personality was involved. In measure, the person is no longer subject to the control and supervision of the local community and may disregard the opinions of his neighbors because he finds the standards and approval of his behavior in different groups unrelated to the place of residence. The greater the number of associations and communalities to which the person belongs, the less chance there exists for many shared experiences by the residents of the neighborhood or community.

CHAPTER XI

DOMINATION

In the life of societies nothing is more frequent and persistent than *domination.* Each social group brings under adjacent social groups when it dares, each element within the group rides other elements so far as it can.

TYPES OF DOMINATION

Parents over offspring. By means of positive institutions or authoritative ideas parents manage to keep their grown children subject to their will. The *pastoral life* props patriarchal authority because (1) in quest of fresh pasture the family with its herds wanders away from the tribe, hence for safety must become a compact unit under one man; (2) labor is saved by guarding and caring for the live stock of grown sons in a single herd. *Agriculture,* too, may go with parent domination. Thanks to stressing filial piety as a virtue Chinese parents as a rule enjoy more authority and consideration than do parents in the West. By marriage, of course, they lose their daughters into other families, but they look upon their sons as their old age pension. I found a Foochow teacher forty years of age, with a family, turning over his monthly salary check to his father as a matter of common duty! Hence, in China the parents of many sons are envied, while a boy baby is never drowned or sold as a girl may be.

Old over young. Among many primitive peoples the elders maintain secret male societies to which the young are admitted by stages marked by awe-inspiring ceremonies. These afford leverage for imposing numerous food taboos in the interest of the old men. In one tribe boys will be told that if they eat of forbidden food they will be struck by lightning. In another young men believe that sores will appear all over the body of him who eats the flesh of the emu. Elsewhere youths are assured that if, prior to initiation, they eat wild turkey, swans, geese, or black duck, or their eggs, their limbs will shrivel up. It is common to subject the

young to a novitiate during which they turn over to the old the choicest kinds of food they find. Furthermore, the old men monopolize the pretty girls while the only mate a young man can find is an old widow or a cast-off hag.

Husband over wife. Under the early maternal system of reckoning kinship the wife remained among her kinsfolk so that her offspring should belong to her clan. As an outsider the husband was in a weak position; unless he "made good" as provider of game for his wife's family, he might be kicked out. Wifely domination, however, is a rare and passing phenomenon. Wife purchase and wife capture, as well as enforced separation of the family from the wife's clan, gave the husband the upper hand, which he has kept. Generally law and custom have merged the wife's property with his, given him control of her earnings, her occupation, and her place of residence, denied her freedom of contract, made him responsible for and therefore master over her conduct, allowed him more sex liberty than she might claim, and given him control over the children.

Men over women. In Old Japan the woman's lot was summed up in the "three obediences," viz., unmarried, to her father; married, to her husband; widowed, to her son. In China woman's lot is in no wise of her own fashioning, but has been shaped by male tastes without the least regard to what the women themselves think about it. The ancient sages—all men—molded the institutions which bear on woman and it is male comment, not real public opinion, that enforces the conventionalities which crush her. By wit, will, or worth, the individual woman may slip from under the thumb of the individual man, but never is the sex free from the collective domination of the male sex. Perfectly certain of their own superiority in wisdom and virtue, men have settled what is fit and proper not only for themselves, but also for woman.

I talked with a Chinese gentleman who was promoting a revival of Confucianism. "You'll admit," I remarked, "that we Occidentals have juster ideas as to the treatment of women." "Not at all," he replied. "The place Confucianism assigns to women is more reasonable than that of the Christian West."

"But why should women be so subordinated?"

"Because women are very hard to control. You can never tell what they will be up to. At the bottom of every trouble there is a woman."

"Isn't that due to your depriving women of the educational opportunities which they once enjoyed?"

"No, it was precisely experience of the difficulty of keeping women under control when they are educated that led our forefathers to lessen their schooling."

"Then you would shut girls out of school?"

"No, I wouldn't go as far as that. Let them be taught to read and write."

"Nothing more?"

"Possibly. But it should be very different from the education given to boys."

"For example?"

"Why, teach the girl household arts and ethics so she will know her duties as daughter, wife and mother."

"Would you teach her her rights as well as her duties?"

"No, no. That is quite unnecessary."

In ancient India girls chose their husbands. To-day, however, not only are girls disposed of by their parents, but they are married so young that in British India alone there are nine million wives under fifteen years of age, of whom a third of a million are widows! This child marriage, which is said to cause one-fourth of the women to die prematurely while another fourth are made invalids for life, is supposed to have developed out of the fantastic notions of the Brahmins regarding purity. As they see it no wife is "pure" who has ever felt love for another than the one she marries. In order, therefore, that the man may have a wife whose thoughts have never dwelt even momentarily upon another, the girl must be married before the dawning of her sex consciousness.

The prohibition of remarriage, which bears with senseless cruelty upon myriads of child widows who had not even entered on sex life, reflects male egoism, which cannot endure that the female who has lost her mate should form another union. The custom, which obtained in India and China until suppressed by law, that the widow should let herself be burnt on the funeral pyre of her dead husband, sprang from the same source; likewise the seclusion of women, which prevailed through the Moslem world.

In Mexico you read male ascendancy in the custodial care of daughters; in the half-Oriental seclusion of wives; in the exaltation of the wifely virtues of patience, self-effacement, and constancy; in the widespread custom of keeping mistresses; in the spouse's

adultery giving the wronged wife no such claim to divorce as it does the wronged husband; in the exclusion of women from the professions, but not from the toilsome and ill-paid forms of labor; in the social ostracism of the self-supporting woman; and in the neglect of parents to educate the daughter as they educate the son.

Fighters over workers. In the agricultural stage a tribe tells off its best men to train themselves in arms, while the women and the weaker males provide for them. But due balance between the fighting class and the industrial class cannot be preserved, for the warriors are able to turn against the cultivators their weapons and skill. Hence, the warriors make themselves masters of society. During the European Dark Ages *scholae,* or brotherhoods of fighters, wandered about offering their arms and prowess for the protection of harassed settled populations. It was only too common, however, that a community which had engaged one of these bands and agreed to feed it in return for protection became eventually its serfs.

In old Japan the military class—nobles and *samurai*—comprising 4 or 5 per cent of the people absolutely dominated the rest. They went always armed and the slightest offense by one of the swordless was paid for with a stroke. The peasant might even be cut down by a passing swordsman for no other purpose than to test the edge of a new blade! The elaborate politeness we observe among the Japanese descends from the not-distant time when an obsequious manner was a matter of life or death. Wherever the higher nobility traveled the common people were expected to fall upon their faces in obeisance; otherwise instant death at the hands of their retainers!

The well-situated over the ill-situated. In central Arabia the numerous oases are divided from one another by stretches of waterless steppe. The steppe men are therefore masters of the situation and the *fellahin* of the oases have to bow to their pretension to greater nobility and accept the rule of a Bedouin sheikly family which leads its life between a fortress in the oasis and the black tents of the desert. From such families spring the sultans or emirs who, owing to their ability to combine oasis with oasis by virtue of their command of the intervening tracts, gather a treasure sufficient to attract and maintain a standing force which may bring under other Bedouins and more distant oases.

The strongest among allies over the rest. In the course of the Greek resistance to Persia, Athens became the head of a maritime confederation of city states. Gradually, however, owing to the great lead of Athens in shipbuilding and seafaring, the Athenians came to provide and man the common fleet. Athens began then to dictate the money contribution of each of the allies and presently the confederation became an Athenian military empire in which the former allies became subjects, then victims of exploitation, and finally revolters. In like manner the numerous peoples with which the Romans in their expansion made alliance passed gradually into the position, first of dependents, and then of subjects. The history of the relations between Great Britain and the native states of India illustrates afresh how alliance between unequals passes almost insensibly into domination.

Conquerors over conquered. Domination of this kind is the commonest thing in history. In the smiling parts of the earth wave upon wave of wild spearmen has rolled over the settled peoples—in Mesopotamia, Babylonians, Amorites, Assyrians, Arabs, Medes, Persians, Macedonians, Parthians, Mongols, Seljuks, Tartars, Turks; on the Nile, Hyksos, Nubians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Turks; in Italy, Romans, Ostrogoths, Lombards, Franks, Germans. The great cities of the ancient world were by no means founded like ours on commerce and manufactures, but were *the fortified seats of tribute takers,* fortresses holding in awe a subjected tribute-paying agricultural population. The nucleus of such a city was the court—the monarch together with the warriors, priests, nobles, officials and courtiers—who lived on tribute and held down the tribute-payers.

The earlier empires took tribute and troops from their subjects. No ancient monarch, except, perhaps, some of the Ptolemies, aimed to benefit their subjects generally. Found, however, to peter out soon, rapacious domination is abandoned for a policy which heartens the subjugated by leaving them some freedom and hope. Rome had large views. She felt bound to give the conquered good administration; even under the Republic attempts were made to check abuses by provincial governors like Verres. With the setting up of the Empire administration greatly improved, the Emperor felt more responsibility for the welfare of the provinces than the sordid Senate had ever felt.

A like development occurred in the domination of the British over India. The memorable trial of Warren Hastings so fixed the attention of the intelligent British upon the administering of India as to secure for wholesome principles of conduct a recognition which was never after forgotten. Since India came under the crown in 1858 the British *raj* has generally taken into account the *welfare,* although not until lately the *will,* of the subjects.

The masters of the state over the subjects of the state. Only in certain American commonwealths and in "democratic" societies like Norway, Switzerland and New Zealand is government really an instrument for promoting the general welfare. Elsewhere it is a means of domination either by the actual holders of office, such as rulers or bureaucracy, or by a class in the background whose creatures and servants they are. For example, although the governments of South America are republican, rarely do the needs of the common people weigh with them. The handworkers misread their true interests and have therefore but slight political importance. The large proprietors use their control of government to draw to themselves the lion's share of the advantages of the social union. In tropical South America the conversion of political power to personal advantage is the shortest road to fortune. Like gold mining or rubber gathering with enslaved forest Indians, the capture of the proceeds of taxation is a splendid get-rich-quick enterprise which stirs the *conquistador* imagination. Government is a mode of acquisition sufficiently predatory, profitable and perilous to appeal to the born gentleman; for the common people politics offers only the thrills of a dangerous sport!

TRENDS OF DOMINATION

The dominating element makes society the victim of its special psychology and outlook on life. Hence, whole epochs bear the stamp of the ascendancy of this, that, or the other element in society. Here are a few of the slants that may be distinguished:

Masculinism. The fighting impulses of the male sex seriously unfit it to take sole charge of society. If the policies of states obeyed the wills of *men and women* rather than of *men* only, the world would enjoy more peace. Male pugnacity conceives government as mere "keeper of the lists" rather than as machinery for serving certain common needs. Soldier and policeman are looked on as fittest embodiments of the state, whereas teacher, factory

inspector, health officer, rural organizer, and agricultural adviser are but bastard representatives of the state's purposes!

By "business" a rational being understands the social system of making goods and getting them to the consumer. That its claims should take precedence over life and limb, over health and family, is monstrous. Yet the fighting impulse prompts men generally to look upon business as an arena in which, of course, somebody is bound to get hurt. This is why good men long protested against interference with child labor, the wrecking of the health of working girls, the night work of women, preventable work accidents. Even yet many feel that stopping the sale of diseased meat or "doctored" canned goods is unfair, like depriving prize fighters of their best blows and tricks. Women, on the contrary, insist—poor fantastic creatures!—that the palming off of putridity and poison, under the guise of food, upon mothers buying nourishment for the children they have risked their lives to bring into the world is not *business* at all, but plain *villainy!*

Male-sex bias comes out again in the *needless taking of chances.* Human reason wars continually on hazard, and all insurance rests on the rational desire to substitute certainty for risk. Yet men who have sweat for their money will gamble away their week's wage in an evening! No one, however, has ever seen working women regularly risk their wages on the turn of a card. Craving security women strive to lessen risk, while men fatuously create it. In the early years of gold-mining camps recklessness is rife; to save himself a little trouble in handling explosives and timbering shafts the miner endangers the life he is toiling to enrich! Soon after the taking of wives the miners turn prudent and shun needless dangers.

Men nearly monopolize the consumption of liquor and narcotics even when well aware of the risk. Women, having more self-control, shrink from self-poisoning. In the slums heavy drinking among women is a sure sign of demoralization born of despair. In China women never took to opium smoking until conditions had become hopeless. Again, women have too much insight to be guilty of the follies men commit in the penal field. One cannot imagine them treating juvenile offenders as if they were adult, expecting to make bad men good by solitary confinement, shutting up people who cannot pay their debts, imprisoning persons without any provision for feeding them, or settling cases by judicial combat. Only

men are foolish enough to persist in applying punishment to victims of uncontrollable criminal impulses!

Clericalism. The undue ascendancy of the religious profession gives us "clericalism." A well-recruited clergy, keyed up by high moral and intellectual standards, renders valuable services if it commands public confidence in a sufficient degree to exercise a qualified leadership in matters of faith and conduct. Always, however, the clergy should be counter-balanced by other intellectual groups lest they torment the people with those futile austerities which regularly develop in an unchecked clerical order. It is not a question here of an unspiritual and self-seeking priesthood exploiting a credulous people. Our problem is, What will happen when an able, conscientious, resolute, and well-organized clergy gains such an ascendancy that they are able to have their way with a people? In seventeenth-century Spain, Scotland, and Massachusetts, in the Mexico, Peru, and Colombia of two generations ago, in the Russia of yesterday, and in the Ireland and Quebec of today may be read the tendencies that lurk in clerical control.

In case the religion encourages self-dedication, the influence of the clergy causes a larger number of persons to turn their backs on natural "worldly" aims and give themselves to the religious life. Coupled with the growth of endowments for religious purposes, this results in cramping the economic development of the people. Three centuries ago in Spain there existed upward of nine thousand monasteries, besides nunneries. One hundred clergy cared for the services in the Cathedral of Seville. In its diocese there were fourteen thousand chaplains; in Calabarra, eighteen thousand!

Growth in the number and richness of sanctuaries is a sure sign of the dominance of the clerical view that such sacrifices are God-pleasing. In certain settlements of our European immigrants one comes upon a superb stone parish church in the open country, ten miles from town, while for miles around the farmhouses are smaller, meaner, and barer than those of the neighboring Americans. There is also a tendency to "enrich" the religious services and to multiply sacraments, thereby exalting the importance of the priest. When, as in seventeenth-century Scotland, worship is not free to develop toward sacerdotalism, sermons become so long and so frequent as to absorb all leisure. At that time ministers would relieve one another in the pulpit, the congregation would

remain sometimes for ten hours together, and in a single Edinburgh church thirty sermons were delivered every week![1]

Where the clergy dominate religion lays a heavy tax on time. In Mexico until recently there were, counting Sundays, one hundred and thirty-one religious holidays in the year, and more than half the people observed them all! In Greece the holy days eat up nearly a third of the year, and in tsarist Russia not over two hundred and fifty days in the year were left for work. In Abyssinia religion once claimed about half the time. The Protestant Reformation did away with most of the saint's days, but in atonement developed a burdensome observance of Sunday, so that "Scotch Sabbath" and "Puritan Sabbath" have become bywords for iron repression of the most innocent pastimes.

An enlightened clergy may ban many folk superstitions, yet foster certain ones which serve its aims. Even after priests and pastors cease to teach that the course of Nature and of affairs is governed by a series of miracles known as "special Providences," and that health, security, and prosperity can be gained by prayers, fastings and offerings, they encourage a solicitude for one's soul, leading to a morbid introspection and devotionalism. The belief in the reign of law has come up in the last two hundred years, not by favor of the clergy, but in spite of them.

Great as are the services of higher religion in ennobling aims, an ascendant clergy invariably presents conduct in a false perspective. The *social* virtues—sobriety, truthfulness, fair dealing, helpfulness—are thrown into the shade by the *religious* qualities of devoutness, strict observance, church attendance and support. The offenses which shock theologians, such as heresy, blasphemy and scoffing, are painted so black that lying, dishonesty, and injustice

[1] Robert Baillie, Commissioner for Scotland in London, wrote in a letter of May 17, 1694:

"This day was the best that I have seen since I came to England. . . . After D. Twisse had begun with a brief prayer, Mr. Marshall prayed large two hours, most divinely, confessing the sins of the members of the assembly, in a wonderful, pathetic, and prudent way. After, Mr. Arrowsmith preached an hour, then a psalm; thereafter, Mr. Vines prayed near two hours, and Mr. Seaman prayed near two hours, then a psalm; after, Mr. Henderson brought them to a sweet conference of the heat confessed in the assembly, and other seen faults to be remedied, and the conveniency to preach against all sects, especially Anabaptists and Antinomians. Dr. Twisse closed with a short prayer and blessing."

See Brooks Adams, *The Emancipation of Massachusctts*, 1887, pp. 5-6.

look gray by comparison. In the end you get a people austere and devout, but not truthful, loyal, and kindly.[2]

If they have a free hand clergymen always impose the ascetic yoke, which appeals strongly to those who have outgrown the burnt-offering stage of religion. Asia and medieval Europe bear the palm for self-inflicted bodily suffering to please God, but the ascetic poison took little hold of their laity. For an instance of a whole people blighted by misconceived religion one must look to the Scotch of the seventeenth century.

Every profession strives to exalt itself, and the clergy are no exception. In the absence of lawyers, scholars, and other educated groups to puncture their overweening pretensions, ministers will insist that they are ambassadors of God, that their commands from the pulpit are binding, that sudden mysterious calamities will fall upon scoffers, that Providence continually sets aside the laws of Nature on their behalf, that prodigies and portents attend the death of the man of God. They teach that it is dangerous to speak disrespectfully of a clergyman, to fail to salute him in passing, to cross him, or to sue him at law. The lives of eminent preachers written by their professional brethren abound in edifying stories designed to cause clergymen to be regarded with fear and awe.

Since the sacerdotal order rules by ideas, they try to control the whole intellectual life of society in order to uphold their influence. In order that the people's religion might remain "pure," the Spanish clergy brought about the crushing of the Protestants and the expulsion of the Moors, while the Massachusetts theocracy persecuted Antinomians, Baptists, and Quakers. If they dare go so far, the clergy censor the reading of their flock, curb the press, bar out "disturbing" foreign books, and maintain a regular "index" of condemned writings. Moreover, they are jealous of any education not under their own control. Intent on keeping their people subject to themselves, they never push popular education and put every obstacle in the way of its being provided by the state. When they create schools of their own to compete with the public schools, the religious part of the curriculum quite overshadows the secular. While friendly to that higher learning which they can control and

[2] "It would be a great gain to this country," wrote the saintly Keble a century ago, "were it vastly more superstitious, more bigoted, more gloomy, more fierce in its religion, than at present it shows itself to be." What a goal!

use, their suspicious fear of the increase of natural knowledge prompts them to strangle free inquiry and the liberty of teaching.

In short, of all despotisms that of the priest is the least wicked but the most hopeless. No one can withstand whatever he sees fit to proclaim as God's will. Out of their mundane experience or common sense his flock can draw nothing to oppose to his obscurantism or fanaticism. His is the one despotism without check or limit.

Militarism. The ascendancy of the military profession over society gives rise to *militarism*. Such ascendancy is likely to occur when army and navy officers are drawn chiefly from a hereditary upper order, so that their *professional* prestige is reinforced by *class* prestige. This affinity between the nobility and the army may be an inheritance from feudalism, or it may be the result of deliberately pampering and privileging the officer caste in order to draw into it those able to contribute most to its spirit and prestige. The militarist bias is, of course, financed and promoted by concessionnaires, battleship builders and munition makers.

When the fighting caste gives the key, the pursuits of the soldiers are esteemed nobler than those of the civilian. He is regarded, not as a killer, but as a hero ready to shed his blood for king and country. Proficiency in war is deemed the be-all and end-all of national organization and effort. All sound men are looked upon as potential soldiers; all sound women, as potential mothers of soldiers; national resources and productive power, as possible sinews of war. The health of the masses is conserved solely in order to preserve their military fitness. The idea rules that the people exist, not to live their lives, but to win wars. A little folk with no such cheering hope is despised. Army and fleet are not watchdogs to protect the people in their peaceful pursuits, but the means of imposing the national will on lower races, of "organizing" backward peoples, or of fulfilling "cultural missions" to unwilling neighbors.

War is deemed, not a horror, but "a biological necessity." Peace *within* the nation is priceless, but *between* nations it is, in von Moltke's view, "a dream and not even a beautiful dream." International violence is identified with the evolutionary "struggle for existence," and the losers of a war are branded as "the unfit." During peace militarists demand ever heavier armament and longer training, heedless of the fact that other militarists

will persuade *their* peoples to do the same, so that the relative position of the rivals remains unchanged. Each casts more of its treasure upon the altar of the War god, yet is no whit safer!

In militarist philosophy the state is not for individuals, but individuals are for the state. The aims of the state are not the happiness of its citizens nor the advancement of mankind, but mystic goals, vaguely related to civilization, the super-race, destiny, or God. National self-conceit is sedulously fostered by a pseudo-ethnology, a falsified history, and a systematic blackening of the character of rival peoples.

Militarism strangles liberalism and strengthens imperialism. It loves dynasties and scorns democracy. The military chafe under civil authority, while they sneer at parliamentary debate as "mere talk." Since it is illogical to require the conscript to kill those whom he regards as defending their country, while not requiring of stay-at-homes the lesser sacrifice of keeping silent when they disapprove, militarism calls for war-time censorship of newspapers, suppression of public meetings, control of university professors and religious teachers, and the suppression of writers and speakers who criticize the war policy or take "the enemy point of view."

Commercialism. When traders, manufacturers, capitalists, and bankers wield the bâton, *commercialism* reigns. The extraordinary infatuation of Americans with business men is chiefly due to incessant newspaper laudation and glorification of this class. Furthermore, among us the commercial spirit is held in check neither by aristocratic traditions, nor by strongly organized liberal professions. Since the small business men take their cue from the great merchants, financiers, and heads of big enterprises, in an era of commercialism these, their spokesmen, become the file-leaders, tone-givers and pace-setters of society.

The tone they give reflects, of course, their characteristic habits of thought so far as these have not been qualified by non-business influences. One who is a business man and nothing else slips easily into the fallacy of ignoring non-economic goods and of rating well-being by dollar income. What he desiderates is *prosperity* rather than *welfare*. The only wealth that is real to him is bankable wealth. Values that are not pecuniary, such as *public health, race vigor, natural beauty, scientific progress, moral tone,* and *ideals of life,* he will sacrifice when they interfere with

national or personal gain. His ideal is high wages, big salaries, and fat dividends; whatever stands in the way of maximizing these "hurts business" and is anathema. He cannot see that there are business profits which cost some of us ten times their worth in salubrity, or quiet, or peace of mind. Such a man is tolerant of poisonous smelter fumes, grade crossings, factory smoke, and noisy advertising, because he can realize the profits they symbolize, but not the harm which they do.

So long as this type bewitches the public, "success" means "business success"—that is, making money. A candidate's trump card is the promise of a "business" administration. The highest compliment for a philanthropic, religious, or educational scheme is to pronounce it "business-like"; whereas a man is insulted if you call his business "philanthropic," or "religious," or "educational"! A school board must be a "business" board, scholars should be picked and officered by a business man as university president, and the ultimate control of churches, colleges, and charities is left to the "solid men of business" whose money makes these possible.

A business man's success in his undertakings may be roughly guaged by the money he has been able to make under the accepted codes, but the success of the divine, jurist, officer, statesman, scholar, thinker, artist, or poet is not properly measured by his gains. Nevertheless, under commercialism the money yardstick will be naïvely applied to each and every kind of achievement, with the result that alongside successful business men the head men in every line of intellectual or idealistic endeavor will look like dwarfs. As the public comes to feel this, cupidity will be sharpened and corruption will invade every type of structure in society.

The idea that you should not disturb persons making money, as you would not disturb a laying hen on her nest, causes the public good to be sacrificed out of a superstitious reverence for business. Nature's stores of wealth are not conserved for posterity, lest opportunities for immediate profit be curtailed. The nation allows itself to become in spots "a polyglot boarding house," because mill-owners, mine operators, contractors, and railroad companies insist on an unlimited flow of cheap alien labor. Property is put above human life, for lawmakers stay

their hand when business men predict ruin if they are required to make their work places safe and sanitary!

Government is looked upon, not as guardian of every great public interest, but as bulwark of property rights and maintainer of conditions favorable to making money. Its master-aim is business prosperity, on the theory "Make employers content and they will make the people content." Such government services as public health, conservation, education, recreation, and relief are starved in order to keep taxes low or to subsidize private enterprises for profit; or else the prisons are run to make money for prison contractors, the parks, to enrich traction companies, the schools, to provide employers with cheap youth skilled at the public expense, the public-utilities commission, to make a market for issues of corporation securities.

The commercial fallacy so befuddles society that it no longer knows its bad from its good. Things plainly anti-social, such as the liquor traffic, race-track gambling, and commercialized prostitution, are spared on the ground that they are "businesses." Then, too, the open vice shop "brings people to town." A movement to clean up a rotten city government is deprecated as "hurting business." Chicane is all right if it is merely "the tricks of the trade." A crime committed without malice and merely "in the way of business" is condoned. The people are taught that speculation is not gambling, that tax dodging is not larceny, that railroad rebating is not treachery, that free transportation passes are not bribery, that deleterious adulteration is not murder. The large-scale malefactor of high finance goes unpunished because he is a "Napoleon," a "superman," "asserting the higher law which great enterprises have the right to command."

Since no people that is intelligent and free can long endure the unqualified ascendancy of business men, their influence needs to be balanced by that of other groups. During the period 1890-1905 American opinion more and more followed commercial minds, and the results are writ large in the alarming growth of materialism and corruption through this period. Thanks to a sudden flood of light on the ways of big business in the years 1901-1908 (known as the "literature of exposure") other groups—educators, social workers, economists, geologists, and physicians —have won the confidence of the public, while a much better

type has replaced the money-mad business men who spoke for our commercial element at the opening of the century.

Leisure class ascendancy. As corrective of unwholesome social tendencies the leadership of those who do not have to work for a living may be most salutary. This class may temper male ascendancy by diffusing that idealization of woman which grew up with medieval chivalry and gave birth to "lady" worship. Its love of pleasure may serve to counteract the morbid asceticism and "other-worldliness" which sometimes radiates from the clergy. Taking the enjoyer's point of view rather than the trader's, this class may check commercialism by insisting on valuing a thing or an activity by what it can add to life and not *by what it will fetch.*

But when the leisure class has the last word on everything, its influence may be very noxious. Exempt from labor, it makes leisure the cardinal index to superiority and meets all who would enter its charmed circle with the challenge, *Do you work for a living?* Out among the plain people, who, like Atlas, support the world on their shoulders, runs like devil grass the fantastic idea that work is disgraceful, until millions who have nothing to look forward to but the common lot are set at odds with their bread and butter. Not only do sensitive and aspiring workers come to hate their work, but, in order to avoid the ignominious thing, the shrewd crowd into shady occupations and invent numberless ways of "living by one's wits." At the threshold of the leisure class forms a corrupt half-world of *demimondaines,* procurers, onhangers, gamblers, touts, charlatans, swindlers, bravos, "gentlemen of fortune," and other higher parasites, which, like an abscess, continually pours out moral infection. This is the chief cause of the rottenness which always characterizes the later stages of an aristocratic society.

Leisure folk keep about them numerous servants, ostensibly to render their masters personal service but really to "perform vicarious leisure." So there grows up among them a sense of the shamefulness of waiting on yourself, which spreads out and prompts people who can ill afford it to pay some menial to do for them things they could easily do for themselves. It is felt demeaning to clean your clothes, black your boots, carry your luggage, roll your baby carriage, answer your doorbell, wait on your table, or wash your car. In order to hire these things done

for them the middle class scrimp on necessaries and have few children, while living is made dearer for all because too many workers quit production to render superfluous services.

The prestige of a leisure class rests on *conspicuous waste* as well as on *conspicuous leisure*. At the social summit, to be sure, are some so sure of their place that they are free to lead a "simple" life, but in general the leisured develop a prodigal manner of life, which most of the useful people accept as the *only* proper way of living. They feel that nothing adorns like precious stones; nothing is beautiful unless of costly materials; no raiment is fine but silk and broadcloth. There is nothing for furniture like rosewood and mahogany; for the palate, like champagne and truffles; for pleasure, like a theater party or a meet with the hounds. There is no society but the joint enjoyment of the expensive, no marriage save a church wedding, no rest save at a watering-place hotel. Thus foppish standards, begotten of spenders' rivalry, spread through society and corrupt homebred notions of what is fit or worth while. People come to scorn the joys at their elbow and pine for luxuries out of their reach. Ungratified worldliness gnaws at the heart of multitudes, while greed is whetted till even the decent turn to monopoly, extortion, chicane, and acquisitive crime.

When the new-rich force their way into high society with a torrent of expenditure no social barriers can withstand, the effect on public morals is yet more disastrous. The spectacle of their baronial estates, princely houses, liveried lackeys, and Sybaritic luxury contaminates even hard-headed persons with wealth worship. People fall apart into as many exclusive social groups as there are styles of living and forget how to meet the fellowman on the level. You are snob to those below and toady to those above you, so that the higher are cankered with pride, the lower with envy. If the workers accept these false values they cease to respect themselves and will in the end let themselves be governed by the wealthy.

MEANS OF DOMINATION

The means of maintaining ascendancy reach from sheer coercion to something like partnership.

Physical force. Assyrians, Huns, Goths, Tartars, Mongols, Moguls, Manchus, Mahdists, and Turks have ruled by the naked

sword. Even now in certain states of tropical America government is propped by guns.

Political inequalities originating in the exercise of force. Under the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns the cards were skilfully stacked against the dominated peoples and classes. By property qualifications for the suffrage, by unequal representation of tax-paying classes, by political privileges accorded to dominant races or nationalities and propertied classes, by political discrimination against subject races, nationalities or toilers, governments were constituted which would respond to the will of dominant elements rather than to that of the majority.

Corruption. For cash or other immediate personal advantage poor and ignorant voters will often turn over their votes to the political agents of the very elements which oppress and exploit them. At times in some of our commonwealths a party representing only selfish interests has been able to keep itself in power by the aid of votes purchased with money or favors. The naturalized foreign-born have been very susceptible to timely attentions and kindnesses shown them during their early difficult years in this country; hence, social work on a large scale originated in New York with Tammany Hall and kindred political organizations. In Chile, despite a democratic suffrage, the large landed proprietors preserve their control of the state by systematic corruption. The democratic or workingmen's party makes no small noise in the campaign, but on election day many who have shouted, paraded and worked for it sell their votes to the Conservatives for a week's wage. This is the reason a deputy will have to spend from $3000 to $6000 on his election, while a senator, having a larger district to handle, spends from $10,000 to $16,000. As such an outlay is prohibitive for the individual, no one aspires to a Conservative seat in Congress unless the rich landowners about Santiago will stake him with a corruption fund. Hence, it is the Santiago oligarchy that determines who shall stand for a given province on the Conservative ticket, and finds the money needed to elect him. Small wonder that the Chilean Congress refuses to enact a corrupt practices act.[3]

In Great Britain the king has always been "the fount of honor" and nowadays the titles and honors bestowed in the King's name and on the King's birthday are determined by the Govern-

[3] E. A. Ross, *South of Panama*, 1915, pp. 338-9, 344-7, 370-3.

ment. At times the granting of titles to commonplace industrial or financial magnates who have made heavy contributions to the funds of the party in power is tantamount to outright purchase of the means of political domination.

Towards the close of the last century there grew up in several American commonwealths state party bosses who secured large contributions to party funds from big businesses on the secret understanding that such contributors should enjoy special consideration when the party was in power. No one was nominated for office, or in any case aided with money in his campaign, who spurned the "advice" of the party boss in such matters. By "direct" nomination of party candidates, by legal limitation of campaign expenditures, and by enforced publicity of party receipts and outlay, the system of "invisible government" was much shattered 1910-1914.

Patronage. The Dutch in the East Indies dominate the natives partly by recognizing and patronizing the native sultan. Thus the Sultan of Djoka in Java retains his trappings and pomp while the Dutch collect the taxes in his name and he appoints the natives they want to do his justice. The Dutch enjoy a free hand while his people enjoy the illusion of being governed by their own Sultan. You see many autograph letters and presents the Sultan has received from Queen Wilhelmina of Holland with whom he corresponds as an equal. For such attentions he sells out his people to the foreigners, and becomes a puppet of the European resident adviser.

In eighteenth-century England George III built up in Parliament by the lavish distribution of offices, sinecures and pensions a party known as "the King's Friends," which could be relied on to stand by the king's ministry through thick and thin. The system, of course, could not have been maintained without a large number of "rotten boroughs," whose representatives in Parliament had no constituents to answer to. When organized labor began to be a force in the United States it was long kept politically null by the device of reserving certain Federal offices for its leaders. It is fear of thus being put off with a sop that has prompted the Socialist party in many countries to refuse to allow its leaders to accept office under another party.

The political use of spiritual power. The early Sultans at Constantinople contrived to turn the Eastern Church into an

instrument of Turkish dominion. The lower clergy, throughout the Christian lands conquered by the Turk, generally remained patriotic leaders, but the bishops and other higher clergy became tools of the Turk. In a Briton's [4] description of an archbishop in Cyprus we see what arrows fill the ecclesiastical quiver.

Geronymo held many weapons in his hands. First, as head of the church, he was the chief owner of land in this island, and could therefore raise the rent on hundreds of farms at any moment and on any pretext. Second, as head of the church, he was the biggest trader in the island, and could therefore raise the price of articles in the bazaars of every market town. Third, as head of the church, he was one of the chief exporters of wine, salt, and brandy, and could therefore easily derange the shipping trade and annoy the ports. These temporal means of mischief could be strengthened and inflamed by spiritual allies. He could stop the Sacrament and suspend the rites of marriage and sepulture. He could shut up church and cloister, put the altars under mourning, and deny a suffering people all the solaces of religion, from the act of baptism to the final offices of grace.

Under the old regime in Russia, the Tsar through the *Oberprocuror* of the Holy Synod held the Church captive and by means of twenty thousand village priests was able to disseminate among his credulous subjects any lie which suited his purpose as, *e.g.*, that the massacre of 1500 on "Red Sunday" in 1905 was caused by English and Japanese spies who incited the Petrograd workmen to march upon the palace simply in order to have them killed.

It is scarcely necessary to recall how characteristic has been alliance between throne and altar during the struggle of the European peoples against absolutism. Centralized churches have preached the Divine Right of kings, urged unquestioning obedience to constituted authorities as God's will, and opened their bosoms to the greatest dynastic tyrants and mass murderers while hurling their heaviest thunders upon those heroic self-sacrificing lovers of their fellowmen who contributed to bring in the new day.

Cherished ignorance. The spread of secular knowledge unsettles dominion in so far as it rests on ideas. The Romanoffs looked upon the brutish ignorance of their subjects as the brightest jewel of their crown. They made difficulties for the local

[4] Hepworth Dixon, *British Cyprus*.

councils (*zemstvos*) in planting schools among the common people, no new school could be opened without express authorization. High school and university were subject to high-handed interferences in order that their product might be "reliable."

In Java the Dutch gladly provide higher schools for training bright native lads to serve them in administering the country, but give very little encouragement to popular education. The government provides no elementary schools for the natives, so that tuition costs $25-$30 a year per pupil, in high schools $75-$125. Small wonder that less than a tenth of the children learn even to read. Three thousand Javanese of high school education or above, a third of all educated Javanese, were deported without trial 1926-8 and dumped down in the New Guinea jungle solely because they agitated for more educational and civil opportunities for their people. The Dutch assured me that they were Communists in the pay of Moscow!

In South America the ruling proprietary class wishes darkness to reign in the minds of the toiling masses. The *hacendados* fear lest schooling make the son of the agricultural laborer, the *peon* or *inquilino,* grow up demanding, or restless and migrant. They would have him stay on in his father's mud hut, content with the old hard life and deaf to the call of opportunity elsewhere. As one put it to me: "We don't want the children of our *inquilinos* disturbed in their minds."

The secret manipulation of public opinion. Propaganda proved itself so effective in the World War that to-day American would-be dominators have largely abandoned the risky methods of gaining their ends by bribing public men, buying votes, "colonizing" voters, "stuffing" ballot boxes, and have set themselves to molding the will behind the ballot. They seek so to work upon the citizen's mind that he will vote for the men and measures which suit *their* interests, and against the men and measures which advance *his* interests. The tactics of the banded American public utility companies, popularly known as the "power trust," reveal a new technique.

The driving force is billions of dollars in securities, a considerable portion of which is pure "water," which will appreciate if regulation of utilities is made a sham, and depreciate if regulation becomes effective or public ownership and operation of these utilities prevails. The plan is to gain control of the great

opinion-forming agencies, Press, Forum and School, regardless of what methods have to be used.[5] For example, newspaper favor is sought by spending annually millions of dollars for advertising electric stocks and appliances, so that newspaper "good will" will be secured and lead to a censorship of the news and editorial columns. Bright speakers in the secret pay of the power trust seize every opportunity to address clubs and other influential bodies. Whatever their theme, they contrive to get in a "dig" at public ownership. Debates on public utility policy are fomented between high schools and the team supporting the power trust view is furnished with data and helped to win. Ill-paid university professors are engaged to make "investigations." Researches thus made by supposedly independent authority show public ownership to be a failure, or on the way to failure, and the reports are given wide circulation. Sometimes textbook "surveys" are made which result in revision of the offending text or the substitution of one preferred by public utility executives. In an effort "to change and direct the economic thought and the economic practice of the American people" they seek to reach the minds of twenty million school children, many times by subterranean channels. On the laudable pretext of furnishing information a "catechism" or other pamphlet prepared and furnished free by power trust publicists is slipped into the high schools or grade schools where school heads are innocent enough to allow it. Women employees are trained for platform work and placed in grade schools to train children to regard private ownership of public utilities as synonymous with the American system of government and to fear the

[5] Among the "exhibits" of the Federal Trade Commission is a letter from an official of a big Pacific Coast public utility to the president of a Philadelphia company in which he states that the "Committee on Relations with financial institutions" many years ago "discovered the country bank." "We came to the conclusion about fifteen years ago that as a practical incentive to get the banks to work with us there is no substitute for deposits. A worth-while account has, therefore, been the keynote of our policy." "We have at this time accounts with 230 country banks scattered all over our territory, and while our policy keeps an average of around a million and a half dollars tied up in balances in these country depositories, we believe it is well worth while . . . because it cements their friendship and coöperation."

During the public utilities' campaign against the water-and-power act, "a scheme to put California in the power business," these bankers sent out "literally hundreds of thousands of personal letters and pieces of literature to their depositors and stockholders as well as campaigning against the act personally." "The other power companies in California follow pretty much the same policies I have outlined."

results of public operation. Such women often join clubs and attend social affairs as a part of their day's work and spread power trust propaganda without any knowledge on the part of their associates that they are on the secret pay roll.

The irony is that the public when it settles its bill for electric light or power furnishes the millions, charged to "operating expense," for all this bamboozlement and befuddlement!

Under "government by the people" the favorite manoeuver of entrenched greedy interests to dodge consideration of a proposal on its merits is to turn against the opponent one or more of the stocks of popular prejudice ever "on tap." They charge him with having "a dash of a tarbrush," with being a "sheeny," a "rough-neck," a "low-brow," an "atheist," a "red." They insinuate that he is intemperate, insolvent, or unpatriotic. If he is of humble origin, he is "from the gutter"; if he is learned, he is a "high-brow," a "brain-truster"; if he is high-minded, he is a "Pharisee"; if he dresses well, he is a "silk stocking." Anything to get a "change of venue" from reason to prejudice!

The sharing of the benefits from domination. When an empire has a superior culture to impart, its domination may be profitable to both parties. To the peoples she brought under her sway Rome offered peace, internal order, security of industry and property, Roman law, public works and the classical culture. Her rule was iron but broadly just; provinces like Spain and Gaul, which had resisted her yoke with desperation, later flourished wonderfully and became intensely loyal. Spain might have retained her colonies in America had she been less avaricious and cruel in her policy respecting them. The British *raj* in India and yet more in Malaya has brought certain great benefits to the subject peoples.

Modern capitalistic imperialism takes over a backward region in order that home concessionaires may convert to their own profit its forests, mineral resources, irrigable tracts and water power. In return the natives get (1) law-and-order, (2) public-health promotion, (3) the services of plant and animal pathologists and (4) improvement of the means of communication. The home public is regaled with a thousand pretty human-interest tales (*a la* Kipling) of the blessings bestowed on the simple-minded natives ("Thou art my father and my mother!") by the sent-in magistrates and medical men, but hears never a word

as to the luscious profits reaped by British "insiders" from the quietly-carved-up natural wealth of the dependency!

MORAL RESULTS OF DOMINATION

Weakening of character. "Prolonged subjection to a foreign rule," says Seeley, "is one of the most potent causes of national deterioration." Arrian, a Greek writer, declared of the East Indians:

> They are remarkable for simplicity and integrity; so reasonable as never to have recourse to law suits and so honest as neither to require locks to their doors nor writings to bind their agreements. No Indian was ever known to tell an untruth.

Indian character as we know it is such a contrast to this picture that the change can be accounted for only by long subjection to foreign rule.

The character of the Greeks a century ago, at the time of their struggle of liberation from the Turks, was in glaring contrast to that of the classical Greeks. The generations which have come on the scene since then, show in growing measure, the virtues of freemen. The Syrians are a fine stock, but life under oppression has tainted them with lying and trickery; not until a second generation has grown up free of the Turkish yoke will their normal character reappear. Some of the East-European Hebrews also show moral deformity from being under the heel of aliens. In Palestine, however, where they enjoy justice under Britain's mandate, such Hebrews slough off their oppression psychosis and develop in many cases a fine character.

There is no gainsaying the warping of woman's character under male domination. Just as the Turks regard Armenian trickiness as a race trait instead of the result of their own violence, so the deceit and cajolery by which women gain their ends under man's yoke are looked upon as sex characters instead of natural products of domination. The Saracenic civilization was intensely male and hence it is not surprising that the tales of the "Thousand and One Nights" harp on the "malice and craft" of women.

Emotional depression. In Japan the high head, squared shoulders and flashing eye of the young men as they pass foreigners in the street say: "We are masters here." In Manila

you mark the self-confident and manly bearing of the educated Filipinos conscious of open paths upward. In India, on the other hand, the educated act in your presence as if not quite sure of themselves; *they have been sat upon so often!* To be sure, the Swarajists, who have broken with the British, are independent in manner, even defiant; but many others are unmanned by the realization that, no matter how able or right they may be, it is always the Briton who decides. As you note that depressed look, that characteristic droop of the shoulders, that too-deferential air, you realize how unnatural it is that the will which reigns there originates sixty-five hundred miles away!

Oppression psychosis. The oppressed are likely to become hypersensitive and suspicious. They bear a "chip on the shoulder" and see slights where none were intended. They act groupwise, like the Irish in America, long after the special need for sticking together has passed. They are for any religion rather than that of their oppressors. Hence the Irish and Poles are last-ditch Catholics; the Czechs, staunch free-thinkers; the Koreans, sincere Methodists and Presbyterians! Wherever there is a privileged domineering state church the proletariat delight to spite it by joining the Socialists.

"Compensation." The push and effrontery that some immigrant Jews never get over is their way of "compensating" for their humiliation by the oppressor's contumely. So is the chauvinism of the Poles. The oppressed welcome the idea that they have a special "mission." Scattered and without a country the Jews kept alive their self-respect with the myth of being the "chosen people." The romantic poets of Poland put out the idea that Poland is the "Christ among the nations," i.e., that it will save the nations of Europe as Christ did humanity through His martyr death!

Striking a balance. On this question of domination no simple maxim like, "No man is good enough to govern another without that other's consent," or its opposite, "The backward races are the white man's burden," suffices. The peoples of Turkestan were immensely benefited by being brought under even such a régime as that of the Tsar. The African culture cannot fit for self government. On the other hand the Siamese have certainly developed faster than if, like their neighbors in Burma, they had fallen under alien rule. The subjection of the Chinese to

foreign domination would be, in the end, an incalculable misfortune for them.

RESISTANCE TO DOMINATION

Often the chief prop of domination is the belief of the dominated in the legitimacy of the existing relations. These relations, bedded in custom and gilded with master prestige, can best be challenged by *outsiders,* especially individuals from the dominating element, since their judgment in such a matter has weight. Hence, the leadership of the intellectuals in all successful proletarian movements, the rôle of "renegades" from the nobility in spreading socialistic agitation among Russia's peasants and workers. Of course, the material conditions must be ripe and belief in the legitimacy of domination must already have lost some of its magical binding power. But generally it is radical members of the class in the saddle who first spread doubt as to the propriety and necessity of being ridden.

Among the dominated the first to respond to subversive ideas are by no means those who have the most to complain of. The front fighters for the emancipation of women did not come out of the kitchen but out of the study or the drawing room. The first stirrings of the European labor movement occurred not where the masses were under the severest pressure, but where liberal ideas were ripe; for "it is not poverty which makes the poor man into a proletarian but *his philosophizing about it.*" The first battalions of workers to go into action against capitalist domination were not from the least-paid and worst-treated sections of the wage-earning class. In 1848 the French economist Blanqui traveling through the French centers of industry on Government commission was struck by the fact that always the most turbulent of the workers were the better paid ones. The earliest modern labor movement in England, that of the Chartists, came from the brightest and best paid stratum of labor.

To develop its utmost fighting power the dominated element must be unified and inspired and for this there is nothing better than the belief that its glorious destiny is to throw open the gates to an entirely new world, to conquer for all a juster, and happier future. Such a Messianic vision gave *élan* to the socialist movement which hoped to break in pieces the old social order to build on the ruins a new one "without boundaries of

nationalities, classes or sex." It kindled ardor in the movement for the emancipation of women, which dreamed that sex equality alone would end the injustice, brutality, war and oppression of our man-made world. It lent wings to the Youth Movement which aspired to replace the rotten régime of the graybeards with something honest, simple and true.

THE OUTLOOK FOR DOMINATION

There are thousands of American communities in which, under the prompting of Big Business, the commercial element has climbed into the saddle. In "Middletown," that industrial Mid-West city of 40-50,000, studied in 1925 and again in 1935:

Tolerance in religious matters has increased markedly in recent decades.

Economic tolerance—*e.g.*, toward deviant economic theories, labor organizations, and so on—has diminished.

The press has assumed an outwardly more urbane and tolerant air at the same time that the sources of news and the editing of the news have come more markedly under the influence of the single, peremptory point of view represented by its business world.

Educational tolerance . . . is increasingly likely to be curtailed by the growing awareness by the city leaders that they must control the things taught to the young.

. . . tolerance has apparently decreased in regard to national politics. Here again appears the enhanced recognition of the stake of business in national politics.[6]

. . . the old active tolerance bred of mutual respect and zest for adventure in a brave new world yet to conquer has given way to a defensive tolerance which allows dissent only where it must or where the thing tolerated is of no consequence.[7]

. . . free discussion like the Ethical Society of the 1890's, where men freely debated such topics as atheism, find no place in respectable business circles today.

Some of Middletown's most rugged independent thinkers in 1890 were the local doctors, judges, and lawyers. These men less often speak their minds; they have become to a greater extent intellectually colorless, and are sticking to their last making money.[8]

. . . Middletown seems recently to have been building its

[6] *Middletown in Transition,* by Robert S. Lynd, and Helen M. Lynd, 1937, p. 426.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 427.

[8] *Ibid.*

fences higher. The city is more antagonistic to outside groups; individuals in the city are more wary of each other.

New industries come to Middletown for the big profits to be made out of the low wages, long hours, and extraordinary submissiveness of local labor. Very skilfully the workers are kept thinking that the blessings of life flow from the men of wealth and the employers. In the "open shop" they believe as devoutly as the Chamber of Commerce itself. This state of mind is a "gold mine" to the local business men and they will go any length to prevent its being disturbed by either residents or "outside agitators." [9]

Nevertheless, domination *within* society is likely to wane. On comparing our time with the early eighteenth century, it is evident that a host of arbitrary discriminations—racial, religious, occupation, and class—have been wiped out. Dominations that proudly flaunted themselves are gone, or else survive only under cover. In place of the arrogant ruling classes are knots of sly wire-pullers! The chief yoke-breaker seems to have been *publicity*—not so much because it inflames the oppressed to revolt as because *it stirs neutral bystanders to interfere*. When the odious side of a domination is exposed multitudes of outsiders are disgusted and look eagerly for an opening to "sock" it. Just as the normal jury delights in giving the proven wife-beater "the limit," the public enjoys unhorsing those shown to be riding their fellow-men.

In short, publicity does in society what sunshine does in the physical world—it sanitates!

Nothing, it seems, can hinder our world from coming to be a vast auditorium. What the big gyved newspapers hold back the little "irresponsible" newspapers will let out. What the newspapers conspire to smother the broadcasters will "spill." What

[9] Observes H. D. Lasswell in *Politics*, 1937, p. 37:

The bias against government is strikingly indicated by the absence of a cartoon stereotype for the public as a recipient of benefits from public expenditures. The emphasis is all on the "Taxpayer." Often arrayed in a dark suit with a white collar, four-in-hand tie, sometimes with a white vest, often with light trousers, the taxpayer is one of those pathetic souls who always get it in the neck.

The frail little fellow has thinning hair, a long nose, a slight mustache, and glasses.

The "Taxpayer," unlike the "Public," is always being acted upon.

both newspapers and radio blanket the platform speakers and authors will divulge. As public high schools and universities multiply, more citizens will have had their youthful eyes opened by virile instruction in anthropology, history, government, economics, and sociology. Then, as the working week shrinks, myriads get their first look at what is going on "back of the scenery." Even if but a tithe of the new leisure is used for self-improvement, there will be millions of fresh recruits to the multitude of outraged bystanders eager to smite some noisome domination.

On the other hand, *alien* domination may actually increase in the near future. In the schooled peoples concern for family, neighborhood, or province comes second to concern for the nation. But, thanks to government control of school, film, radio, and press, in many countries the international outlook is exceedingly rare—has perhaps one supporter where nationalism has five hundred. Now the half-score of "powers" wield such weapons that they are able to do as they please with weaker peoples. In its earlier phase "imperialism" meant the bringing of savage, barbarous, or disorderly peoples under the rule of advanced peoples; of late it is taking a new and uglier "slant." As numbers grow and home supplies of raw materials become scanty, there is a restless quest for "suitable colonies." No international organization exists capable of curbing the greedy "power," nor is there the slightest prospect that any people will stay its hand from "conviction of sin." Through its control of news channels the government can bring its people to believe anything it wants them to believe and will command their whole-hearted backing for anything it sees fit to do to a weaker people. We must expect, therefore, to see many moves to encroach upon the sovereignty of civilized, Christian, self-governing, but weak, peoples.

CHAPTER XII

EXPLOITATION

All about us we see one making use of another, the wife becoming a barren parasite, the husband loafing on his wife's earnings, the grown son hanging around home, one brother or sister "working" the others, friend exploiting friend, and so on. The thing is common and its key is simple. *In any sentimental relation the one who cares less can exploit the one who cares more.*

Institutionalized exploitation. Whenever the law perceives in a personal relation a fine chance to exploit, it tries to supply safeguards. It scrutinizes suspiciously gifts from ward to guardian and looks into the circumstances surrounding the willing of property to those about the death bed. It limits freedom of contract so that infatuates may not mortgage their entire future in favor of another. Still, for all its benevolent intentions, the law cannot prevent many exploitations arising between individuals from differences in the strength of their situation, their character, or their mutual love. However, the exploitation most in need of attention is not that which contravenes the law but that which, being established in law or by the state, has become an *institution.* It may be defined as *any regular profiting of one element in society at the expense of other elements which would be abolished if the elements came to be equal in power.* Here is the key to the stubborn desire to dominate. The leading purpose in dominating is to *exploit,* i.e., *to use others as means to one's own ends;* hence, those in power resist all efforts to terminate their domination lest the exploitation which depends on it come to an end.

KINDS OF EXPLOITATION

The chief kinds of exploitation are:

1. *Sexual.* This has been one great object of women capture. "Booty and Beauty" have been the spurs pricking the young bucks of the tribe to foray. Sometimes a beaten people has been

required to deliver to the conquerors annually not only a money tribute but also a tribute of maidens.

2. *Religious.* In order to ingratiate themselves with their god the conquerors may force the beaten to worship him or to furnish youths to be sacrificed and maidens to be dedicated to their deity.

3. *Egotic.* The ego dilates before signs of abasement on the part of others. The Roman master exacted of his hangers-on (*clientes*) that they should attend him when he showed himself in public and thereby exalt his dignity. The proud senatorial landowner required of his tenants-at-will that they should periodically pay him their *obsequium* or humble respects. The feudal monarch exacted *homage* of his fief-holders. Louis XIV of France, the "Sun King," expected his loyal courtiers to gather at the Ox-Eye window of his palace to observe his going to bed and his getting up. The rise of the centralized monarchy on the ruins of feudalism in the seventeenth century involved the transformation of the lord living on and governing his fief into the *courtier*, who obtained for his son a place in army, state or church, for his daughter a good marriage, only by settling at the royal court and enhancing the glory of the monarch.

Taken together, however, all these exploitations amount to little; for the one overshadowing species of exploitation is

4. *Economic* i.e., *making others work for you or taking for your use the fruits of their unrequited toil.* Before the advent of mechanical power, if a man could not make others grind, tote and dig for him, he had to put his own back into it. Much as men hate to enslave their fellows, still more do they hate hard work. The modern sentiment against forced labor owes much to our success in harnessing the forces of Nature to our service.

LINES OF ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION

Exploitation crops up between a great variety of elements.

Offspring by parents. Thanks to natural parental love this has rarely gone far. None of the hundreds of nature peoples studied have been found to be hard on their children. The groups that took to exploiting their youngsters raised too few of them, hence disappeared. Among ourselves there is still a small contingent of fathers willing to keep their children out of school at work on farm or in mill.

Women by men. In primitive society practically all the work devolves upon the women. It is they who dress the skins, pitch the tent, make the garments, prepare the food, fabricate pottery, baskets, and mats. The Indian never touches the game he has brought in after he has dropped it at the tent door. The Eskimo man will not even draw the seal from the water after he has speared it. All *exploit* goes to man, all mere *drudgery* goes to woman. As game becomes scarcer and more and more the food supply comes from the little patches of corn or yams or manioc cultivated by the women, the men become parasites upon their wives. Hence, many peoples in the lower agriculture show women exploited by men. "The Wallach," says Palmer, "has an inveterate horror of any labor that can be avoided—as for the unavoidable, he has a very high ideal of the 'dignity of man' and considers that it is only right and fitting that he should spend the long summer days in a delicious siesta while his wife does all the work upon his little holding!"

Hogarth observes women in Turkey "carrying and laying the bricks of a rising house watched by a ring of squatting men," and adds, "I have seen a mother pass and repass a rapid rocky stream, carrying in succession a husband and two grown sons; and on the bare stones of Taurus all the women of a migrating horde trailing their bleeding feet after the camels, horses and asses which bore their fathers, husbands and brothers." [1]

Among the Hakkas of southern China as among the Dyaks of Borneo the idleness of the men arises from the power of tradition over the division of labor between the sexes. Formerly the men hunted and fought but, now that hunting and fighting are gone, inherited ideas as to what is "woman's work" keep the men from "buckling to."

Among our Appalachian mountaineers, as a relic from pioneer days when the men were abroad hunting much of the time, the woman carries the water from the spring, chops the wood, milks the cows and tends garden. Although the game failed a century ago, the men will not turn hand to such things; for they are "women's work."

The exploitation of women *by their own men folk* is dying rapidly owing to spread of the romantic-love pattern, rise of the plane of popular intelligence, equal schooling of boys and girls,

[1] D. G. Hogarth, *A Wandering Scholar in the Orient*, 1896, pp. 67-68.

powerful watchful women's organizations, enfranchisement of women, restraint by *mores* and laws friendly to females, and resort to birth control.

The flight of home industries to the factory *plus* birth control have made possible a new type, the parasite wife, who neither works nor bears children, yet imagines she bestows a supreme boon when she allows her man to support her!

Poor by rich. Wealth may be the means of establishing an exploitive control over other men. The wily Jacob acquiring the famishing Esau's birthright for a mess of pottage is a symbol of how a temporary surplus may be converted into a permanent advantage.

Wealth, i.e., *economic power,* may be converted into many other kinds of power, political, legal, social, ecclesiastical, religious, etc.; but these in turn can be converted into wealth. Rich men may use their money to get into politics but once there they may use their political power to gain more money. They may use their money to acquire for themselves more legal rights and then use their legal rights to gain more money. They may use their money to win a control over needy men and use this control to gain more money. Thus the formula for the exploitative utilization of riches is Wealth—Power—More Wealth.

By bribery the wealthy shift the main burden of taxation upon those too poor to bribe. A few years ago American multimillionaires residing in New York City were paying taxes on from a twentieth up to a tenth of what their fortunes proved to be when probated. The attorney most conspicuous in the formation of "trusts" in industry admitted that by means of a present he induced the assessment official to let him write in the figures on which the numerous combinations he represented paid taxes!

The rich may harass the small proprietor until he sells out cheap. In the Roman Empire the law was unable to protect the petty landowner against the encroachments of his senatorial neighbor. So he abandoned his holding, sold it at a nominal price, or donated it to the great man with the understanding that he might remain on it at the pleasure of his master. This tenure was known as *precarium.*

The numerous owners of anthracite coal lands in eastern Pennsylvania were forced to sell to the big coal companies because the latter by controlling the coal-carrying railroads were able to

levy upon their competitors exorbitant charges for carriage. In the end the little holders let their coal lands go for a pitiful price. A like control over the carriers enabled the dominant petroleum concern to acquire our Eastern oil lands at a fraction of their value. Often in the American West the big rancher used his numerous armed cowboys to ruin the "homesteader" and chase away the small cattleman in order that he might himself grow rich on grazing stolen from the public lands.

The institution of *debt slavery* permits the rich to take advantage of the distress of the poor by loan contracts which sink the borrower and his descendants into perpetual bondage in case the loan is not repaid at the appointed time. Centuries before the tsars bound the peasants to the soil, many Russian cultivators had lost their liberty of removal from one manor to another in consequence of owing money to the landlord. In tropical America the institution of *peonage* permits the planter to bind the agricultural laborer to his *hacienda* by means of a small advance of cash or goods.

Some years ago investigation by the United States Immigration Commission disclosed the fact that immigrant peonage existed in every state in the Union save Oklahoma and Connecticut. Although in the South and West many aliens were being held to labor against their will under intolerable conditions, it was in the lumber camps of Maine that the commission found "the most complete system of peonage in the country."

An *exorbitant charge for the use of capital* is another means by which the monied man exploits the poor. We read of Java.[2]

> It is not the large European capitalist, but the small native or Oriental capitalist, who is the most conscienceless exploiter of peasant labor. Many of the Javanese peasants have their crops mortgaged for three years in advance, and are forced to pay interest at the rate of from 10 to 50 per cent a month. Were it not for the protection afforded to the natives by their land laws a considerable part of their land would soon pass into the hands of Chinese usurers through mortgage foreclosures.

It is foolish to suppose with the anarchists that the *State* is the one great engine of exploitation. Often government is the sole check upon the power of the rich to hire bravos to work their will upon small neighboring proprietors whose lands they covet.

[2] Bulletin U. S. Dep't of Labor, *Labor Conditions in Java*, p. 933.

When public authority abdicates, the poor or friendless man has to submit himself to him who has armed kinsmen or retainers at his beck. The Senate Committee on Civil Liberties' investigation of 1937 disclosed an astounding number of spies and bullies retained by American industrialists to intimidate their labor.

How government may affect the use of capital to exploit others is illustrated in the policy of the Soviet Government respecting the farm tractors, combines, etc., it was turning out. Had it sold or leased them to the better-off peasants (*kulaks*), the middle and poorer peasants would have had to pay an exorbitant price to get their land tilled. Instead the Government set up 3,000 tractor stations over agricultural Russia and all peasants have the use of them on the same terms.

The industrious by the leisured. Only the leisure class has the time, the organization, the continuity, and the resources for putting through an exploitive enterprise. One of their great strokes was getting the European State to release the holders of the fiefs from their feudal obligations, so that great parcels of land granted originally as a means of endowing the defense of the realm became on easy terms private property pure and simple. Another was the wresting of land from the old European village communities. Kropotkin insists:[3]

> The village communities had lived for over a thousand years; and where and when the peasants were not ruined by wars and exactions they steadily improved their methods of culture. But as the value of land was increasing in consequence of the growth of industries, and the nobility had acquired under the state organization a power which it never had under the feudal system, it took possession of the best parts of the communal lands.

Perhaps the nearest modern counterpart is the appropriation of the natural wealth of Mexico by the "Cientificos" under President Diaz, 1880-1910, and the stealing of farm land from peasants and native communities until agricultural Mexico came to mean 8000 great estates.

The ignorant by the intelligent. Relations freely entered into between two intelligent persons will probably benefit both, whereas if one is ignorant the same relation may lead to his exploitation by the other. The European trader goes to the uncivilized native of the tropics and induces him to part with

[3] *Mutual Aid*, 1904, p. 236.

everything he has for spirits or opium, or tempts him with goods on credit. The trader offers gay cloth, knives, gongs, guns and gunpowder to be paid for by some natural product of the jungle or some crop not yet planted. The native has not sufficient forethought to take only goods he can pay for and not enough energy to work early and late to get out of debt; he sinks deeper and deeper into the morass and remains for years or for life a debtor.

The mining companies in Peru recruit most of their underground labor through agents who go about and "hook" the guileless native. The "hooker" turns up in a village some weeks before the annual fiesta in honor of its patron saint. On such an occasion the Indian is wont to "blow" himself because his entire emotional, recreative, and social life centers about this *fiesta*. What with presents of vestments or jewels to the effigy of the saint, fees to the priest for masses, and a feast for his numerous relatives and friends, he is in a mood to embark on reckless spending. Comes now the wheedling "hooker" and offers him from $30 to $50 cash, provided only the Indian will sign a bond to repay the debt by labor. Often the Indian signs the contract when drunk and usually he fails to realize where he is to work and how. He thinks he is to work for the "hooker," whereas he may be sent a hundred miles away to toil in a freezing mine gallery or a hot cane field. Buried far from home in a coastal sugar *hacienda* or a *montaña* coffee estate, the poor fellow finds himself a slave without a shred of legal protection and quite at the mercy of his employer.[4]

Siam's gravest problem is the pressing in of the neighboring Chinese who, being exceedingly economic-minded, regularly get the better of the Siamese in trade and money lending. By loans and mortgage foreclosure they do the simple Siamese peasant out of his patrimony, so that the government contemplates the restriction of immigration from China.

The Filipinos, too, are by no means capable of holding their own against a race equipped for gain-getting by ages of the severest struggle for existence. Chinese smuggled from the mainland into Mindanao in a *prau* by night will be found a few years later at the head of big Philippine enterprises or branches of trade. It is not that the Celestials are so much abler but that they have become *specialized* in trade.

[4] E. A. Ross, *South of Panama*, 1915, p. 153.

The persecution of the Jews in Tsarist Russia was prompted far less by religious bigotry than by peasant resentment of their exploitation by Jewish shopkeepers, money-lenders, grain buyers and *vodka* sellers. In the same way the Turkish peasants were roused against their Armenian and Greek neighbors by experience of their inability to hold their own in dealings with these wily elements.

The unorganized by the organized. In the last two centuries of the Roman republic the territory won by arms, although the property of the state, was in the hands of four or five hundred magnates whose citadel of power was the Senate. Beneath them lay several millions of freemen, Italians or provincials. The former held great blocks of the land of the state by "precarious" tenure; the latter were in turn precarists of the former. Thus there was a hierarchy of tenants and subtenants, all holding directly or indirectly land belonging to the state. But since the magnates were usually senators, i.e., the government itself, their dependence on the state was nominal. They even rid themselves at last of every payment for the use of their immense stretches of public land. On the other hand, the dependence of the suboccupants upon these magnates was real and strict, so that the latter realized the full worth of the use of the land. It is thus that a phalanx handles the unorganized.

Between 1827 and 1864 Spain drew from Cuba a revenue of eighty-seven millions of dollars. Says Alleyne Ireland.[5]

The Dutch East India Company was a company of brisk and energetic tradesmen who with profits as their lodestar and greed as their compass obtained through the chance of events absolute control of one of the most beautiful and fertile regions of the earth and unhesitatingly sacrificed it to their low ideals.

In the thirty-five years of the full operation of the "culture system" in Java it contributed over $200,000,000 to the treasury of Holland, representing chiefly profits on the sale of government coffee and sugar, after paying all the expenses civil and military of Netherlands India.

The unparalleled looting of many large American cities in the years before the great civic awakening which began about 1905, exemplifies the leverage afforded by organization. The "grafters"

[5] *The Far Eastern Tropics*, 1905, p. 173.

were not numerous but they paid no attention to party lines or to the line between public business and private business. With the saloon keepers, gamblers, and keepers of houses of prostitution, the gas, electric lighting, water, tramway, and railway companies, together with certain favored contractors, bankers, and business men, the politicians formed a "ring" buttressed by the votes of blind partizans, selfish job holders, naïve naturalized immigrants, and venal "floaters," reinforced by electoral frauds. The robbed taxpayers were far more numerous, but they were for the most part unaware of how they were exploited, or else divided on lines of party, nationality, occupation, or social class. Years of exposure and agitation were necessary to arouse the citizens to the point of banding together against the *plunderbund;* but once they rose the ringsters were swept away like chaff before a gale.

The laity by the priests. Among the rural people of India there is no domestic incident which does not entail its tax of offerings or food for the Brahman. Nothing happens without the Brahman being "feed and fed." To sustain the spiritual life of the people is not their concern. As Brahmans their business is to eat, not to teach.

When Cyprus came under Britain in 1878 the tricks of the Greek Church were laid bare. Observed Hepworth Dixon:[6]

> Pasha and archbishop had always much in common. By their birth and training they were Oriental and their notions of government were those of Oriental men. Each fleeced his flock; one shearing with his hanjar and the other tearing with his crook. Hanjars are sharper instruments than crooks; but in the hands of skilful shepherds, crooks can comb out lots of wool. So long as pasha and primate could agree about the times for fleecing, little was left for the poor sheep, except to stand up quietly to the knife.

In Roumania the superstitious peasants believe that if a man dies without a lighted candle in his hand he will not reach Heaven. But since many persons *do* die without the lighted candle in hand, the country priest charges the dead man's family eighty francs to get him into Heaven and a certain annual sum to keep him there.

In South America[7] the Indians of the Sierra are still exploited

[6] *Op. cit.*, pp. 43-44.

[7] E. A. Ross, *South of Panama*, 1915, pp. 321, 322.

by their *curas* by means of practices which the church outlawed as long ago as the Council of Trent (1563). They collect their baptismal, marriage, and burial fees *in advance* and these fees are not fixed but are assessed according to the means of the family. Thus they contrive to absorb the entire surplus of the natives, so that a grossly ignorant half-breed *cura* may extract from the poor herdmen of the Bolivian highlands an income which would do credit to one of our metropolitan pulpits!

Exploitation *via* religion is waning rapidly. Not only are the beliefs crumbling which underpin such exploitation, but among believers the idea finds increasing favor that you can "save" yourself by your own efforts, without calling in any priest or church. Increasing recurrence to the Old Testament Prophets and to the Gospels works against the sacerdotal claims which make exploitation easy.

Conquered by conquerors. Since the stronger ceased to eat the beaten, or to kill him in order to appropriate his women, the omnipresent motive in conquest has been economic exploitation. Homer's Greeks made war for the sake of booty but later generations became adept at squeezing tribute out of the weaker. The revenue derived by the Roman Republic from her eastern conquests made it possible from 167 B.C. on to exempt the Romans from paying taxes to the state. By Cæsar's time two-thirds of the population of the capital were in receipt of wheat largesses. Three hundred and twenty thousand citizens representing at least 600,000 persons had become dependent on the weekly dole of wheat and oil, and sometimes wine, extorted from the provinces as tribute. These, however, were the petty parasites. Rome was also the feeding and roosting place of the greater vampires, the governors, senators, capitalists, landlords and slave merchants, who were using the Roman legions to bleed the Mediterranean world.

In the words of G. Ferrero: [8]

> As little by little the treasures of Mithridates, conquered by Lucullus in the Orient, arrive in Italy, Italy begins anew to divert itself, to construct palaces and villas, to squander in luxury. Pompey, envious of the glory of Lucullus, follows his example, conquers Syria, sends new treasures to Italy, carries from the East the jewels of Mithridates, and displaying them in the temple

[8] *Characters and Events of Roman History*, 1909, p. 19.

of Jove, rouses a passion for gems in the Roman women; he also builds the first great stone theatre to rise in Rome. All the political men in Rome try to make money out of foreign countries; those who cannot, like the great, conquer an empire, confine themselves to blackmailing the countries and petty states that tremble before the shadow of Rome; the courts of the secondary kings of the Orient, the court of the Ptolemies at Alexandria—all are invaded by a horde of insatiable senators and knights, who, menacing and promising, extort money to spend in Italy and foment the growing extravagance.

Presently for very heavy toil, such as mining, moving heavy objects, turning grinding mills and bringing wild land under cultivation, free labor was not to be had, so that it was necessary to coerce men to work. Free men preferred beggary, or parasitism on the rich, which was greatly developed in the ancient world. Hence the demand for slaves was insatiable. "The later campaigns on the Rhine and the Danube, were really slave hunts on a gigantic scale." Manstealing was a regular trade. With the least relaxation of vigilance on the part of the state the sea was beset by pirates and the road by brigands, who distributed their human catch through distant markets, especially Delos, the great slave market of the Græco-Roman world.

There is no sign that the greed of the Crusaders was damped by their Christian faith. Under them the bulk of the rural population of Syria sank into a slavery more grievous than they had known under the Arabs. In the inventories of the estates of Frankish barons they were listed with the "live stock." History shows no more relentless exercise of the rights of conquest. Even the Syrian Christians were enslaved. Nor were the Crusaders less ruthless in their treatment of the town populations of Syria. Very often they slew all the Mohammedan citizens, sold their wives and children, and seized the masterless property. It was a rule among the champions of the Cross that he who first entered a house became owner of it, and everything in it. There was no respect whatever for the private rights of the conquered. Thus many a penniless ruffian became wealthy and founder of a "noble" house.

For heartless exploitation of the weak the conduct of the *conquistadores* toward the natives of Spanish America remains unmatched. For two centuries probably no Spaniard came nearer to manual labor than superintending from his saddle the movements

of native workmen. Some thousands of Indians would be granted to a Spaniard on the theory that he was to provide them instruction in the "things of our holy Catholic faith." As a just recompense to him for thus saving their souls, they were to serve him with their bodies.[9] Under this pious cloak the invaders seated themselves firmly on the backs of the natives, and remained there while their serfs washed gold for them or tended herds or grew food. Besides sending great quantities of produce to their masters who lived in the cities the villagers had to send one seventh of their number to serve the masters directly, while the state took another quota to work in the silver mines. In the latter case the loss of life among those suddenly translated from the valleys or lowlands to pits and galleries at an altitude of 15,000 feet was frightful. In the neighborhood of Potosi the Indian population fell within a hundred years to a tenth of its original number.

Open wholesale exploitation of this sort is now on the wane not so much because our enterprising element has a heart as because all the peoples watch each other and the whole world may ring with the atrocities committed for the sake of rubber on the hapless natives along the Congo or the Putumayo. Then, too, machinery, steam and motor lessen the demand for forced human labor, so that it is chiefly in the extraction of the natural wealth of the tropics that the old brutal exploitation survives.

The governed by the rulers. In ancient India the king was master and owner of all the land; in the ceremony of inauguration he is expressly said to be "the devourer of his people." In the First Book of Samuel under guise of prophecy the practical significance of an Oriental kingship is brought out.

> He will take your sons and appoint them unto him for his chariots, and to be his horsemen, and they shall run before his chariots; and he will appoint them unto him for captains of thousands, and captains of fifties; and some to plough his ground and to reap his harvest, and to make his instruments of war

[9] Wrote Pizarro, Peru's conqueror, to a boyhood friend in Spain:

> The two pigs, the burro shared the one room in which lived you, your parents, your eleven brothers and sisters the last time I visited you. The cock crowed from the footboard of your parents' bed. Come to Peru. I will make you Lord of a palace of a hundred rooms. Five hundred slaves will be yours, an estate of ten thousand acres. Would you believe it, nearby is a spring that runs, not water, but wine? When we shoot the wild duck, it drops already stuffed, roasted hot, ready for hungry stomachs. . . .

and the equipment of his chariots. And he will take your daughters to be perfumers and cooks and bakers. And he will take your fields and your vineyards, and give them to his officers and to his servants. And he will take your menservants and your maidservants and your goodliest young men, and your asses, and put them to work. He will take the tenth of your flocks, and ye shall be his servants.

In the later Roman Empire many Roman subjects settled beyond the frontier among the barbarians in order to win clear of recruiting officer and tax gatherer. Under the Merwing kings of France taxes were no longer looked upon by the people as contributions for protection, but as mere organized pillage. Queen Fredegond repentant recognizes in the gathering of taxes not the support of necessary public functions but "the hoarding of the tears of the poor, the sighs of widows and orphans."

Under Charlemagne and his successors the count, charged with administering a district in the name of the king, dispensed justice, raised taxes, and levied troops without any legal restrictions on his acts. He had to be wary of the great landowners and bishops, but he was held in check by no assembly of any sort. He became therefore a local tyrant. His cupidity was whetted by the fact that often he had bought his countship. Unsalaried he paid himself out of fines, taxes, and payments for exemption from military service. Hence, the abuse of power was profitable to him and he made justice as severe, taxes as heavy, and military service as exacting, as possible. Small wonder that the rich purchased of the king immunity from the count's jurisdiction, and by thus honeycombing the state hastened the advent of feudalism.

In the Malay States before the advent of the British Resident one found

A system of taxation under which every necessary as well as every luxury of life was heavily taxed; law courts in which the procedure was the merest mockery of justice, the decisions depending solely on the relative wealth or influence of the litigants; . . . a system of debt-slavery under which not only the debtor but his wife and their remotest descendants were condemned to hopeless bondage; an unlimited *corvêé* or forced labor for indefinite periods and entirely without remuneration; and the right of the raja to compel all female children to pass through his harem.

State exploitation is fading out because it "kills the goose that lays the golden eggs." Modern government therefore does not

exploit directly but enforces the property and contract rights by means of which the dominant class (or classes) exploits others. It stands back of the legal rights of the landlords, the *amos,* the *hacendados,* the *pomieshtchiks,* the wool kings, the cattle kings, the mine operators, the usurers, the monopolists, the big industrialists and other groups which enjoy exploitive advantage.

A class which aims to control government in order to legitimate and safeguard its privileges and property claims, is not primarily interested in having the salaries of offices or the spending of taxes. The government which meets its requirements may be quite honest, economical and efficient. What is known as "good government" in American cities often means nothing more than the clearing out of useless placemen, along with the elimination of "graft" from public works and the purchase of public supplies. It may have nothing in common with self-government or popular government, but may signify simply that a roused business or propertied class has wrested control from the shady politicians and crooked business men, in order to restore government to the functions they are interested in.

GENERAL TRUTHS ABOUT EXPLOITATION

1. *The social elements differ in original disposition to exploit.* Handworkers are less eager to live off others than those in pecuniary employment, such as traders, manufacturers, and bankers. None are such mad exploiters as those bred to leisure, for they claim a God-given right to live delicately at the expense of others. "Neverworks" are in sooth the most dangerous element in society, for in order to be supported they are willing to sacrifice morals, religion, popular liberty, and national independence. No political movement is so bloody, sordid and unpatriotic as a White Terror.

2. *Exploitation is more open, ruthless and stubborn between the unlike than between the like.* Family feeling, "the call of blood," damps the impulse to exploit. One part of a kin group does not prey upon another part. Strong tribal, national, or denominational consciousness checks exploitation within the tribe, the nation, or the religious body. Exploitation is worst just after a conquest, every step in the assimilation of conquerors and conquered brings a let-up. People without predatory traditions (South African Boers) will enslave aborigines very unlike themselves.

African slavery was tolerated by European opinion long after it had outlawed white slavery.

So exploiters *stress or invent unlikeness* in order to justify themselves. The Southern master insisted that the Negro "has no soul," or saw his bondage as God's punishment laid upon the descendants of Ham, who failed to show respect to Father Noah! The religious orders in the Philippines excused their neglect to provide for popular education by representing the natives as "monkeys." For centuries the English insisted that the Irish were a turbulent race incapable of governing themselves! Islam prohibited the enslavement of the faithful but approved that of "infidels." Difference has, indeed, such validating power that the very ignorance and degradation long exploitation begets will be offered as a justification for its continuance!

3. *An element is ready and whole-hearted in exploitation in the degree that it constitutes a self-conscious group.* Islam knit together the Asiatic invaders of southeastern Europe in collective exploitation of their Christian subjects. In the Middle Ages Christianity gave the population the solidarity it needed for systematically exploiting the Jews. On the march to Peking in 1900, race consciousness gave the allied armies warrant for common maltreatment of the peaceful Chinese along their route.

4. *Exploiters never relinquish exploitation.* A kept class does not tire of living on the fruits of other men's toil nor does it ever renounce exploiting from "a conviction of sin." Its outlook takes color from its parasitism and it never fails to develop moral distinctions and theories which justify its economic base. Individual members may come to feel doubts but their class ejects them, dresses its ranks and moves on.

Nevertheless, the spirit of the age reverberates even in the members of an exploiting class, and in some cases they have been brought to feel compunction respecting their relation to those who support them. This feeling expresses itself *not in a movement utterly to give up parasitism,* but in insistence on greater humanity toward the exploited or in the recognition of "duties" and "responsibilities" toward them. Toward the end of feudalism there was a movement among the lords to better the lot of the serfs. Southern slaveholders developed higher standards of humanity in the treatment of their slaves and punished atrocities by the more ferocious masters. Employers adopt "welfare" work and "safety

first" for their employees, while capitalists urge the "Golden Rule" in business and espouse such doctrines as the "stewardship of wealth" and "the Christianization of capital." Imperial countries admit their obligation to spend a part of the revenue extracted from a tropical colony in improving the colony, while kings by Divine Right acknowledge their duty to promote the welfare of their subjects. But *never* do the exploiters *of their own motion* abolish serfdom, or slavery, or absolutism, or turn loose the dependency, or socialize the great estates, or adopt progressive taxation, or extend public ownership. Slavery, serfdom, peonage, landlordism, industrial feudalism, absolutism, or monopoly *never end by consent,* but only by coercion.

5. *Foreign domination is likely to suppress intra-social exploitations.* If the foreign masters exploit the dependency they will be *jealous* of the native exploiting groups, if they do not they will be *disgusted* by them. The Romans followed the principle of *Parcere subjectis, debellare superbos* in order to create in the dependency an interest loyal to their rule. In India the British curbed the rapacity of the insatiable native princes. The Americans on taking over the Philippines found the brazen parasitism of the friars, who owned one fifteenth of the cultivated land, so odious that soon they packed them off.

6. *Outside control menaces the maintenance of an exploitation.* In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries negro slavery was more inhumane in the self-governing colonies of the English West Indies than in the Spanish and French West Indies, which were governed from Europe. Lay churches, like the Protestant denominations, were more complaisant about slavery than the Roman Catholic Church. In Virginia, Jamaica and Barbados, where the masters controlled both state and church, the slaves had the fewest rights. Eastern opinion, working through the Federal Government, has checked the frontiersman's grabbing of the land of the Indian, and the trader's robbery of him by selling him whiskey. Aroused British opinion put an end in 1833 to slavery in the English colonies, while Northern hostility, aroused chiefly from 1835 on, was the cause of the downfall of slavery in the United States. The coming of Hawaii under American law in 1898 automatically terminated the system of indentured labor which the planter class had established on the sugar plantations. If there are still five or six million slaves in the world despite seven or

eight million emancipated in the last hundred years, it is because they are in regions like the Sudan, Sierra Leone, Arabia and Nepaul, where it is difficult to bring outside pressure to bear.

This is why sociologists are cautious about joining in a cry for "home rule," which many consider the last word in political righteousness and wisdom; they want to know what group expects to benefit from "home rule"!

7. *Masked exploitation outlasts open exploitation.* In an enlightened democratic society the only considerable exploitations that can survive *are clandestine.* Jobbery in municipal contracts is secret. The "white slave" traffic is furtive. A race-track gambling scheme wears the guise of an amusement enterprise or an encouragement of horse breeding. Peonage is remote and has an innocent air. Monopoly endures not in virtue of royal grant or favoring law, as in olden time, but by reason of hidden rebates from carriers or secret understandings among commercial rivals. The periodical shearing of "lambs" in the stock market is tolerated only because the process is not understood by the public.

Hence, what latter-day exploitation most dreads is *being unmasked.* What it fights most desperately is investigation or exposure. It centers its pressure on newspaper men, newspapers, magazines, prosecuting attorneys, legislative committees, professors of the social sciences, clergymen, agitators—in a word on those who may show it up or direct public attention its way. *Alarmed resistance to publicity on the part of a business organization affords just grounds for suspicion.*

8. The favorite mask of an exploitation is a *counter service or return which falls far short of being an equivalent.* The virtual slavery of the indebted peon is camouflaged by crediting him with wages for his labor, then charging him "five prices" for the paltry supplies he obtains from the planter's store. His laboring like a slave for mere food and clothes appears as a double transaction of purchase and sale. The ghastly servitude of the Indians on the Putumayo in eastern Peru hid itself in the books of the British company as the exchange of raw rubber at an incredibly low price for food and clothes at a price five or ten times their real worth. Under the system maintained formerly by the Dutch government in Java each native was obliged to keep six hundred coffee trees in bearing and deliver the crop cleaned and sorted at the government warehouse at a fixed price—nine and twelve

florins the *picul* previous to 1874, although forty and forty-five florins were paid in the open market of the ports.

Forced labor being unknown to American law the operators of Southern lumber or turpentine camps used to provide themselves with the negro labor they could not attract by wages by having able-bodied negroes arrested on some flimsy or trumped-up charge. By paying their fines when they were sentenced to the chain-gang to work out these fines the operators gained control of the negroes' labor power at a trifling expense.

9. *Opportunities for masked exploitation multiply as social relations become involved and social interdependence more extended.* Once the worshiper offered his sacrifice himself, but the custom of letting the priest do it opens the door to extortion. Of old one might conduct one's case, but the custom of appearing in court only by attorney delivers the litigant to the legal profession. Reliance upon bought food or milk gives the adulterator his chance. In the South a too-commercial farming has often enslaved the cultivator to the storekeeper with his mortgage and crop liens. Producing for the market instead of for home consumption exposes the farmer to the exactions of elevator men, grain buyers and common carriers; the remedy is "Raise your own stuff." The investment of capital gives an advanced people a means of exploiting a backward people quite as productive as the brutal extraction of tribute. The spread of the opium evil among the Chinese under the stimulation of British traders, who even forced two wars rather than be interfered with, illustrates the perils which lurk in trade.

10. *Whatever lessens inequalities among social elements in respect to intelligence, courage, organization, discipline or situation narrows the power of the one to exploit the other.* Gunpowder leveled up the townsmen with the barons and knights. The proofs of intelligence and capacity given by the French commoners before the Revolution made absurd the ancient privileges of nobles and clergy. Many believe that if our Southern negroes gain industrial skill and accumulate property they will not for long be kept out of their rights. Organization among farmers brought about a great change of attitude on the part of the "Granger" railroads. In many countries rural coöperatives have freed farmers from gougings by middlemen. Credit coöperatives trim the claws of the local money lender. From Ireland to Argentina organization

among rural tenants has quickly broken landlord oppression. The Japanese Tenants' Union cut down by two-fifths the share of the crops taken by the landlord. Labor organization is naturally hated by employers for it wipes out much of their economic advantage. The forming of a union among actors or newspaper writers or kitchenmaids or longshoremen with resulting publicity has a magic effect in ending the worst abuses of which they are victims. Modern economic analysis weakens the kept classes because, by tracing their high social position to *privilege* rather than to *intrinsic superiority,* it deflates their prestige. The doctrine that all are equally sons of God undermines the eighteenth-century axiom, "God will think twice before he damns a person of quality."

THE OUTLOOK FOR EXPLOITATION

1. By prolonged isolation and selection noble breeds of horses and dogs have been built up. Were the laws of breeding applied consistently to human beings for three millennia there might be an all-noble people; until then any promising opportunity to exploit others will be promptly snapped up.

2. The encroachments of production-for-sale on production-for-use continually open doors to cunning exploiters. At present consumers have little protection against the skullduggery of producers and middlemen.

3. The few and simple restraints of a primitive society will not suffice for a complex modern society. Restraints upon would-be exploiters will have to become many, various, definite and well-enforced if anything like justice is to prevail.

4. There is nothing hopeless in the outlook, never was sentiment against exploitation so general; all we have to do is to block later and subtler forms of exploitation as effectively as man-stealing, shanghaiing, kidnapping, slaveholding and piracy have been blocked.

5. It is so natural for the greedy and cunning to devise means of getting the simple and trustful "on the hip" that the uprooting of every form of grievous exploitation can be achieved only under the leadership of the intellectual and moral *élite.*

6. In a normal people "Am I my brother's keeper?" is generally answered in the affirmative. Altruistic persons with leisure become indignant and band together in order to foil exploiters of the weak or confiding.

7. As a rule the ignorant are easier to exploit than the intelligent, the illiterate than the literate, the unschooled than the schooled. Better education for all is therefore an anti-exploitation policy, although one should beware of expecting too much from it.

8. There is no lack of competent persons to put in charge of the machinery for administering the laws thwarting some specific form of exploitation. That many boards created for such a purpose have disappointed high hopes is because exploiters quietly saw to it that these were manned with persons who had no wish to make them succeed.

9. There is much humor and ready laughter among Americans largely because they have been freed from so many of the old exploitations and fears of exploitation. Nothing makes sour and dour like the sense of being helpless under the flaying knife.

10. People who have ample reason to feel confidence in the good will of their government towards them will never lend themselves to a movement to overthrow it. The government instant to shield all elements of its people against every form of exploitation need have no dread of a revolutionary uprising.

11. The claim that the employer-employee relation of necessity opens the door to exploitation cannot be conceded. That in myriads of cases it has done just that does not prove that exploitation of the worker lies in the very nature of private employment. Labor may be exchanged for money on equitable terms provided that the two parties do not stand far apart in bargaining power. You hear of "wage slaves" but never of "salary slaves"; yet it is to be supposed that the employer makes a profit out of both! The latter, however, are in a stronger position for bargaining.

12. If the foes of exploitation aim to wipe out all inequalities of pay between workers of very unequal value to the enterprise, any régime they set up will quickly crash. Equalization of pay is an altogether different thing from equalization of opportunity.[10] Let the more competent feel that the superiority of their services commands no recognition in the pay schedule and they will eventually find means of fashioning a social order more to their liking.

[10] No justification is intended here for the fact that in 1936 forty American corporations paid 75 of their executives salaries larger than that received by the President of the United States! Salaries of from 50 to 200 times the earnings of the average worker in the industry are not uncommon. How salaries are boosted to such figures is well understood.

PART IV

CONFLICT AND ADAPTATION

CHAPTER

XIII. Opposition

XIV. The Good Side of Opposition—Stimulation

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CHAPTER XIII

OPPOSITION

There is a "contrary" type, *e.g.,* that Scotch worthy of whom Macaulay wrote, "His hostility was not to popery or to Protestantism, to monarchical government or to republican government, to the house of Stuart or to the house of Nassau, but to whatever was, at the time, established." Such "born kickers" pose as champions of the Right, although what animates them is *the spirit of contradiction, i.e.,* the glow that some feel from *not* doing that which is pressed upon them by circumstances or by others. Group oppositions, however, have a less temperamental origin!

Interference of interests as a cause of opposition. Clash of interests, even when it does not breed hostility, begets opposition in case either party sees an advantage in it. So long as one believes that by expending X it can force the opponent to cede X+, there will be strife unless the other party yields. In case both become convinced that an advantage of X can be extorted only by an expenditure of X+, there should be an adjustment of the clashing interests in some agreement, treaty, law or institution.

Whether conflict will end in adjustment or will continue until one or the other combatant is disposed of, *depends on the nature of the arena.* If the struggle takes place, as it were, in a *bowl,* then the farther the stronger pushes the weaker, the harder it is to make him yield still more ground. This is illustrated by two well-matched states when, after an initial advantage, A invades B. As a rule, the farther the invading army penetrates, the longer the line of communications to be protected and the greater the resistance offered by the local population.

If, conversely, the arena is, as it were, an *inverted bowl,* the situation does not stabilize itself. The farther the stronger pushes the weaker the easier it is to make him yield still more ground. Such a case results in the complete triumph of the one and elimination of the other. This is exemplified by maritime rivals, Rome and

Carthage, Genoa and Pisa, Venice and Genoa, which fight until one or the other is overcome. Here there is no stabilizing frontier as there may be between land powers. For sea powers, indeed, there can be no frontier; the same sea is in all ports and wherever the sea flows the hostile ships may sail and meet and fight.

Some combatants *grow stronger as they lose* because self-interest, sympathy, or love of justice stirs outsiders to intervene on their behalf. In industrial struggles public opinion often veers to the weaker when the adversary appears to be pressing his advantage too far.

Hatred may make conflict chronic. We tend to hate those who come often between us and our goal. Statesmen, politicians, and business men may be good enough sportsmen to harbor no ill will toward those who persist in getting in their way, but the masses are more emotional. The animosity of the white workers of California toward the immigrant Mexicans, of the English-speaking coal miners of Pennsylvania toward the Slavic immigrants who displaced them, of Northern wage earners on strike toward the negroes imported from the South to break their strike illustrates the natural hatred of supplanters. In such a case conflict is not limited by balancing the gains and costs of strife.

Imaginative hostility as a cause of opposition. Opposition may spring from that imaginative hostility which arises in us when we suspect that an idea inimical to us is in another's mind. Against this feeling closer association and fuller knowledge of one another offer no security. "Whether intimacy will improve our sentiment toward another man or not depends upon the true relation of his way of feeling and thinking to ours." No doubt we should hate rivals and foes less could we hobnob with them and find them to be men like ourselves; but it is not so with the antipathy which roots in difference. There are individuals who do not "improve on acquaintance." Mark Twain had the type in mind when he drawled, "The more I think of him, the less I think of him." This is why refinement, culture and good taste do not insure less hostility. They make a richer and finer sympathy possible, but at the same time multiply the antipathies.

Resentment is a species of hostility springing from menace to the mirrored self. "It rests," says Cooley, "upon a feeling that the other person harbors ideas injurious to us; so that the thought of him is an attack upon ourself." Indignation is a higher

sort of imaginative hostility "directed toward some attack upon a standard of right and not merely an impulse like pique or jealousy." It claims a social foundation and is always ready to justify itself in open court.

Feuds die as life overflows. When life is emaciated, grudges are cherished and handed down from fathers to sons as precious heirlooms. Feuds between clans in Sicily or in our Southern mountains, between slum gangs, between villages in China and in the Caucasus, between tribes in Arabia, constitute the pungent seasoning of a humdrum existence. But when life is full such conflict is avoided as bootless. Again, *hatreds die as society becomes fluid.* The worst foes sometimes are bickering farmers whose fields join and who cannot get apart. In the city ties are more easily shifted, with the result that city denizens are more often indifferent to one another than country dwellers but less often hostile. One *avoids* the antipathetic person but does not *hate* him.

One benefit from the starting up in a rural neighborhood of a village improvement society, a community club, a grange, or a social center, is that, by giving people something else to think about than the other fellow's faults and irritating ways, it sweetens the entire community.

Grades of opposition. Conflict varies in sharpness from the strictly-regulated good-humored rivalry of a tennis match to the lone fight of two mountain feudists with whom it is "Kill or be killed!" The former is so agreeable that all the time its scope is being extended; it is only the devastating oppositions that the socially-minded seek to head off or put down.

Deep-going social change is likely to start up conflict. Disturbance in the relations among the elements in society unsettles old adjustments of conflicting claims and looses new clashes. Unexpectedly men find themselves on strange battle-fronts. Compromises knit by bygone peacemakers have been ravelled out and there seems to be nothing to do but to block your opponent from having his way at your expense. Well does Lasswell say: [1]

> Something of the primitive immediacy of the feud appears also in the relations between races and nationalities whose relative status is undergoing rapid change. If the former slave challenges the economic position of the master, if the foreign wage earner

[1] See *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. 6, "Feuds."

applies for a job, if the foreign cultivator possessing a low standard of life bids for a farm, if the foreign manager operates a plantation and disregards local law and custom, if, in short, any sudden upset occurs in the existing pattern of claims for freedom of movement, for income or for deference, there arise the probability of violence and the growth of malignant hostility between the opposing groups.

Wholesome opposition. A battle not for self but for a loved cause or principle is fought without the embitterments, but also without the mollifyings, which come from the presence of the personal element. Disinterestedness may intensify conflict, as we see in scientific controversies in which the issue is the establishment of truth. In such a case forbearance in exposing the errors of an opponent would be betrayal of that end for the sake of which the personal element is excluded from the conflict.

In a way, *open opposition preserves society*. Without the right to oppose what we consider tyranny, obstinacy, caprice, or stupidity, we should quit persons who betray such characteristics. Protest affords relief, helps us feel that we are not completely crushed in relationships which otherwise we should find unendurable. In any volunteer association the corking up by the dominant element of the protest and opposition of the rest is likely to lead to the splitting of the group. Statesmen realize that it is well to tolerate criticism of government in parliament and in the press as a vaccine against revolt. Free remonstrance is a safety valve, letting off steam which, if confined, might burst the boiler.

The fighting group. Opposition hardens and toughens groups that can stand the strain. Warfare has been the great state maker. The Eskimos, who are so pacific that one avenges himself on his enemy by singing satirical verses about him and thereby "getting the laugh on" him, are quite state-less. The first power to be passed up to a newly formed political union is *the war power*. A foreign war will either *make* or *break* a state distracted by factions and internal dissensions. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 unified Japan but shattered Russia. Likewise a hard-fought strike strengthens a labor union if it survives. When a union is in a fight with its employers, it is an easy matter to collect dues and special assessments. Opposition brings out the latent fighting qualities in a union as in an individual and dispels the lassitude which may appear after a long spell of peace.

Every fighting group would, if it could, suck all will out of its members. The State calls it wrong not only for the citizen to prefer *his* interest to *its* interest, but for him to put *any* duty above his duty to it. The Church makes a like demand for unqualified obedience. In politics bitter feeling develops against those leaders whose behavior threatens to "split the party." The industrial struggle draws sharp lines. Says John Graham Brooks: "I have seen a man wholly unruffled under such words as 'liar,' 'coward' and 'thief,' but the monosyllable 'scab' had an instantaneous effect like a dash of vitriol in the face." Special fighting groups like the Molly Maguires, the Camorra, the Mafia, as well as ordinary criminal gangs, demand of their members unlimited devotion. Expect little personal freedom if you belong to (fit-phrase!) a combat organization.

Hence, the fighting group is likely "to end in some one's vest pocket." Once its directors have succeeded in making it an object of idolatry, *they no longer need to make the group serve its members*. Since the members regard themselves as existing for the group, the heads are free to commit it to any policy, however rash or destructive. The outcome of peoples blindly yielding to the insistent demands of their respective governments for patriotic self-sacrifice is needless and meaningless war. State worship is the more dangerous, the less the people control the state. Bad as it is, the "our country—right or wrong" attitude is least harmful under popular government.

Opposition is the very breath of life to the fighting group and often it goes to pieces when it no longer has antagonists. A political party after an overwhelming victory is liable to lose its cohesion. The disappearance of the opposition party entails the break-up of the survivor. Party leaders deplore a victory that leaves them with a big, "unwieldy" majority, for they realize that a formidable enemy is the best prop to their party discipline. In England under James II and under William and Mary, the non-conformist groups, Independents, Baptists, Quakers, etc., repeatedly rejected approaches on the part of the Government for they realized that concessions would undermine that unanimity of opposition which alone held their members together.

Engulfment. A forest fire spreads because the heat from the blazing part so dries the foliage of the adjacent green forest that presently it is ready to burn. Opposition likewise exhibits a mys-

terious tendency to spread, to engulf outsiders. You never see a conflict originally involving a dozen quickly narrow down to two; but often you see a conflict between two quickly draw in a dozen. A community may be split from top to bottom by the personal rivalry of two political, financial or social leaders; becoming stirred, people "take sides" until no neutrals remain. A quarrel between two highlanders develops into a feud between clans which continues to be handed down long after the cause of the original quarrel has been forgotten. The conflict between Austria and Serbia in July, 1914, became a quicksand into which 28 nations sank!

Why do outsiders with no vital interest at stake plunge into a going conflict as moths fly into a flame? Aside from the propensity to "take sides" as you get roused, probably the explanation is that as time goes on the belligerents make ever more desperate attempts to win allies. A, who begins to fear lest he lose, will give anything, promise anything, to a friendly outsider if only he may gain thereby an ally a′. Combatant B now becomes alarmed, shows himself so cajoling and liberal that he acquires ally b′. It is again A's turn to worry and in desperation he pulls wires until he acquires a new ally a″. And so engulfment goes on until all who keep their heads join in measures to arrest it.

Moral deterioration from "wild" conflict. If not regulated, every variety of opposition tends to *grade down*. Never does a struggle go "from worse to bad"; the drift is "from bad to worse." Controversialists who start with a free resort to billingsgate will not *of themselves* arrive at restrained courteous polemic. Feudists who in the first phase of fighting lie in ambush and shoot at women and children, will not, in the absence of outside pressure, rise to the plane of fighting in the open and only with armed opponents. You never find belligerents who have been poisoning wells and scattering disease germs among the enemy spontaneously dropping their "dirty" tactics as the war proceeds.[2] The reason why conflict tends to worsen is that, as fighting drags on, the combatants become more weary, exasperated, vengeful, fearful of losing. On false reports of what the enemy are doing, one side resorts to foul tactics and now the enemy feel justified in repay-

[2] Of course, the plane of conflict may be raised if superior persons (trained officers, idealists) get to the helm.

ing "in kind." Whatever chivalry the belligerents started with disappears; more and more the cry is "Anything to win!"

So by degrees conflict declines morally unless opponents agree to renounce "dirty" tactics, or else are restricted by outsiders. You will get no long record of "clean sport" unless everything unsportsmanlike has been precisely defined and strictly punished. The code of rules under which joint debates and athletic meets are conducted becomes longer and more explicit with experience. Thanks to the growth of publicity every competition or fight of moment will have to heed the comments of the onlooking public and shun all tactics they hiss at.

Interference of oppositions. Oppositions occur between sexes, ages, races, nationalities, sections, classes, political parties and religious sects. Several such may be in full swing at the same time, but, strange as it may seem, the more numerous they are the less menacing is any one. *Every species of conflict interferes with every other current species, save only when their lines of cleavage coincide; in which case they reinforce one another.*

Suppose that at a given moment there is a certain strain along the line between Christians and Jews. If now, a strain appears along a quite different line, *e.g.*, that between employers and workmen, the religious opposition will become less intense. For Jewish bosses and Jewish workmen will be estranged; likewise Christian bosses and Christian workmen. On the other hand, Jewish and Christian capitalists will recognize that they are "in the same boat," while Jewish workers and Christian workers will sympathize with one another as fellow victims of exploitation.

Take the case of a tension between blacks and whites. Suppose now embitterment arises between labor and capital. If the lines of cleavage cross, each opposition will weaken the other. But if, as sometimes happens, all the employers are white men and all the employed are black men, then one antagonism reinforces the other and the rift in society is deeper than ever.

So, paradoxical as it may sound, a society riven by a dozen oppositions along lines running in various directions may actually be in less danger of early break-up than one split along just one line. For each new cleavage narrows the cross clefts; indeed, you might say that society is *sewed together* by its inner conflicts!

Means of lessening the sum total of opposition. This is not to imply that the volume of opposition in a given society is

constant, or that it is a matter of indifference how much it is. All oppositions, save only healthy rivalries, fair competitions and fruitful controversies, are not only wasteful of energy but they block coöperation between opponents. The wise have therefore always deplored opposition and have worked out the following means of forestalling it.

1. No invidious discriminations. In all save private and domestic relations, let a man's color, race, ancestry, religion and politics be ignored; ask only, "Can he deliver?"

2. Difference of belief and opinion, instead of being taken as proof of wilful perversity, may be looked upon as the natural consequence of individual differences ("no accounting for tastes"), or of unlikeness in education, occupation, experience or associations. Good-humoredly differers may "agree to disagree."

3. The fondness of the young for strife on account of the tensions and thrills it offers may be lessened by providing them with harmless and amicable forms of competitive sport.

4. Concord may be promoted by abandoning acrimonious controversy and adopting the "objective attitude" of the scientific inquirer toward matters of dispute.

5. So far as society equalizes life opportunities for the young, strife is less bitter because opponents are contending, not for their children's chances, but only for their own.

6. Conflicting interests may contend in good temper provided there is no assumption of superiority and air of disdain. The one-time *hauteur* of American railroad officials greatly exasperated their complaining patrons, while the nothing-to-arbitrate attitude of pig-headed employers has helped to inflame their workers.

7. In so far as government is representative and speaks for all, it wields greater moral authority and can do more to mollify intra-social struggles.

8. Society may forestall a struggle between conflicting interests by laying down in an impartial spirit their relations. In case their relations are of such a nature as not to admit of being thus prescribed from outside, it may avert conflict by threatening to throw its weight into the scales on the side of the right or the reasonable.

9. Free access of an aggrieved element to some forum, court of law, administrative commission, legislature, or electorate, where

it can count on a fair hearing and an impartial verdict, may avert bitterness even when its verdict is adverse.

10. By preserving full freedom of discussion society invites the aggrieved to appeal to the court of public opinion.

11. Whether discord or harmony is to prevail depends not only upon economic and social conditions, but, in part, upon mental attitudes; *e.g.*, whether men accept or reject a religion of brotherhood, regard contention or fellowship as the more "natural."

12. Creative thinking may avert or terminate conflicts by devising an ingenious solution (not a compromise) which satisfies both parties. In the United States the struggle over who shall have the right to marry was avoided by the state recognizing *both* civil marriage and ecclesiastical marriage. Perhaps a struggle between church and state over elementary schooling may be sidestepped by providing that each church may instruct her children in the public schools for a stated period each week.

13. Why should not man discover bigger boulders in his path than the fellow-man? Observes Lasswell: [3]

> More men are killed by pathogenic bacteria than perish from bullets, yet the imagination of mankind has not yet been kindled against the invisible enemies of the species. It may be that the manipulation of collective opinion for the sake of raising the prestige of science will contribute toward the achievement of this sense of unity of man with man. It may be possible to dramatize the plight of man as a lonely adventurer adrift on a speck of dust in the unplumbed vastnesses of celestial space and thus to arouse a sense of the ludicrousness of internecine strife. . . .

Nevertheless, oppositions must come. Is the stirring up of a spirit of opposition in a social element always to be condemned? Certainly not if there is no other way of removing some imposed handicap which keeps it in a state of backwardness or degradation. The emancipation of Oriental women cannot occur without a transient hostility between the sexes. The position of labor in the social order could not be improved without promoting class consciousness among the wage earners and marshaling them against their employers. Despite Mr. Gandhi's doctrine of love, India cannot win freedom without developing some anti-British feeling.

[3] See *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 4, under "Conflict, social."

CHAPTER XIV

THE GOOD SIDE OF OPPOSITION—STIMULATION

The chief types of opposition are *competition* and *conflict*,[1] *i.e.*, a race and a fight. In the former you may do nothing to hamper your opponent; in the latter you may block his efforts, even disable him. Hence competition, unlike conflict, *stimulates but does not destroy*. Nothing excites ire like being repeatedly thwarted, so the emotion begotten by conflict is anger; but the beaten competitor is stirred to envy or jealousy rather than to anger. The sages always deplored conflict but not all of them deplored competition, for its higher forms may survive even in an ideal society.

Some reach their best only when vying just as a spirited horse makes his best speed only when "paced" by another horse. Says Cooley: [2]

> Human rivalry appears to have much of this instinctive element in it; to become aware of life and striving going on about us seems to act immediately on the nerves, quickening an impulse to live and strive in like manner. . . . The motive of rivalry, then, is a strong sense that there is a race going on, and an impulsive eagerness to be in it. . . . Rivalry supplies a stimulus wholesome and needful to the great majority of men and . . . is, on the whole, a chief progressive force, utilizing the tremendous power of ambition, and controlling it to the furtherance of ends socially approved. . . .

Measurement of the stimulus from competition. Having noted that the records for bicycle riding made in competition averaged 4½ per cent faster than the records made against time, Triplett (1897) tested forty children in a number of trials each for their speed in turning fishing reels. One-half of the trials were performed by the child alone, and one-half in competition with another child. *Twenty* of them gained markedly in the com-

[1] *Controversy* is considered in the chapter "The Organization of Thought."
[2] C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, 1902, pp. 275-277.

petitive trials over their average for solitary work; *ten,* for the most part older children, were little affected by competition; and *ten* actually lost in speed under the influence of rivalry owing apparently to loss of motor control under excitement.

A German schoolmaster, Moede, tested (1920) seventeen pupils in a class, working individually and working in competition. The eight poorer students did better in competition than alone. The seven better students sometimes did not so well as when alone, although, as a whole, the speed of the class increased. In learning by heart the poorer were helped eleven times as much as the better. The cause of the difference seems to be that the better pupils work so hard when alone that they are little quickened by rivalry when associated, while the presence of others in some degree disturbs them. The poorer pupils, on the other hand, work with nothing like maximum attention and concentration until competition "keys them up."

These experiments were made upon very unequal competitors; competition between those of nearly equal powers always heightens speed, the gain being about 10 per cent when it is uncertain which will win. On the other hand, *both show a decrease* when the difference is so great that the conclusion is foregone. These experiments seem to justify the old practice of ranging the pupils in a class in a row according to their performance. The dull pupil might not aspire to head the class, but he was stimulated to get by the one next above him and to keep above the one next below him.

Whittemore had 12 university students work single, then in competition. His conclusions (1924) are:

All subjects turn out more work when competing than when not competing. The average percentile gain is about 26.

The subjects least capable in speed, profit most from competition.

All subjects do poorer work when competing than when not competing.

The homogeneity of the group with respect to the quality of the work produced is less under non-competitive than under competitive conditions.

Working with 1538 school children of grades 5 to 8, Maller reports (1929): "The efficiency of work under competition was

found to be consistently and significantly higher than under coöperation."

Experiments by Sorokin and others at the University of Minnesota (1930) show that with only the incentive "We want to see who can beat and will tell it," children turn off more work than when they are paid but do not compete.

How to generalize rivalry. When an athletic contest is open to all students, many feel there is no chance for them and bystand idly watching a few stars compete. Unless they can be drawn in by getting up contests involving a great variety of aptitudes, they should be formed into a number of graded groups, so that all within the same group are enough alike to be stimulated by competing among themselves.

In the camps of the American Expeditionary Force overseas (1917-18) games were adapted to large numbers. New games were built incorporating movements used in the major sports. The competitive spirit was roused by pitting group against group and awarding points. On the same principle business men, in stimulating their selling force, do not award prizes or honors to those men making the biggest sales, because this narrows the contest to the salesmen in "easy" territory. But every man is brought into the contest when careful estimates are made of the coming year's sales in each district and the winners are the salesmen who most surpass these estimates.

Often the athletic rivalry between high schools breeds nothing but contests between small teams and picked lads. From such matches the great body of pupils derive no stimulus. The remedy is a system which spurs each lad to score what points he can in the various athletic events. The sum of these individual scores is the total for the school and this divided by the number of boys enrolled gives the average athletic excellence for that school. In this way school can compete with school, even when too far apart to meet, and every pupil may feel the enlivening prick of rivalry.

Rivalry for physical efficiency may be generalized by giving all pupils who pass the tests engraved certificates, setting forth the record of the individual in the various events. The Public School Athletic Association may give in addition a seal to affix to the certificate; a gold seal for high-grade performance, a blue

seal for those attaining a mark between eighty and ninety, and a red seal for a mark between seventy and eighty.

In many schools all of the important hygienic precepts are built into a score card whose aggregate is 100 per cent. The pupils in physiology and biology are expected to check each day the items which they have lived up to and at the end of each half term their average is entered in the teacher's record book. By posting the names of those averaging above 80 per cent and posting the averages, a health contest is under way encouraging the best averages, hence the best health.

Means of utilizing the rivalrous bent. Shrewd athletic directors deliberately foment rivalry in order to convert self-development into a race. By means of competitive games and contests they stir up many who would accomplish nothing if they were shown gymnasium apparatus and urged to get to work in order to improve themselves physically. Another method is to encourage comparison of all-around individual efficiency. Perhaps ten tests are given each lad and the results are posted on a special bulletin board. If Johnny sees that Harry is jumping higher or lifting more than he is, he will practise day after day in the hope of beating him the next time the tests are given. He would never work so hard for mere health.

Toward the end of the World War the Russian soldiers, having no tradition of active sports, became the prey of sloth and boredom in the quiet sectors and suffered great moral deterioration. The English and American soldiers, on the other hand, brought with them an interest in sports and preserved their morale by games and athletic matches. The Young Men's Christian Association workers in the prison camps no doubt saved thousands of war prisoners from moral collapse, melancholia and death by applying the prick of emulation. Encouraging these half-starved, homesick, miserable captives to organize competitive games calling for strength, skill, and quickness, seems a mockery till one marks how the eye kindles, the form straightens, and hope revives as their hearts respond to the challenge of a chance to beat!

The United States Steel Corporation methodically employed rivalry among its plants in order to stimulate production. *The Pittsburgh Survey* found: [3]

[3] Vol. III, p. 184.

When a mill broke a record the men who accomplished the feat were praised, their names published in the trade journals, while superintendents of other mills taunted their men with the disgrace of having been beaten. This would arouse all the skilled men to greater activity and another mill would establish a new record. For years a piece plate cut to the shape of a huge broom was kept suspended above the Edgar Thompson blast furnaces at Braddock, as a symbol that all competitors had been swept aside and that these furnaces were producing more pig iron a day than any others in the world. This made a strong appeal to the men, and they were constantly on edge to retain that record.[4]

A technique has been worked out for benevolent institutions by which the soliciting of members or contributions becomes virtually a sport. The soliciting force is organized into two divisions, each headed by a general and consisting of a number of "teams" with their captains. The generals pick their captains and the captains pick their workers. The effort is concentrated on a "campaign" to end on a fixed date. Every noon the force lunches together, each team at its own table. After luncheon the captains report, and the results of the day's work are chalked up on a big bulletin board. Each worker is racing with every other worker on his team, each team with every other team in the division, and each division with the other. The spirit of rivalry is roused just enough to make the distasteful task play, but never to the point of leaving disappointment or bitterness in the beaten.

Whether intellectual effort should be stimulated by competition for college honors or by election to Phi Beta Kappa is a much-mooted question. One distinguished schoolman condemns the whole system of incentives as "abnormal, unprofitable, false and immoral. Their entire tendency is to temporary result, to the recognition of an unnatural means to an end, to the development of the selfish spirit and to dishonest practice, as well as to over-pressure and over-nervous and physical strain." On the other hand, public recognition of outstanding scholarship is general and few deans doubt its efficacy. The objections relate to abuses, such as taking easy courses in order to win high marks, rather than to the principle of employing rivalry as a stimulus. Those who decry emulation as a low motive in comparison with interest or thirst

[4] When the men in a mill made a new record, that amount of production was henceforth expected of them! However, "the superintendent passed cigars."

for self-improvement do not realize how strong and general is its appeal.

Standards growing out of rivalry prevent overpopulation. Man tends to multiply up to the food limit, at which point all margins for pleasure, beauty and leisure have been swept into the hopper for the raising of big families. Almost the only thing that has ever arrested the growth of numbers well inside the food limit is the diversification of wants in response to rivalry. At first this, that, or the other thing, is wanted for *vanity's* sake. One thirsts to outshine or outpace others. One cannot endure to be surpassed by another in trophy, ornament, or display. In the course of time the new wants acquire a firmer basis. Vanities are pruned and trained into "comforts and decencies," which become indispensable to self-respect.

Services of economic competition. Wasteful as economic competition often is, let us not overlook its magical effect upon the man in a rut. An editor who, a dozen years ago, gave his best thought to adapting his newspaper to the needs and tastes of the community has failed to notice how silent, gradual changes have transformed the community's interests. Not until a neighboring journal cuts seriously into his circulation, is he roused to the necessity of making over his paper to suit his new constituency. So it is with the manufacturer, the merchant, the railroad man. Absorbed in routine, they drop effortful thinking and fall below their best possibilities until the threat of loss lashes them into renewed mental activity.

In a static time hard work and conscience may keep one up to the mark; but in a time of rapid development rare is the man who will serve the public best by working diligently on familiar lines. There is need of frequently changing the character of one's goods, one's services, one's methods; but few will do this of their own free will. The impulse of the conscientious man is to work hard in the accustomed way; not that he is lazy but that he is habit-bound. Nothing but fear of being supplanted by a competitor will goad him to the point of adapting his output to the changed requirements of the public.

CHAPTER XV

THE BAD SIDE OF OPPOSITION—ANTAGONISTIC EFFORT

There is in *conflict,* as distinguished from *wholesome competition,* an element which is altogether bad. This may be called Antagonistic Effort, *i.e.,* equal efforts expended in opposite directions, so that A is neutralized by B and B is neutralized by A. It is illustrated in the "tug of war" which often exhausts the rival teams before a decision is reached; in the futile straining of locked wrestlers neither of whom can overcome the other until both are nearly spent; in the exchange of blows by which well-matched pugilists may pound each other into pulp; in the advertising campaigns of competitors which exactly offset each the other but leave them both nearer the poor house; in the alternate price cutting of two business rivals, which pushes them closer and closer to insolvency; in the lawsuits and appeals with which litigious men wear themselves out; and in the retaliatory tariffs by which two nations beat each other's commerce to its knees.

Conflicts of attrition. So long as the antagonistic efforts are in balance *nothing is settled.* All exertions which are promptly met and neutralized by counter-exertions are wasted, for they decide nothing. *It is only the margin of superiority that counts.* Hence the peculiar ruinousness of opposition which assumes this form. It is exhibited in a railroad "war" when rates are slashed far below the cost of service and both competitors slide steadily toward bankruptcy. The railroad with the longer purse will win; but it may never recoup itself for its losses by higher rates, for the beaten road, though bankrupt, does not cease to be a competitor. It is seen in the costly electioneering campaigns of rival political candidates. The total outlay of time and money may be absurdly out of proportion to the salary of the office they are seeking. Neither would have made the canvass could he have foreseen how terribly he would become involved; yet they plunge deeper and deeper into expense because each realizes that all he has already expended is quite thrown away unless he wins the

election. Each is hoping to win by a spurt at the finish, so they go on and on, winded but afraid to quit.

The greater the amount of effort which must be put forth before the telling margin appears, the more costly is the conflict, and the greater is the incentive to seek a means of avoiding it. The expenditure of strength and resources in antagonistic efforts may leave both contestants ruined, the victor being no better off than the vanquished. The more clearly they foresee this possibility, the more they will rather compromise than pay the price of fighting to the bitter end. But if one opponent realizes what a struggle is likely to let him in for, he will be at a disadvantage in negotiating with one who is blind to the cost of conflict. The former will have to make most of the concessions if the disastrous conflict is to be avoided. In dealing with the clear-sighted, the very blindness of the pugnacious may be a trump card!

Most conflicts cost more than was expected. As we review the pitiful squandering of human life, strength and resources not only in the wars of nations but also in the struggles between labor and capital, in commercial "wars," in political contests, in lawsuits and in private quarrels, it becomes apparent that elementary impulses of anger, jealousy, and greed, should not bear all the blame. Even the cool and calculating enter into a disastrous conflict thinking it will be decided by a sudden thrust or a clever stroke, and fail to foresee the long drain of energy which they must endure before a victory can be won. Convinced of superiority, one neglects to compute the sacrifices which may lie between superiority and triumph. It is the besetting fallacy of militarists to picture war to their people as a sharp, brief struggle between prepared forces terminating in the victory of the force which is braver, more intelligent or better led. They refuse to recognize how normal it is that war should become an expenditure of antagonistic efforts which wears down the belligerents till both are ruined and prostrate.

The convertibility of resources. In general, the more nearly matched are two combatants, the more prolonged and exhausting their conflict is likely to be. Again, the struggle will be prolonged in proportion as their strength is convertible into the particular kind of effort essential to a decision. If citizens can readily be trained into soldiers the conflict does not end when one belligerent has used up his original army, but continues until one belligerent

approaches the end of his man power or, at least, of his morale. In case the ban on the use of women on the battlefield is lifted, the final outcome of the conflict will be the same but it will be delayed, and the prostration of the belligerents will be more complete when it arrives. If the factories are capable of being speedily converted into munition plants, the war is not decided by original stocks of munitions, but becomes a matter of comparative coal, iron, copper, food production, woman power, child power, etc., and may go on until one belligerent suffers a complete economic collapse.

Forcing a quick decision. Lest conflict lapse into a process of competitive annihilation, opponents strive to force a quick decision. The "winded" pugilist studies how he may deliver a "knock-out" blow. By a secretly planned advertising campaign the business man seeks to bankrupt his competitor before he has time to prepare a counterstroke. The railway company tries to administer a *coup de grâce* to a parallel line by cutting fares 80 per cent at a stroke. Regardless of expense, the litigant puts his cause into the hands of the leader of the bar. The aggressor state plans by surprise attack, by speedier mobilization, by having ready the larger number of trained soldiers or aviators, by accumulating in advance the greater stock of guns, aircraft, or submarines, or by springing some new and, at first, irresistible weapon—forty-two centimeter howitzers, or Zeppelins, or poison gas, or tanks—to win the war before its enemy converts his potential strength into actual strength. Since the conversion of resources into telling effort calls for time a protracted conflict becomes inevitably one of "attrition" and tends toward the utter prostration or impoverishment of both parties. As a rule, it is only the short decisive conflict that does not cost the victor more than victory is worth.

Competitive preparedness. When resources can be converted only slowly into weapons, and the combatant wins who gets a "broad running start" over the other, fear begets *competitive preparedness,* which is only another form of antagonistic effort. It is, to be sure, less violent than actual conflict but it may be nearly as exhausting. In the Caucasus the safety tower of each farmstead evidently absorbed more labor than the habitation itself. In Afghanistan the time wasted in standing guard in the sentry tower that overlooks each field exceeds the time spent in tilling the field. In Albania the man, being occupied in protecting his

family, is parasitic on his wife who alone produces anything. Just as in war each people is duped into believing that *this* levy of troops, *this* big gun armament, *this* "victory" loan will win a decision, forgetting that until the breaking strain arrives its every prodigious exertion is counterbalanced by a corresponding supreme exertion on the part of the enemy; so in peace time, they are victimized by the "preparedness" fallacy. They do not notice that their every sacrifice in the way of *more* ironclads, *more* guns, or *more* soldiers becomes the basis of an appeal by the preparedness party in each rival state to insure *its* safety by *more* ironclads, *more* guns, and *more* soldiers. And such sacrifices made by other peoples "for security" become in turn the basis of appeals at home for even greater sacrifices "for security." So the munition makers' game goes merrily on until armament-capping becomes well-nigh as ruinous as war itself. When a people realizes that the major part of what it produces goes into the bottomless pit of competitive preparation and finds such "security" is economically nearly as exhausting as war, it is tempted to attack its rival, in the hope of destroying it and thereby ending an intolerable situation.

Means of avoiding antagonistic effort. Antagonistic effort is, then, the utterly evil element in conflict. It is a pit into which heedless man is precipitated by his aggressive and self-assertive instincts. It is the lurking devil which all glorifiers of war and struggle overlook. It is the Adversary baffling, betraying and tormenting a too pugnacious and too sanguine race. It devastates society, as its counterpart, hatred, devastates the soul. Small wonder, then, that the supreme concern of all seers, prophets and founders of religion has been to draw mankind away from hatred and strife into the paths of amity and peace.

It is possible, however, to eliminate or curb this noxious feature without suppressing contest itself. Intercollegiate athletics may be kept from degenerating into a matching of purses by barring players who receive financial inducement to attend college, and by so limiting the training period as to avoid an excessive loss of time in preparation. The anti-intellectual tendencies in public joint debate are held in check by rules forbidding "personalities" and excluding everything foreign to the question. The law denies appeal from a court decision when the value in dispute is small. Party managers pledge themselves to buy no votes. Laws which limit the amount of campaign expenditure save opposing candi-

dates from ruining themselves in a political contest or becoming bound to selfish moneyed interests which contribute to both parties. Rival railroads agree to close their needless downtown offices. "Legalized pooling" or commission-fixing of *minimum* as well as *maximum* rates restrain them from rushing into receivership *via* rate "wars." After a series of industrially lean years caused by "cut-throat" competition among producers the game of "beggar-my-neighbor" ends in a "combination," or in the absorption of all the weaker firms by the financially strongest. Missionary boards come to the understanding that none will plant a mission in a native center where a Christian mission already exists. Rival colleges avoid the waste of circularizing the same constituency, or cultivating the same secondary schools, by dividing territory if they are far apart, or by specializing in different lines if they are near each other.

Finally, war-worn exhausted states may do what has been done hundreds of times by jarring communities, form an organization for peace, create tribunals with power to decide disputes, renounce their armaments and relinquish their liberty to make war at will.

CHAPTER XVI

PERSONAL COMPETITION

Competition is the vying of two or more persons for a single desired object. Metaphorically even alternative attractions, *e.g.*, religions, types of education or ideals of life, which make their appeal to the same people, may be said to "compete." We are pained to learn that *conflict* has broken out in an organization we are interested in; but not to hear that there is more *competition* within it. For competition excludes all idea of hurting or tripping your competitor, whereas conflict permits the disabling of your antagonist, in any case the thwarting of his efforts. Naturally competition begets less bad blood than conflict, therefore is less dreaded and hated.

Participants in a fist fight never end uttering mildly sarcastic remarks about one another; the movement is always in the reverse direction. Starting with biting remarks they come gradually to an exchange of blows; which illustrates the truth, *competition trends downward.* As a rule, if a competition does not slump to face-scratching, hair-pulling and fisticuffs, it is because an outside influence prevents it. The competitors may be restrained by the code of gentility; but the pattern of *lady* or *gentleman* is a factor injected from outside by society. Every instituted contest should be under carefully-framed rules barring everything which does not tend to establish comparative excellence in the chosen field.

The goals of competition. *Economic* competition is, of course, for dollars or for what will bring in dollars. But there is competition for other limited desirables, such as *publicity, social status, popularity, fame, political power, influence,* etc.

Comments a sociologist on the Oriental immigrant in Hawaii: [1]

> The subtle change that takes place in the mind of a man as he comes to feel that Hawaii is his home affects the use of his income and savings. At first he spends almost nothing for the sake

[1] Romanzo Adams, *Interracial Marriage in Hawaii,* 1937, p. 260.

of its effect on the mind of others. But, by the time his Hawaiian born sons and daughters are old enough to marry, the question of local status is highly important and the family income is expended largely for things that may be expected to enhance prestige. Household furniture, education, gifts to friends on such occasions as weddings and birth festivities come to be important.

There is no competition, however, for such blessings as *health, contentment, peace-of-mind* because *there is always plenty to go around.* No matter how much health other people enjoy, I may conquer health for myself. Whatever contentment other people have achieved, there is always a contentment I may win for myself. None compete to be "saved"; there is salvation for everyone who can qualify. Nor is there competition for the enjoyment of the beauties of nature or the masterpieces of art or literature; all one needs is power of appreciation.

The function of competition. Although competition for customers, or patrons, or clients, or subscribers, or employment, or office, or for friends and backers, is prompted by private aims, *it discharges the broad social function of assigning to each his place in the social system.* Since we do not come into the world with our destiny stenciled on the forehead, we discover what we are fit for by experimenting. By a series of competitions we test the impression we make on others, rate our powers in terms of other men's powers, and learn whether we may aspire to the higher occupations and posts. Competition in this sense need not be conscious or contentious. From our school days on judgments are formed about us of which we are unaware, but which go to determine our careers. For example, several are under consideration for the same appointment. Their entire record is scrutinized so that they are made competitors throughout their past, although at the time they were not in the least conscious of it.

The chief alternative to competition as a means of assigning each to his place is *hereditary status.* In the later Roman Empire the well-placed families protected their position by allowing none to aspire to a calling above his father's. In Prussia, before the Emancipation Edict of 1807, both lands and occupations were built into the caste system. "Noble" land could not be bought by non-nobles, nor "peasant" land by non-peasants. Neither noble nor peasant could take up occupations which belonged to the burgher class. In India to-day the principal occupations are in the

hands of hereditary castes and it is expected that the son of the priest, smith, or accountant will succeed to his father's office.

This system so clashes with the natural desire to get on and so affronts popular ideas of justice, that it must have come into existence as the device of those in the higher offices and occupations to relieve their children from the competition of the children of the lower-placed. However, when society is weak, inheritance of status makes for order and continuity. In the European Dark Ages anarchy was likely to follow the death of the king, so *the principle of legitimacy,* viz., that the crown passes automatically and at once to the king's eldest son (The king is dead; long live the king!), was hailed with relief.

The intensity of competition. The relative amount of activity invested in the selective process measures the intensity of competition. In a stationary society where, as a rule, children follow the occupation of their father, where certain trades are reserved for certain castes, where the great places in the state are hereditary and elections unknown, where peasant may not vie with burgher, nor burgher with retainer, nor retainer with lord, a man devotes little energy to finding his place. Where on the other hand, as in our society, at least a third of native adults are found by the census taker in some other than their natal state, where a large proportion have tried some other occupation than the one they follow, where schools are free, and skill is not ordinarily acquired from one's father, where protected occupations do not exist and where politics is an absorbing interest, the expenditure of energy in placement will be relatively large.

The intensity of competition varies:

(1) With the degree of personal liberty; (2) With the rate of social change; (3) Inversely as the efficiency of the selective agents. The freer one is to roam the social field, set up in this or that calling, try for the better-paid or more honorable offices and get a decision on one's merits; the less often one runs into racial, religious, or class discrimination; the nimbler are customers or clients or patients in transferring their patronage; the more frequently will the well-established be subjected to the competition of outsiders and the harder must they work to escape ousting.

Again, *social change* opens new avenues to many who feel settled. Our automobile industry has in thirty-five years absorbed millions of Americans, few of whom inherited or stumbled into

their jobs. In the same time such new professions as play director, social worker, screen actor, radio announcer, have absorbed several thousand young men and women, nearly every one of them placed by competition. The creation of a vast army for the World War set hundreds of thousands of young Americans vying to settle which of them should obtain military commissions.

The better the selective agencies the more quickly, economically, and accurately competitors are sifted. The time will come when an hour with graded tests of mental ability will reveal an applicant's caliber better than a bushel of estimates by his acquaintances. Compare the cost of trying for a political appointment under the old system of bringing "influence" to bear with its cost under the merit system. Consider that some candidates spend on a political contest as much as the salary of the office comes to for the entire term! Two men running for the office of county superintendent of schools will spend two months electioneering. If the selective agency were a competent board of education, the tax on their time might not exceed two days!

Systems of education which discover and develop the special capabilities of each individual, as well as offer specialized training for each calling, enable choices among competitors to be prompt and just. Likewise, the laying down of definite requirements for those who would follow teaching, nursing, law, accountancy, etc., saves much fumbling and disappointment.

RESTRICTIONS UPON THE METHODS OF COMPETITION

Business. In the absence of binding rules or accepted standards of fairness competition assumes extravagant or vicious forms. Said the U. S. Supreme Court in *Sinclair Refining Co. vs. Federal Trade Commission* (1923):

> Competition is not an unmixed good. It is a battle for something that only one can get; one competitor must necessarily lose. The weapons in competition are various. Superior energy, more extensive advertising, better articles, better terms as to time of delivery, place of delivery, time of credit, interest or no interest, freights, methods of packing, lower prices, more attractive and more convenient packages, superior service and many others, are and always have been considered proper weapons. Expense attending the use of any weapon, the foolishness of it, the fact that a method is uneconomical, or that the competitor cannot meet any method or scheme of competition because it will be ruinous to him

to do so, have not, nor has either of them ever been held unfair. Such things are a part of the strife inherent in competition.

This hands-off attitude hardly accords with current economic thinking. Courts and administrative boards have outlawed a great number of practices as "unfair," not because they are obviously wrong but because they tend to the success not of the better caterer to the wants of the public, but of the inferior one. The criterion of "fairness" is whether the practice contributes in the long run to supplying the consumers with the greatest abundance of good wares or services at the lowest cost—which is sound. By this touchstone are condemned local price-cutting, the operation of bogus "independent" concerns, the use of "fighting" brands, rebates and preferential arrangements, exclusive sale or purchase arrangements, conditional requirements, espionage, coercion and intimidation, black-lists, and interference with the contracts and business of competitors.

Labor. Among workingmen "scabbing" and strike-breaking, pace-making, tattling and spying are frowned on as methods of getting on; but it is deemed legitimate for the workingman to court promotion by showing superior skill, devising better tools or processes, or making valuable suggestions.

The professions. No honorable doctor or lawyer will advertise, solicit employment, pay commissions for business, undertake cases on a contingent fee, show a client how to beat the law, or give him advice which is immoral or anti-social in its tendency. Aside from the reputation of satisfying his patrons, he has no legitimate way of bringing his merits to the attention of the public other than scholarly activity in his profession or free work for needy individuals or for the community.

Elections. With popular government has come a need of defining what constitutes improper electioneering. Vote buying, personation, treating voters, betting in order to influence an election, deceiving illiterate voters, contributing to churches or charitable institutions during a campaign, providing conveyances for voters, forging campaign literature, publishing false statements of the withdrawal of candidates, keeping electors from the polls, intimidating electors, influencing employees—these have been prohibited either because they drive good men away from politics or because they enable a minority candidate to win.

The basis of appointment to office. Long ago nepotism fell into bad odor. Then "patronage," the right of private irresponsible individuals to name office-holders, came under a cloud. Afterward was challenged the awarding of offices for party work or party contributions, or on the promise of such contributions. The merit system of recruiting civil servants, under which applicants are rated according to training, experience, and proficiency as revealed by examination, raises the plane of competition and improves the quality of office-holders. Many who aspired under the spoils system now have no prospect and many who formerly had no prospect now aspire.

The basis of promotion. In private business the superior has generally been free to promote whom he would. But in large concerns, where the superior is often a salaried man and not financially interested, his choice is likely to be affected by family, social standing and personal liking. Here, as in the public service, "free promotion" often gives the relative, the fawner or the wire puller the advantage over the modest man of worth. On the other hand, where, as in church or university, promotion goes by group choice, there is less chance for "influence."

The great rival principle is that of *seniority*. This is simple and certain and leaves no room for favoritism and prejudice. It prevails in nearly all armies and navies, because the officers are not greatly dissimilar in ability and training, while length of experience is of great importance. Its principal merit, however, is that it insures that the loyalty of subordinates shall not be impaired by the jealousies and resentments which spring up like devil grass when promotion is suspected of being arbitrary. In the civil service it has less place, but it finds favor with all unions of government employees because more complicated systems lend themselves to manipulation. American railroads after futile attempts to install a system of efficiency ratings have been forced by the organizations of their employees to promote on the seniority principle.

However, it is a *deadening* principle. Not only is the oldest in service not necessarily the most efficient, but, by checking competition for promotion, it takes away one incentive for acquiring efficiency. Furthermore, by putting age in the saddle, it favors the reign of senile conservatism. The open-mindedness and enthusiasm of youth are needed to break the crust of custom continually forming in society. Under promotion by seniority only rarely will a

young man attain to a responsible post. Hence, the attempt to work out some scheme of efficiency ratings by which the employee as he goes along makes up the record on which one day will be decided whether he or another shall be advanced to greater responsibility or reward. During the World War our army and navy sought to base promotion upon the frequent and detailed reports of superior officers as to the professional zeal, ability and attainments of their subordinates. It is possible to promote on an efficiency basis which will work to the satisfaction of the force.

The principle of relevancy. May rival colleges in their circulars make invidious comparisons? May the theater owner with propriety call the public's attention to the greater fire risk of a rival place of amusement? Is it "hitting below the belt" for a baking-powder manufacturer in advertising to cast doubt on the wholesomeness of other brands? Is it "foul" for an applicant to submit truthful matter reflecting on the qualifications or worthiness of another applicant? May the Protestant and the Catholic clergy proselytize from each other, or shall they confine themselves to winning the unchurched? While evidence as to comparative merit is always pertinent, the judgment of a competitor is so subject to bias that invidious comparisons by him should be ruled out. Generally "war to the knife" between rivals proves ruinous to both good morals and good manners.

The general principle to follow in drawing the line between proper and improper methods of competition is relevancy. Men have a just horror of "political influence" in official circles, but do not object to learned bodies being heard from when it comes to filling an important technical post; their opinion is *relevant* to the problem. The physician may not advertise, for self-laudation is *irrelevant* to merit; not so is his appointment as lecturer in the faculty of the local medical college. It is *relevant* for preparatory schools to list the institutions which admit their graduates on certificate and to call attention to the performance of these graduates in college and university. Boastful comparisons are *irrelevant* to the competition of religious denominations, which ought rather to be decided by the type of character which they produce in their members. The awarding of public office on the basis of services to the political party is intolerable, because party work is *irrelevant* to the successful conduct of the office.

In other words, *we resent a success won by some other prowess than the one called for.* We are disgusted by the fight that becomes a "foot-race" and by the foot-race that becomes a fight; by the slugging match that becomes a "joint debate" and the joint debate that becomes a slugging match. We resent that social tact, irrespective of scholarship, should govern a university appointment, and that scholarship, irrespective of social tact, should govern a diplomatic appointment.

The plane of competition. It depends chiefly upon the kind of practices tolerated whether or not a competition will lower those who take part. If paid puffery, kowtowing, assurance, blowing your own trumpet, wire-pulling, "petticoat influence" and such like regularly win, then the field will be abandoned by those who will not stoop to such methods. The greater the number of attractive fields in which such methods prevail, the greater the proportion of ambitious young people who will finally let go their high standards and sink to a lower moral level. It is of little avail for parents to implant moral scruples in their children if in many of the alluring arenas of competition success is seen going to the tricky and self-ingratiating. Let clergymen take note that *raising the plane of competition* may accomplish quite as much in saving souls as artistic evangelism.

In the early frontier communities and in certain isolated American communities to-day "anything goes" (biting and gouging) in a fight. In earlier American political contests, "rough-and-tumble" was the rule, while rival newspapers resorted to a scurrility now unknown. In old societies on the other hand the recognized competitions are hemmed in by standards, so that in most arenas honorable young men may compete without losing their self-respect. The rearing of a ring fence about every competition indicating just what is and what is not permitted is a moral achievement *which takes time.* These restraints originate with the better element—and only slowly do they arrive at a consensus.

Competition and sympathy. Competition need not breed enmity. In a society like ours, in which anyone may try to be anything, there will be much disappointment but not necessarily much ill feeling. A graduate of the law school joins the bar of a town with a score of lawyers. At the end of a year or two he may have to give up the law, but very likely he cannot hold any particular competitor responsible for his shipwreck. So it is with business

men. The failure realizes he has been eliminated by "general conditions" rather than by a rival.

Even when the loser of a competition knows the winner he will not hate him, provided that the competition has taken place under reasonable rules, which have been loyally observed. Bitterness there will be when one believes that the rules have not been lived up to by one's rivals or that one is the victim of malicious discrimination. In large organizations there will be bad blood if it is suspected that favor governs promotions. If, on the other hand, the patently efficient man is promoted, the good will and congratulations of his competitors may go with him as he rises. In the field of college sports the most intense rivalry to "make the team" will not generate personal bitterness provided that the coach is competent. In case justice rules the competitive struggle, people like the British and the Americans, who have absorbed much of the spirit of sportsmanship, will attribute their failures to something in themselves. But no little ill-will attends personal rivalries among peoples like the Poles, the Danubians, the South Americans, who inherit an ideal of sensitive aristocratic pride and have little experience of competitive sports.

THE LIMITS TO COMPETITION

Some think that the wear-and-tear of such a competitive system as has grown up in the West in the last four centuries has a lot to do with the apparently-growing volume of nervous breakdown, insanity and other forms of crack-up. If such is the case devices to temper the strain deserve attention.

Muffling competition. In Japan the code of the jinrikisha men forbids one runner to pass by another going in the same direction. The young and strong runner is not to dash past the old and feeble runner lest the latter be so much the sooner eliminated from the calling. When you have had a house built in Japan you have entered into a relation which cannot lightly be broken off. Whatever repairs may be needed during the life of the house must be arranged for with your builder, never with anybody else. None but he has the right to send for the plasterer, the roofer, the tinsmith. So is it with a garden. The maker looks after it season after season and no other gardener can be hired to touch it unless the original relation has been dissolved by mutual consent.

This is a survival from the old communal organization of Japan. We Americans, on the other hand, have been willing to allow competition to permeate every part of life. Our commercial traveler cannot see why with his better goods and lower prices he cannot get orders the first time he visits South America. The loyalty of the South American merchant to the European house from which he has been buying seems to him unbusinesslike and unreasonable, while the merchant concludes that to Yankees money is everything.

Limiting the period of competition. Those who take the long view recognize limits to competition. Certain great American railroads have deliberately adopted the policy of not replacing elderly servants with younger and more vigorous men but retaining them until they retire on a pension. Some, to be sure, are past their peak of efficiency; on the other hand, by holding out the prospect of a life career these companies attract a higher grade of ability than they would obtain under a ruthless system.

Society will reap the advantages of competition if every man until thirty to thirty-five years of age is liable to be passed or ousted by a better man. But after this probationary period it may be well to consider a man's value to the employer as settled and to make him feel safe from displacement so long as he continues to "make good."

What irony that, at a time when intelligent business men are striving to build up a stable and loyal force, university presidents who have been bitten by the "efficiency bug" or caught the inhumane spirit of high finance recommend that professors be replaced as soon as the university has skimmed off the cream of their strength! The tendency of our time is toward attracting good men by holding out a certain life career, instead of throwing them away like squeezed lemons at the end of their prime. Ease of mind is a condition of originative work and this cannot be realized without security of tenure.

The folly of keeping men on tenter-hooks was illustrated in the university whose president, having imbibed big-business ideals, let it be known that no professor, not even a world-renowned scientist, "owned his job." The mature scholar might be displaced if he proved unproductive. Each professor was expected to report annually what he had published in the past year. The result was that professors dared not embark on a large and important

research project which might not come to fruition for years, but busied themselves on a succession of small investigations which would yield something to publish every year!

Value of a sense of security. Young people vie eagerly for the favor of individuals of the other sex, but marriage should put an end to such rivalry. Love has to compete with other interests in life, so it is still worth while for spouse to woo spouse; but neither should feel exposed to the competition of younger or more attractive members of the same sex. "Trial marriage," by reintroducing competition, would subject the mated, or at least one of them, to a tormenting uncertainty and deny the blessed sense of security matrimony ought to bring.

The confidential relation which grows up between patient and practitioner—resulting in the trusted "family physician"—muffles competition, to be sure, but few would care to see it disappear. The same is true of the assumption of permanency in the relation between pastor and flock. No doubt the clergyman who, after some experience, settles into a life pastorate is happier and gives his parishioners better service than if he held a succession of pulpits. On the other hand, professionals without permanent employment—such as newspaper, stage and screen people—are exposed to the full force of competition with the young and after their peak their lot is often tragic.

The courts wisely recognize property in the "good will" of a business, for it encourages the business man to build up lasting relations with a group of satisfied customers. Were not "good will" something one can protect and sell, a merchant would have no motive to preserve it after he contemplated removal, change of business, or retirement.

Security of tenure. The public service must be made a career before the public will have able, trained and loyal servants. This implies security of tenure and dismissal only "for cause" after a certain novitiate. Such stability absolutely excludes the idea that offices—save those which determine policy—should be treated as the spoils of party victory. Public servants will never be rewarded as well as the servants of mammoth business concerns. All the more, therefore, should they be assured security of tenure.

As the principle of security of tenure becomes established appears inevitably the "dead line." If it is taken as a matter of course that the employer—church, university, corporation or state

—will retain the faithful servant during his declining years, the employer will naturally insist that it must in return have him for most of his prime. If clergymen and others find increasing difficulty in obtaining permanent placement after the age of forty-five, it is not that the employer is harder-hearted but that employment entails heavier responsibilities.

Old-age pensions or allowances follow quite logically upon the policy of undisturbed tenure. The time comes when it is cheaper to retire the old servant on half or third pay than to continue paying his former salary for services of little worth.

While competition thus happily is being mitigated for certain groups of brain workers, it is a shame that the great army of manual laborers should be afforded no shelter whatever from the competition of the younger and more active.[2] Something might be done to stabilize employment by a law requiring the employer to pay the employee dismissed without fault a wage proportionate to the length of time he had been in the employer's service.

Is the tempering of competition unfair to youth? Is not all this a discrimination on behalf of age against more efficient youth? No, the policy may be justified even to the young. Their being held back a little may be looked upon as the payment of premiums for insurance to protect their own inevitable period of decline. For example the young scholar at thirty might well take over the professorship of the scholar of sixty. But the old scholar holds his chair until he reaches the age of sixty-five and the young man continues five years more as assistant professor before the chair falls to him. When he in turn reaches the point of declining energy the rule will now work to his advantage. On the whole, then, has the blunting of competition helped him or hurt him? Viewing his

[2] "A man can hardly have a good spirit if he feels that the ground is unsure beneath his feet, that his social world may disown and forget him tomorrow. There is scarcely anything more appalling to the human spirit than this feeling, or more destructive of all generous impulses. It is an old observation that fear shrinks the soul and there is no fear like this. The soldier who knows that he may be killed at any moment may yet be perfectly secure in a psychological sense; secure of his duty and of the sympathy of his fellows, his mind is quite at peace; but this treachery of the ground we stand on is like a bad dream. As one will shrink from attaching himself in love and service to a person whom he feels he cannot trust, so he will from giving his loyalty to an insecure position. It is impossible that such a tenure of function as now chiefly prevails in the industrial world should not induce selfishness, restlessness and a service only mercenary." C. H. Cooley, *Social Process*, 1918, p. 140.

life as a whole, one can hardly doubt that he makes a good bargain when by foregoing his early supplanting of the older man he saves himself in turn from being supplanted at a time of life when check or discouragement may be fatal.

CHAPTER XVII

INSTITUTIONAL COMPETITION

When an institution finds itself sore beset by a competitor the following tactics are open to it.

Destruction of the competitor. The first impulse of the menaced is to *destroy its competitor.* A "trust" cuts the price of its products below cost of production wherever an "independent" seeks to sell. A shipping combine has "fighting ships" which are called into play when a new steamship line enters its trade. As soon as the competitor announces a sailing date the combine advertises a steamer to sail on or near this date and offers a freight rate below the actual cost of carriage. To protect its monopoly of prestige the dominating social class may hobble by strict sumptuary regulations the classes which challenge it. In colonial New England there was a law that no one who possessed less than $1500 might wear lace. In feudal Japan the prospering farmer, craftsman, or shopkeeper could not build a house as he liked nor have certain articles of luxury. The richest commoner might not order certain things to be made for him, might not ape the ways or assume the privileges of his "betters."

The spread of anti-slavery feeling among the producing element of the North was due to their perception that slaves menace free labor. Regarding the early abolition of slavery in Massachusetts John Adams remarked: "Argument might have had some weight . . . but the real cause was the multiplication of laboring white people who would not longer suffer the rich to employ these sable rivals so much to their injury."

After representative government, with its inevitable strife of political parties, has been set up, the parties controlled by the propertied strive to crush the rising party which champions working-class interests. Loath to meet it on the hustings they hypocritically denounce it as "unpatriotic" and "subversive," a movement with criminal aims led by scoundrels and assassins, which is not entitled to the rights of a legitimate political party

but deserves only to be stamped out by banning its propaganda and jailing its leaders. Thus was outlawed the socialist party in Germany under Bismarck, and by the same ruffian technique our "red-baiters" would deprive the communist party of its place on the official ballot.

The history of religious persecution is full of attempts to insure a monopoly by murdering the spokesmen of competing doctrines and movements. In Diocletian's time Roman religious beliefs were weak while the Christian beliefs were vigorous and spreading. In desperation the old system made a ferocious attempt to exterminate all Christians. A thousand years later the Church stamped certain sects out of existence and strangled heresies in the cradle. Says Coulton:

> . . . that which some love to picture as the harmonious growth of one great body through the Middle Ages is really a history of many divergent opinions violently strangled at birth; while hundreds more, too vigorous to be killed by the adverse surroundings, and elastic enough to take something of the outward colour of their environment, grew in spite of the hierarchy into organisms which, in their turns, profoundly modified the whole constitution of the Church. If the mediaeval theory and practice of persecution had still been in full force in the eighteenth century in England, nearly all the best Wesleyans would have chosen to remain within the Church rather than to shed blood in revolt; and the rest would have been killed off like wild beasts. The present unity of Romanism so far as it exists, is due *less to tact than to naked force.*[1]

Instructive is the change of front of the Church with respect to the Franciscans. The religion of poverty and love propagated by Francis of Assisi took possession of the whole Church. The most beautiful chants of the Middle Ages and the greatest sermons originated among the Franciscans and the Dominicans closely related to them. New life was given to art and scholarship. All the great scholars of the thirteenth century—Thomas of Aquinas, Bonaventura, Albertus—were of the begging orders.

But the Church which had granted authority to St. Francis and established the Little Brothers of the Poor as a monastic order turned against it when the ideal of poverty spread so far as to menace her power and riches. She declared what the Franciscans were preaching about the poverty of Christ and the Apostles to be heresy and demanded submission. All the "spiritual" Franciscans

[1] G. G. Coulton, *From St. Francis to Dante*, 1907, p. 40.

were condemned as heretics. Cardinals who still defended the ideal of poverty, a few years before so popular, fell into disgrace. There was a bitter struggle, but at the end of the fourteenth century the worldly Church had crushed the propaganda of the poverty ideal. As a result the monastic orders lost in inspiration and influence and by the time of the Renaissance monasticism had fallen into "laziness and worthlessness." [2]

In 1660 the English Episcopal Church, now "established," entered upon the same persecutive policy of which it had been the victim. In 1662 the Act of Uniformity was passed enforcing the use of the amended Book of Common Prayer. In 1664 the Conventicle Act made illegal all meetings for worship except according to the Church. In 1665 an act was passed forbidding Nonconformist ministers to approach a borough. Not until 1689 was its endeavor to crush Dissenters abandoned.

The Puritan theocracy in New England in its treatment of Antinomians, Baptists, and Quakers showed a like ruthless determination to crush every movement which challenged it.

Withdrawal from competition. In case the rival cannot be wiped out one seeks to *withdraw from competition,* just as an army which cannot beat the enemy retires behind fortifications. The rulers of Japan, realizing early in the seventeenth century that the Jesuit missions were disintegrating a society founded on communal custom and filial piety, slew the native Christians, drove out all foreigners save the Dutch traders, who were confined to a 3-acre isle, made it a capital offense for any Japanese to leave Japan, broke up all vessels capable of long voyages, and attacked any European ships entering a Japanese port, except the vessels of the Dutch company.

In the third quarter of the last century, it became clear that the American standard of living could not possibly survive the competition of the Chinese coolies' standard of living. The friends of the American standard finally reared a barrier against the Oriental standard in the form of the Chinese Exclusion Act.

A state lacking in opportunities cannot hope to attract immigrants and therefore by every means in its power it binds its nationals to it. It discourages their emigration, sends agents abroad to organize them if they have left the homeland, and frowns upon their naturalization in another state.

[2] See A. Harnack, *The Evolution of the Monastic Ideal,* 1903.

A church that cannot crush competitors by its own strength summons the state to her aid. In South America until recently the state protected the religious monopoly of the Catholic Church. Only since 1865 in Chile have non-Catholics been permitted "to practice their religion inside private buildings belonging to them." Up to 1907 the law decreed that any person conspiring "to establish in Bolivia any other religion than that which the Republic professes, namely, that of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church," is a traitor. The constitution of Peru declared "The Nation professes the Roman Catholic Apostolic religion; the State protects it and does not permit the exercise of any other." Not until 1915 was the last clause abrogated.

If the state will not shield her, the church that shrinks from competition seeks a life apart. The early Church permitted mixed marriages in serene confidence that the Christian would convert, rather than be converted by, the pagan mate; but an edict of Louis XIV forbade marriage with heretics because of "the continual temptation of perversion." An expanding church does not admit very young members and is willing to leave children alone; but a church hard pressed seeks to forestall the judgment of its young people by incorporating them at an early age and requires its members to rear their children straitly in the faith. It conducts its young through a tunnel of church schools and societies lit by church lamps, instead of letting them into the broad daylight of the public school, the social settlement, the social center, and the public playground. This is why Soviet Russia will not allow any one but parents to teach religion to persons under 18 years of age!

Great care, too, is taken to button up the minds of the faithful. The church forbids them to read certain periodicals, patronize certain libraries, see certain plays, or follow certain university courses—a sure sign that the church counts on surviving *by holding on to her people* rather than by winning new converts!

The college loath to modernize its curriculum and methods cultivates assiduously its alumni and appeals to them to send their sons to "dear old Pennhurst." Facing the growing interest in natural science and social science, the classics dig themselves in as "required subjects," while the new attractions are kept in the inferior status of "elective subjects." The old parties, menaced by a new political movement they dare not meet in the open, pass a

law excluding from the official ballot a party which has not received a specified percentage of the ballots cast at the last election!

A device for holding business competitors at bay is the "factor's agreement" which binds the dealer to handle only the goods of a certain producer. Or an organization may require of the dealer the handling of articles upon which the patents have expired, as a condition of obtaining other articles, or the handling of a certain article as a condition of the handling another article or line of articles.

Constrained adaptation. The government-led Westernization of Japan was not at bottom a conversion to Occidental culture but the reluctant taking over of certain Western institutions and policies in order to save Japan from absorption by some Western power.

In China the activity of the Christian missionaries forces the native faiths to assume higher forms in order to survive.[3] Chinese scholars read into the Confucian classics elevated moral ideas which unconsciously they have imbibed from Christian sources. In some parts, under the spur of missionary competition, the Confucians band together and send out wandering gospellers of their own to spread the doctrines of the sage at fairs and festivals Chinese Mohammedans, Buddhists and Taoists form "national associations," found schools, relieve the distress of the poor, help needy children to go to school, and attend to the birth, marriage and death ceremonies of the destitute.

The Ceylonese Buddhists tell of the "incarnation" and the "immaculate conception" of Buddha and comfort the dying by assuring them that the Lord Buddha will presently receive them into his arms. The Buddhists of Japan besides sending out missionaries of their own have adopted various methods of their Christian competitors. They have stated times for preaching. They have pastoral visitation, street preaching, Sunday schools, prison and army chaplains, and special organizations for young men, women, and children. They maintain charities, push temperance, and set up schools.

The "amusement" clause of the Methodist Book of Discipline has in many places become a dead letter because its enforcement would be a serious handicap in competing with less strict churches. The success of the undenominational Young People's Christian

[3] E. A. Ross, *The Changing Chinese*, 1911, pp. 256-57, 279.

Endeavor Society caused large denominations to organize young people's societies of their own. In like manner the churches develop "institutional" or social, or recreative, features, not because the ruling element really wants them, but in order to attract or hold the young people, or the unchurched.

The coming up of socialism forced a reluctant church to concern herself with the material welfare of the masses. In the 1870's, in order to check Lassalle's movement, Bishop Ketteler of Mayence organized in Rhenish Prussia "Christian trade unions" which spread to Germany and Austria. It is not of record that they ever did *anything* which the bosses strongly objected to their doing. In Belgium the socialists, in accordance with their principles, organized coöperative banks among the poor; in order not to lose them the church started coöperative banks of her own. In the same way coöperative credit associations have been organized in Quebec in connection with the church.

In Mexico after the masses had gotten out of hand the church tried to lure the hand-workers into "Catholic unions" or "free unions," which submitted themselves to the authority of the church in policy as well as in doctrine and pledged respect for religion, country, family and property. Such tactics only excited the sardonic mirth of men who had risked their skins for the exploited workers years before the clergy showed a spark of interest in them. The advanced social program of the "Federal Council of Churches in Christ in America" was adopted by some of the thirty Protestant bodies reluctantly and only because they realized that "something must be done to win back the workingmen."

In Germany social insurance was first urged by the Socialist party. Bismark and his Junkers hated the socialists and cared nothing for the welfare of the workingmen, but they took over this policy of their opponents in order to make German wage earners proof against socialism.

When wage earners begin to vote or form unions the *bourgeois* (businessmen's) parties hasten to put on a thin pro-labor veneering. They run their man as the "log cabin" candidate, woo labor with genial handshaking and barbecue, appease labor leaders with political jobs, scatter lush promises they do not intend to fulfil, give their policies a labor flavor (high tariff urged as "the protection of American workingmen"), pass measures which they know

the courts will throw out as "unconstitutional," toss labor a few sops, or offer substantial benefits while at the same time providing capitalists with bigger benefits along other lines.

The competition of young American commonwealths for settlers spread democracy by hastening the extension of the suffrage and the early adoption of a system of public education. The competition of ambitious cities for residents or factories or state public institutions obliges them to adopt policies respecting prostitution, parks, boulevards, schools, police, handling of labor troubles, etc., which may be wormwood to the dominant element.

Universities are so loath to change that their adaptation to new conditions is usually forced by competition. The universities of the seventeenth century, embedded still in scholasticism, adopted the principle of freedom of inquiry which prevailed in the newly-founded scientific academies—only because in no other way could they attract the best scholars of their day. Americans are fortunate in having two types of university—endowed and state. Their competition for professors broadens academic freedom while their competition for students tends to modernize the curriculum by introducing such new subjects as economics, sociology, business administration, and journalism. The catering of the endowed universities to the prejudices of donors, actual or possible, would hamstring their teaching of the social sciences, were it not that they have to meet the competition of the liberal state universities.

In public institutions and in private institutions there are strengths and weaknesses, but they are not the same for both. Accordingly if the two types are brought into honorable competition within the same field each is stimulated to develop the kind of strength the other has, along with its own kind of strength, and to rid itself of the weaknesses peculiar to it. Fortunate therefore is the society which has both public and private high schools, both state and endowed universities, both state and private forestry, both state and commercial insurance service, both parcel post and express companies, both community and private agencies of poor relief, and both state and philanthropic institutions for dependents. In order that there may be true competition there should be no partnership between private societies or foundations and the government; each should go ahead on its own feet and show the best it can do.

Specialization. Finally an institution *eludes competitors by specializing*. A college may snap its fingers at rivals offering courses in commerce and journalism and keep its halls filled by offering the best-framed and best-taught classical course of study. When yellow journalism seems to be carrying all before it, some journals save themselves by excluding blare and flare and offering the judicious a soundproof retreat amid the howling of Bedlam. Until lately the British navy refused to enter the common arena of competition among the professions. No one could become a cadet without a recommendation from some relative or friend of the family in the navy. This restriction might seem to limit fatally the talent the navy drew upon; but the prestige accruing to the navy from its social exclusiveness may really have operated to supply it with more than its due share of talent.

A church which in its attitude towards science, morals, and social work is out of tune with its time may go in for beauty. With dusky and mysterious interiors, magnificent mosaics, wonderful Gregorian music, forests of lighted candles and domes blue with incense smoke, it may attract those who are sensuous or mystic in temperament.

Tactics of the new. The tactics of the new have to be altogether different. Being young and weak it will not dream of *destroying* its established competitor. It cannot *withdraw from competition* for it has no intrenchments to withdraw to. No *constrained adaptation* seeing that it is already adapted to its time. In case it *specializes* there is no competition at all between it and the established.

So the new prefers tactics not open to the established. It courts public favor by *making extravagant claims and promises*. The old has to be cautious in making promises for they can be checked against its record; but the young aspirant is held back by no such hobble. The untested remedy sets up as a cure-all; the untried reform poses as advance agent of the millennium. When the Fourier "phalanx," solitary confinement for malefactors, the "single tax" on land values, the "monitor" system or the "natural" method of learning a foreign language enters the lists, glowing pictures are painted of the wonders it will work.

The new courts attention by *sensationalism*. The established has the prestige of age and possession; the new must gain prestige by other means. The newly rich in order to break the spell exercised

by the old families set a pace in extravagance and ostentation which the former social arbiters cannot stand. The leaders of new departures in art or literature excite curiosity and awe by long hair, flowing ties, unfashionable cut of dress, bizarre actions, and studied unintelligibility. Joseph Smith, the founder of Mormonism, made an immense sensation with his story of the Angel with his inscribed plates of gold. New religious movements are much readier to claim "signs and wonders," than old movements.

The new *appeals to the more easily aroused demands of human nature.* The demand for *freedom* is one of these and hence the new holds out the lure of release from some form of restraint. Jesus proclaimed, "My yoke is easy and my burden is light." Paul preached "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law." The Reformers offered Christians "freedom from prelacy." The Anabaptists permitted prophecy *ad libitum.* The Quakers rejected the sacraments and a paid clergy. The Free Methodists gave free course to religious feeling. Philosophical individualism makes a great initial appeal while the doctrines of anarchism have a seductiveness all their own. The claim that the artist should throw off all "gyves," including the Ten Commandments, always makes a hit in some quarters. "Free verse" is a rallying cry, while "symbolism" is welcomed as loosing the artist from the trammels of the actual. "Free election of studies" is the slogan of the assailants of the fixed curriculum.

Other winning cards in the hand of the new are *ritual, secrecy* and *exclusiveness.* Their appeal is obvious.

Thanks to such tactics the inferior new may triumph over the time-tested old if the plane of popular intelligence be low. In ignorant minds valuable institutions may be shaken by the blatant claims of charlatans and false prophets. For a while people may be lured from hard-won and age-sifted truth to follow bubble promises and glittering sophisms. What gratifies man's deep and lasting needs may be abandoned for that which chimes with his fitful and passing desires.

Let no institution elude competition. When, however, the plane of popular intelligence is high, it is chiefly competition that forces institutions to adapt themselves to the conditions they face and the people they serve. Without this spur the institution stands still, even degenerates. Since this is so, *no institution ought to be shielded from competition by any special privilege or advantage.*

The youthful sect, party, college, doctrine, or ideal ought to have the same freedom to agitate, proselyte and organize that the established enjoys. Moreover, individuals should be free to quit old organizations without unreasonable forfeiture. Interparty migration tends to liberalize parties; interdenominational migration, to liberalize churches; interuniversity migration, to liberalize universities; and interstate migration, to liberalize governments.

An institution that has the children of its members as a matter of course needs not cater to them, and may petrify in its tracks. So it is unwholesome that children should be expected to take over the friendships, grudges, loyalties, and allegiances of their parents. The parent who lays upon his child inescapable obligations before the poor youngster has reached the age of free choice is confiscating his child's personality!

If, instead of *inheriting* their adherents, organizations had to *win* them, they would accommodate themselves to the needs of to-day. The contrasts between organizations would connect less with differences of origin and history and more with the actual contrasts of type in contemporary society. In religion, for example, Methodists and Catholics, Friends and Christian Scientists, Dunkers and Salvation Army, would, no doubt, find each a type they were best suited to but certainly some of the one hundred and fifty sects in the United States would perish because their *raison d'être* is in distant European conditions or remote centuries.

The vying for public favor by rival parties, sects, schools, professional codes, systems of education, theories of government and ideals of life brings about that accommodation of institutions to popular preferences which characterizes "democratic" society. The competition of patterns and manners for adoption makes them direct and expressive instead of formal and stiff. The competition of ideals of life for favor humanizes them so that they chime with the better self of man. As organizations and institutions are obliged to compete they come into line with the general trend of opinion and feeling. Under *inherited status* institutions make the character of their people; under *competition* the people make the character of their institutions.

CHAPTER XVIII

AGE CONFLICT

Far under the surface goes on an intermittent struggle between old and young for access to the controls. By "young" I mean those eighteen to forty, by "old" I mean those over sixty. Let us call the in-between "middle-aged." Age conflict has been overlooked seeing that it never turns savage and results in broken heads. This is because: (1) old and young intermingle at every social level; (2) the contending groups are fluid in make-up, the old recall their restless fiery youth while the indignation of the young is tempered by the thought that, as they grow old, power will come to them of itself; (3) the ire of the old at the revolt of youth is cooled when they see their children confronting them, while the young are staggered to discover their parents in the opposing ranks; (4) the middle-aged have everything that can fit them to function as mediators in the age conflict.

Bases of conflict. One basis is the fact that *old and young differ in aptitudes*. Long ago Lord Bacon pointed out:

> Young men are fitter to invent than to judge, fitter for execution than for counsel and fitter for new projects than for settled business.
>
> Young men, in the conduct and manage of actions, embrace more than they can hold, stir more than they can quiet; fly to the end without consideration of the means and degree; pursue some few principles which they have chanced upon absurdly; care not to innovate, which draws unknown inconveniences; use extreme remedies at first; and, that which doubleth all errors, will not acknowledge or retract them.
>
> Men of age object too much, consult too long, adventure too little, repent too soon and seldom drive business home to the full period, but content themselves with a mediocrity of success.

Young and old differ in objectives. When, as in our time, the questioning spirit is abroad, the young normally judge measures, policies, and institutions from the point of view of Opportunity; they are for whatever promises to enable them to get on,

get up, faster. But after their thirties they tend to appraise from the point of view of Security, in their jobs, their property, their investments, their domestic relations, their social standing, their religious faith.

So the young are critical of existing institutions; are progressive, even radical, with respect to the actual set-up. The middle-aged, on the other hand, are conservative from fear of losing place or vantage already attained. The former clamor for more open doors—*ahead of them;* the latter want more closed doors—*behind them!*

Of course, blockheads will be conservative even in their youth, while the very bright may remain progressive all through life. Again, certain of the young may lean to the right because they see things through the eyes of their parents, while some of the old lean left to the end because they look out on society through the eyes of their children. The heirs of property, situation, or social position will probably be conservative even in youth; but the old who have toiled and moiled yet gotten nowhere realize they have nothing to lose and see no reason why they should not clamor for a change in the "rules of the game."

Each type exasperates the other. The elders resent the crude egoism and rashness of youth, its insistence on having what it wants at once "no matter what," its brazen proposals to alter or discard inherited culture-patterns. Goaded by their passions the young arrive at biased judgments; it is the old, in whom the passions are cooled, who can be looked to for objective and disinterested judgments.

The old can feel sympathy with the young, but the young, having never tasted age, have small patience with its faults. Age's realism and cool deliberation offend the eager and impetuous. They see the once alert become with advancing years almost vegetative, loath to examine new ideas, to study or think hard. The old will not qualify themselves to guide society aright, yet toward the young capables they show a fierce jealousy; *they are afraid of being thrust aside.* Nor does character always improve as the passions of youth cool. Often the fire of idealism and generous enthusiasm dies down, so that the erstwhile high-minded and chivalrous become stodgy, comfort-loving and hypocritical.

Youth cries:

There is no scorn so fierce as that of youth for the inertia of older men. The lack of adjustment to the ideas of youth's elders and betters, one of the permanent tragedies of life, is certainly the most sensational aspect of youth. That the inertia of the older people is wisdom, and not impotence, is a theory that you will never induce youth to believe for an instant. The stupidity and cruelties of their management of the world fill youth with an intolerant rage.

Youth sees with almost a passionate despair its plans and dreams and enthusiasms, that it knows so well to be right and true and noble, brushed calmly aside, not because of any sincere searching into their practicability, but because of the timidity and laziness of the old, who sit in the saddle and ride mankind. And nothing torments youth so much as to have this inertia justified on the grounds of experience. For youth thinks that it sees through this sophism of "experience." It sees in it an all-inclusive attempt to give the world a character, and excuse the older generation for the mistakes and failures which it has made. What is this experience, youth asks, but a slow accretion of inhibitions, a learning, at its best, not to do again something which ought not to have been done in the first place? [1]

Lowie, from his study of primitive society, has come to value greatly "the conception of society as a structure segmented into age layers."

Even in the family there is that opposition between the older and the younger generation to which Turgeniev has given classical expression in "Fathers and Sons." The old people piquing themselves on their fund of experience never learn the wisdom of not giving advice that will not and cannot be heeded and remain unconscious of the fathomless boredom into which their futile prolixities of reminiscence plunge the impatient listener. The young, inclined to brush aside their elders as at best well-intentioned dotards, have not the prophetic gift to divine that all need not be senility that is not grist to their mill. Often rupture may indeed be avoided but there is ever the latent possibility of discord and the manifest incompatibility of thoughts, tastes, and modes of living. Of course the estrangement is not limited to the confines of the family because in essence it is not a personal but a class struggle. Hence any mixed assemblage will reveal the same cleavage, the same clash of temperaments that divides fathers and sons, mothers and daughters.[2]

Forms of conflict. Age conflict may take the form of a "revolt of youth," *i.e.*, the young insist on choosing mate and occupation,

[1] Randolph Bourne, *Youth and Life*, pp. 11-15.
[2] R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, 1920, p. 314.

reject the religious, political and social orthodoxies which their elders thrust upon them, and brush aside hoary but burdensome rules of conduct for which they see no warrant. "I want to think for myself," they protest; "I want to lead my own life."

It may take the graver form of the young *attempting to wrest the control levers from the hands of their elders*. Hotly they challenge their monopoly of the key posts in state, party, church, courts, bureaus, army, and navy, universities, professional and learned societies, business organizations. The old rely on age qualifications, length of training and experience, seniority rules of promotion. The young try by daring and sensational stunts to outshine their elders and rivet attention upon themselves. The old plead the value of their detachment, their long experience, their store of garnered wisdom, their caution and deliberateness. The young charge their elders with being timid, inert, hide-bound, routinary, with want of initiative and decision, with failure to recognize and understand the new factors in a situation. The slogans of the old are "Ripe judgment," "Safe and sane," "Experience counts," "A steady hand at the helm." The slogans of the young are, "New blood," "More vigor," "Away with the old fogies," "Give the younger a chance."

Age conflict in the past. Among the few primitive groups who lead a hard life and are of low organization, *e.g.*, the Fuegians, the Damaras, and the Hottentots, the old are abandoned or killed when their usefulness is past. Generally, however, at the primitive level the older men have saved themselves by organizing secret societies with blood-curdling and awesome rites into which the young are inducted by degrees. This *gerontocracy* prevailed in Negro Africa and among the peoples of Australia and Melanesia. The effect of the initiation ceremonies on the young is to heighten their respect for the old men and bring them under senile control. Numerous food taboos and restraints on marriage give the old a monopoly of the choicest edibles and the prettiest girls. Nor does initiation raise the youth to equality with the elders. He is long kept in a subordinate position, he has nothing to say in political affairs, and even in the matter of food he will not be free from all restrictions until he is well along in years.

As to the place of the old in the early civilizations Goldenweiser observes:

The exaggerated prestige of old age is one of the *differentiae* of primitive civilization.

While these (the old men and in some groups the old women) take a less active part in the everyday activities, their leadership in ceremonial and political matters is pronounced, and they do everywhere constitute the great depositaries of tradition, figuring as the mouthpiece, as it were, of the conservative *status quo*. They know the past, in fact, they know all there is to be known, and they see to it that this knowledge is passed on without much loss, as well as without much addition. They are the great stabilizing fly-wheel of the civilizational mechanism.[3]

The advent of writing weakens the position of the old. So long as law is but custom handed on orally the graybeards are key men, for their minds are reference books of settled cases. New cases do not stagger them, for in some remembered precedent they have at hand a solution. But in comes writing and presently all jurisprudence, equity, history and science are more accessible in books than in the memories of old men! The younger no longer stand in awe of the larger experience of their seniors, for from books they can gather the fruits of many men's experience.

Nevertheless, in ancient Sparta the *Gerousia,* or council of twenty-eight men, all of them over sixty, held the state for centuries to the system of a semi-mythical legislator. Even in Athens, if any young orator advanced new ideas, the old politicians who had the ear of the assembly denounced him as a hireling and traitor so that he had to retire from the *agora* to private life. Both Rome with its "Senate" or "old men" and the Church with its "presbyters" or "elders" provided scope for the organizing ability and disinterestedness that usually bloom late in life if at all.

Age conflict in the present. The youth-age conflict in modern society has received little attention; but here are some significant facts from the recent history of Prussia. In the revolutionary year 1808 minors were forbidden to participate in political associations, after 1850 they might not take part in political meetings or processions. After 1867 schools were not allowed to publish manifestos in the press and independent school papers were put under the ban. From 1874 on no school papers were allowed and even non-political associations among students were prohibited. Naturally secret associations grew like mushrooms and faculties were expected to take measures to break them up.

[3] A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization,* 1922, p. 257.

AGE CONFLICT IN MODERN SOCIETY

Static times versus dynamic times. Quiet epochs leave power in failing hands, whereas stirring times, which discredit precedent and tradition, give the capable young their opportunity. Gowin [4] has shown that the Protestant Reformation was led by churchmen whose average age was thirty-eight, whereas in quiet times the Church was guided by men well up in the sixties. Men of forty-two came to the helm during the Puritan Revolution, although sexagenarians have held the tiller of England in calm epochs. The dozen greatest French revolutionaries averaged thirty-eight years, while in smooth water the skippers of the French ship of state ran to fifty-nine years. The American Revolution was brought on by men under forty, while the anti-slavery agitators were forty-one; but in slack stretches American destiny has been confided to men averaging above fifty-three years.

Japan was modernized by men under forty, and the Turkish Republic and New China are led by young men. In the Philippines the generation who had their education in English and assimilated the ideas introduced by the Americans, have all the power. The awakening of patriarchal Asia will array young against old for at least a century, during which myriads of gallant young progressives will be done to death by minions of the power-loving old.

Religion. The ancestor worship of the Far East puts even the middle-aged under the thumb of their forbears; but in its maturity almost any religion works this way. The old monopolize the interpreting of it and they make it back up the control of parents over their grown children. Impairment of the authority of a regnant religion, therefore, brings in its train a weakening of patriarchal control. The introducers of a foreign religion, finding the striplings more receptive than the graybeards, stand always for the right of young adults to reject their parents' beliefs and choose for themselves; so, wherever they go, missionaries tend to shatter the ancient social order based upon the authority of the ancestors.

Education. Better child nurture and teaching enable the young more quickly to develop their powers and cast off the yoke of their elders. The conflict of ages is sharpened when education is being rapidly extended, so that many young people are far better instructed than were their seniors. Among us shoals whose

[4] E. B. Gowin, *The Executive and His Control of Men*, 1915, pp. 264-70.

parents had but the rudiments are winning diplomas, even "seeing the world" before settling down. Such come to perceive on what flimsy foundations rest many of the cherished beliefs and ways of the ignorant "old folks." On the other hand, the prolonging of the period of preparation for life work protracts financial dependence and delays entrance upon a profession and arrival at one's peak of earnings and influence. Another development which helps the old withstand the young is *adult education,* which promises to prolong one's period of mental suppleness and intellectual growth.

Government. Democracy utilizes the patriarch less than monarchy, aristocracy or oligarchy. "Favor and popularity," says Bacon, "follow youth." This is why elected bodies include more young men than appointed bodies, why a legislature elected on a broad franchise will include more young and magnetic vote-getters than one elected by delegate bodies.

Growth of capital. The elders have a great and growing advantage in their accumulations. In general, what men under forty own cannot compare with what is owned by men above fifty. Their incomes differ less to be sure; but the incomes of the young are derived more from personal exertion, those of the old spring rather from ownership. The ever-greater rôle played by capital in production gives the older, so far as they have accumulated capital or credit, an advantage in launching an enterprise in comparison with young men of equal ability.

Power of bequest. Everywhere we see adult children deferring to or obeying parents from fear of being "cut off in the will." This is why, now and then, scions of millionaires are found in the camp of the radicals; they have first-hand knowledge of what capitalist domination means! Limitation by law of the testator's liberty to bequeath his estate as he likes is one means of depriving parents of their power to bend their children to their will. Another is the ownership of the means of production by the State, as in Soviet Russia.

Organization. In any organization promotion on the principle of seniority fills the higher positions with gray-heads. Promotion according to demonstrated merit gives scope to the young who have shown unusual ability and force. Organizations *to do work*—such as banks, commercial and manufacturing concerns, school systems, charitable societies—greatly needing drive and initiative, are less likely to prosper in the hands of the old than such organ-

izations as churches, learned societies, academies, religious orders, fraternal orders, financial houses, and political parties.

The youth movement. In various societies since the World War youth has come to be self-conscious, organized and aggressive. Soviet Russia is a land of youth and dominated by the spirit of youth. Let me cite some impressions I had in the summer of 1934.

Out from Yalta in the Crimea I spent hours in a camp for Young Pioneers, *i.e.*, boys and girls eight to sixteen. The camp, which has its own milk farms, bee-hives and vineyards, is occupied during the long vacation, May to October, and accommodates four shifts of three hundred each. There are many such camps in Russia, but this is one of the most desirable. All the children here are *udarniks, i.e.*, have distinguished themselves in some way. Each is on a "project" of his own choosing and the group have their own Soviet where they learn to deliberate and administer their collective affairs. Never have I met a body of children so alert and reactive as these.

Some miles away I visited a camp of Komsomols (Communist youth, seventeen to twenty-four) and was well heckled regarding labor conditions in my country. What a contrast between the product of our high-schools and that of the Soviet high-schools! *Our* teachers can hardly impart to their pupils any critical truth about working conditions or public utility finance without bringing down on their heads the "business" school-board, the local chamber of commerce, or the local chapter of the D. A. R. . . . The Young Pioneers and the Komsomols . . . possess an uncanny insight into anti-social situations which *we* have been taught to tolerate.[5]

In Italy "Fascism was mainly a political movement of the younger generation which had been convulsed by the War and needed a guiding hand. Since Fascism means bread for its partisans and hunger for its enemies, most of the young people in Italy don the black shirt and shout their fidelity to their Dictator." Germany's Youth Movement was recruited from the young people "who crowded the schools and colleges of the Republic after the Armistice and who could not be absorbed through normal employment when their education was completed." Thousands of restless unemployed people who had roamed the countryside as members of the Youth Hostel Association were quick to organize under the emotional appeal of Hitler. Now they constitute the Nazi Youth Movement.

[5] E. A. Ross, *Seventy Years of It*, 1936, pp. 172-3.

In China "since its beginning in 1915 the youth movement has gained impetus with the burial of tradition after tradition." It is "recognized as the most important moving spirit behind the social transformations in China." It stands for "a new philosophy, a new system of education, a new form of government." In France, Austria, Poland, and Czecho-Slovakia there are clear evidences of the discontent of youth with the old order. Young Japan and Young India are making themselves felt. The Turkish Republic means that young are at the helm. That in America youth appears to be "apathetic" may mean only that the old have not been "on top" here to an unreasonable degree.

As an endeavor to stir up the young to think for themselves and suggest directions which their thinking ought to take, the youth movement is praise-worthy; but not if it goes on to tell the young that the cards have been slyly stacked against them and that the old are enjoying an unfair advantage in the constitution of society when, in fact, such is not the case.

AGE TRENDS OF OUR TIME

Some current developments tell on the side of the old:

a. The old have help from their growth in relative number owing to the fall of the birth rate and to the prolongation of human life in consequence of the vanquishing of many diseases. Since our grandparents' day the proportion of the population over the age of sixty-five has doubled. It is now about 6% while those past fifty are near 20%. It has been computed that by 1960 those over sixty-five will be a tenth of the population, by 1980 those over sixty will constitute a fifth! As the cohort of elderly grows they become able to impose their will. In the nineteenth century the tillers of society were in the hands of men about fifteen years older than were the helmsmen of the fifteenth century. By the dawn of the twenty-first century the mean may have gone up another fifteen years. When Nestors abound and everywhere sit tight in the high places, the feud between them and the progressive young may become bitter.

b. The rise of a new technique for "keeping young." Elderly women are availing themselves of "beauty culture" to hold the center of the stage instead of retiring early to the wings, leaving the limelight to the blooming girls. Men past life's

noon show signs of making a like rally. Guided by a personal hygiene ever more scientific and medical examinations ever more thorough, they are using gymnasia, golf links and country clubs to prolong the vigor and elasticity of both body and mind. Apparently mental decay is being put off at about the same rate as physical decay.

c. Discovery that decline into stupid prejudice and obstinate conservatism as the years pass is not due to senescence, but grows out of long addiction to bad habits of thought. Following from youth on a proper mental hygiene prevents such fungoid growths.

d. More and more in capitalist society income and power go with ownership. Since most of the old hang on to their property till death, they are sure to be courted and deferred to by all who have hopes of being remembered in the will.

On the other hand certain trends of our time are imparting social weight to the young.

1. Many of the young are equipped with a vastly better education than their parents received. For the greater part of its history education has consisted in passing on a stock of learning which the young were to accept without question. Secondary schools were expected to plant in their pupils the orthodox ideas of their time. This is why many high-school graduates prove tighter-minded in later life than those who quit school at the sixth grade! But the rise of the ever-developing sciences has shattered the old idea that the task of the school is to pass on learning; its business is to *help one to make the most of one's powers.* The "progressive school," in which the pupils *learn* in order to *do,* does not shackle youth with the pet notions of their elders but so builds them up that they can discern how arbitrary are many of the beliefs and ways of the hide-bound "old."
2. The young are quicker than their elders to "catch on to" the countless new things coming into the warp and woof of our lives. On the farm it will be the boy rather than his father who "fixes" the tractor when it is out of order or gets the radio to "work."
3. In almost any line "long experience" counts for less than formerly. In the mass production industries semi-automatic

machine operations have lessened the value of experience and put a premium on the drive and pliancy of youth. "Speeding up," synchronization of production processes, and the insistence on higher output per man make it difficult for the older worker to retain his place in industry. Many firms lay off the older worker first in a slack season and rehire him last (if at all) when employment picks up.

4. Such assets of the graybeards as ripe scholarship, profound erudition, familiarity with ancient lore, close acquaintance with venerable sacred writings, weigh less now than at any time in the last twenty-two hundred years. More and more humanity is pinning its hopes of relief from the major ills of life to the progress of the sciences.

Balancing these conflicting tendencies, one may venture to predict that ere long through most of humanity the young will succeed in squirming from under the patriarchal knee, but that the old will contrive to keep most of their command of the controls in society.

CHAPTER XIX

SEX CONFLICT

Between individual men and women in the love relation there are innumerable clashes of personality; but even between the sexes as groups there smolders an antagonism which ever and anon bursts into flame. Among its sources are:

Sex difference in instinctive equipment. Woman has at least one instinct all her own, the maternal; while man has the stronger pugnacious impulses. Nor do the sexes share equally in the will to dominate, to display one's self. This is why Nietzsche declares, "Men and women are alien—never yet has any one conceived how alien." That they react so differently to certain situations makes each sex seem at times queer to the other. In the refined classes the sexes are carefully trained from childhood to conventional attitudes toward each other; but among the "plain folk" each sex views the other with some dislike or contempt. Rough old farmers talking freely by themselves are likely to conclude that women generally are touchy, unstable, flighty, vain, irresponsible and sly. But their women folk gathered about a quilting frame agree that for the most part men are coarse, sensual, self-willed, violent, egotistic and unreasonable.[1] So there is a gulf between the sexes in primary reactions, which may cause a clash in the fields of attitude and opinion.

Man has monopolized power. As chief trouble maker, and protector of his own from trouble, man has arrogated to himself the shaping of the large events and institutions conditioning the life of family, community, tribe and state. For the ages that his decisions related to little else than war, peace, and security,

[1] Middletown's culture says that men and women "are different kinds of people. Men are stronger, bolder, less pure, less refined, more logical, more reasonable, more given to seeing things in the large, but at home needing coddling and reassurance, 'like little boys.' Women are more delicate, stronger in sympathy, understanding, and insight, less mechanically adept, more immersed in petty detail and in personalities, and given to 'getting emotional over things.'" R. S. and H. M. Lynd, *Middletown in Transition,* 1937, p. 176.

women consented to their exclusion. Tied down by their babies they left fighting and all that pertains to it to the men. But since *man-made law,* instead of *ancestral custom,* has come to fix the rights and duties of spouses, and since the man-managed state has laid its interfering hand on family, children, education, recreation, industry, public health and public morals, thinking women more and more resent exclusive male control of law and of the state.

Man has set up ideals for women as well as for himself. On the whole the ideals for men have been wrought out by men but the ideals for women have not been wrought out by women. In Japan, for example, the mold into which the daughter's soul is poured is plainly man-made, whereas the mold in which the son's character takes shape is by no means woman-made. The female is to be adorned, modest, self-abnegating, gentle, retiring, and domestic because the male wants her so. The world over, man follows his own notions of what women ought to be and to do. The wide divergence in the meanings of "virtue," "honor," "modesty," "liberty," as applied to the sexes is man's work. How much it costs the human female to be what he expects her to be, how many of her best possibilities are sacrificed, and whether she is happy in the rôle he forces on her, are questions which never occur to the self-confident male. For him, "That is the way I like 'em" is final!

Where the spirit of our Old South reigns, an elaborate upper-class "lady"-worship fails to conceal the naïve assumption that God placed women here for the sake of the male sex. As a matter of course women should find their mission in serving, pleasing, and inspiring men, but no one suggests that the male sex has its end in anything it does for women; *its end is within itself.* The young woman should cultivate a conciliating and caressing manner, and avoid opposing or disagreeing with men. If she has opinions she dissembles them and if she has learning she hides it, lest male irritation blast her with the reproach "unwomanly." To please men she must wear delicate and flimsy clothes, no matter what they cost her fingers or her purse, and shun the plain but convenient "tailor-made" garments. Male opinion blames the widow who remarries for putting her own happiness above loyalty to a man's memory; but no one thinks less of the widower who remarries. The divorced man goes everywhere, but the divorced

woman is ostracized no matter what her justification. The men hold under constant surveillance the reading, associations, and activities of their womenfolk, and expect the woman to subordinate her own notion of what is proper for her to the judgment of her nearest male relative. It is assumed that a woman's repute and standing are of more consequence to her menfolk than they are to herself!

The vast body of literature on "the woman question" setting forth impressively the disabilities which nature has imposed on the female sex and solemnly warning of the social risks of making women free is a monument to male self-conceit and fatuousness. Never has there been such an illustration of how sex bias warps judgment. The parade of learning, logic, disinterestedness and impartiality in thousands of sermons, articles, pamphlets and books is seen on close inspection to be as empty as a soap bubble!

Genesis of sex conflict. An inter-sex adjustment becomes bedded in the culture patterns and we adapt our behavior to it. But when the culture patterns are shattered hidden injustices show up. Hence, in our day, with the crumbling of religious dogma, the decay of the principle of authority, the overtaking of the clergy by other learned professions, the adequacy of fewer births, and the opening to women of doors to self-support, the right of one sex to fix the destiny of the other is challenged. Why are men so eager to bar women from the skilled trades, the higher educational walks, the professions, public service, and public office, unless it is that they want the soft berths and the power seats for themselves?

Features of sex conflict. Sex conflict never becomes carnage as may conflicts between races or classes. The sexes are cross-linked by countless close ties—lovers, spouses, brothers and sisters, mothers and sons, fathers and daughters—so that they never confront each other armed and in hostile array. Physical combat between the sexes never has been nor will be. Nor is it a conflict between men and women; rather it is a duel between the old, masculine, woman-depreciating culture and the new bi-sexual culture built on science. Always there are women who uphold male domination and men who stand up for the rights of women; so each group tries to win converts from the other. The champions of male rule work artfully upon the feelings of women to make them distrust themselves and accept an as-

signed status; while the friends of aspiring women appeal to the sense of fair play in men to persuade them to let their sisters go free.

As agitation thrusts "woman's rights" into the focus of attention, sex antagonism flares up. Then, as women are conceded instalment after instalment of freedom and opportunity, which blithely they hasten to use and enjoy, the sexes settle contentedly into the changed relations and their antagonism dies away. There is always a residue, however, *due to differences in the reaction of the sexes to elemental life situations.*

What determines the outcome of sex conflict? In some fields, namely, intersex association and manners, status of the wife or the mother, domestic seclusion, the education of daughters, etc., the outcome of the conflict in the higher social classes practically settles it for the rest, unless society is cleft by deep ethnic or cultural chasms. On the other hand, mere upper-class example cannot remove the grievances of woman in respect to her legal status in home, industry, education, the church, and the state. The battle rages about these citadels of masculine power until either they capitulate or the attack is decisively repulsed.

Not fists nor weapons settle intersex conflict, not always even argument and debate. Factors from outside the field of controversy may incline the balance one way or the other. Quite in their day's work researchers in biology, psychology, sociology, or church history may explode dogmas which long have buttressed male domination, namely, that God is male, that woman was created as an afterthought and solely for man's comfort, that the Fall was due to Eve's tempting Adam, that owing to her menstrual flow woman is "impure," that about conception and birth there is something guilty and shameful, that the father is the sole author of the child's being, that women have no souls, that women as the chief ally of the Devil in dragging men down to perdition must be kept cloistered or veiled, that "it is shameful for a woman to speak in a church," etc., etc. Once these ancient props are gone, there is little left on which the male sex can base its claim to dominate. And it is not easy to see from what source it can procure new serviceable dogmas to take the place of the exploded ones!

Developments keeping women under the yoke. Although the religious dogmas which propped male domination are crum-

bling, certain current developments tell against sex equality: (a) war and "preparedness" exalt the sex that fights; (b) decay of the household industries lessens the economic importance of the home-staying wife and makes her more dependent on her man; (c) heavy athletic contests emphasize the physical superiority of males to females: (d) the popular connecting of happiness with *the owning of things* (a by-product of modern salesmanship) is hostile to idealism in the relations of the sexes, and unreins man's greater physical strength and hankering to dominate: (e) for a long time there will be a vast deal of exploring, pioneering, subdual of nature and wild life to be done on our globe and this will help keep *men* to the fore.

Developments releasing women. (a) Mental testing proves the intellectual parity of Darby and Joan; (b) limiting the size of the family spares wives from being looked on by men as mere brood mares; (c) communal nurseries (as in Soviet Russia and among the Jewish settlers in Palestine) allow the mothers to keep on with their jobs; (d) parents give their daughters as good a schooling as their sons; (e) admission of women in increasing numbers to the higher walks and the learned professions; (f) sex equality in voting, access to public office and participation in public life.

World-wide sweep of sex conflict. In the ages to come changes in life conditions or in ruling ideas may cause swings of the pendulum between sex equality and male dominance; but *our* time, at least, will witness the swift spread through most of mankind of the freedom, opportunity and respect attained already by about a quarter of the world's women. Three-fifths of humanity are steeped in Oriental cultures which, in the main, subordinate the female sex to a degree hardly to be matched in any culture of which we have record. The readjustments in the relative status of the sexes through the Asiatic world will make fireworks, we may be sure, for several decades. "In China bobbing the hair is a symbol for which women die martyrs, able and energetic girls, killed in backward villages during some militarist reaction." In Moslem Asia there are villages where women who leave off the veil are bound to a post and stoned. Without a spell of growing tension, sex embitterment, female self-assertion and occasional savage reaction woman's day cannot dawn in the Orient.

THE OUTLOOK

If there should develop a reaction (which Heaven forfend!) against the sex-equality trend, the primary cause will probably be not a recrudescence of the old craving of men to dominate women, but spread of the conviction that "emancipated" women are in a measure "falling down" in their race-continuance function. Endeavor will be made to show that not a sufficient number of children are being born owing to the wife's dread of pregnancy; that the wives of superior and successful men are not delivering their due quota of heirs; that children are not being looked after and cared for as self-sacrificingly and intelligently as we have a right to expect; that mothers are bringing up their daughters to demand too much from life, or to sidestep the duties which fall upon them as women; or mothers are too absorbed in their pursuits or pastimes to acquire over their sons that character-building influence which was often the reward of the old-fashioned home-staying mother.

It is upon these functions and opportunities that the leaders of women should center their attention. If too many capable women fritter away their newly-won freedom in pleasure-seeking, beauty culture, the sex chase, struggle for social recognition, pursuit of a career, etc., then a tide of opinion unfriendly to sex-equality will become strong.

When all has been said there are limits beyond which the equalization of the sexes cannot go. The time may come when women collectively will have as much weight in society and state as men; but there is no prospect that in sex relations the man will lose his prerogative to make the advances, to woo, to propose marriage, because it rests on physiology. No one can get away from the fact that a marriage may have a measure of success even if the wife does not respond to the amorous approaches of her husband, whereas it fails utterly in case the husband does not respond to the amorous approaches of his wife.

CHAPTER XX

RACE CONFLICT

Of all species of group opposition race conflict holds the most menace. Age conflict and sex conflict never become sanguinary. Conflicts between town and country, employers and workers, are limited by the realization that each is necessary to the other. Religious wars and class conflict cease when the beaten conform to the will of the victors. But a man cannot change his race as he changes his religious beliefs or class aims. Disarmed and submissive he is just as offensive to the conquering race as he was while he was fighting. The logical thing to do would be to exterminate the beaten race in the style of Ghengis Khan. It is only because what poses as "conflict of races" is in reality a struggle over territory that the beaten race is left alive once it has been driven off areas which the more powerful covet.

There exists an organic basis for the repulsion between human races in the fact that races may differ markedly in features, physiognomy, skin color, body odor; and everything distinctive of one race is commonly offensive to members of other races. Each isolated racial group look upon their own physical traits as defining the perfect human type and fear or despise all men with divergent traits.

The possibilities of inter-racial trouble are multiplied many fold when it comes to be generally accepted that races fall into a hierarchy. Those which at a comparatively early date became possessed of the elements of an advanced culture are "superior"; while those which, being remote from the developing centers of culture around the Eastern Mediterranean (Africans south of the Sahara, Australians, Melanesians, American Indians), remained at a low cultural level, are "inferior." This rating of races according to the grade of culture that geography and history had allowed them to acquire has been one of the most devastating delusions of the modern European civilization.

Race as the anthropologist sees it. Scientists insist that the basic mental differences among color races are like those among stocks within the same race. What makes Malays, or American Indians, or Congolese a mystery to us is not mental quirk but cultural background and special experiences.[1] Given our training, their minds would work as ours. In many areas of race contact shrewd observers conclude that there is no "native" mind distinct from the common everyday human mind. Whatever difficulty is met in educating together children of different races does not come from difference in the texture of their intellects. In every major race are found individuals capable of taking in our whole intellectual heritage. Even naked savages, if protected from exploiters and given time, will become civilized. Reader, how were your ancestors and mine living when the First Pyramids rose?

On the other hand, it would be strange, indeed, if all branches of mankind scored equal in brains when within each branch we find all grades from idiot to genius. The *mental* traits of a local variety, like its *bodily* traits, correspond to the conditions of sur-

[1] Dealing with the contention that the Negroes in Africa have a larger development of the instinct of submission than other races, since they have been enslaved for so long and to such a large degree, Professor Ellsworth Faris points out that along the Congo River, inhabited by Bantus of the same racial stock in small political units, slavery is everywhere present and the differences between a slave and a free man are very striking. The free men are proud, independent, often haughty, in their bearing; slaves, on the other hand, belong to a lower status. They submit to their masters, allow themselves to be sold to others without protest, give to their owner the perquisites from any game they may have killed in the hunt, and in every other way act as if they are being motivated by an instinct of submission.

"If, however, one inquires as to the origin of the slaves among the Bangalas of Bopoto he learns that they belong to the Bankundo tribe who live a hundred miles and more up river. Upon ascending to the Bankundo tribe one finds the free men among them showing no traces of the slave psychology, but with the same haughtiness and independence that slave owners traditionally exhibit. The Bankundos, however, own large numbers of slaves of their own, who in their turn show the slave attitude quite unmistakably. These slaves of the Bankundos are spoken of as Balolo, that is, up river people, and the Balolo when you go up river and find them, are free people, owning slaves who come from higher up the river. The same thing is found as one ascends the stream, and the interesting fact develops that the slaves are always sold down river, are unable to escape and get back home, accommodate themselves to their situation, accept the inevitable, and breed generations of slaves. But people from the same village and sometimes in the same family remaining at home (for captives in war are the chief origin of slavery in this region) are free people with none of the slave psychology."

vival it has met for, perhaps, tens of thousands of years. Considering the very dissimilar degrees of contrivance, foresight and self-control required for keeping alive and rearing young in regions as diverse as Greenland, Nejd, Uganda and Polynesia, it would be a miracle if all local varieties of man were found to be of just the same brain power.

If strains of distinct races should be proven unequal in their higher capacities, the more gifted may well set up restrictions on breeding with the lower; but this implies the "color line" and will make bad blood. Moreover, it is not yet settled whether the crossing of the more specialized human varieties gives good results or bad. So long as we *don't know,* balancing "arguments for" miscegenation and "arguments against" is childish; we shall just have to await scientific investigation on a large scale in the numerous regions where there has been much race crossing. Meanwhile, since the scrambled can never be unscrambled, social and legal barriers against crossing should be looked upon for the present as dictate of prudence, not solely of blind prejudice.

Unequal race multiplication. Thanks to their being helped to down famine, epidemic, and tribal wars, backward races more and more are cutting their deaths, but rarely do they cut their births as do the advanced races. Their "standard of living" is less exacting and the men are not considerate of their wives and children. In South Africa the Bantus "under the white man's broad shield," as they put it, multiply like rabbits, threaten to overflow any areas or occupations reserved for them and displace their white neighbors not by *outdoing* them but by *underliving* them. (But *not all* native peoples under white domination are multiplying rapidly.) It is unlikely that races just emerging from savagery will be allowed, after they have filled their home lands to the distress point, to overflow into the homelands of other races and underlive them. To the blacks may be left those low, wet parts of tropical Africa to which they are peculiarly adapted, but elsewhere they will find few doors ajar.

Clash of cultures poses as "conflict of races." The so-called "race hatred," which for centuries existed between Gaels and "Saxons," Poles and Russians, Germans and Czechs, Kurds and Armenians, is a mask for economic, political and religious enmities. Most of what has passed for *race conflict* is really *clash of cultures.* One is offended not by the physical traits of the

other, but by his speech, ways, beliefs, and values. Consider what it really is that prejudices many Americans against Jews, Mexicans, and Italians!

Hatred of the competitor wears the guise of race antipathy. So long as the white laborers in our Pacific States (1867-1882) faced displacement by immigrant Chinese they abominated everything about these supplanters, their culture as well as their looks. Here and there the inoffensive coolies were made victims of brutal mass violence. But within two decades after the adoption (1883) of the policy of Chinese exclusion by the United States the sense of pressure had passed from the minds of the whites and the remaining Chinese were not only tolerated but even liked!

The later rise of anti-Japanese feeling was due not to "natural antipathy," but to fear inspired by the rapid economic advance of the Japanese on our Pacific Coast and by certain moves of Japan. On the other hand, looking upon the people of China as potential customers rather than competitors, we find virtues in them which we refuse to see in the Japanese. In the same way anti-Negro feeling crops up in new places and in new social layers as the American Negro makes his way out and up from the cotton fields.

Lord Olivier observes: "The ordinary white South African has not, until he began to feel his competition as a wage worker, detested or even despised the native as the white West Indian used to the colored man, or so much as the white West Indian or American southerner did the emancipated Negro." [2]

Says Bogardus: "As long as unskilled immigrant laborers, of any race, remain 'in their place,' amenable to control, all goes well. But let a few of the more energetic of their number climb industrially, start a labor union, or lead a strike; let a few of the families move out from the immigrant neighborhood into a better-class neighborhood; let a few of their children take prizes or class offices at school—and straightway the underlying competition is recognized and social conflicts are stimulated. Immigrants who have been encouraged because of the work they can do, are viewed in a new light as potential competitors for rank, position, status. The slogan is raised: We are going to

[2] *The Anatomy of African Misery*, 1927, p. 134.

be overrun. . . . Anti-race propaganda is both subtle and openly spread, and an overt race conflict is at hand." [3]

Since the competition of a rising or immigrating race element hits, first labor, then business, then the professions, and lastly the propertied, the social classes react to it in this order. When hard-pressed handworkers drive out their alien competitors the classes above self-righteously rebuke them; but mark how they react when *their* turn comes!

Competition causes a lasting split only when your competitors are readily identifiable. When they are of other hue ill-will springs up against them, extends even to members of that race who are *not* competitors. Repaid in the same coin the feeling is now real race-hatred. Hence, admit to your country those of another color who come as tourists, travelers, culture seekers or culture bearers, but, if you do not want a new rift in society, bar those who will directly compete with your own people.

Resentment of domination may set races at odds. In India, as formerly in Egypt, the tension between natives and British springs not from true race antipathy, but from *the strain of alien rule.* In some British the wielding of power and the consciousness of belonging to a privileged caste breed an overbearing attitude. In the high-caste Indians, once the spirit of nationalism has been aroused, the realization that in everything that counts the alien has always the last word becomes galling. The passion to be rid of British rule is not elemental but, as a rajah put it to me, "comes from the fact that there is not a single Indian who has not several times in his life been insulted or aggrieved by some British official."

Prudent immigration policy may embroil races. The restriction of immigration by a nation with a controlled fertility, fearful of being swamped by the overflow from congested blindly-multiplying peoples, will seem an insult when the excluded are of a different race. Under dread of population pressure many nations will eventually adopt policies which ignorance or malice will charge to sheer race antipathy—and which will be resented as such.

The successful operation of democracy requires that a people be fairly like-minded, able to think, feel and act together. Exclusion of immigrants of an altogether different hue and culture

[3] E. S. Bogardus, *Immigration and Race Attitudes,* pp. 8, 9.

may be motivated by a people's reluctance to become a hodge podge of diverse colors, tongues, and faiths, with the most discordant moral and economic standards; yet the policy will be interpreted as a gesture of racial arrogance.

THINGS WHICH ARE AGGRAVATING RACE CONFLICT

Modern mobility. A century and a half ago only a handful of venturesome missionaries, traders and travelers had dealings with men of another hue. But the progressive abolishment of distance, the incessant reaching out of traders for new markets, the quest of industrialists for untapped sources of raw materials, and the search for virgin fields for the investment of capital, have forced a growing contingent among us to have relations with people of another color. Hence race consciousness *and perhaps race conflict* are advancing upon humanity at a terrifying speed.

White conquest and domination. In four centuries Europeans with the aid of gunpowder have fastened their yoke on the natives of the Americas, Australia, Oceania, Africa, and large parts of Asia, crushing many of them into slavery. As a result the whites now have a bad case of "swelled head." In Britain consciousness of belonging to an "imperial race" makes even the town riff-raff look down on "Chinks" and "niggers!" The Germans, no doubt, would have become just as color conscious had not their colonial career been abruptly broken off. The whites have become so overbearing that other races can hardly get along with them save as confessed inferiors. For two or three centuries the world situation has lent color to the myth of "Nordic" superiority. But how old Hammurabi would have laughed at it! Or Rameses II! Or Solomon! Or Haroun al-Raschid! Or Marco Polo!

Capitalistic imperialism. The world's surplus capital is in the hands of whites and the hankering of white capitalists to make "big money" by seizing the untouched natural wealth of areas occupied by other races and dictating the terms of employment of the native labor they require, prompts them to use the vast propaganda machinery they control to pillory the colored peoples, and to hurrah for white domination over them. This sordid secret molding of public opinion and manipulation of foreign policy to build "empire" leads to frightful inter-racial hatred.

The inevitable spread of Western civilization. Our civilization, immensely powerful owing to its science and technique, is very unequally distributed, and not all races lacking it resent being taken in hand by a race possessing it. Morocco, Nigeria, Borneo, Hawaii, and the Philippines testify to the blessings a government on the Western model can bestow. Nevertheless, the time will come when the brighter subject races, having taken over our civilization and served their apprenticeship, will yearn to govern themselves. But will the gains from empire and the sweets of power be yielded up on demand?

Popular government. Formerly government held the scales level among the race components of a population, for the ruling class disdained them all. To-day political power is more in the hands of the common people and they are willing to use it against any minority race whose competition they dread.

Growth of race consciousness. Sensitiveness to contrast in hue is of relatively recent origin. Declares Lord Olivier: [4]

> Color prejudice, in the common sense of the term, is in fact essentially a modern phenomenon, dating largely from the rise of the Bristol slave-trade and our assumption of military supremacy in India, and is a complex of many reactions of Negro slave-holding and Asiatic dominion.

Lord Bryce points out [5] that:

> . . . down till the days of the French Revolution there had been very little in any country, or any time, of self-conscious racial feeling. . . . However much men of different races may have striven with one another, it was seldom any sense of racial opposition that caused their strife. They fought for land. They plundered one another. They sought glory by conquest. They tried to force their religion on one another. . . . But, strong as patriotism and national feeling might be, they did not think of themselves in terms of ethnology, and in making war for every other sort of reason never made it for the sake of imposing their own type of civilization. . . . In none of such cases did the thought of racial distinctions come to the front.

But the sense of racial kinships is spreading, deepening. In the last century it inspired Greeks, Italians, Poles, Czechs, and Magyars to struggle for self-determination. Later it roused Serbs,

[4] "Color Prejudice." *Contemporary Review*, 1923, CXXIV, pp. 449-56.
[5] In his Creighton Lecture *Race Sentiment as a Factor in History*.

Roumanians, Bulgars, and Armenians. Now it stirs Indians, Burmese, Egyptians, Arabs.

Intolerant nationalism. The rising passion for national homogeneity begets impatience with racial minorities. Witness the former pressure on Polish Catholics by Protestant Prussia and Greek-Orthodox Russia; anti-Semitism prompted by the suspicion that their religion makes the Jews internationalists; the legislation of our Pacific States aimed at landholding by Japanese immigrants; the demand that the Negroes in the United States be deported to Africa. The hellish possibilities that lurk in this ideal appear from the deliberate extermination (1915-16) of a million Armenians in Turkey, and from the driving out from Asia Minor in 1922 of a million and a half Greeks and Armenians, leaving everything they could not carry on their persons to be appropriated by the Turks!

MEANS OF MITIGATING RACE CONFLICT

Caste. In India from time immemorial religion has segregated different strains into castes with prescribed functions, the members of which do not eat together or intermarry. The aboriginal races are "outcastes" and may not come within so many yards of the higher castes. Accepted as "God's will" the caste system inhibits all race conflict.

Regulated avoidance. Since personal contact and competition beget race friction, the races may be held apart by residential segregation, "Jim-crow" cars, "nigger heaven" sections in theaters, separate schools, playgrounds, churches, public libraries and labor unions, the ban on inter-marriage, and the exclusion of the weaker race from the skilled trades, the offices and the professions. Unless, however, the weaker race generally acquiesces in such restrictions latent conflict will persist.

Justice. Interspersed races may share unequally in higher functions and still enjoy equal protection in their rights. There are areas under white rule, *e.g.,* Jamaica, British Guiana, where the local courts deal out even-handed justice. The police do not discriminate between offenders on the ground of color. Blacks have a place in the rural constabulary and exercise authority over other blacks. The civil service makes room for educated Negroes under white direction. There is no unfairness in providing police protection, health service, public improvements, or

school facilities. "A Negro may attain the highest success in business or profession, may go to all of the places and do all of the things where his desires and money can take him." In French society superior Asiatics and Africans circulate on their personal merits.

Fairness in the bestowal of *recognition* is an emollient. Every time a member of the minority race wins a fellowship, receives an honorary degree, is voted a medal, presides over a church gathering, achieves a commission in the army, or has his poems, plays, or music acclaimed by the general public, race tension is eased.

Exposing the base source of race prejudice. R. Marshall [6] found that of the 77 whites in a village of Northern Alaska 9 with an average intelligence quotient of 94 regard the Eskimos as "distinctly inferior to the whites in every way"; 38 with an average I. Q. of 104 deem the Eskimos "somewhat inferior to the whites but should be treated as equal"; 30 with an average of 106 regard the Eskimos as "fully as admirable a people as the whites."

Included among the nine people who regarded the Eskimos as distinctly inferior were the whites with the first, second, fourth, and fifth most enemies among their own race. Not a single one of the nine people was ranked by his fellow whites among the top half in popularity. This hints at an interesting psychological linkage. A person is disliked by his own people, so, in order to assuage the feeling of inferiority which this must at least subconsciously create, he bolsters his pride by stressing how much superior his entire race is to another race.

If it is shown to be a fact that in any society the chief fomenters of race prejudice and injustice are of the baser sort, the higher can be rallied to fight their pernicious influence.

The protest of universal religions. Islam recognizes no color bar, hence its strong appeal to Africans. Since the Europeans came into contact with the blacks south of the Sahara in the fifteenth century and began to carry them away as slaves Christianity has not lived up to its principles of the brotherhood of man. Of late, however, its far-sighted leaders have seen the necessity of a definite stand on race. The Jerusalem conference of the International Missionary Council in 1928 declared "any dis-

[6] *Arctic Village*, 1933.

crimination against human beings on the ground of race or color . . . is a denial of the teachings of Jesus." In Africa and Asia Christian missionaries often excite the opposition of white settlers and colonial governments by building up in the natives a sense of human dignity and helping to develop leaders among them.

Organizing fair-play sentiment. Anti-race myths spread faster than the truth; antipathy is more catching than good-will; fear is an intenser emotion than friendliness. Therefore, a poisonous race-hatred propaganda can be met only by organizing the widely-diffused-but-weak fair-play feelings in the community so that they may be given hands and feet and tongue.

Interracial coöperation. The formation in the American South and in South Africa of near a thousand general, state, and local committees made up of representative whites and blacks, to study the race problem, consider grievances, find out what may be done to improve race relations and then line up both races in doing it, is a rational way to lessen race friction. Hitherto each race has seen most of the worst element of the other; fellowship and team work on these committees between the best Whites and the best Negroes improve each race's opinion of the other. In India a like benefit comes from "Indianization" of the governmental services, whereby in all departments picked Britons and Indians are working shoulder to shoulder for the public good.

Communism takes its stand for race equality. Asserts Dr. Hans Kohn: [7]

> In the Soviet Union a determined stand has been taken against race discrimination. The rational belief in the complete equality of all races has become the official creed, and energetic educational efforts are being made to raise the social and economic conditions of the underprivileged races. . . . Communism helps to organize backward races in their struggle for political and economic advancement and liberation. This assistance contrasts with the attitude of many white labor and socialist groups among whom race interests are stronger than class interests. The help given to backward races by communists emanates not only from their identification of racial and class conflicts and from an alliance against the capitalist and imperialist powers but also from the fundamental policy against race discrimination within the Soviet Union. Bolshevism continues, in a rationalized and secularized form, the stand of primitive Christianity against race

[7] Article on "Race Conflict," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 13.

discrimination; but the equalitarian Soviet theory goes further than most Christian agencies in tackling not only the psychological and emotional causes of race conflicts but also their economic roots.

THE OUTLOOK

In large numbers the whites, armed with the most effective means of taking human life, are seeping into areas which other races have occupied for ages and regard as their own. The bulk of these whites are quite without moral restraint so far as other races are concerned and are capable of any collective atrocity against the native population in case they find it seriously in their way. The only source from which restraint may be laid upon them is the people "back home," who are under less temptation to spurn the demands of justice. Here is the reason for upholding "imperial control," as against independence or "home rule," for the so-called "colony."

As for the larger, more advanced and more formidable nonwhite peoples, the whites must quickly "come down from their high horse" if that most dreadful of all wars—race war—is to be avoided.

Than the relations of color races no social question is more in need of scientific approach, rational self-control, and the organized effort of the best element in all races. All intelligent persons of broad outlook ought to seek a platform of conviction on which they can stand as a unit against the mischievous proposals which appeal to the emotional and shortsighted multitude.

CHAPTER XXI

TOWN-COUNTRY CONFLICT

For ages the unlikeness of city types and country types has begotten misunderstanding and antagonism. On the peasant's horizon the stirring, colorful, vivid city has flared like a beacon, luring ambitious youth as a candle draws moths. The city has been the folk's wall-girt stronghold, the seat of government, the arena of politics, the cradle of freedom of thought, the site of the great temples, the focus of the web of commerce, the show place of rare and madding goods, the magnet for the rich and proud. It has housed the *élite,* the leisured, the learned, the artists, the higher schools, the universities, libraries, museums and monuments—in a word everything that brings the gifted to a glow.

Cultural contrasts. Until the arrival of telephones, good roads, automobiles, and radio, the tillers of the soil tended to be groovy, family-centered, and suspicious of strangers. "Boor," "churl," "rustic," "heathen," and "pagan" come from words for "countryman"; "civil," "polite," and "urbane," come from words for "city." To the farmer, individualized by his manner of life, the city masses have seemed as alike as shoe pegs. They are *order-takers,* whereas the farmer is so independent that he will not take orders, is loath even to take advice. Dealing with the elemental, the farmer has prized muscular strength, "know how," all-round handiness; but in the city dexterity, *finesse,* and ruse have been admired. Used to silence the farmer has felt ill-at-ease amid the many-throated roar of the streets, while to the city man the quiet countryside is "dead." Townsmen and countrymen work out different tables of value, for in the city one's rating depends greatly on niceties of garb, speech, manner and observance—while in the country it depends more on personal prowess, family background, and lordship over acres and herds.

Clash of interests. Not only do city and country beget opposing types, but when they are bound up together many of their tendencies and interests clash. As a lone worker the farmer is

an individualist, whereas the city wage earner readily develops into a coöperator with his fellows. The countryman is concerned as primary producer and ultimate consumer, the city man is interested chiefly in middleman's profits. Working with a costly instrument like land, farmers think first of the borrower, whereas the city thinks of the lender. The country is for "cheap" money; the city, for "dear" money. Since property taxes irk farmers, they are for taxes on incomes, on corporate earnings, on undistributed business profits—all of them anathema to business men. Townsmen want low cost of living, whereas farmers want high prices for their produce.

In faith and morals the country loves beaten paths; it is in the city that clever individuals junk tradition and indulge brazenly in freedom of thought. The city with its motley population and weak community sense is "liberal" with respect to drinking, amusements, sex relations, and Sabbath observance, while the country remains puritanical and would like to clap a "lid" on the city.

Town and country as antagonists. In their bid for power the city holds by far the better cards. It attracts much human cream from the farms and has most of the well-educated. Notwithstanding its slums and ignorant masses, its culture is superior at the points where culture counts. The easy self-assurance of townsmen paralyzes countrymen with a sense of inferiority. Better organized and better led, they are clear as to their aims and their power is wielded as a unit. Farmers, on the other hand, besides having few shekels to spend on propaganda for their cause, are usually divided, beguiled and outmanœuvered. A territorial nobility sharing political power with the Crown or else constituting the upper chamber of the national parliament once gave the country the upper hand. But after the stilts were knocked from under landed gentries the cultivators became an army without officers, at the mercy of the superior financial power, social prestige, and political generalship of the city.

Like the fiery assaults of wild tribesmen upon veteran troops, the emotional, disordered attacks of farmers upon the well-led urban cohorts collapse in the face of stubborn resistance. If an agrarian organization or party does not quickly score success, its members quit in shoals complaining, "You have not made good your promises." Thanks to the "go-it-alone" economy of the

farm, farmers show little loyalty to their fellows or devotion to their common cause. Instead of supporting a press of their own they let themselves be bamboozled by newspapers subservient to the interests that skin them. In politics they will accept as leaders attorneys for the very groups by which they are exploited. Small wonder that when they demand bread they are given a stone—which too often they receive thankfully!

That the city has had its way most of the time is evidenced by the unconscionable spread between what the farmer receives and what the housewife pays for country produce; the fact that the farmer never names the price at which he sells or the price at which he buys; the widespread practice of price-fixing among the local dealers to whom he must sell or from whom he must buy; the exclusion of "dirt" farmers from key positions in the state and from the inner councils of the great political parties; the long delay in providing credit in forms needed by farmers; the poorness of the schools provided for country children in comparison with those maintained for city children; the failure of rural schools to inspire love of farming and of country life; the readiness of the average newspaper to ridicule and cry down anything the farmers want which business men object to their having. An elaborate study published by Professor T. W. Cape in 1933 concludes that "the farm population contributes a much larger proportion of its wealth and income to the support of public functions than urban peoples, but receives fewer benefits, whether measured in terms of burdens borne or need of such benefits."

City domination in classic times. The town-country struggle has a colorful past. The Græco-Roman civilization was essentially a city civilization. Greece from her morning was a land of cities, each with its dependent territory a city-state. In time Sicily and Southern Italy, the Ægean coast of Asia Minor and the shores of the Black Sea were abloom with hundreds of Greek city-states. Then Rome by means of colonies planted the germs of city life in the many tribes in central and northern Italy; so between the fourth and the second centuries B.C., Italy became a congeries of city-states. It took but a century of Roman rule to dot North Africa with hundreds of cities; only in the Teutonic and Slavic worlds did tribal life persist.

Writes Guglielmo Ferrero: [1]

The Empire covered itself with cities great and small, rivalling each other in splendor and wealth; and into these cities, at the expense of depopulating the country-side where nobody was willing any longer to live, it attracted the peasantry, the village artisans, and the yeomanry. In these cities, schools were opened in which the youth of the middle class were taught eloquence, literature, and philosophy, and trained for official posts, the number of which increased from generation to generation, and for the liberal professions. Little by little, the expenditures of the urban civilization, the cities and their increasing luxury, outdistanced the fertility of the countryside, and, from that moment, the latter began to be depopulated and sterilized by the cities. With each succeeding generation, the impulse toward the cities became stronger. In order to feed, amuse, and clothe crowded city-populations; to carry through the construction of the magnificent monuments whose ruins we still admire; to provide work for the industries and arts of the cities,—agriculture was, little by little, ground down by ever-increasing burdens. The position of the peasant, in the solitude of the depopulated countryside, became ever more sad and gloomy, just as the cities became fairer, bigger, fuller of amusement and festivals.

The country throws the city off its back. Rostovtseff [2] notes that the cities form only a thin upper layer but they are very talkative, so everybody notices them. The peasants are silent. Nobody mentions them except casually; but they are the bulk of the population and they see that the cities are living at their expense. So in the third century A.D. comes an immense social upheaval, now interpreted as a rising of country against city. Since the army had come to be made up of countrymen, scores of emperors proclaimed by the troops fight for power.

The huge Oriental countries never knew a real city life, political power was based upon the peasants and the expression of this was the absolute monarchy characteristic of the Orient. Now, after the third century, under Diocletian and Constantine, the Roman Empire was transformed into an Oriental empire. The Emperors founded their power on large masses of peasants, pressing down the city population to the level of the peasants, "making out of them the same servants of the State that the peasants always were in the Oriental world."

[1] G. Ferrero, *Ancient Rome and Modern America*, 1914, pp. 80-82.
[2] M. Rostovtseff, *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*, 1926.

The feudal system was another form of rural domination and it lasted near a thousand years. The barbarian hordes which flooded the Roman Empire in the fifth and sixth centuries had not arrived at the urban stage; they were for country life with the rural village as its nucleus. As the conquerors settled down the land was parceled out among their chief men on condition that for it they furnish military service, not only personal service but as well the service of so many knights. The lords managed this by letting out portions of the land they held to others under agreement that these sub-vassals should provide a certain number of men-at-arms for the military force required of a great noble or tenant-in-chief. Thus all power was in the hands of Crown and fiefholders, while the proud cities of the Empire, no longer lording it over the open country, languished as trade centers or died. In this new domination, of course, the real tillers of the soil had no part.

Before the American Civil War the slaveholding planters of the South constituted an aristocracy which dominated the American nation politically and watched jealously over the interests of their agriculture. Since the destruction of that class agriculture has never been in the saddle nationally. In Mexico, until recently, the eight thousand landed proprietors (*hacendados*) with the support of the Church and the ignorant dependent peons ruled the nation. The Mexican Revolution has meant the overthrow of the power of *hacendados* and Church and the rise of a government reflecting the views of the urban liberals, of organized city labor, and of the land-hungry peasants.

Embattled farmers. Seventy years ago American farmers set out to better their lot by team work. Among the major farmers' movements we find the Grange, the Farmers' Alliance, the American Society of Equity, the Farmers' Union, the Non-Partisan League, and the American Farm Bureau Federation. Some have been stronger in the East; others, in the West or South. Some, like the Grange, stress social, recreative and educational aims; others with grim single-mindedness press toward economic betterment. Some pin their hopes to farmer control of legislation, while others seek control over the acreage and selling price of their chief product.

Certain old grievances have been redressed. The railroads, once so arrogant and arbitrary, have been brought under adequate

regulation. Freed from the toils of a shrinking currency, the farmers have ceased to clamor for paper money or the free coinage of silver. Demands for pure food laws, parcel post, postal savings banks and rural delivery of mail have been met. The immense development of the activities of the United States Department of Agriculture and the building up of strong colleges of agriculture and experiment stations in the states reflect farmer wishes. Special provision for supplying government credit to the farmer has been made. Never before has the American farmer had benefit of such low interest rates. After nearly forty years of denunciation of "grain gambling" the Grain-Futures Bill became a law, strengthened later by the Commodity Exchange Act. The Packers' Control Act, pressed for ten years, brought to a close a long-drawn-out controversy. The Agricultural Adjustment Act attempted to restore farm purchasing power to its 1909-1914 level. The farmers are no longer denied whatever benefit a protective tariff on their produce can bring them.

Town-country tension. Nevertheless, the balance between agriculture and industry has been upset by manufacturer domination and in the open country farmer-mindedness is growing. Farmer organizations with political and economic programs intensify strife between country and city. Agitation has roused millions of farmers and convinced them that certain dominant elements in the city have gotten them on the hip and are exploiting them. Long organized for profit the business element in the cities have been marshaled into a united front when ameliorative legislation for farmers impends or when farmers' coöperatives threaten the profits of some group of traders.

The advertisements of business men provide about seventy-five per cent of newspaper revenues. It is not surprising, then, that, once the business men generally were lined up in opposition to farmers' movements by the traders concerned, most of the newspapers venomously attacked and misrepresented every farmers' movement. Outside the farm press the newspaper which showed any sympathy for the great historic farmer movements, or even told the simple truth about them, has been the exception. Malignant newspaper propaganda, then, has widened the rift between city and country.

Another wedge has been the extraordinary movement toward association among business men. Of late, the storekeepers of the

town see far more of one another than they used to. They hear more speeches and read more articles justifying the demands of the aggressive business element. The member of the chamber of commerce, or Kiwanis, or Rotary, or Lions, or Gyro club of one town feels himself a brother to the members in other towns. With astounding rapidity the merchants of the country towns have been aligned with the merchants of the cities, captained as they are by bankers, wholesalers and manufacturers.

Thus the local dealers who sell the surrounding farmers their supplies and handle their products are pulled away from these farmers upon whom they depend. They are led to think more of the ways in which their interests are opposed to those of their farmer patrons than of how they might work with these patrons to promote a common prosperity. The farmers are far more numerous than the dealers who serve them, but they are scattered. Distance, weather, and farm duties hinder them from meeting regularly with the business men at their Tuesday luncheon. So the town business men organize, pick their objectives, and go their own way.

Town-country animosity never leads to angry mobs and serious destruction of property as labor-capital animosity sometimes does; for embattled farmers do not look starvation in the eyes as do embattled workingmen. Nevertheless, the struggle may be stern. The tarring and feathering of the organizers of the Non-Partisan League in various states by groups of infuriated local traders shows how far some townsmen are ready to go.

MEANS OF MINIMIZING STRIFE BETWEEN TOWN AND COUNTRY

1. The merchants of the rural trade center may be brought to see their community of interests with their farmer patrons and to realize that they ought to line up with them, rather than with the city. For they are more dependent on the farmers than are the farmers on them. Good roads, motor cars, and the mail-order houses enable the farmers to ignore the town merchants if they choose; but the banks and stores can find no substitute for the farmers' patronage. It is short-sighted for town traders to clap a stiff license fee on farmers who endeavor to sell their produce direct to town customers. Both groups have a common interest in low freight rates, good railroad service, improved roads, better farming, and the maintenance of schools, churches and libraries,

so there should be organized effort to get townsmen and farmers together for friendly discussion of their common problems.

2. The local merchants and bankers might ignore the deceitful propaganda and emissaries sent out to them from the big cities, artfully appealing to their business-class consciousness, and open their minds to the literature and speakers setting forth the grievances, aims and programs of the farmers' organizations. The farmers would meet them half way, so it might be possible to disabuse their minds of certain misconceptions *they* harbor as to the rôle of business men. If given half a chance, those who stress the mutual dependence of town and country can make a convincing plea. Agricultural economists agree that the time when the trade center could take an exploitive attitude toward its rural patrons is over, the right note for to-day is coöperation.

3. Those who speak for farmers—the faculty of the agricultural college, the county agents, the heads of farmer organizations, the publishers of farm papers, the bankers and dealers immediately interested in rural prosperity—should fight the immense unscrupulous and insidious propaganda glorifying the business element and prejudicing the public against farmers and their demands.

4. Farmers should have their own organs and mouthpieces instead of allowing themselves to be "doped" and duped by newspapers wooing the advertising of city business men; and they should be relieved of city-minded preachers who feel they are making "a great sacrifice" in taking charge of a country church!

5. It should be possible for the farm child to acquire a good elementary and high school education without leaving the home roof. This together with the spread of the consolidated school, the introduction of country-minded teachers, texts and curricula and the use of the rural school as a social center, will result in narrowing the gap between town and country dwellers in respect to education, bearing and social polish.

6. The presence of more "dirt" farmers among public officials, on public boards, and in party councils might rid farmers of the suspicion that the city is dominating the country.

7. The development of farmers' coöperative marketing and coöperative buying may weaken the class consciousness of the country merchants by throwing them with the salaried agents in the employ of local farmers' organizations.

8. No normal tiller of the soil should need to resign himself to life-long tenancy, for the measures by which it is possible to prevent the formation of a permanent tenant class are well known. Thus we should escape the production of the peasant mind and the bad social relations that it begets.

THE OUTLOOK

We dare not generalize for the bulk of humanity; but for American society at least we may expect the relations between town and country to become friendlier because countrymen and townsmen are becoming more alike. Thanks to automobiles and improved highways farmers are no longer mud-bound, they get to town oftener and stay longer. If local tradesmen or buyers combine to squeeze them, they drive on to the next town! It is now easy for farmers to gather in large numbers and deliberate upon their common interests. In access to church, lodge and entertainment the farmer is no longer much behind the townsman. Collected by school buses his children may attend a township graded school where they receive as good an education as the town youngsters. "Rural free delivery" means that he gets nearly as good a postal service as the townsman. The radio reaches both equally well and affects them in the same way. Four-fifths of the cultural contrasts between town and country are in the way of disappearing, so that ere long townspeople should have but slight grounds for looking down upon farmers as "clod-hoppers" and "hicks," their natural prey.

CHAPTER XXII

CLASS CONFLICT

Class conflict arises between social classes one of which holds itself superior and dominates, or aims to dominate, the other for its own advantage. It is precipitated by some economic or technological change which throws up a new class or depresses an old one. Disposal of the Roman "public land," the spoil of conquest, brought on the struggles with which the Gracchi were identified. Later the saturation of Italy with enslaved war captives called forth convulsive efforts from the dying small-husbandman class. Cheap access to foreign breadstuffs led over a century ago to the struggle between the landlords of England and the factory lords with the masses over the question of the "corn laws." In the closing decade of the last century the appreciation of gold precipitated a struggle between debtors and creditors which quickly died down when, after 1897, gold began to depreciate. Eli Whitney's invention of the cotton gin near the end of the eighteenth century caused an immense cotton-planting interest to grow up in our South about African slavery, which had been waning. A low price for agricultural produce, which resulted from too rapidly bringing Western public lands under cultivation, caused our Middle Western farmers such hardship sixty-odd years ago that they locked horns with the nearest group which might be held responsible for their plight, namely, the railroads.

Again there are economic developments which *allay* class opposition. The spread of rural coöperation may put an end to the outcry of small farmers lest they be swallowed up by large capitalistic farming. Coöperative stores may end the friction between the public and the retail merchants. As they find out the conditions of factory efficiency intelligent employers drop certain exploitive policies which peculiarly exasperate their workers. The manifest necessity of finding buyers for the output under "mass production" reconciles many employers to the policy of paying high wages.

Alternation of social strife with social peace. Since a class struggle is too wearing to be let run on forever, there is brought about an adjustment in customs, moral standards, institutions, law, or the constitution of the state. Each belligerent gains its main contention, so that their opposition dies away. Ere long this adjustment seems a part of the order of Nature and later generations can hardly conceive of any other arrangement. Thus there was social peace in England from the abolition of villeinage until the beginning of the enclosures. But the hour strikes when some economic or technological change breaks this settlement and class strife flares up again. This may lead to anarchy, alternating revolutions, foreign intervention, or else to a fresh adjustment ushering in another June.

In a long spell of social calm the sense of class fades, the feeling for family, community or nation becomes strong, and society is deemed an outgrowth of natural fellowship and the spirit of cooperation. Morals, law, and state, are regarded as consistent one-piece creations of conscience or reason. Conversely, a period of sharp conflict confirms the idea that society is not born of good will, but is the arena of contending groups which, nevertheless, have to stay together. The social order is looked upon as a balancing of opposing forces, while laws and institutions are seen as compromises rather than products of logic.

TYPES OF CLASS CONFLICT

While the story of class struggles would make a big book the foreground in modern times is filled by a few types.

Laity against clergy. In South Europe all through the nineteenth century the "liberals" have striven to break the grip of the clergy upon charity, education, the opinion-molding agencies and politics, leaving them, however, free to promote religion. In the Americas, where under the colonial system of Spain the Catholic hierarchy enjoyed vast wealth and power, the struggle to throw off the clerical yoke has been at times bloody. In Massachusetts and Virginia in the eighteenth century there was a long fight to oust the Protestant ministers from their commanding position. Throughout Islam to-day the friends of Western culture challenge the iron control exercised by the ill-educated and narrow-minded Mohammedan clergy.

Civilians against military. Because it has weapons, discipline, the habit of violence, lust of command and scorn of labor, the element that occupies itself chiefly with arms tends to domineer over those engaged in the pursuits of peace. How the fighting arm has been brought under control is a story too long to recount here. The case of Japan shows that it is still possible for the military to sit in the saddle and dictate national policy.

The active against the leisured. The idea that only the recipients of unearned incomes, namely, the holders of feudal estates, are fit to hold the reins has been losing ground ever since in Venice, Genoa, the towns of the Low Countries, and the cities of the Hanseatic League, rich merchants and bankers began to vie successfully with the territorial nobles. Owing to their reinforcement by industrial capitalists in the last two centuries "men of affairs" have gained greatly in prestige. With the lords of business have ranged themselves the stars of the professions, the successful lawyers, surgeons, engineers, architects, and journalists. These are as well educated as the scions of the old families, and they live as splendidly as the heirs of long rent rolls; so it is impossible for the aristocrat to look down on the banker, steel king, or factory lord, even if the latter *is* "self made" and visits his office every day. In the United States the old precedence of the man who *inherits* money over the man who *makes* money is dead, and it is dying in Europe.

Commoners against nobles. The essence of nobility is *privilege*. In France before the Revolution the nobles besides their rents enjoyed privileges much resented by the peasants, such as the collecting of market tolls, the right to hunt over the tenants' crops and the right to hold a manorial court in which the lord was at once judge and party in suits arising out of his claims upon his tenants. Moreover, nobles were exempt from most of the king's taxes, they were not subject to the lower courts, and all the "plums" in Church, Army and State were kept for the court nobility.

Since the middle of the eighteenth century there has been a revolution in ideas which has made every form of privilege odious. No disinterested thinker challenges the principle of equal rights and the equality of all before the law. All feel that social recognition of unusual merit or of preëminent services to society should take the form of money reward, public honor, or social distinc-

tion, never of *privilege,* particularly of *transmissible privilege.* Nobles now enjoy no monopoly of state service and rarely wield hereditary political power although they are allowed to keep their titles. If the British House of Lords survives, it will be as stronghold not of *privilege,* but of *capitalism.*

Cultivators against landlords. A widespread historic conflict is that between the tillers of the soil and the owners of great estates who would keep them in a state of subordination and helplessness. The French Revolution started a movement which by the sixties of the last century had emancipated the peasants throughout Europe. The confiscation of estates of *emigré* nobles enabled the French peasants to get most of the farm land of France into their hands. The abolition of Negro slavery and the prohibition of peonage broke up the old plantation system in our South. Thanks to the Land Acts of 1881 and since, much of the soil of Ireland has been acquired by those who work it. In Egypt and the Philippines there has come lately a great diffusion of land owning. Since the World War the progress of smashing land ownership as a basis for domination has been startling. The Russian Revolution wiped out the titles to one hundred ten thousand estates containing 165,000,000 acres of arable. As a means of appeasing discontented peasants and checking the spread of Bolshevism legislation forcing the break-up of the estates has been put through in ten countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe. "At the present moment the real situation in Europe is such that there are only a few insignificant remnants of large estates in the hands of the owners other than the peasantry and farmers." [1] Outside of Russia the "green" rising has in fact borne more fruit than the "red" rising. The Mexican Revolution doomed the régime of huge *haciendas* with peonage. In Central America and South America, however, landlord domination, a legacy from the Spanish colonial system, stands unshaken. Asia is cankered with landlordism—how much no one knows—but the late crash of European landed gentries will reverberate through Asia. By the end of this century in no country will the tillers of the soil be victims of oppression, ignorance, and hopelessness, as they generally were down to 1789.

Laborers against capitalists. In the thought of our time the overshadowing class conflict has come to be that between workers

[1] Sorokin and Zimmerman, *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology,* 1929, p. 69.

and capitalists. And this issue is very recent; communism as a fighting creed sprang from the famous Marx-Engels manifesto of 1848. Thanks to tsarist folly the Marxists gained the upper hand in Russia in 1917, and since then collective ownership and control of the means of production has had its first try-out on a national scale.

The issue is not that of ordinary industrial conflict—whether employees shall have more of their product or win more rights. On into the future as far as we can see these matters will have to be fought out in particular concerns or particular branches of industry. It is the question *of abolishing the class of persons living on what is paid them for the use of their capital,* so that no element in society will be able to live without useful work. Whether this ideal can be realized depends on whether the state can competently direct production. If it could handle capital, say four-fifths as well as private capitalists are doing it, labor would reap an advantage, for at present capitalists get at least 30% to 35% of the net value produced in the field of manufacturing industries of the United States.

Anti-capitalist developments. Certain changes are weakening the hold of the economic system known as "capitalism."

1. Demonstration that many of the current standards of beauty, propriety, rightness, and truth are of neverwork origin (Veblen) and intended to discredit the useful elements in society by gilding conspicuous waste.

2. The populace are seeing through such capitalist sophisms as "Earn more than you get," "There is always room at the top," "Three generations from shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves," "Interest is the reward for abstinence," "Businesslike" = "economical and efficient."

3. Economists have come to recognize that our economic order is really *an acquisitive system,* which metes out no certain punishment for such economic crimes as waste, restriction of output, the buying up and suppression of patented improvements, adulteration, fraud, monopoly, overcapitalization, vice promotion, and the squandering of natural resources.

4. A century ago in the heyday of capitalism the big shipowner, merchant, or manufacturer personally attended to the concern he made his money from; but, as concerns become incorporated and capitalists become security holders, their perpetual receipt

of income begins to look like "something for nothing" in the eyes of those who are making the business profitable. Moreover, out of absentee ownership develops a hereditary leisure class, which is apt to become a focus of demoralization and corruption.

5. Realization by the thoughtful that the attainment of government "by and for the people," international peace, free speech, free press, academic freedom, even-handed justice, truthful journalism, a socialized education, and a spiritual religion is continually made difficult owing to secret pressure and sly machination from the capitalist class.

Pro-capitalist developments. Other developments, however, are telling against the revolutionary program of "all power to the workers."

1. Mental testing uncovers steep inequalities in natural ability among normal folk and shows that such inequalities resist the leveling power of a common education and social environment.

2. The growing ease of escape of gifted individuals from the ranks of machine tenders lowers the social prestige of this class, strips it of its natural leaders, and causes the slogan "All power to the workers!" to be hooted at.

3. The increasing complexity of the industrial and business mechanism, and the dependence of great populations upon its smooth functioning make the leaders of labor hesitate to take it into their own hands. Hence, the Marxian program was not put through in Germany at the time of the 1919 revolution.

4. Business leaders have scored a brilliant success in bringing about the coöperation of scientists and inventors in solving the technical problems presented in modern industry.

5. Incessant newspaper and magazine glorification of the pet notions, prejudices, and ideals of the business men who buy advertising, along with the control of party organizations *via* finance and the use of veiled propaganda to hoodwink and mislead the public, may make the capitalist class secure for an indefinite time provided that they have the self-restraint to let the workers share in the fruits of industrial progress.

Tactics and weapons of class struggle. In order to win general support each class camouflages its selfish interest in the struggle by standing for some high-sounding principle or broad social interest. The landed proprietors demand the shutting out of cheap foreign-grown foodstuffs in order that a virile rural popu-

lation be preserved as the nation's reservoir of potential military strength. The feudal lords never admit that they covet the fruits of other men's toil, but ever harp upon their willingness to die for "throne and altar." Landlords confronted by a tenants' union set themselves up as defenders of the rights of property. Manufacturers solemnly declare that their sole purpose in seeking high tariff protection is to be able to pay "an American wage." To beat the labor unions employers pose as champions of "industrial freedom," as unselfish upholders of the "open shop" principle that the workman may work where and for whom he pleases and under such conditions as he deems fit. In resisting the demand for a legal working day they profess disinterested solicitude for the freedom of the wage earner to contract for such length of working day "as may seem good to him." Workingmen pressing for the exclusion of Oriental low-wage labor assume the noble rôle of guardians of Christian civilization. The wealthy resist progressive taxation on the ground that it would "penalize industry and thrift." *Every threatened privileged class uses the occasional breaches of the peace which invariably accompany popular movements to strike the fetching pose of "champion of law and order."*

Each class kindles the fighting spirit of its members by shrieking that its very existence is at stake, or by circulating shameless lies relative to what members of the opposing class have said, or attempted, or done. If possible, it makes an economic thrust at its opponent. Landlords evict tenants who will not pay the higher rental demanded. Tenants reply by agreement not to pay the higher rental and to rent no premises from which a tenant has been evicted. Workmen strike; employers lock out or black-list. Farmers build their own grain elevators and stock pens. Manufacturers' associations obtain an ordinance against picketing, and menace with ruin any employer who signs an agreement with union labor or runs a closed shop. Workingmen by refusing to work alongside non-union men compel them to join the organization. By union labels a special market is created for goods of the "fair" employer, and by sympathetic strike the employer who uses "scab" product is embarrassed, or by boycott the market for his products is curtailed.

The stakes of class struggle. In the *economic* field the strife of classes rages about rentals, length of lease, ownership of tenant's improvements, prerogatives of landlord, wages, length of the work-

ing day, Sunday labor, avoidable risk in industry, "speeding up," method of payment, collective bargaining, and the closed shop.

In the *social* field it involves recognition of the union, methods of hiring and "firing," shop discipline, and the question of the workers' share in management.

In the *political* field it concerns itself with:

(a) Constitutional rights, franchise, sharing of offices, appointment or election of officials, remedies for their misconduct, selection and powers of representatives, rights of assemblage, of association, free speech, free press, etc.; composition of army and the courts, position of church and school in the state.

(b) Class privileges and their abolition. Equality before the law.

(c) Distribution of public lands, of landed property, of taxes, of tariff benefits; rights of property, of inheritance, of contract, vested rights, legal position of master, of employer, of creditor; nationalization of industries.

THE OUTLOOK FOR CLASS CONFLICT IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

The following from *Middletown in Transition,* 1936, sequel to *Middletown,* 1926, by Robert S. Lynd and Helen M. Lynd, shows what is going on in a small Mid-Western manufacturing city.

Business people do not like to think of "classes" and feel happier in ignoring the possibility of their existence. And tradition aids them . . . for, according to the "American way," even the working man with a wife and four children and eighteen dollars in his Saturday pay envelope is on his way to becoming, if not a millionaire, at least independent and secure in his old age. Or, if he isn't, it is because he is lacking in initiative or thrift or industry and is therefore simply getting what he deserves.[2]

The newspapers endeavor to spread the idea that the community is just one big happy family.[3]

In 1932, the high-school dean proposed that high school girls wear a simple uniform "in order to eliminate class distinctions in high school and to place the poor on an equal footing with the rich." But the evening paper promptly shuddered editorially at such regimentation and denial of democratic principles.[3]

The line between working class and business class, though vague and blurred still, is more apparent in 1935 than it was

[2] *Middletown in Transition,* p. 444.

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 445.

ten years before. Business-class control over the city has tightened, and the determination to run an open-shop town has increased. Business doesn't intend to tolerate any funny business from labor. Local editorials reiterate that "capital and labor are partners," but to Middletown that means that the working class does well to dance to the tune that the business class pipes. Out of the depression there is unquestionably emerging the first faint outlines of local labor solidarity.[4]

Some boys and girls now no longer dare brave the front door of the high school "with the steps crowded with richer students looking you over," but go around to the side entrance.[5]

Middletown labor in characteristic American fashion lacks any driving sense of class consciousness. It has no dynamic symbols for itself as *over against* the business class; but it has been taught by press, by school, by church, and by tradition to accept, as its own, watered versions of the official business-class symbols.[6]

These minor white-collar people are beginning to realize as the city grows larger that they definitely do not belong with the small upper classes.[7]

This trend toward the separating out of the middle class is definitely increasing in Middletown.[8]

It is far more congenial to the mood of the city, proud of its traditions of democratic equality, to think of the lines of cleavage within its social system as based not upon class differences but rather upon the entirely spontaneous and completely individual and personal predilections of the 12,500 families that compose its population. Various groups of inconspicuous folk keep breaking off from the central big-business drive of the Chamber of Commerce and setting up bitter little pressure groups to try to protect their interests. These things are regarded as "disloyal," as "stirring up dissensions," and as the work of "trouble makers."[9]

As American society matures there is possibility of a line-up developing between those whose incomes derive chiefly from ownership and those whose incomes derive from the sale of their labor. Farmers who work independently with land, implements, live stock, etc., are not drawn into this line-up; nor are professionals, whose services are rendered chiefly to individuals. It is *the industrial wage-earners* who are most likely to challenge the capitalists' unceasing push for more profits. But the pure capital-

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 451.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 452.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 454.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 456.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 457.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 461.

ists do not stand alone as champions of profits; conscious of weakness they combine with the active business element (chambers of commerce, manufacturers' associations, etc.) in the endeavor to control society.

Facing a rising tide of criticism, opposition, legal restrictions and prohibitions, American capitalists are now far more class-conscious and class-loyal than were those of a generation ago. More and more they think, feel and act together. They are willing to follow leaders, wholeheartedly support class policies, rally to any of their brethren who make an outcry, smash, if they can, any one or anything that stands in their way. In four decades a culture has grown up here embodying the views, bents and aims of capitalists; while some scoff at it, most of them find it a lamp to their feet. According to this culture capitalists and business men have a self-evident right to organize themselves to any degree that seems good to them; while it is needless, fantastic and un-American for wage-earners to organize themselves in order to strengthen their bargaining power. It is abominable and a portent of revolution for strikers to threaten strike-breakers, but it is gallant and high-spirited for local business men to turn "vigilante," put on hoods, and collectively "beat up" or "run out of town" the outsider sent in to unionize local workers!

Capitalism is constantly evolving and critical students of it show how new short-sighted practices are bringing it into disrepute. They point to the extension of banker control over enterprises, which means decline of pride in excellence of product and management with an eye single to profits; to the maze of "holding companies" designed to mask exorbitant profits; to agreements to "freeze" prices in order to gouge consumers; to the reckless ripping out and callous waste of natural resources our grandchildren may have dire need of; to the failure of industry to provide steady employment for its working force; to the relentless concentration of ownership going on.

Nevertheless, private capitalism can boast many distinguished achievements and services to offset these shortcomings; nor do we know how many of the latter can be corrected without enfeebling private initiative. The one forecast it seems safe to make is that business will not be allowed to go forever at its own gait, serving or knifing the public welfare as it chooses, but will be *required,* by law or public authority, to *do* what it claims to do and to

deliver (actually) what it professes to deliver. Thousands of deft excisions may be necessary in order to do away with the oppressions, gougings and frauds that mar private capitalism in America.

The vision of proletarian social revolution rolling like a prairie fire over all industrial societies, bringing workers to the top and obliging capitalists to work, is not shared by the sociologist. For these societies differ greatly among themselves in worker status and attitude. The more in the way of health service, schooling, means of recreation, political participation, and paths of promotion that stands open to the workers, the more uncertain will be their response to the slogan "Down with capitalism!" Great Britain has not had a revolution for 250 years, the reason being that things were not allowed to come to such a pass.

The impression that the relations between classes in this country have worsened has no solid basis; in my own time I have seen a blurring of class lines and more man-to-man relations between members of different classes. Social democracy is making sure gains. Nor does relentless analysis of contemporary American society oblige us to look for increasing capitalist-worker confrontation and enmity until a struggle for mastery breaks out.

In a half-century the working week in industry has been cut a quarter and the 15-20 hours of added leisure open to workers and their families something like "the good life." A radio set and time to listen to it mean access to as good music as the millionaire hears. In his low-priced or "used" car the hand-worker can visit a thousand beauty spots his parents never saw. And he can avail himself of the ever-multiplying facilities for adult education.

It is not easy to bring such a man to feel himself a "wage slave"!

As workers quit the slums for the suburbs, own and use a bath tub, shave daily, drive cars, have a "Sunday best," possess a fair education and look "presentable," their social status so improves that you cannot convince them they have no show under capitalism. Since the lot and outlook of labor vary greatly from country to country, labor's response to proletarian slogans will not be the same in all countries. Exit "world revolution in our time"!

Playgrounds, parks, public forests, bathing beaches, high schools, community centers, health centers, clinics, hospitals, convalescent camps, large-scale public housing, "security" and other desirables can all be had without abandoning "private ownership

of the means of production." Capitalists will consent to pay taxes to make these conveniences possible rather than risk utter ruin from the eventual rising of an enraged working class.

That our capitalists will do the far-sighted and politic thing cannot be taken for granted; for, in a dominant class *arrogance, rapacity* and *unteachableness* are fostered. The French *noblesse* "never learned anything and never forgot anything"—which insures downfall! Fortunately, however, American capitalists with seigneurial pretensions do not find it easy to get their superiority conceded. The hocus pocus (garb, trappings, airs, manner, ritual, exclusiveness, myths) by which in the past a dominant class awed the common people is of little use now owing to the rising plane of popular enlightenment.

Are the heirs of wealth here coming to be functionless, self-indulgent, luxury-loving and "soft"? On the whole, no. Many are starting in the family business near the foot of the ladder and "working their way up" through the organization. In no previous society have so many fortunes been voluntarily "dedicated to a public use." Heavy taxation of the estates of decedents will very likely be used to check the multiplication of families of endowed loafers; for our lawmakers show themselves much more willing to hamper the *transmitting* of fortunes than the *winning* of them. It would seem that within the capitalist class active money makers will continue to dominate, rather than idle "coupon-clippers."

The *laissez-faire* social philosophy, which had thinkers hypnotized for more than a hundred years, is now as dead as mutton. The points at which private enterprise in profit-extraction give annoying results are ever more numerous. From time to time a branch of business—proprietary medicines, retail liquor selling, variety shows, private medical schools, investment trusts—goes bad and the heavy hand is called for. Every legislature, every Congress nails new pickets on the fences protecting consumers, workers and investors against noxious forms of "enterprise." Imagine loosing upon a hapless public what the law is now holding back—adulterated foods, deceitful nostrums, humbug cosmetics, fraudulent securities, misleading advertising, bought testimonials, "fixed" prize fights, "phoney" gambling devices, "fake" diplomas! No, business will be left free to pursue legitimate aims, but it will be required to respect certain limits and shun certain practices found to be against the public interest.

The 205 social settlements which have sprung up among us since 1889 contributed their bit to narrow class chasms. With 1500 staff members and 7500 volunteer workers these institutions reach at least a million persons a year. From residence in the settlements thousands quite outside the class line-up—writers, artists, scholars, intellectuals, professionals—have learned something of "how the other half lives." Enjoying general confidence and the gift of utterance, they have opened the eyes of the public to the flocks of cormorants which prey upon the poor. The settlements "strike out against sweat shop, unsanitary work rooms, child labor, low wages, overwork of women and other civic and industrial evils." "The war and post-war years have witnessed a further extension of settlement interests and strategy into large-scale public housing, city and regional planning, systematized social insurance, internationalism and world peace." [10] The settlements, of course, cannot wipe out class conflict; but they have brought together Alley and Avenue, mitigated the virulence of class conflict, and imparted vigor and self-confidence to public opinion.

Sunlight is a great sanitary agent, destroying harmful microbes that can flourish only in the dark. The like is true of the microbes that infest the body of society, they cannot endure the light! Concealment and misrepresentation are the main reliance of the beneficiaries of a social abuse; snatch these two cards out of their hands and hardly will they take a trick. The Russell Sage Foundation listed at the close of 1927, 2700 social surveys. In view of the rate at which the fruits of social research are coming out one can predict that in time the whole social body will be X-rayed and the resulting chart showing the location of nests of monopolists, price-"freezers," labor trimmers, hi-jackers, and racketeers can be consulted by any one. This is bound to lead to the extirpation of many wrongs which now feed the fires of class struggle.

[10] Article on "Social Settlements" in Vol. 14 of *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.*

CHAPTER XXIII

INTRA-CLASS CONFLICT

Not only is class arrayed against class but the elements which make up a class may quarrel among themselves. We think of nobility, clergy, and *bourgeoisie* as the actors in the drama of the French Revolution; but each of these classes had internal conflicts. Says See: [1]

Everywhere we witness conflicts arising between the court nobility, which benefited by all the favors of the state, and the petty nobility, which was excluded from the high ranks of the army. The majority of the nobility demanded the abolition of the venality of the military ranks and disbanding of the privileged units in the army.

In the clergy the vicars often turned against the bishops and religious orders. They not only demanded an improvement of their own condition, but also desired a better distribution of the ecclesiastical property, which would thus be devoted to the needs of religion and the relief of the poor. They approached the idea of a nationalization of this property. Besides, they wished that the tithes be used for their "original purpose," instead of benefiting only the great tithe-owners. Finally they often called for the revival of ecclesiastical elections and of the old church councils.

Between the various classes of peasants differences were continually appearing. The prosperous peasants, the so-called *laboureurs,* on the one hand, and the mass of poor peasants, on the other, quarreled especially over the question of the commons.

In industrial matters the merchants and factory owners were opposed to the masters of the trades. The former memorialized against the trades guilds and their regulations; the latter upheld the old system of guilds with their privileges, and protested against the use of machinery. In the rare instances in which the journeymen made themselves heard they agreed with their masters in denouncing machinery, but they were against their masters on

[1] Henri E. See, *Economic and Social Conditions in France During the Eighteenth Century,* 1927, pp. 224-6.

questions pertaining to work and wages, and demanded the right to form unions.

Job jealousy. The dangerous simplicity of seeing society as composed of a few big homogeneous classes becomes apparent when we observe how workers behave toward competitors for their jobs. So long as the labor movement under the leadership of idealistic intellectuals aimed at creating a new social order, belief in the natural solidarity of labor was cherished as an article of faith. But the capitalistic social order has proven harder to overthrow than the early communists expected and many disillusioned workers have become willing to leave the complete making over of the economic structure of society to a later generation. Giving up the idea of advancement by means of out-and-out class struggle they stand guard over their job territory, ready to fight even fellow proletarians in case they threaten it.

Natives versus immigrants. Most of the oppositions in society-at-large—of sex, of nationality, of race, of grade—crop up within the laboring class itself. There have been times when the growing cohorts of women in industry were viewed with hostility by male labor unions and treated in ways far from chivalrous. Native workers have met immigrating foreign workers with violence, boycott, exclusion from the unions, and finally, with restrictions upon their entrance into the country. As long ago as the reign of Edward III the laboring population of London killed all Flemish workers who were unable to pronounce "bread and cheese" in the proper English way. In 1893 a French mining company replaced a hundred French workers with Italians. Two days of bloodshed followed and peace was restored only by means of the military. In 1910 near Salzburg Austrian workers fought with Italians who were being put in their places. Right after the World War anti-Semitism flared out in reborn Poland not only among the *bourgeois* elements but also among the workers. The Polish workers refused to work beside Jews and sometimes maltreated them. When in the industrial districts of Warsaw and Lodz great labor dismissals took place, it was the Jewish element in the labor force that was put on the street first.

As labor gains in political strength it relies less on violence to discourage the intrusion of aliens and more on legislation. Effort is made to fix by law minimum wages for foreign workers so that they cannot underbid native workers, to withhold public work

from contractors who employ aliens, and to bar foreigners from the country by some test.

As the resistance of native labor to immigrant labor develops, there is an interesting shift in the position taken by the capitalist class. While the workers oppose the immigration of foreign job seekers, often hiding their self-interest behind an ideology of "natural racial antipathy," or "protection of the high standards of national work," the employers, who have been accustomed to claim a monopoly of patriotic feeling as against the "dangerous internationalism" charged against labor, abandon this rôle completely. They take to standing up for the immigrants against their working fellow-countrymen and prate of "the quickening influence of competition in the labor market." Such has been the attitude of the ultranationalistic North German estate owners and the Conservative manufacturers of Westphalia toward the incoming Polish laborers. The French entrepreneurs, so glowing in their professions of ardent patriotism, oppose any barring out of Italian immigrants despite the fact that these Italians have been taught by their Fascist leaders to keep up their allegiance to Italy.

The color chasm. In the American South proletarian class consciousness has proven quite unable to bridge the color chasm. The lower you go in the social scale the more violent is hatred of the Negro; for cheap Negro labor has its attractions for the Southern employing class but it is a terror for the "poor whites." Moreover, the white wage earners find a grim comfort in realizing that there is an element still lower than they in the social scale, on whom they can have the satisfaction of looking down! So no local trade union admits black workers. When a strike is on, some of the opposite color are always ready to serve as strike-breakers. This race antagonism is sedulously fanned, for each year it leaves in the pockets of Southern employers scores of millions of dollars which would have had to be paid as wages if working-class solidarity were realized.

In the North as an aftermath of the Civil War there was a sentiment for giving the Negroes a square deal. They met with no group hostility so long as they could fit themselves into the chinks and crannies of the local economic organization, doing things which few white persons cared particularly to do. But when, after the World War, the great influx of Southern Negroes into Northern industrial centers caused many white workers to

tremble for their jobs, the Negroes had little welcome in labor unions and were more or less boycotted.

Town-country split. In Europe the town-country cleavage yawns in the path of working-class solidarity. To the farm-born country laborer the factory worker in the city is a ne'er-do-well who fights property out of resentment because he has no prospect of owning any, while he, the agricultural laborer, counts on having some day a bit of land of his own. The city worker is a loafer who after hours reads his newspaper or plays games with his friends in the cabaret while the rural worker still has to get in the last load of hay or feed the live stock. He is a parasite on the countryman, who has to work that the other may eat, who has to pay high taxes that the other may have better housing, schools, recreation centers. The industrial worker, on the other hand, thinks of the man in the furrow as a "clodhopper" a century behind the times, whose horizon reaches scarcely beyond his plow tail; as a greenhorn in politics, whereas he, the man of the pavements, sees through the political game. The ordinary newspaper, of course, beholden as it is to the business element, is careful to let pass no opportunity to foment dislike and mistrust between town worker and countryman.

Religious rifts. Religious and moral ideas also split the working class. "Patriotic" labor unions which put the claims of country above those of class seek a peaceful solution of their differences with employers. The national consciousness of the Czech workers is keener than their class consciousness. In Germany the Catholic workers generally belong to the Center Party, which dissents from the labor movement at large not only in matters of religion but also in labor policy. Since the 1919 Revolution new labor groups have been formed to spread the gospel of industrial peace as against Marxism. They are national in feeling, law-abiding in method, and do not regard religion and education as mere tools of the capitalist class. The Fascists could not have come into power in January, 1933, had not millions of German wage-earners abandoned their distinctive proletarian movement and joined the National Socialist Party of lower-middle-class origin. They were detached from their allegiance to the working-class by intensifying the appeal on behalf of their maltreated, humiliated and imperiled fatherland. Other means of winning German workers were anti-Semitism and the *Kraft durch Freude* (strength through joy)

movement. Nor should we overlook that all the former leaders of labor were jailed, their press destroyed, and their party organization smashed!

Skilled versus unskilled. Let us not forget the rift between skilled and unskilled. The skilled worker has professional pride. He knows something of the whole process he works in and feels a certain satisfaction in it. Thanks to his high wages his standard of living is far above that of the unskilled. His women and children rarely have to work to help make ends meet. Schooling holds out the prospect of his children rising in the world.

Enhancing their bargaining power by organization the skilled may win for themselves so good a position that they become reconciled to the established social order and share the capitalistic spirit. By their less fortunate brethren they come to be looked upon as "the aristocracy of labor." On the other hand, the hordes of unskilled, feeling that they have "nothing to lose but their chains," preserve their revolutionary ardor. The skilled develop "craft consciousness" and form exclusive unions; the unskilled develop "class consciousness," dream of rallying all proletarians for the assault on capitalism, and are charmed by the idea of "one big union."

Opposing "wings." In the degree that organized wage earners reap instalments of benefit from past efforts and sacrifices, there appear "right" and "left" wings. There is no name harsh and contemptuous enough for the radical wing of the labor movement to call the leaders trying to reach their aims by bargaining and agreement rather than by fighting. The latter are called "misleaders," "labor fakers," "traitors," "reactionaries." In the eyes of the radical the American trade unions' government is a "hard-boiled autocracy of bureaucrats," quick to resort to "terrorism" and wholesale expulsion against those who differ with them. And from the right wing come charges that the radicals are "boring from within," "plotting to disrupt the labor organizations," "taking orders from Moscow," etc. Gompers, the head of organized labor, addressed the socialists as if they were his bitterest enemies; in his autobiography no word against the capitalist is so charged with indignation:

> I know what you have up your sleeves and I want to say that I am entirely at variance with your philosophy. I declare it to you, I am not only at variance with your doctrines but with your

philosophy. Economically you are unsound, socially you are wrong, industrially you are an impossibility.

The Russian peasants gave proof on countless occasions while the Bolshevik Revolution was going on that they were overwhelmingly against the old tsarist system. But, as *that* nightmare receded further into the past and they were confronted by proposals that they had never even thought of, it was seen that they were by no means one in attitude toward communist policies. The bulk of the peasants were so averse to "socialization" that only under state pressure would they form agricultural collectives. Great numbers of them were deported from their homes and forced to work on public enterprises.

Thus we see exemplified the general principle that *opposition is sharpest when it arises between those who have been united.* After the Reformation sectarian controversies so embittered the Protestants that often it was said, "It is easier to hold with the Papists than with those of the other sects." The hatred of apostates and renegades is far sharper than if no bond had ever existed. Family quarrels are proverbial for the bitterness they develop, next come church quarrels. In American politics the hatred of the Republicans for the "mugwumps" is a case in point.

No doubt the capitalist class, too, is very far from constituting a harmonious self-consistent *bloc.* Its elements by no means present a solid front even in resisting the pressure from the side of labor. But the disagreements and oppositions within this class are more hidden than those within the working class and it is impossible to bring them out into the light.

CHAPTER XXIV

INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT

Conflict between workers and their employers not only involves the momentous issue of the sharing of the earnings of industrial concerns between labor and capital, but generally is embittered by the feeling among employers that they are masters and that their workers are trying to wrest from them their self-evident right to "run their business as they please."

Unlike the conflict between the working class and the capitalist class, considered in the chapter on *Class Conflict,* industrial conflict is waged between bodies of dissatisfied workers and their employers. These workers do not aim at overthrowing capitalism or abolishing the capitalist class but at the removal of specific grievances or the improvement of their condition *within the existing social system.* They may be fighting only for endurable conditions, or for conditions as good as some other workers have, or as good as they themselves have had some time. When workers make demands they know cannot be met without fundamental change in the relative status of labor and capital, what we see is *class conflict* rather than mere *industrial conflict.*

Some industrial conflicts grow out of a drive by workers to change the balance between employer and employee. Once the desired change is effected the matter may cease to be a bone of contention. Such are struggles over the standardization of the working day, the legal responsibility of the industry for injuries arising out of industrial accidents, the limitation of child labor by law, the right of workers to deal with their employers through third parties, namely, the officials or agents of their unions. But, in the nature of the case, struggles over *wages* cannot arrive at a final settlement. Price levels change and with them profit levels, an industry gains or loses in profitableness, the supply of a particular kind or grade of labor fluctuates, the local cost of living changes; any of these may force wage revision. Even in the absence of economic justification employers will cut wages when

they feel themselves strong in relation to labor, while laborers will demand more wages when they think they can win. So wage disputes cannot be expected to cease until the parties concerned unite in setting up machinery by which conflicting claims may be adjusted according to working principles which both sides accept as fair and reasonable.

Industrial conflicts are born of industrial changes. While industrial conflict originated in the pressure upon wages exerted by a grasping mercantile capitalism in the closing stage of the handicraft system, it is only since the industrial revolution that it has assumed large proportions and become, so to speak, institutionalized. In each country such a conflict makes its appearance not long after the industrial revolution. In China and India it was but a few years after the introduction of modern factories before conditions became so intolerable that labor organized and struck. Latter-day industrialism affords the employers such a leverage that the workers can be pressed down into utter misery if they do not unite and threaten to tie up the industry.

Issues or objectives. There is no aspect of the sale and delivery of labor which may not give rise to an industrial dispute: The pay scale, the basis of remuneration, the amount and compensation of overtime, the length of the working day, Sunday and holiday labor, night work, removable hazards to life, limb or health, sanitary conditions, shop discipline, rules and fines, grounds of discharge, workers' freedom of speech and freedom to organize, recognition of the union, the closed shop; these by no means exhaust the list of matters over which master and men may quarrel. As labor gains in self-confidence and foresight more of its battles turn on matters relating to job security, the concrete freedom of the shop and the integrity of its organization. Such are shop discipline, arbitrary discharge, denial of the right to organize, the company union, etc.

Weapons and tactics. Each side has spies to worm out the secrets of the other. Workingmen intimidate non-strikers and beat strike-breakers or else hire sluggers to do it. Employers hire gunmen, mine guards and watchmen to beat up labor leaders and provoke violence. They make "plants" of explosives in order to "get something" on the labor leaders. Bomb outrages are met by deportations. Each side gets together funds to defend its own law violators and to convict the law violators of the other side. If

public sympathy or support is decisive, the fighting class embarks on a campaign to win the favor of the public. It pleads the purity of its motives and the rightfulness of its claims, demonstrates that they are identical with broad social interests and brands its opponents as predatory, lawless and desperate. In case the class has political representation and can gain some of its ends *via* politics, it establishes a political front and log-rolls with other groups.

In most branches the mass of equipment utilized for production has enormously increased. To-day when a hundred cotton-mill operatives strike they tie up perhaps ten times as much capital as a hundred operatives who struck eighty years ago. Stoppage is ten times as costly to the capitalist as of yore, so he is more restless when tied up by a strike and resorts to more ruthless measures to break the strike. The strikers realize this and become heedless of public interests in their endeavor to foil the strike-breakers. Of necessity, then, the parties to the labor conflict tend to become more reckless and lawless in their tactics.

Along with the growing prominence of capital equipment goes a tendency toward larger production units. Automatically this diminishes the importance of the individual workman to the employer and augments the importance of the employer to the workman. In a ten-man shop, the employer loses one-tenth of his force and of his profit, if one disgruntled workman quits him. In a hundred-man shop, he loses only one per cent, so that, as units grow, the protesting workman is less and less considered. On the other hand, the bigger the units the fewer, so that it becomes less likely that this workman, without changing his residence, can find another factory in his line to employ him.

This automatic dwarfing of the individual wage earner gives rise to an irresistible movement toward organization. Those who work in factories not theirs, with machines not theirs, on materials not theirs, under conditions they have no voice in determining, and turn out a product that belongs to some one else, discover that they have an interest in common. Only when combined can they compel the employer to heed their grievances and claims. The union of the employees of a single concern ("company union") may equalize them with their employer as respects power to inflict loss, but *it does not equalize the two parties with respect*

to holding-out power. Hence, the workers unite themselves into wide unions in order to assure financial support during a strike.

Industrial conflict and the law. The course of the struggle is greatly affected by the attitude of the courts towards "combining to raise wages," "conspiracy," the boycott, the blacklist, the enforcement of "specific performance" of the labor contract, the legality of a strike on behalf of the closed shop, the legality of the "yellow-dog" contract, the legal definition of what constitutes "coercion" and "intimidation." Times innumerable the workers have been hamstrung in industrial conflicts because the means by which alone they could mass and wield their economic power were held unlawful and subjected them to arrest and imprisonment.

Industrial conflict and the state. In the long run distinctions between "lawful" and "unlawful" in industrial disputes are brought to reflect the actual distribution of political power. Accordingly the workers endeavor to make themselves a force in politics either to obtain statutory remedies for court decisions crippling them in their struggles or to bring about protective legislation such as prohibition of night work, imposing maximum limits upon the length of the working day, workmen's compensation for industrial accidents, the seamen's law, curtailment of the use of the injunction in industrial disputes and minimum wage laws. From time to time new weapons in aid of the employer are forged by the courts and nothing but an intelligent wielding of the power that resides in the ballot saves the workers from being put at a fatal disadvantage in their struggle.

Industrial conflict and the public. When boycotting is attempted or the employers plan to "starve out" the strikers, the attitude of the public may be decisive. The tram company loses when the public will walk rather than be served by brought-in strike-breakers. Public sympathy inclines toward the workers when their cause has a strong emotional appeal, for example, when they are shamefully overworked or underpaid, when families are being set on the sidewalk, when women and children are visibly suffering, when the elementary rights of free speech or free assemblage have been ruthlessly trampled on, or when their opponent is a swollen and hated trust. Rarely, of course, is there any pathos about the employers' cause, so their tactics are to divert public sympathy from the strikers by playing up their occasional acts of violence or pinning upon them the false label "anarchist"

or "bolshevist." The picturing of strikers as enemies of property, marriage, religion and the state is an old game that has been worked ten thousand times and has netted the employers billions of dollars that would have gone to labor as wages, yet (such is the simplicity and gullibility of the public) it is still far from worn out.

When an employer feels himself in a strong position, he deplores public inquiries "because they give opportunities to certain men to air their views." The "aristocracy of labor" are not always eager to have the searchlight turned upon their cause when they have a dispute with their employers, but the ill-paid endeavor by street parade, mass meetings and pilgrimages to draw public attention to their plight. Thus in the parade of the striking London dockers of 1888:

> Emblems, quaint and pathetic, were carried in the ranks. The docker's cat and the sweater's cat, the docker's dinner and the sweater's dinner, the docker's baby and the sweater's baby, diminutive and ample, respectively. . . . Fish heads, onions and tiny loaves were carried on pikes as an object lesson in docker's fare to the magnates of the city.

The spectacle of non-resistant suffering is very effective in winning public sympathy. Wanton arrests, imprisonment for ignoring harsh injunctions, cruelty by mine guards or sluggers are fine material for a publicity which evokes pity. But in some cases violent self-help arrests attention, starts investigations and gains publicity for grievances. In a West Virginia conflict the miners met the violence of the employers and their henchmen in office with armed resistance. The "war" that followed advertised the ugly situation, the story was laid before Congress and the committee of investigation placed the responsibility squarely upon the mine owners and the subservient state officials.

Results of industrial conflicts. It is certain that the tens of thousands of industrial conflicts of the past century have had the effect of limiting the power of the capitalist "to run his business as he pleases." Out of experience of losses from strikes or from noticing what has happened to other employers, he learns to pay some heed to the needs and desires of labor. Even lost strikes crimp the employer's pocketbook and make him consider how he may avoid labor troubles. Beyond all question a century of growth in the will and power of labor to take its own part has

chastened the spirit of arrogant employers. The "nothing to discuss" manager has lost too much money for his stockholders to stand high in their favor, while the manager who keeps the wheels turning by showing himself reasonable and conciliatory is called up higher.

Labor, too, has learned from its heartbreaking struggles. In certain directions it has met a disposition to yield, while at other sectors of its battle front every foot of ground has had to be fought for; so it discovers the lines of least resistance and advances along them. It finds what prerogatives cannot be wrested from capitalists without risking the life of the business. It learns that certain things in the control of industry are more vital to employers than other things which may be more valuable to labor

Industrial relations are coming to be socially willed. In the absence of strong labor organizations wage-slashing employers would soon divert to profits billions of dollars now paid as wages, and labor would presently come into a condition and a frame of mind that might lead to an appalling social explosion. On the other hand, vast hard-fought industrial struggles between giant corporations or employers' associations and powerful labor unions hold out such prospects of violence and immense economic loss—to the public as well as to the belligerents—that society will probably insist on the substitution of rational process for an endurance contest. This, however, in modern democracies will not come about by the fancied "short-cut" of "compulsory" arbitration, but by the more delicate and exacting process of mobilizing public opinion through the activities of government investigating bodies, "labor boards," etc. Thus the terms of employment, instead of being arrived at as aforetime by "the higgling of the market," will come gradually to be matters of social volition, avoiding, however, the crude mechanism of direct compulsion. Many will shiver at seeing the relations between employer and wage-earner removed so far from their "natural" basis; but the alternative is the virtual disappearance of the private employer bent on extracting the utmost profit the situation allows and his replacement by the state!

THE AVOIDANCE OF INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT

Even with both parties in a belligerent mood there are various means of lessening industrial conflict.

1. Avoidable conflicts occur because one side counts on throw

ing dust in the eyes of the public. Hence, if all the significant facts about a troubled industry could be broadcast on short notice, the chances of hoodwinking the public would be greatly curtailed and many a clash might be avoided.

2. Industrial conflicts are so costly that they will be shunned in the degree that the parties can forecast the probable outcome. The time may come when the counsel of industrial engineers is available to both sides and that side will yield which is shown the certainty of defeat.

3. When labor and capital disagree flatly as to how a profit-sharing scheme will work out or how speeding up by a bonus system will affect the worker's health, instead of sounding a call to arms they may invite an outside expert to look into the project and tell them what may be expected of it.

4. Realizing the cost of fruitless bickering labor union and management in a given concern, say a railroad, may coöperate for greater efficiency, the earnings from the resulting increase of production to be shared on terms settled in advance and satisfactory to both.

5. Often employers show fight because they imagine labor aims to oust them. When they discover that their workers, far from aspiring to conduct the industry themselves, a task for which they have neither ability nor experience, wish only to influence such matters as pay, hours, working conditions, safety and job tenure, they become willing to adopt a plan whereby grievances may be remedied before strife breaks out.

CHAPTER XXV

RELIGIOUS OR SECTARIAN STRIFE

Among the motives that may prompt the dominant element in society to require that all shall support its particular form of religion are:

1. The sadistic desire to make suffer those so presuming as to differ with it over things supernal.

2. To get religion solidly behind the social order so that its teachings as to God's will may tell on the side of the dominators.

3. To hinder fanatics, false prophets and self-seeking charlatans from leading astray the simple and credulous.

4. To save the innocent from going to hell through sheer ignorance or error.

5. To win God's favor, on the theory that God is a "jealous" Being who is displeased when worship due Him is paid another or when His followers worship Him in the wrong way, and will greatly reward persecutors who spare Him this displeasure.

Religious intolerance. The resort to force in the field of religion is relatively modern. Viscount Bryce points out that a profound difference between the ancient world and ours

> . . . lay in the fact that in it all religions were mutually compatible, so that a polytheist, while primarily bound to worship a God of his own country, might worship those of other countries also. . . . The first people that claimed exclusive reality and wide-stretching power for its own Deity was Israel. . . . The first rulers who tried to enforce by persecution conformity to their own religious usages were the Sassanid kings of Persia, who, being fire-worshippers, forbade their Christian subjects, and doubtless other non-Zoroastrian subjects also, either to bury or to burn the bodies of the dead, these modes of interment being to them a desecration of Fire or of Earth. The first form of worship prescribed by law and enforced by penalties was the worship of the Roman Emperor, or rather of his "Genius" or protecting spirit.[1]

[1] James Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, 1921, IX.

It took the ferocious religious wars which lacerated Europe from the middle of the sixteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth to open men's eyes to the hellish possibilities which lurk in the non-toleration of religious differences.

Religious strife is a social cancer. Nothing, indeed, is worse than bloodshed over religion, for, on the whole, it is *the superior* who are decimated. The coarser pay small heed to things spiritual; required to conform or rot in jail, they *conform.* It is only those with a dash of idealism who will suffer rather than give up their faith. If they are not using religion as a cloak for worldly aims the persecutors, too, are far above the rabble in idealism; so, if *their* heads are broken, the human stock is left the poorer. As a means of rooting out the nobler, leaving the fatheads and belly worshipers to perpetuate their kind undisturbed, nothing surpasses bloody religious strife.

Other social oppositions fade or soften with the lapse of time; the quarrel is settled by an adjustment, or it drifts out of the focus of attention as new interests beget new alignments. Not so is it with religious opposition. If to-day God is angry that we tolerate those who worship Him in a different way or worship another deity, He will be just as angry next week or next year. On other battlefields the combatants make peace when both realize that the struggle is costing them more than victory can possibly bring. The religious, however, feeling themselves under a stern exacting eye, *dare not compromise.*

Many religious conflicts reflect other conflicts. The South Irish are stubborn Catholics as a protest against their former maltreatment by the English Government. Had they been victims of a Catholic Government no doubt they would be to-day fervid Methodists and Baptists! Under the domination of Catholic Austria Bohemian nationalists, balked in their political aims, developed rejective attitudes and became militant free-thinkers. The Poles were but indifferent Catholics until the Kingdom of Poland was divided and Prussia tried to absorb her Poles into the Lutheran Church, while Russia sought to gather hers into the Greek Orthodox Church; then from outraged nationality-feeling the Poles became the ardent Catholics they are to-day! Again and again it has been shown that Jewish Orthodoxy draws much of its vitality from Anti-Semitism; once the Jews cease to be discriminated against and persecuted, the Synagogue loses much of its

hold. The mass of the Koreans turned Protestant Christians because it gave vent to their resentment at being "assimilated" by Japan.

Sectarian controversy need not be a social menace. In its raw youth the religious sect, fired with zeal for "saving the world," lashes out at every creed and group which stands in its way. It threatens, bans, anathematizes. However, "hard words break no bones"; so long as the state keeps the lists and maintains "a fair field and no favors," sectarian strife is not likely to shatter the public peace. Explosions are to be looked for only if downright persecution is permitted, or if the state puts its authority behind a particular religious body. Then it is that Pandora's box is opened.

Religion can thrive without state support. In Europe the devout have been taught to interpret the state's refusal to pay religion's bills as signifying cynical indifference to what may befall the spiritual life of the people. A state that spends nothing on religion is stigmatized as "godless," while disestablishment of a state church is solemnly branded as "an act of national impiety." Now, a century and a half of American experience proves that such epithets are malicious. Not only does religion flourish better here than in most countries with a state church, but European inquirers discover in America no sentiment whatever for the state care of religion. It appears that the devout remain unconcerned so long as their religion has the state behind it to promote it and pay its bills, but they turn zealous and bestir themselves as soon as they realize that its fate is altogether in their own hands.

TRAITS OF A PEOPLE-SUPPORTED RELIGION

Democratization. When a cult has only the offerings of its followers it seeks to endear itself to them. Where the constitution of the church is elastic the laity are conceded a share in church government; where this is rigid the clergy pay more heed to the wishes of their flocks, persuade rather than command. Then, too, religion is obliged to become simple and graspable. A century ago the famous DeTocqueville testified:

> I have seen no country in which Christianity is clothed with fewer forms, figures and observances than in the United States; or where it presents more distinct, more simple or more general notions to the mind.

Greater consideration for the worshiper. The active participation of the congregation in worship is sought. In a state-supported church often one finds elaborate and beautiful services, although scarcely any are present save the officiating clergy; for after all, God is being glorified! The people, on the other hand, are loath to pay for a worship in which they have no voice nor part. They will support only rites that stir an emotion of adoration in the worshiper. Moreover, the costly adornment of the sanctuary is less prized, for the human heart is regarded as the real seat of worship rather than a sanctified place before an altar.

Less sacerdotalism. In a state-supported church the clergyman's whole duty may consist in the performance of the appointed rites; but in a church dependent on the free-will offerings of its members he does not come off so easily. His sacerdotal functions shrivel, to be sure, but he is expected to give his people solace, counsel, and instruction. He becomes a combination of priest, public teacher, personal counselor and social worker.

More practicality. A people-supported religion is obliged to show a practical spirit. It is not enough that it produces results in another world and an after life, it must demonstrate its power over human lives here. Can it inspire loyalty, hope, courage, and self-sacrifice? Can it devise relief for its afflicted members?

WHAT IT MEANS TO DIVORCE CHURCH AND STATE

Total separation of church and state implies:

(a) Freedom of religious belief and the free exercise of worship within the limits imposed by regard for morality and public order.

(b) No religious test to be set up as a requisite for naturalization, voting, office holding, or jury duty.

(c) No one to have his civil or political rights abridged by ecclesiastical provisions; nor to be absolved from the performance of his civic duties by his religious views.

(d) No recognition of ecclesiastical jurisdiction by public authorities.

(e) No public money to be spent for the support of religion.

(f) Cemeteries to be controlled by the municipality rather than the church.

(g) No indoctrination or obligatory participation in worship in public schools or state educational institutions.

(h) Ministers not to make the exercise of civic functions a

matter of conscience, nor threaten spiritual penalties for the citizen's political activity.

Most of this program was early realized in the United States and of late it has been spreading rapidly over Christendom. Nothing else has done so much to damp that spirit of religious persecution which, as Sydney Smith observed a century ago

> has been the employment and curse of mankind for four or five centuries—not only that persecution which imprisons and scourges for religious opinion, but the tyranny of incapacitation, which, by disqualifying from civil offices, and cutting a man off from the lawful objects of ambition, endeavors to strangle religious freedom in silence and to enjoy all the advantages, without the blood, and noise and fire, of persecution.

Far from any sect employing law or public money to get the better of another

> the wisdom of America keeps them all down—secures to them all their just rights, gives to each of them their separate pews, and bells, and steeples, makes them all aldermen in their turn, and quietly extinguishes the faggots which each is preparing for the combustion of the other.

What embitterment we missed by keeping church and state separate may be guessed from certain laws which have been found necessary in disestablishing a long-dominant church. In France, according to the Law of Separation of 1905, buildings used for worship belong to the public; no political meeting may be held in a church; no religious sign or emblem may be fixed on public monuments or in any public place save buildings used for worship, cemeteries, and monuments of the dead. The clergyman is prosecuted who, in a place of worship, insults or defames a public official, or who incites to resist the execution of the law or the legal acts of public authorities, or tends to arouse or arm one section of the citizens against the others.

In Mexico official permission must be obtained before opening a new temple of worship for public use. A church may not maintain convents, primary schools or charitable institutions. Ministers of religion may not solicit funds or conduct worship outside of church buildings, may not wear elsewhere their distinctive garb, may not publicly criticize the government or officials. They may not vote, hold office, or assemble for political purposes. No political assem-

bly may be held in a place of public worship. No political party may bear a name indicative of relation to any religious belief. No religious periodical may comment on political affairs. In a word, the clergy are expected to confine themselves to promoting religion.

These are not spiteful and persecutive handcuffs, but necessary means of freeing the state and political life from mischievous clerical meddling. Such drastic measures can be dispensed with only where the distinctness of church and state is understood and accepted by all.

MEANS OF AVOIDING SECTARIAN STRIFE

1. Streets and other public places should not be used for religious demonstrations. In a single year recently forty riots occurred in India between Hindus and Moslems resulting in the deaths of 197 persons and the injury of 1598 others. All but six of these riots were caused by Hindu religious processions insisting on making loud music while passing Mohammedan mosques.

2. Neither churches nor groups formed on a religious basis should endeavor to control by secret "trades" and wire-pulling political parties, nominations, elections, appointments, or public policies. If a church feels it should "take a hand" in politics, let it do so openly and avow frankly its motives.

3. In matters political or civic one's religious convictions or church affiliations ought not to figure at all. Dragging them in should be resented as wilful injection of a foreign issue.

4. Clergymen should beware of preaching a political sermon on the specious plea that the issue is between simple right and wrong.

5. Charter provisions as to the church affiliation of the members of the governing board of a private educational, research, philanthropic, or civic institution are to be deplored.

6. It is short-sighted for church people to throw their custom, their patronage, or their votes to the merchant, professional man, or candidate who is their fellow-member; for other churches follow suit and soon the community is split along sectarian lines. The fewer the social, political, commercial, or professional advantages church membership bestows and the greater the spiritual advantages, the better will be the feeling among the churches. Let a church *exalt religion* rather than promote the worldly success of its members.

7. The churches should tacitly agree not to poach on one another's membership.

8. The churches should welcome every opportunity to coöperate in moral, civic, and social-welfare movements.

9. Now that there is a wholesome tendency to exalt life above ritual, and character above creed, those who insist upon stressing points of doctrinal difference among the denominations should be sent to the rear.

10. Clergymen who are determined that their denomination shall have its own distinctive newspapers, schools, social centers, recreation centers, charitable societies, lecture courses, boy scouts, and factory welfare work and who forbid their parishioners to share in promising community undertaking along these lines, should be deemed stumbling blocks to the advent of community consciousness.

11. Study of the greater religions of the world as expressions of the religious impulse in man should be encouraged. Such study, disclosing that each religion speaks in the same tone of authority, might break down that "absoluteness" from which spring fanaticism and intolerance.

CHURCH AND STATE IN RELATION TO EDUCATION

False prophets are so ready to delude and prey upon the ignorant that the state cannot afford to withdraw all support from the church without putting itself behind the school. In these days of loosening of churchly bonds, only rise in the plane of popular enlightenment has hindered the spawning of foolish sects from becoming a public nuisance as it was in the seventeenth century. Yet there are churches which, aspiring to control education as well as religion, withdraw the children of their communicants from the public school in order to segregate them in the parish school!

The devout are quite justified in objecting to an elementary education so bare of religion as that of the public school must be. The solution is to set aside week-day periods during which the pupils of the community school may go to appointed places and receive religious instruction according to the wishes of their parents.

The separate school with its emphasis on religion denies the civil organization access to the budding mind. The modern democratic state is very far from being a sheer coercive organization.

To procure respect for its laws it puts its trust *in civic attitude rather than in fear*. By bringing the young under appropriate training in the public school it aims to *socialize* its future citizens. Now, if the children are to know no other schooling than that of the church, the democratic state misses all opportunity to build citizenship into them. The church is free to mold at will the sprouting conscience and teach the child always to put *her* claims above those of the state, although the latter is the organ of the *whole* society.

Again, segregation all through the formative years with those of its own faith in school and on playground is a poor foundation for a citizenship which shall spontaneously respect the equal rights of fellow citizens of other faiths or no faith, recognize generously their virtues, and coöperate with them freely in every department of life save only that of religion.

Although total separation of church from state has solved the problem of how differing religious bodies may live together in peace, a great controversy may break out over the question whether the church or the state shall have charge of popular elementary education. Either excusing the members of a religious body which maintains schools of its own from paying taxes for the support of the public schools or the sharing of the state school fund among religious bodies according to the number of children they are teaching will have a most disastrous effect upon the endeavor to socialize and fit for citizenship by means of the community school.

Experiencing increasing difficulty in propagating their peculiar theology in the atmosphere created by modern science, the clergy of some religious bodies will insist upon withdrawing the children of their followers entirely from influences which they do not themselves control. This will raise the question whether society has any rights at all respecting the influences to which its future citizens shall be subjected.

The restraining by law of public or state schools from spending money for instructors or books teaching the descent of man from lower forms (evolution) is the extension of the state's protection to a particular variety of religion, namely, fundamentalism. If biology is thus to be strait-jacketed, there is no good reason why astronomy, or history, or pathology should not likewise be strait-jacketed at the behest of this, that, or the other, religious group.

Thus the distinction between the free science of the public school and the shackled science of many a church school would disappear.

Social policy respecting mischievous varieties of religion. Ever since the curtain went up on the life of man (by the invention of writing about six thousand years ago), hundreds of bestial or degrading cults have held him back socially. Beyond question, therefore, the spread of a sub-social or anti-social religious sect is a matter of grave public concern. Nevertheless, the use of law against it would give zealots an opening to demand that *all* forms of religion save their one "true" form, be suppressed; which would land us soon in the sixteenth century! The score of on-the-whole-uplifting religions which now dominate the bulk of mankind have won to the fore by the superior strength of their appeal rather than by ruthlessly trampling down their rivals; so we have no call to let go the principle of religious toleration. Provided that the plane of popular enlightenment be kept high by means of public schools, public libraries, and other cultural agencies, there will be little to fear from the pernicious cults which from time to time spring up and have their day.

CHAPTER XXVI

CONFLICT BETWEEN LEARNED AND IGNORANT[1]

There is enduring conflict between *men of light* who reject baleful popular superstitions and strive for certain intelligent social-welfare measures—such as compulsory vaccination, compulsory sterilization of congenital defectives, compulsory school attendance, anti-quack and anti-healer laws, anti-spitting ordinances, freedom of speech and of the press, religious liberty—and the *dark-minded,* who resent such measures and would fetter the intelligent by anti-vivisection laws, anti-evolution laws, anti-birth-control-information laws, censorship of opinions, banning of "radical" books, etc.

It is childish to imagine that the ignorant tend to be humble and teachable in their ignorance and defer to men of extraordinary knowledge. The truth is the ignorant, unless from childhood they have been taugh to look up to the learned, are jealous of those of so much greater influence than themselves and welcome an excuse for humbling them. This is why in the early civilizations the learned, if they stood outside the charmed circle of the priesthood, *cultivated a paternal relation* to those they taught so that it should be a sacred lifelong obligation of the pupils to succor and protect their teacher. In old China the scholars built up such a prestige for themselves among the people that it was quite "the thing" to wear spectacles and affect the scholar's stoop!

The learned are most in danger, however, from persons who wish to silence them and to that end inflame the ignorant against them. It is the priests of the popular religion that rouse the rabble against heterodox thinkers and men of science. Politicians who seek to ride into power on the pledge to "kick King George out of the schools of Chicago" set the horde of "patriots" yapping at the high school teachers of American history. Quack doctors lead the assault upon regular physicians and fire fools with the

[1] I do not consider *sectional* conflict, *nationality* conflict and *party* conflict because these topics are in the capable hands of the political scientists.

cry, "Vaccination violates God's law." Pulpiteers out for popularity and power touch off the latent fanaticism of the pious with the proposal to "tear down the statue of the pagan goddess Liberty" in New York harbor and replace it with the figure of Jesus Christ!

In a society of aristocratic traditions, fools and blatherskites are not indulged and scholars are likely to find among the social superiors a following which will not let them be torn to bits by the unlettered mob. Nowhere are the ignorant so free to harry the learned as in a political democracy, in which they are used to being flattered and cockered by stump orators, campaign "spellbinders," candidates for public office, and other courtiers of Demos. Led thus to a high opinion of their own wisdom and worth, they hate the intellectuals who presume to explode their pet dogmas. The behavior of the Athenian democracy toward their heterodox thinkers show what will happen when the enlightened few are at the mercy of the uninstructed many.

Athenian intolerance. For some time after 415 B.C. the Athenian courts made strenuous efforts to punish every discoverable case of impiety. The philosopher Anaxagoras who insisted that the heavenly bodies are but masses of fiery matter was found guilty of irreligion and nothing but the intervention of his old pupil, Pericles, saved him from death. He is the first freethinker known to have been legally prosecuted and condemned for his freethought. Protagoras ventured to read at the house of the freethinking Euripides a treatise of his own, beginning with the avowal that he offered no opinion as to the existence of the gods, life being too short for the inquiry. The remark got wind and he had to fly for his life. His book was publicly burned, all who possessed copies being required to give them up—the earliest known instance of "censorship of the press." The supreme instance of democratic bigotry was, of course, the condemning of Socrates to death on the charge of undermining religion. In the more aristocratically ruled Greek colonial cities philosophic speech was comparatively free; it was the self-conceited Athenian masses that introduced into Greek life the persecution of critical spirits.

The ardor of every modern social thinker for the promotion of public education springs from his realizing that, with the spread of majority rule, scholars and intellectuals are sure to be dealt with in Athenian fashion unless the plane of popular intelligence be raised.

Modern intolerance. In 1595 the Catholic rabble of Cracow in Poland, "led as usual by the students of the university" dragged Dr. Faustus from his house. His life was saved by the strenuous efforts of certain colleagues, but his library with his manuscripts was destroyed. In Russia in the seventeenth century "scholars were obliged to study in secret and by night for fear of the hostility of the common people." In Spain in the eighteenth century under Charles III, the combined power of the Church, the orders and the Inquisition "rested on a broad foundation of popular fanaticism and ignorance." At Birmingham in Protestant England in 1791 occurred the brutal wrecking of the home and library of the investigator, Dr. Priestley, by a dark-minded mob. The execution of Francisco Ferrer in Spain in 1909 showed that hatred of enlightenment and intellectual freedom has in some quarters survived into the twentieth century.

Intolerance in the United States. In the educationally-backward regions of the United States the learned are probably in a more exposed and insecure position with reference to the untutored many than anywhere else in the civilized world. Neither constitutional safeguards nor the enlightened churches are able to shield them from the bigotry of ignoramuses lashed into fury by designing preachers of the more benighted sects. Political candidates have gone about lauding the yokel for his "practical common sense" and sneering at the enlargers of knowledge as "college fellers" and "smart Alecks." This is the favorite dodge of legislators justly suspected of having betrayed their constituents to the moneyed interests, when they are running for office against a college-bred reformer. Votes are won when bumpkins hear belittled those they have felt bound, hitherto, to look up to. Again, demagogues and professional "patriots" make capital for themselves by attacking teachers and textbook writers of American history. If defeated before the board of education they take their cause to the polls and invite citizens with only boyish Fourth-of-July notions of American history to pronounce upon the tendency of historical scholars to present the American Revolution as a part of a general democratic movement among the English-speaking peoples!

In 1924 investigation of the teaching of social science in the 62 colleges of a prominent Protestant denomination in our Southern states showed little freedom in the teaching of these branches when

they were tolerated at all. In one Southern state the legislature has made it unlawful to teach in state-supported schools "any theory that denies the story of the Divine Creation of man as taught in the Bible, and teach instead that man was descended from a lower order of animal." Another state, going further, penalizes any teacher or textbook commission adopting a textbook "that teaches the doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of animal." When the legislature refused to pass such a law, the measure was forced onto the ballot by an initiative petition and adopted by a majority of the voters! Incredible as it may sound, in a state which has no anti-evolution law, certain local school boards have ruled that evolution may not be presented as a fact, "even in private conversation between teachers and pupils."

So a battle is on between men of science and the champions of popular tradition. The latter propose to settle it, not in the laboratories, in the libraries, in the meetings of learned societies, or even in the forum of public discussion, but *on the hustings and at the ballot box,* outside of Bedlam surely the worst imaginable place to settle questions as to the origin of the world, of life and of man! When the traditionalists declare, "It is not for a group of educators to decide what they wish to teach youth but for the fathers and mothers to decide what they wish to have taught their children," they appeal to the lowest standard that has ever been proposed anywhere for a system of public education. For what is education for if it is not to make children more enlightened than their parents are?

School teachers as butts. The weight of the yoke the ill-educated and self-conceited would lay upon those who have to do with education may be judged from the special burdens imposed on school-teachers. Attempts have been made to bar from employment women teachers who bob their hair or smoke cigarettes, wear short skirts or gay colors. School-boards have ordered their women teachers to wear "ankle-length smocks," to avoid "dates" and dances, to take part in "church work," to spend a specified proportion of their week ends in the community, not to fall in love or become engaged, not to go out with any young man "except insofar as it may be necessary to stimulate Sunday School work." As for marrying it nearly everywhere costs the teacher her

job. Men who smoke are denied a teacher's certificate and men teachers are ousted for smoking. New York teachers, a committee reports, have been "punished for organizing unemployed members of their own profession, for arousing public opinion against crowding in the schools, for defending victimized colleagues, for addressing meetings. . . ." Teachers are required to promise not to join the Teachers' Federation. No wonder "school-teachers are becoming the most tight-lipped and timorous group of creatures of any profession in the country."

Those who have imposed these incredible gyves are by no means fools. Usually they are crooks in danger of being found out, who perceive that, by thus hectoring and humiliating the intelligent, they can at no cost to themselves make a hit with their long-eared constituents.

Perhaps this is why teaching no longer attracts the independent and truth-loyal. More than a decade ago, a questionnaire to 3000 educators pretty well distributed over the United States brought out that 77 per cent agree "one should never allow his own experience to lead him in ways that are contrary to the teaching of the Bible," 80 per cent hold that "no school, college, or university should teach anything that is found to cause its students to doubt or question the Bible as containing the word of God," 51 per cent believe that "radical" criticism of our country is always unjust and should be suppressed. If facts are found favorable to Socialism they should, in the opinion of 37 per cent, be omitted from high school histories. Forty-three per cent deem that our manual laborers get a financial reward justly proportional to that taken by capitalists; 54 per cent think that no texts should be used in our schools which question or doubt the justice of our social and economic order.

Quite justifiably the historian, Dr. Charles A. Beard, declares (1936):

> We have reached a point in American life where the maintenance of educational liberty can no longer be taken for granted. All over the country, schools are attacked by highly organized and well-financed minorities that seek to browbeat legislatures, the Congress of the United States, schoolboards, and teachers. The precious values of liberty and scientific inquiry are threatened with extinction, and with them the principles upon which democratic government rests.

Comparative status of scholars. The security of the learned from being muzzled or booted into the gutter at the behest of bigots and ignoramuses varies greatly as among different peoples. In the larger part of Europe the populace is afforded no opportunity to dictate to scholars what they shall teach, but in the Balkans and the new Slavic states a tradition as to the dignity and independence of the scholar has not yet been well established. In Spain the enlightened are struggling to overthrow ecclesiastical bigotry, in South American countries the security of the scientists varies inversely with the power of the Church. In Soviet Russia, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany scholars in the social sciences may not voice conclusions offensive to the dominant political organization. In Japan the scholar has been in a strong position but in Turkey and Egypt he is only now in process of being released from the throttling grasp of the Moslem Fundamentalists. In the United States in the endowed universities the scholar's independence is more often threatened from the side of plutocracy; in the state institutions more often from the side of democracy.

MEANS OF PROTECTING THE FUNCTIONING OF INTELLECTUALS

The Church. Through the Dark Ages the church was a patron of learning and a shelter of scholars against intolerant rulers or populace. The members of the medieval universities enjoyed the privileged status of the clergy. Later, however, confronted by a rising tide of learning disturbing to her dogmas, the church became by degrees the most intolerant and great-scale persecutor known to history.

The State. The attitude of the absolutist state has reflected the personality of the ruler. Some rulers have been as dark-minded as the unlettered masses, while others have chosen to be renowned as patrons of learning and friends of free inquiry. With the arrival of representative government the enlightened gain influence over state policy. Moreover, since increasingly the state requires specialists of various kinds, it feels bound to provide the institutions which produce them.

Constitutional guarantees. Provisions in the fundamental law securing freedom of speech and of the press, religious freedom, a learned judiciary, etc., are of great value to that small minority whose assets are knowledge and ideas.

Chartered foundations. Endowed institutions of learning enjoying a quasi-independent position and secure from vexatious interference by state officials are havens of refuge for scholars.

The learned professions. The members of such a profession cannot but stand for the value and importance of the learning which underlies their calling. Every rise in the standards of admission to the learned professions removes them farther from the numskull point of view.

A learned clergy. "If the blind lead the blind they shall both fall into the ditch." Those religious sects are least open-minded whose laity are led by preachers nearly as ignorant as themselves. On the other hand, when well-educated men occupy its pulpits a denomination will not hound true scholars. The historic struggle for a learned clergy in the great church bodies of America has been a veritable *Kulturkampf*.

Science in industry. The good will of the commercial and capitalist class has been gained for pure science partly by the immense and incalculable services applied science has rendered industry and commerce.

Science and healing. A fund of popular gratitude and good will has been built up for men of science from universal recognition of the services of certain sciences in discovering the means of conquering disease and promoting health.

A common front for intellectuals. Realizing that "all science is one" the learned may develop an *esprit de corps*, so that all agree to stand together in defending the freedom of each.

Spread of secondary and higher education. Few youths complete a secondary school without appreciating the rôle of science in our civilization and realizing the conditions under which alone the *élite* can function. When one citizen in twenty is a college graduate and one in two a high school graduate, the ignorant will not be suffered to tyrannize.

The promotion of adult education. With a marked reduction of working hours, great numbers are coming into leisure. Not a few of them will enroll for advanced cultural instruction if it is brought to their door in the form of "university extension" courses, correspondence courses, popular forums, town-meetings "of the air," and the like.

CHAPTER XXVII

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT—WAR

In the distant days when men fought with clubs they could not do harm until opponents were but a yard or two apart. Later when they hurled javelins, they had to come within twenty yards of each other before much damage could be wrought. The introduction of the bow-and-arrow extended the striking distance to 250 yards. Black gunpowder enabled the man with the gun to down his enemy a quarter of a mile away. Smokeless powder with small-bore guns extended the range to a mile. In the World War artillery arrived at dropping shells 80 miles away. Now, with the dropping of bombs from fast-flying airplanes and the machine gunning of troops or crowds from the air, the radius of havoc has been so extended that no longer can any segment of the population feel safe.

Taking another aspect of its evolution, we observe that warfare may be waged in 1, 2, or 3 dimensions.

WAR BECOMES TRI-DIMENSIONAL

One-dimensional warfare is illustrated where the fighting is confined to a narrow strip, or is for the control of a highway, such as a mountain pass, a navigable river, a railroad, an isthmus.

Two-dimensional warfare is illustrated in fighting that ranges over an open country by fighters that are not tied to any "line of communication" because they can "live off the country," or, being cavalry, can carry their rations and ammunition with them. Open-sea warfare exemplifies it perfectly, since the sea has no channels and presents no obstacles.

Three-dimensional warfare. This is exemplified by sub-surface or super-surface fighting; submarine attack; machine-gunning from the air; dropping of explosives, incendiary bombs, poison gas or noxious germs.

WAR BECOMES MORE CAPITALISTIC

The cumulative effect of modern martial inventions has been to make war constantly more capitalistic. The amount of lethal machinery the soldier fights with has greatly increased, while the cost of the battleship has grown altogether out of proportion to the crew required to man it. The overwhelming predominance of the munitions factor has forever laid the affrighting spectre of the subjugation of the civilized peoples by barbarians, such as broke through the defenses of the Roman Empire. The easy destruction of the Soudanese dervishes by the machine guns of the British at the Battle of Omdurman in 1898 settled it that the barbarian has no longer "the ghost of a show" when arrayed against modern soldiers.

A second consequence of war becoming more capitalistic is that only wealthy or highly industrial nations can hope to wage war with any prospect of success. The money cost of fighting having grown much faster than the blood cost, that belligerent is foredoomed to defeat which has not either great resources and credit for buying the necessary munitions, or else an abundance of technical knowledge, industrial skill and requisite materials to divert to their manufacture.

A third consequence is the greater time necessary for fabricating an elaborate fighting machine. Big guns, turrets, emplacements, disappearing gun-carriages, battleships, bombing planes and landing fields cannot be improvised, but must be begun months before they can be used. The soldier, too, is not to be made in a day, but must be trained for a considerable time. Hence, less and less dares a nation consider its *potential* defensive resources as equivalent to *actual* defensive resources. Real security calls for a "preparedness," which becomes steadily more costly as warfare grows more capitalistic.

The advance of invention is, moreover, so rapid that stored munitions of war are soon out-of-date. A new rifle is perfected that will throw its bullets a third farther and at once millions of rifles of the "old" pattern in governmental arsenals become junk. A nation lays out hundreds of millions in equipping its armies with thousands of field guns and suddenly the invention of a gun of longer range or quicker fire or more accurate fire obliges it to

scrap them all! The interval between the proud launching of an iron-clad, amid the plaudits of the whole nation, and its last service as target for the guns of a younger vessel continually shortens. The consequence is that the financial burden of armed peace more and more approximates that of war.

RELATIONS OF ATTACK AND DEFENSE

Continually martial inventions bend the stream of history by altering the relative strength of Attack and Defense. Walls, moats, drawbridges, casemates, mines, disappearing gun-carriages, armor-plate, steel turrets, *abattis,* wire entanglements, anti-aircraft guns, and strategic railways are land marks in the development of Defense. Battering rams, mortars, siege-guns, armor-piercing projectiles, asphyxiating gas, hand-grenades, bomb-dropping aircraft, torpedoes, and submarines have told particularly on the side of Attack. Now a new invention enables defenders to snap their fingers at besiegers, ere long some other embodiment of ingenuity puts defenders to rout. As we scan the history of the art of war, we see the balance between Attack and Defense constantly waver.

Defense is strongest in relation to attack in one-dimensional warfare, since the defenders have only to block the assailants on the line along which they have to advance. On the sea, however, defenders have no advantage since there is no natural obstacle they can get behind, nor can they create such an obstacle. Likewise in an open plain country Defense is no stronger than Attack. When warfare arrives at the tri-dimensional stage, Attack may be actually stronger than Defense, as we see in night attacks from the air in which the aircraft may do immense damage while nothing effective can be done against them *from the ground.* Until recently, aside from the vengeance of pursuit planes, the only reply that could be made to a devastating air attack was a like bombing raid upon the enemy's cities.

The more that war's destruction is concentrated on military forces, munitions and structures, the likelier the prospect that resort to war will continue indefinitely; for the elements interested in promoting the national policies which are likely to precipitate war are very sly, obdurate and ruthless. On the other hand, the more that military offensives extend to and engulf the civilian population and wipe out cultural edifices in which all humanity may have an interest, the more unbearable war becomes. The more

that war is waged from the air and behind the fighting lines, the more indiscriminate is its havoc and destruction of life, the sooner it will come to be looked upon as a universal scourge that must be put down at any cost.

The relation between Defense and Attack is an imperious determiner of social destiny. When smokeless powder, high-power firearms, machine guns, steel-turrets, and land-mines make Defense many times stronger than Attack, a state that is strong in Defense finds itself weak when it invades the territory of another. Small peoples can maintain their independence even against powerful neighbors. The aggressive empire may be held up by some handful of brave mountaineers, so that the nations are admonished to remain each in its own place. When, on the other hand, Defense has little advantage over Attack, numbers are decisive, conquest is easy, the little peoples tremble before the big peoples, empires become more formidable the bigger they grow, and international relations are in unstable equilibrium.

DOES MODERN WARFARE FULFIL AN INERADICABLE HUMAN INSTINCT?

In the earlier stages of social development, it *does* seem as if a pugnacious instinct can be seen at work. Thus, on the basis of his observations in Central Borneo, MacDougall remarks: [1]

> The people are very intelligent and sociable and kindly to one another within each village community; but . . . the neighboring villages and tribes live in a state of chronic warfare; all are kept in constant fear of attack, whole villages are often exterminated, and the population is in this way kept down very far below the limit at which any pressure on the means of subsistence could arise. This perpetual warfare, like the squabbles of a roomful of quarrelsome children, seems to be almost wholly and directly due to the uncomplicated operation of the instinct of pugnacity. No material benefits are sought; a few heads and sometimes a slave or two are the only trophies gained; and if one asks of an intelligent chief why he keeps up this senseless practice of going on the war path, the best reason he can give is that unless he does so his neighbors will not respect him and his people, and will fall upon them and exterminate them.

But several considerations forbid us to believe that modern warfare is a product of the pugnacious instinct:

1—Hand-to-hand encounter rouses the combative spirit; but

[1] W. MacDougall, *Social Psychology*, 1909, p. 280.

what is there to stir the blood in the crew of a battleship, safe behind four-inch armor, shelling an undefended coast town nine miles away? in a big-gun squad working heavy lethal machinery from a point miles behind the front? in the droppers of bombs on masses of infantry or on undefended cities? Soldiers have been through a war without once seeing the face of a living enemy.

2.—In spite of being filled with atrocity lies by the military authorities, soldiers in the trenches often come to realize that the men in the opposite trenches are not their personal enemies but fellows just as good as they are, who like themselves are hapless victims of a quarrel between their governments. In such a case they experience not exultation but remorse when by means of a mine they have managed to blow into bits some hundreds of their suffering antagonists.

3—Big wars, involving the bulk of the young manhood of the country, by no means suffice to gratify a true instinct, because they are rare. Whole generations never once taste "the exhilarating experience of killing an enemy who is trying to kill you"! Instinctive pugnacity would prompt the young men to go on the warpath every spring as happened often among the American Indian tribes. If we really want to give rein to the fighting impulse, we have only to junk the Constitution of the United States; the quarrels that would soon develop among the forty-eight states would give belligerent youth all the fighting it craves, perhaps a bit more!

Modern warfare is no solvent of overpopulation. Fighting has come to be virtually an extra-hazardous branch of engineering. Not the sword is the fitting symbol of Mars to-day, but the tank, the barrage, the dreadnought. Modern warfare is capitalistic—tons of metal hurled miles to kill one foeman! Hence, wealth is poured out even more lavishly than blood. There is more destruction and waste than carnage. The dogs of war devour men, but even faster they lap up the resources by which men live. Warfare, therefore, is no longer to be relied on as a cheap ground-clearer, a quick remover of excess population and reliever of population pressure. In fact, difficulty in surviving will be more generally experienced *just after* prolonged warfare than *just before!*

War's selectiveness. In the past when combat was hand-to-hand, the strong, agile or shrewd fighter was more likely to emerge alive than his weak, or slow-witted comrade. But now the havoc

is wrought not by your antagonist personally, but by his machinery —long range cannon, bombs, shells, poison gas, tanks, machine guns. They destroy soldiers quite without discrimination. So we fall back upon the question, "How do soldiers compare in biological quality with noncombatants of the same age?" The fact is, the physically best are taken while the ill-grown, the rickety, the deformed, the weaklings, the very dull are left behind to breed their kind. The vast loss of life in the wars of the Revolution and the Empire caused the standard of admission to the French army to be lowered by three inches. The political incompetency of our South since the Civil War—as compared with the Old South—is laid to dearth of competent leadership owing to the destruction of the flower of the best Southern families in four years of war.

Having a national ax to grind German thinkers have insisted that war is a valid inter-group test of fitness to survive. But race quality is only *one* factor in deciding which side wins. Others are: comparative size of the belligerent peoples, their natural defenses, their mineral resources, their stage of industrial development, their training and technique, their degree of specialization upon warfare.

WHAT IS PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT?

We live in a time when on all hands human life is recognized as a supreme value and the accidents, diseases, and unwholesome conditions which menace it are being fought with unexampled zeal and success; when, as never before, people are willing to make sacrifices in order to avert or assuage other people's suffering. Nevertheless, as never before, national effort is being directed to devising means for the wholesale blotting out of human life. The explanation of the paradox is that our *culture* is humanitarian, whereas the governments of the "Powers" are militaristic. The States without "empire" are sincerely pacific. The present cult of international violence is incidental to imperialism. Imperialism appeals to the Powers because the development of the means of destroying human life has been such that any Western government armed with modern weapons can, with little risk to itself, inflict such havoc as it pleases upon an African or Asiatic people that refuses it something it wants.

This being the case, the more far-sighted financiers and statesmen perceive that we are now in the era of the apportioning of the lands and peoples of the globe; so that what a nation

succeeds in grabbing for itself in the course of the next three or four decades may fix its economic outlook and determine its relative importance for ages to come. This is why, although the military establishments of most of the smaller peoples are honestly defensive in purpose, those of the Powers, whatever their mealy-mouthed professions and pretenses, are maintained in order to retain or extend "empire."

The eagerness to grab is sharpened by the demand of modern industries for certain materials that occur in very limited quantity here and there over the globe. The ore bodies and oil pools have been located by explorers, prospectors, and field geologists; usually the natives are not aware of the existence of these treasures and could do nothing about them if they were. More and more, the attitude of the chancellaries of the Powers toward the fate of a backward territory hinges on what they have learned as to its subterranean wealth.

The Powers strong enough to insist on taking a hand in the final apportionment of the remainder of the globe differ greatly in their attitude toward territorial acquisition. Great Britain has a quarter of all humanity within her empire, a share altogether beyond reason, which can be defended only at a staggering cost and which may be torn asunder despite her best efforts. The U. S. S. R., having enough backward areas to keep her occupied for a generation, can deplore the sordid scramble among the capitalist groups of the "empires." Holland, Belgium, and Portugal no longer have prospect of expanding their holdings and will be thankful to be left unmolested with what they already have. France is a sated power having enough barbarian territory to keep her occupied for a long time. China, besides having no tradition of aggression, conquest and dominion, will need her best efforts to keep from becoming the victim of Japan's rapacity. The U. S. is the only power in our time which, being in undisturbed possession of an over-seas dependency (the Philippine Islands), concluded that it would be a liability rather than an asset and proposes to turn it over to its own people. The "hungry," therefore aggressive and unscrupulous, powers are Germany, Italy and Japan.

When all the desirable and weakly-held parts of Asia have been divided up, as Africa has already been divided, will appeasement ensue? Will the colonial possessions of Holland, Belgium and

Portugal be wrested from their weak grasp? As soon as all the savage, barbarian and semi-civilized peoples have been engulfed by the Powers, will greedy eyes be cast on the *smaller* civilized peoples? When about everything desirable has been collected in the hands of eight or nine Powers, will they regard one another with a measuring eye to see which would be the easiest to pull down and carve up? None of these questions can be answered because no one living can foresee how much the public's attitude toward warfare and empire will change ere this century is out. There may be painful surprises in store for "hard-boiled" militarists who serenely look forward to a future of almost continuous warfare punctuated by occasional outbreaks of peace! They may be torn to pieces by infuriated mobs or wiped out at an agreed-on hour by a conspiracy of assassins.

WHAT MAY ALLAY INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT?

H. G. Wells' grim prediction that it will be a joint revolt of opposing aviators that will end the war system and usher in the creation of a real World-State is plausible. The aviators are men of very superior quality in the prime of their youth. In view of the costly weapons that they manage and the heavy responsibilities laid upon them, they are drawn from the cream of their respective peoples. Now, as these thoughtful young men come to reflect upon the real nature of what they are doing, consider the significance of their exploits in the wholesale blotting out of peaceful human life of both sexes and all ages and of edifices of which man may be proud, and in bringing down in planes other gallant young fellows they know to be just as good as themselves, they may become nauseated by the performances expected of them and lend themselves to a conspiracy to overthrow the governments that stand in the way of effective international organization of power to put a final end to the use of violence for aggression or for settling international disputes.

Thousands of times groups have faced a crisis like that which confronts the nations now. The well-disposed have had to go always armed and on the *qui vive* because of the presence in their midst of a few bullies who encroach on others and will not submit the resulting disputes to arbitration. A traveler reports that among the feud-ridden Berdurani of Northeastern Afghanistan

the villages and fields bristle in all directions with round towers. These are constantly occupied by men at enmity with their neighbors in the same or adjoining villages, who, perched up in their little shooting boxes, watch the opportunity of putting a bullet into each other's body with the most persevering patience. The fields, even, are studded with these round towers, and the men holding them most jealously guard their lands from anyone with whom they are at feud. . . . If even a fowl strays from its owner into the grounds of another it is sure to receive a bullet from the adversary's tower. So constant are their feuds that it is a well-known fact that the village children are taught never to walk in the center of the road, but always from the force of early habit walk stealthily along under cover of the wall nearest to any tower.

In the Icelandic saga of Burnt Njal we see clearly that domestic peace has been brought about not by the spread of peaceableness but by the setting up of courts the awards of which have behind them overwhelming force. Men joined to support legal institutions not out of friendliness but because they found their feuds intolerable. In the same way after the peoples have suffered enough they may rally to the League of Nations or some other world political organization in such strength as to make it possible to coerce sovereign states disposed to break the peace.

CHAPTER XXVIII

SOCIAL ADAPTATION

Wilful unlikeness in the outstanding features of life is likely to beget misunderstanding and aversion, even hatred. It is not the *differing actions* of other people we resent so much as *the standards which these actions are supposed to reflect.* The gentleman does not resent the overalls and horny hands of the workingman; he believes that the latter would lead the gentleman's life if he could. But if a man of means, contemptuous of the gentleman's horror of productive labor, deliberately gives himself up to real work, his conduct will be resented. Hostility arises between those with contradictory standards, for each regards the ways of the other as a covert attack upon his own standards.

Ethnocentrism. Each people notices and plumes itself on cases in which its standard is higher than that of another people but overlooks cases in which its standard is lower. We despise the coolies of Canton for eating the unclean rat, but cannot understand that the Mohammedans and Jews despise us for eating an equally unclean animal, the pig. We rate the Japanese as immodest because formerly the sexes bathed together unclad, but it never occurs to us that the refined Chinese regard our nude paintings and statuary, our art posters, our advertisements of corsets and underwear, our décolleté gowns and our round dances as evidences of our extreme immodesty!

We feel that our care of the body suffices; but the Japanese who take a hot bath every evening—even the humble coolie at least twice a week—complain that crowds of Americans are offensive in odor, while the Chinese have developed a care of the ears which is totally unknown to us.

The Englishmen not only regards fighting with the fists as a proper means of settling personal differences, but he cherishes it as a precious national institution. The Asiatic, on the other hand, regards physical encounter—save in extremity—as befitting barbarians, and in the Englishman's propensity to strike or kick those

who have offended him he sees nothing but a violent and uncontrolled temper.

The irate Oriental feels that he most marks himself off from the animal when he heaps opprobrious epithets on his enemy and indulges in biting reflections on his character and ancestry—in other words, when he assails the *personality* of the offender rather than his *person*. The wrathful Occidental, on the other hand, feels that the right thing to do is to obliterate the features of his enemy.

The American is shocked by the Chinaman's lack of chivalry toward his wife; the Chinaman is shocked by the American's lack of reverence toward his parents. The American jokes about the absence of toilet soap in his chamber in a French hotel, while the hotel keeper shrugs his shoulders at the American's willingness to use a cake of soap after previous guests instead of carrying his own soap.

Thus every people propends to regard his own ways as refined and excellent, in accord with reason and the will of God, and to look down on others in so far as they depart from its own ways.[1]

Now, when elements with clashing traditions respecting diet, dress, manners and social customs are intermingled, their mutual aversion and contempt not only limits gravely their coöperation, but may even lead to violence.[2] The persistence in society of elements with quite incompatible standards is therefore recognized as a weakness and a danger;[3] so the thoughtful seek among

[1] "It is one of the most curious features of Austro-Hungarian life that there is not one of the many races that make up the inhabitants of the Dual Monarchy that is not regarded with hatred, or fear, or aversion or contempt by all the others." F. H. E. Palmer, *Austro-Hungarian Life in Town and Country*, 1904, p. 122.

[2] "The impoverished Magyar always insists upon his social superiority to the equally impoverished Hun. The Pole looks with contempt upon the Lithuanian and the latter is prompt to assert his claim to a more remote ancestry and an older civilization than the former. This racial pride, equally strong in each race, is the cause of many conflicts between these men when they meet over their cups. In the early years of mining, it precipitated many a conflict between the immigrants of the various races from the British Isles, and the bloody and fatal quarrels which so frequently take place among the Slavs are due to the same cause. It has its influence upon the industry. The Pole and Lithuanian will not work together. Foremen have to study national proclivities and prejudices with regard to the productive efficacy of groups of employees under their management. In large towns, where the mine employees live, the various races form colonies, and generally keep within the limits of the section appropriated by them." Peter Roberts, *Anthracite Coal Communities*, p. 25.

[3] "Difficulties sometimes arise between the Porto Ricans and the Japanese.

the dissimilar some basis for mutual respect and coöperation. Hence, partly spontaneously and partly from influences brought to bear, diverse ethnic elements in association gradually adapt themselves one to the other. The chief steps in the process are *toleration, compromise, accommodation, assimilation and amalgamation.*

TOLERATION

Religion and toleration. Founders and prophets of religion have seized upon the antipathies arising out of irrelevant differences as the very first of the evils to be cleared away in order to make room for the higher life of man; and always the ancient spirit-of-the-tribe has resisted.

The promulgators of universal religions—Buddha, Zoroaster, Jesus, and Mahomet—preach toleration [4] of the stranger. Jesus, with his parable, "Who is my neighbor?" and his teaching of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, launched a mighty influence for fraternity. But the Church came to foster hatred of the heretic, while belief in collective responsibility to God for individual error made each community or nation intolerant of heterodoxy. At this stage, Christianity came to be a terrible divider and embroiler of men; hence the devastating "wars of religion," 1546-1648.

The latter are seldom the aggressors and rather fear the Porto Ricans in individual disagreements, but on one or two occasions when their blood was up, it required prompt and energetic police interference to prevent a sudden extermination of the local Porto Rican population. The customs of the two people are so different that trouble is apt to result if they are placed in neighboring quarters. The Japanese, for instance, have a naïve disregard for proprieties of costume and occasionally walk about their camps in an absence of attire that Americans or Europeans tolerate only in works of art. Porto Ricans object to this in case of adults, and one or two small riots have occurred as a consequence." Report of U. S. Commissioner of Labor on Hawaii.

[4] Toleration does not imply equal sympathy. The law of sympathy is thus stated by Karl Pearson: "The natural history of morality begins with the kin, spreads to the tribe, to the nation, to allied races, and ultimately to inferior races and lower types of life, but ever with decreasing intensity. The demands upon the spirit of self-sacrifice which can be made by our kin, by our countrymen, by Europeans, by Chinamen, by Negroes, by Kaffirs, and by animals, may not be clearly defined, but, on the average, they admit of rough graduation, and we find in practice, whatever be our fine philosophies, that the instinct to self-sacrifice wanes as we go down in the scale. The man who tells us that he feels to all men alike, that he has no sense of kinship, that he has no patriotic sentiment, that he loves the Kaffir as he loves his brother, is probably deceiving himself." *National Life from the Standpoint of Science,* 1905, pp. 49-50.

Mahomet with his doctrine of the brotherhood of all the "faithful" broke down countless tribal barriers; but by persuading his followers to draw the line against the *unbeliever* rather than against the *stranger,* he replaced one kind of intolerance with another.

The ancient polytheistic religions did not foment hatred among peoples. Each nation had its own gods but recognized the reality of other gods and their right to be worshiped. So long as an individual did not openly reject and insult the gods of his people, he might, if he pleased, worship a deity belonging to some other country. It is *monotheism,* with its insistence that all gods but one are false and every worship but one is a defrauding of the one true God, which makes the man of another faith an "infidel."

Culture and toleration. Unless they suspect witchcraft, natural men are more tolerant of differences than culture men. Thus Wallace observes of a polychrome town in Malaysia,

> Five hundred people in Dobbo of various races, all met in this remote corner of the East, as they express it, 'to look for their fortune.' Most of them have the very worst reputation for honesty as well as every other form of morality—Chinese, Bugis, Ceramese, and half-caste Javanese, with a sprinkling of half-wild Papuans from Timor, Bobber, and other islands—yet all goes on as yet very quietly. This motley ignorant, blood-thirsty, thievish population live here without the shadow of a government, with no police, no courts, and no lawyers; yet they do not cut each other's throats, do not plunder each other day and night, do not fall into the anarchy such a state of things might be supposed to lead to. It is very extraordinary! [5]

Culture men, on the other hand, cherish standards which make them intolerant of many features in the life of nature men, *e.g.,* nudity, uncleanliness, trophy-hunting, "witch-smelling," infanticide, slavery, polygamy, and the like.

It is significant that the antagonist nationalisms which in the course of the last three-quarters of a century have set East European peoples by the ears, did not spring from the uncultivated masses but were inspired from above. It was the *nationalistic* scholars, writers, and poets who made their countrymen conscious of the difference between themselves and others.

What favors toleration. Toleration is promoted by certain ways of looking at unlikeness of customs. One is that *such unlike-*

[5] A. R. Wallace, *The Malay Archipelago,* 1869, II, pp. 214-16.

ness shows not worth-difference, but only difference in circumstances and history. The English are certainly more open-handed than the Scotch, but they will never despise the Scotch as stingy if they realize how the climate and soil of Scotland made frugality a requisite of survival. One will be slow to condemn the Russian peasant as lazy if one considers how his long winter interrupts work and breaks up good habits. A practice like dueling, *vendetta,* or frontier lynching is less shocking when one understands the conditions out of which it grew.

Again, tolerance is fostered by the idea that *manners and customs are, after all, externals; it is inner qualities that count.* Tradition governs externals rather than the heart, so that men who differ outwardly may feel and respond alike in a given situation. Now, the classification of our fellows which is practical is on the basis of *ability* and *character.* We have to appraise them as strong or weak, capable or incompetent, wise or foolish, steady or flighty, "straight" or "crooked," in order to know how to deal with them. We ought to perfect and extend such a classification, not allow a pointless classification according to externals to blur it.

Furthermore, toleration is furthered by *regulated avoidance.* In a mixed population the rules of intercourse prescribe certain reticences. In India ethnic elements the most diverse are able to dwell intermingled and have dealings together by observing a strict etiquette of non-interference, even inattention, respecting one another's diet, family life, social customs and religious practices. Or take the reserves between the Saxons and Ländlers in Transylvania. The latter are as German as the former, but are descended from Austrians who settled there in the reign of Empress Maria Theresa. Says Gerard, "It is curious to see how these two German races have existed side by side for over a hundred years without amalgamating, and this for no sort of antagonistic reason, for they live in perfect harmony, attending the same church, and conforming to the same regulations, but each people preserving its own individual costume and customs. The Saxons and Ländlers have each their different parts of the church assigned to them, no Saxon woman would ever think of donning the fur cap of a Ländler matron, while as little would the latter exchange her tight-fitting fur coat for the wide-hanging mantle worn by the other." [6]

Finally, toleration of non-essential differences is promoted by

[6] Jane E. Gerard, *The Land Beyond the Forest,* 1888, pp. 96-7.

mutually advantageous contacts and relations. Buying and selling, borrowing and lending, fellowship in associations, team work, cooperation as fellow citizens oblige us to judge others as *individuals* and give up *lump judgments* of them according to some peculiarity in food, garb, or rite. This is why homogeneous rural communities, the members of which rarely deal with those unlike themselves, are sensitive to external differences, while cosmopolitan cities, where all types mingle, are broad-minded.

COMPROMISE

The necessity for coöperating prompts the unlike to compose their differences and stick together rather than go asunder or fight. Under pressure they consent to more compromises; as pressure lightens they balk at compromise. The medley of peoples making up the Austrian Empire remained for centuries in one state chiefly because, if they failed to hold together, foreign conquerors would reduce them to a status poorer than they were vouchsafed under the Hapsburgs. During most of the two centuries before 1815, the discordant elements in Austria had to stand shoulder to shoulder in wars involving the fate of the dynasty. After the relations of Austria to her neighbors had become stabilized, the long pent-up discords broke on the surface in the revolution of 1848 and later in the adjustment by which Hungary obtained self-government. The downfall of the military empires in Eastern Europe, 1917-19, allayed the fears which held unlike peoples in one leash and each people would have nothing less than full self-determination.

In Finland the struggle between the parties representing respectively the Swedish-speaking and the Finnish-speaking sections of the population died down under the Bobrikoff régime (1898-1904) when the tsarist steam roller was crushing them into the Russian mass. In place of the war-cry "One nation, one language" the nationalists united on the slogan "One spirit and two languages."

In the United States enforced participation in vast industrial struggles has obliged foreign-born wage earners of many nationalities to sink their feuds and join in a common cause. Says Commons:

For the twenty-five years down to 1900 the racial forces in opposition to assimilation between Slav and English-speaking nationalities in the anthracite industry were dominant. But the industrial disturbances of 1900 and 1902 here . . . directed the

social forces into a different channel. On the broad ground of industrial self-interest racial ties are being broken down, largely through the instrumentality of the United Mine Workers of America.[7]

Compromise involves strain, for each compromising element has to yield something to which it feels itself entitled. Consequently, one means of promoting good will among the diverse ethnic elements incorporated into a society is *to lessen, so far as possible, the number of occasions for compromise.* In case these elements inhabit distinct districts or regions this may be done by allowing every such area the utmost measure of home rule. *Federal* government is, therefore, peculiarly suited to the needs of diverse peoples who wish complete freedom in all cultural matters yet have much to gain from remaining in some kind of political union. At the close of 1922 the "Russian Soviet Republic" was superseded by the "Union of Socialist Soviet Republics."

In case the unlike are not segregated but live intermixed, the only means of avoiding occasions for compromise is "culture autonomy." This contemplates that government should concern itself with little else than order, justice, defense, and economic relations, leaving each national element to organize as it pleases and provide itself as it will with churches, schools, libraries, hospitals, charitable institutions, means of recreation, etc. The law would probably not make education obligatory, restrict child labor, or regulate marriage and divorce, but such matters would be left to the religious authorities of each nationality.

ACCOMMODATION

Another means of bridging the chasm between unlike population elements is *accommodation, i.e.,* convergence of ideas and sentiments touching their relations and behavior.

Forms of accommodation.

1. *Borrowing.* If one element in a mixed society is clearly superior in culture the rest will meet on its plane. The domination of the Incas over the hunting tribes of the Sierras was firmly based because they it was who had taught these nature men to till and irrigate, had introduced the llama, founded sun worship, put an end to war and established a compulsory system of industry. The

[7] John R. Commons, *Trade Unionism and Labor Problems,* 1905, pp. 340-41.

rapid Latinizing of the Gauls after Cæsar's conquest was due to the plain superiority of the Roman culture. Rome made no effort to assimilate them but they Latinized of their own accord. Within forty years Druidism lost nearly all its authority, the Gauls renounced their warlike habits and became interested in peaceful labor, and Roman speech, schools and towns were everywhere.

Even conquerors will learn from their subjects in case these are clearly superior. The Manchu conquerors of China accepted the Chinese culture. The Franks who conquered Gaul in the sixth century were quickly Gallicized and soon disappeared as a distinct strand. The Norse conquerors of what became Normandy took over the Latin culture of the French. The impression Rome made on the barbarian mind comes out in the naïve confession of Ataulfus the Goth that "in the first exuberance of his strength and spirits he had made this his most earnest desire—to utterly obliterate the Roman name and bring under sway of the Goths all that had once belonged to them—in fact, to turn *Romania* into *Gothia* and to make himself, Ataulfus, all that Cæsar Augustus had once been. But when he had learnt, by long experience, that the Goths would obey no laws on account of the unrestrained barbarism of their character, yet that it was wrong to deprive the commonwealth of laws without which it would cease to be a commonwealth, he at least for his part had chosen to have the glory of *restoring* the Roman name to its old estate and increasing its potency by Gothic vigor, and he wished to be looked upon by posterity as the great author of the Roman restoration, since he had failed in his attempt to be its transformer." [8]

2. *Conversion.* This is a sudden adoption, usually under great emotional stress, of attitudes and ideals from an alien culture. Sometimes the very foundation of personality is changed so that no word is so fitting as "rebirth." Conversion involves, furthermore, a shift of attachment and loyalty from one's social group to another. It is largely a phenomenon of adolescence and is manifested chiefly in the religious field. It produces visible social results by ranging natural leaders on the side of the alien and against the traditional. "Wholesale conversion" is not the "real thing" but a temporary surrender to the crowd spirit or else a sheep-like following of the example of leaders. In the foreign field missionaries have learned that "mass movements" yield few genuine Christians.

[8] Thomas Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders*, vol. V, p. 402.

3. *Subordination.* One adjusts himself not only to another *culture* but also to another *people.* We could wish that the relations of two population elements might be on a basis of mutual respect and advantage, but in many cases their inequality of power is so great that what results is *superiority and subordination.*

In the evening the men of an Indian village sit in a circle and talk things over; near at hand their women sit and listen but may not join in the discussion. In China the grown son shows his parents every respect and obedience lest they utter the most terrible words that can fall on Chinese ears, "Son, thou art unfilial." In our South the common Negro addresses every well dressed white man he meets as "boss." In the Germany I knew as a student, if the employer beckoned to a workman the man came running. On the Peruvian uplands even Indian women doff hat to the passing white man and the Indian who "joins farms" with a white man must yearly furnish him a quintal of wool (worth $22.50) at the "customary" price of $8.00 and help him without wages in shearing time.

Thus strong and weak, chastened by experience, arrive at a *modus vivendi* which pares conflict to a minimum. If the superior demands more or the inferior yields less than is customary there may be trouble; but so long as they behave as expected their relations may be amicable. Since subordination is not only traditional but is sanctioned by the religious authorities, rare, indeed, is the inferior who rebels against it. About the only things that menace it are *education* and *agitation.* Of course the instruction the Brahman gives the Indian girls or the priest gives the children of the peon is never upsetting; but genuine education meets the objection a Chilean planter gave me: "We don't want the children of our *inquilinos* disturbed in their minds." In the world to-day on scores of fronts battle rages between the advocates of schools for the children of the people and those who tremble lest the time-hallowed subservience of the lower orders to themselves be undermined by new knowledge.

Then self-devoted agitators breeze in from the stirring world outside and tell the women in the harem, the peons on the estate, or the hill-billy operatives in a Southern mill town: "You don't *have* to submit to this; your sisters, your brethren elsewhere do not." Thereupon in Turkestan the outraged men tie the feminist

intruder to a post and stone her; in China the soldiers of the reactionaries hack off the breasts of the "bob-haired girl" who got the women of the city to unbind their feet; in Mexico the *hacendado* chases off his place the "Bolshevist" intruder who tells the indebted peons to seek another employer; and in the Southern mill town the masked business men tie the sent-in labor organizer to a tree and flog him. On humanity's social fronts in the last two decades the beneficiaries of old abuses have coolly been murdering agitators at the rate of, at least, 500-1000 per month; yet the respectables assure one, "They're agitating for what they can get out of it!"

4. *Participation.* The final stage of accommodation is the breaching of old barriers and the admission of the dominated to share in the prerogatives of their erstwhile superiors. Feminism loses its "punch" when women are seen at the bar, on the bench, in the professor's chair and on the board of directors. The American Negroes cannot feel that everywhere the Whites stack the cards against them when they learn of Negro bankers, mill owners, college presidents, authors and dramatists. In the Philippines you hear of "Filipinization," in Java of "Javanization," in India of "Indianization," *i.e.,* the access of qualified natives to desirable government posts. In Europe, thanks to the democratization of education, army and navy commissions, the public service and the liberal professions, once the close preserve of the upper classes, have been opened to men of any social origin. Whether means can be worked out for giving the organized workers of an industrial concern a vital participation in its management is still unsettled.

Factors promoting accommodation.

1. *Intermingling.* The Incas speeded the assimilation of the populations under them by transferring bodies of peasantry from one district to another. Charlemagne deported Saxons into Franconia, imported Franks and Slavs into Saxony. The spread of the Roman culture owed much to the visits of Roman merchants to the remotest bounds of the Empire and to the settlement of Romans in every province. So long as such intercourse and settlement continued, the diverse peoples grew more alike. But, owing to the roads becoming infested with bandits after the central authority broke down, this osmosis ceased in the fifth century and the differencing forces gained the upper hand. The old provinces were

erected into independent states, a whole family of tongues grew out of Latin, and several nationalities with distinct speech, customs and institutions developed out of populations becoming from diverse regional influences ever more unlike.

2. *Improvements in means of communication.* Intermingling is greatly facilitated by good highways, which bring forward into the present groups which have been sealed up in some mountain region like the Scotch Highlands, the Caucasus, the Pyrenees, the Abruzzi, the Peruvian Sierra, or our Appalachians. Contact has but a slow effect on groups moving on diverging lines of development—such as Hindus and English, Turks and Armenians, Jews and Arabs—but it effaces with startling rapidity unlikeness between groups at different points on one line of development by bringing quickly forward the belated group. Thanks to better communications the Highlanders catch up with their fellow-Britons, the Corsicans with the French, the Sardinians with the Italians, the Ossets and Swanetians in the Caucasus with the Georgians, and the Appalachian folk with other Americans.

3. *A common religion.* A religion which provides the entire intellectual background so knits together its followers that the toughest population lump begins to dissolve when it is no longer held together by a religion of its own. This was why Charlemagne forced Christianity upon the Saxons even at the point of the sword. The conversion of the heathen barbarians between the fourth and the thirteenth centuries was in every case a momentous event, for it brought them at once within a new set of influences and they began to share in the onward movement of European culture. Just as the heathen Slavs who settled in Greece in the sixth century came on so rapidly after they were Christianized that they furnished a patriarch to Constantinople in the eighth century, so the heathen Danes who settled Northumbria in the ninth century were providing England with archbishops within less than a hundred years. In the wake of the religion of Mahomet followed presently the brilliant Saracenic culture. In the foreign missionary activity of to-day so many elements of Occidental culture are imparted with purely religious teachings that the net effect is the promotion of resemblance and sympathy among peoples on the most divergent lines of cultural development.

4. *A common law.* A dual system of law preserves the distinctness of ethnic elements in society, while a law common to all

weakens unlikeness by ignoring it. The Visigoths in Italy quickly blended with the Italians when at the end of the seventh century the two laws, Visigothic and Roman, which had existed side by side, were fused into one law common to the two races.

5. *A common language.* A foreign language cocoons an ethnic group and keeps it alien. Americans have allowed groups of foreign-born thus to encyst themselves until there are young people born and educated in America who cannot understand or speak the English language! On the other hand, universal school instruction in one language is nationalizing the peoples of the Philippines as nothing else could.

6. *A common loyalty.* In the Roman Empire the enlightened did not object to deification of the Emperor, because they saw it as weaving the first bond among the diverse peoples brought within the State by the arms of the legionaries. In Japan Emperor-worship has been deliberately propagated as a means of counteracting the natural tendency of the masses to think in terms of their province rather than of the nation. Bodies of school children headed by their masters are continually brought in from distant places to Nara to do obeisance at the Imperial tombs.

7. *The public school.* Separate schools for different population elements deepen the sense of difference because of their emphasis on distinctiveness of history, language, literature, religion and culture, *i.e.,* things of the *past.* On the other hand, the *common* school stresses the *present* and the *future.* Compare the assimilative achievement of the Americans in the Philippines *with* the common school with that of the Dutch in Java *without* it. Mexican patriots are relying on national rural schools to bring into the nation the fifty Indian groups, comprising over two million souls, that are strangers to Spanish.

8. *The common newspaper.* With its emphasis on the *present* the newspaper weakens the grasp of the traditions which hold groups apart. Readers of the same newspaper are oriented in the same direction and find new and common interests. The American "yellow" newspaper, which by means of scare-heads, color pictures, comic strips, and gong effects gains the attention of foreign-born, has been a potent agent of Americanization.

9. *Voluntary associations crossing ethnic lines.* Joint action in defense of common interests quickly overcomes the suspiciousness

and aversion between the unlike. An investigation by U. S. Commissioner of Labor C. D. Wright showed that among the foreign-born in the stock-yards district of Chicago each nationality has its own churches, schools, building and loan associations and political clubs. The one association which embraces all nationalities is the trade union, which organizes men according to occupation and refuses to recognize nationality lines.

In his trade union the Slav mixes with the Lithuanian, the German and the Irish, and this is the only place they do mix until, by virtue of this intercourse and this mixing, clannishness is to a degree destroyed, and a social mixing along other lines comes naturally into play.

In every trade union, however conservative, there are members who will occasionally get the floor and advise their hearers to vote high wages and shorter hours at the ballot box. As the groups of Slovaks gather around after the business is over to have these things explained to them, many get their first real idea of what the ballot and election day mean, and the relation of these to the Government itself. In their own countries the two essential, if not only, elements of the peasant and agricultural laborer's mind is to believe and obey, or follow.

It is doubtful if any organization other than a trade union could accomplish these things, for only the bread-and-butter necessity would be potent enough as an influence to bring these people out of the fixed forms and crystallizations of life into which they have been compressed.

ASSIMILATION

Assimilation is the process by which an alien element becomes spiritually incorporated into the inclusive group. Seeing that the process has gone on in the United States on a great scale and under the eyes of social psychologists and sociologists, let us see what American experience seems to show.

Means of assimilation. Mere *contact* does not assure assimilation. Thus Bryce observes of the diverse elements in Tiflis fifty years ago: "Here all these peoples live side by side, buying and selling and working for hire, yet never coming into any closer union, remaining indifferent to one another, with neither love nor hate nor ambition, peaceably obeying a government of strangers." They were taking their cue from the past and following the traditions it set them.

Compulsion does not assure assimilation. The attempt (1881-1904) of the reactionary statesmen, Pobyedonostseff, Ignatieff and Katkoff, to Russify the heterogeneous nationalities within the Russian Empire by driving over them Orthodoxy and Tsardom like an enormous steam-roller failed because it sought to substitute one tradition for another. Men will endure much before they suffer another to foist his traditions upon them.

Cultural superiority does not assure assimilation. There are innumerable instances of an alien element remaining for generations encysted in a superior culture. It pleases us to think that we assimilate the foreign-born because of the excellence of American civilization. No doubt such features as economic opportunity, absence of caste, political democracy, religious freedom, and the public school have a great attraction for them. Nevertheless, the secret of our success in assimilating the immigrant who is plunged into the thick of American life instead of swimming round and round in some eddy like a Ghetto or Little Italy or Little Hungary, has been the following principles which have governed our dealings with the foreign-born.

1. *Toleration.* We have left the alien free to speak his mother tongue, follow his folk customs, foregather with those of his own race, form his own church or lodge and amuse himself as he likes.

2. *Individualism.* The summons of American democracy to the bent victim of Old-World oppressions, "Stand up like a man!" has an electrifying effect; it heartens him to throw off the yoke of priest, rabbi or labor boss and do as he thinks best.

3. *The worship of progress.* The custom-bound immigrant finds himself among a people with small reverence for the past. He is taught not only that nearly everything that makes us safe and comfortable is of recent origin, but that *whatever is will some day be surpassed.* We bid the newcomers turn from their pasts, so packed with dividing prejudices and hatreds, and eye the Future, which together we are building.

4. *The bestowal of the franchise.* Naturalization sets in motion strong Americanizing forces. Once Josef has a vote he finds himself an object of interest; people try to "talk him over." He is invited to join this, or walk in that, parade all because of his scrap of political power! Voting, owing to the knowledge it demands, the interest it excites and the responsibility it involves, is

quite magical in bringing men of different backgrounds to one plane.

5. *Insistence upon education of the young.* Tolerant as America is, on one point she insists, "Dress as you please, speak what you please, worship as you please, but you *must* send your children to school." Thus we gently detach the young from their parental matrix and make them our unconscious accomplices in Americanizing their parents.

Hindrances to assimilation. Great numbers of the foreign-born are not *in* America but *under* it. After varied experience as a laborer Whiting Williams states: "The relation between the large employer and, for the most part, the foreign-born and foreign-speaking worker in the labor gangs, is expressed by the phrase of the worker: 'Aw, w'at da hell! w'at da hell da companee care 'bout us?' Countless immigrant wage earners testify that their life in America has been for the most part one constant struggle against adverse industrial conditions and exploitation."

Owing to their poverty and ignorance of English many immigrants have been outrageously exploited and, in the absence of a Legal Aid Society, have not been able to resort to the courts. No doubt multitudes of foreign-born have become embittered against a country which allows them to suffer imposition without putting them in the way of securing redress.

What could be more absurd than that American-born children of immigrants should leave church foreign-language schools not only unable to read and write English but scarcely able to understand or speak it? To permit native Americans to receive all the schooling they will ever get in a foreign language is the very peak of imbecility!

AMALGAMATION

After the major differences between the intermixed elements have disappeared, intermarriage takes place freely and the offspring of these mixed unions reconcile in their persons the opposed tendencies. Inheriting from their two parents distinct traditions they adopt the superior, combine the best elements of both, or else find an independent standing ground for themselves. Thus vanished the historic oppositions of Israelites and Canaanites, patricians and plebeians, Romans and Goths, Gauls and

Franks, English and Danes, Normans and English. Amalgamation, then, concludes the process of adaptation.[9]

But no such happy ending is possible in case the physical differences between juxtaposed races offer a barrier to intermarriage. Observes Bryce:

> It was the good fortune of the Roman Empire that the vast majority of the races whom it conquered and absorbed had no conspicuous physical differences from the Italians which prevented intermarriage and fusion. Race and birthplace were no great obstacle to a man of force. Two or three of the Emperors were of African or Arab extraction. Moreover, the peoples of Southern Europe seem to have less repulsion of sentiment towards the dark-skinned races than the Teutons have. The Spanish and Portuguese intermarry not only with the native Indians of Central and Southern America, but also with the Negroes. The French of Canada intermarried more freely with the Indians of North America than the English have done.[10]

The color line, as it presents itself in various parts of the world and particularly in our South, makes race blending impossible. This is why no "solution of the Negro problem" is in sight, although much may be done to improve the relations between whites and blacks. The living side by side of elements which disdain to mix is not objectionable in a society of the Asiatic type, which does not aspire to spiritual unity. But in a "democratic" society, which covets a social mind, a color line is a source of weakness. Such a society should guard its future by barring out any immigrating race with which its members will not freely mix.

[9] Nehemiah did the right thing on finding that the Jewish colony at Jerusalem was in danger of being absorbed by the heathen peoples which encircled it.

"In those days also saw I Jews that had married wives of Ashdod, of Ammon, and of Moab:

"And their children spake half in the speech of Ashdod, and could not speak in the Jews' language, but according to the language of each people.

"And I contended with them, and cursed them, and smote certain of them, and plucked off their hair, and made them swear by God, saying, Ye shall not give your daughters unto their sons, nor take their daughters unto your sons, or for yourselves." Nehemiah, xiii, 23-25.

[10] *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, vol. I, pp. 293-94.

PART V

COÖPERATION AND ORGANIZATION

CHAPTER

XXIX. Coöperation

XXX. The Organization of Effort

XXXI. The Organization of Will

XXXII. The Organization of Thought

CHAPTER XXIX

COÖPERATION

All large permanent groupings—when they are not the product of coercion—exist for a *purpose,* which without them could be attained not at all or else not so well. In a word they are *co-operations.* This is why *In union there is strength.* If there be no call to coöperate, *In union there is weakness;* for no degree of likemindedness reconciles people to being held together in an organization which is not doing anything for them. On the open frontier the love of absolute freedom always leads to the complete independence of each family, unless there is need of co-operation. In South Africa, among the wandering or "trek" Boers, strife with the Bushmen was the one thing which brought them together.

The purposes of coöperation. The oldest and most frequent motive to large union has been *coöperation in fighting.*

The migrations of nomads into settled areas and their predatory invasions of strong peoples draw them into large, loose unions, such as that of the Israelites making their way into the land of Canaan, of the Vedic people descending into India, of the Cimbri, Teutons and Gauls clutching at Italy. But such unions are temporary because *attack is optional,* whereas *defense is imperative.* For not being ready to attack there is no such penalty as for not being ready to defend. Hence *fear of being attacked* is the master builder of big *permanent* unions. The antagonism between tribes and nations has forged men into solid masses. It was not breaking into the land of Canaan which welded the twelve tribes of Israel under Saul and David, but their wars with the neighboring peoples. The Iroquois confederacy of six Indian tribes resulted from the encroachments of the English. The mercantile city-states of the Middle Ages—Genoa, Venice, Leghorn—came into being chiefly to protect their trade from piracy and to maintain consuls in the Levant to look after their commercial interests. So long as there were Indians to be fought

and so long as the Dutch were in New York and the French in Canada, the American colonists had a lively state-sense. But when they no longer had cause to fear, internal liberty expanded and jealousy of the British State and of the colonial governor grew.

An undisciplined race may be ruined from failure to coöperate when common action is imperative. Fustel de Coulanges shows that the Germans of the fifth century were the mere remnants of a weakened race which had been whipped for three centuries by the Romans, vanquished by Slavs and Huns, above all torn by long internecine wars. Gone were nearly all the peoples Tacitus describes and lauds. They had torn one another to pieces from sheer inability to coöperate politically, to form a strong and stable state. We find only Franks, Alamans, Saxons; not true tribes but mere bands or fighting hordes; for Franks = warriors, Alamans = all sorts of men, Saxons = axe men. These wandering bands accompanied by their women, children, and slaves were without attachment to the soil, settled life, and the idea of fatherland. They no longer had stable traditions, customs, laws, elders and assemblies. The old legal and peaceful régime Tacitus beheld had gone under in centuries of confusion.

He insists:

> Gaul was conquered by Cæsar not because the Gauls were timid but because they would not unite and fight together. In great wars and in the face of invasions personal courage is worth little. It is the strength of public institutions and racial discipline which defends nations. Where the political bond is weak, the invasion at once disorganizes the state, upsets minds, shatters characters and in this growing disorder the invasion succeeds.[1]

Next to coöperation in defense the weightiest motive for political coöperation is *the establishment of tribunals for the settlement of disputes*. The creation of the Icelandic Republic in the tenth century is an instance. Iceland, remote and poor, was not in need of foreign policy, army, fleet or exchequer. The settlements organized the Republic in order to provide machinery which should put an end to the destructive feuds which raged among them. It was a government without an executive side, developed only upon its judicial, and, to a much smaller extent, upon its legislative side. The League of Nations was born of the same motives which drew together the Icelandic communities.

[1] *Histoire des Institutions Politiques de l'Ancienne France*, 1877, vol. I, p. 50.

Another common enterprise is the *construction of public works.* The early city builders—in Babylonia, for example, or in Russia —were tillers of the soil who were providing themselves with a *stronghold,* rather than a *market-place.* The essential thing was the *walls* rather than the *houses,* for in case of foray the peasants fleeing from the open country simply camped in the enclosure until the enemy retired. The residence and trading features of the city developed after it was a stronghold.

The control of water calls for combined labor. It is likely that the early appearance of the despotic state in the valleys of the Nile, the Euphrates and the Ganges sprang from the necessity of maintaining irrigation canals and reservoirs. Stable organization was probably forced upon the Chinese by their need of huge embankments to protect them from the flood waters of the Yellow River.

Worship early becomes a community affair, for private dealing with the Unseen is outlawed lest it be directed against one's fellows. The primitive agricultural tribe feels insecure unless the gods who make the crops thrive become established as the principal members of the community. Hence, the immense significance of the *covenant* by which in return for their care of its interests the tribe undertakes to maintain for the gods temple, vestals, priests, sacrifices and worship. The domestication of the gods not only gave men confidence but trained them in combined action.[2]

Economic coöperation does not forge large groups, but it gives rise to an infinity of small-scale undertakings, such as the collective hunting of a gregarious animal like the buffalo, or of a formidable creature like the elephant or the whale; the common protection of herds against beasts of prey; the common management of live stock owned by separate families; the common mowing of the meadows owned by the village community; and the common upkeep of highways and bridges.

Each crop has its own bearing on coöperation. In the chestnut belt of France, for example, the main task is not the tending of the trees, but the gathering of the nuts. Since there is here no chance for the exercise of superior diligence, skill, or foresight, the nuts are gathered in common. Young and old, women and

[2] See E. J. Payne, *History of the New World Called America,* 1892, vol. I, pp. 480-6.

men join in the task and the nuts collected are a common stock for the whole family. Seeing there are no advantages in going apart, there is no tendency for the married son to set up for himself. On the other hand, the culture of the vine is individualistic. Nothing is gained by coöperation, so that the married son sets up his household as soon as possible and there goes on a constant division and subdivision of vineyard properties. The vine, therefore, does not nourish the sentiment of solidarity.[3]

Shortage of coöperation. All too often the supply of willing coöperation has not met the demand; for, unlike bees and ants, we humans coöperate only from reason. Nearly every community has blockheads who "see no use" in joint efforts vital to the common safety or welfare, slackers who hang back because they count on the rest going ahead. Hence, coöperation for ends a little dim or remote cannot be effected without some compulsion. The anarchists err in decrying coercive authority as always the child of conquest or personal ambition. It may spring up whenever there are life-and-death matters calling for the effort of all—and not getting it! Whatever it be—village palisade, city wall, aqueduct, lighthouse, dike, fire-break, home guard, fleet, practice with arms—if purblind scoffers and slackers stand in its way, the wise will back the leader who makes them "do their bit."

Mutual aid. The simplest coöperation is *mutual aid, i.e.,* the spontaneous combining of efforts. Since it goes against the grain it is more resorted to in *hard* times than in *easy* times. Merchants band themselves into guilds when striving for the recognition of king and priesthood, artisans when struggling for legal rights. Wage earners will not form unions until they have suffered much, employers until the labor unions are pressing them hard. Fruit growers, cotton growers, tobacco growers, do not combine to control their production until they are at their last gasp. Settlers practise mutual aid most when they are poor and struggling. The American pioneers had their "bees" for sewing, quilting, corn-husking, harvesting, threshing, barn-raising, walnut-shucking, and road-mending. If a man was sick, his neighbors "turned in" and with hurrah and good cheer gathered his crop. If he was "burnt out," they came together and cut, hauled and fitted logs for a new cabin. They practised "exchanging work" in harvest time

[3] E. Demolins, *Les Français d'Aujourdhui,* 1898.

and no one hesitated to borrow or lend. Later, when each is "well fixed," these mutual-aid customs die out.

Mutual aid is more in favor with the *lower* social classes than with the *upper*. The latter are too proud to lean on one another, *e.g.*, borrow and lend. With them standing alone is a point of honor. The lowly are not proud and, besides, they can hardly live unless they stand together. The laboring folk of ancient Rome banded themselves into *collegia*. There was a union for each trade to protect its members against the upper classes, insure security in work, and lend some dignity to existence. Each had its festivals and sacred banquets, its banner, its common fund, its houses and lands, its elected head. No wonder Christianity, the religion of love and brotherly aid, captivated this class long before it won over the high and proud!

Peoples like the Slavs and the Japanese, who have but recently emerged from their old-time communal organization, resort more freely to mutual aid than peoples like the Jews, the West Europeans and the Americans, who have been longer individualized. A generation ago great interest was excited by the Russian workers' *artel* the members of which shared equally in work, duties and profits. The Slavic ideal has always been groups of small manufacturers coöperating with one another rather than vast industrial concerns exercising an autocratic control over their personnel.

Neighborhood without mutual aid is likely to beget bickering, cliquism and feuds. Farmers may lose their social traits when there is no longer anything they do together with their hands or their minds. They may be individually prosperous, yet fail to provide themselves with good roads, good schools, and opportunities for stimulating social intercourse. Upright they may be, yet divided by social, racial, and religious schisms. The remedy is to get them to coöperate in importing lecturers, entertainers, and traveling libraries, improving the roads, bettering the schools, building and furnishing an assembly hall for common use, mutual fire insurance, coöperative purchasing, collectively discussing and thinking out problems which touch the farmers' life, joint action on behalf of desired legislation and creating occasions for sociable enjoyment. *The varied practice of mutual aid socializes character and engenders social morality.*

Freedom versus compulsion in coöperation. A common task may be performed by *voluntary coöperation* or by *com-*

pulsory coöperation. In the Middle Ages even military defense was sometimes provided for by common understanding. In the valley of the Wei River in China one sees river dikes, roads, irrigation mains and town walls which owe nothing to authority. There is a tendency, however, for functions which might be discharged by means of voluntary association to devolve upon the State. The citizens maintain a paid police instead of taking turns at "watch and ward." Paid men fight fire instead of volunteer companies. The streets are cared for by a brigade of sweepers instead of by a "clean-up" bee.

The main motives for abandoning free coöperation are:

1. Selfish individuals dodge doing their part in achieving something which benefits all alike.

2. Certain services of joint benefit such as sanitation, education, conservation, street cleaning, food-inspection, provision for recreation, etc., are appreciated least by the ignorant who need them most.

3. The waste of energy in keeping up as many voluntary associations as there are tasks calling for combined effort is avoided by using a single inclusive compulsory organization, *e.g.*, the municipality. The necessity of creating under the voluntary plan as many distinct associations as there are general interests arises out of the fact that the library users are not identical with the school users, the playground users, the water users; with those who want steam rollers, or hose carts, or street sprinklers, or garbage carts, or irrigation ditches, or free antitoxin. Since the circles do not coincide, a special association would have to be organized for each service.

4. What once was done by the intermittent efforts of all—fire fighting, pursuit of criminals with "hue and cry," watching dikes and irrigation canals, road mending, street cleaning, life-saving —has been turned over to the continuous efforts of a few who know their business—firemen, police, street cleaners, inspectors, and coastguards. Now that money is given instead of service, it is simpler to support these services out of taxes than to pass a subscription paper for each.

5. "Voluntary" coöperation is unwilling to the extent that social pressure is applied in order to whip slackers into line. On the other hand, under popular government, the support of each public service may be willing for all but a very small minority of tax

payers. If four-fifths of the citizens approve a school tax, while half of those who contribute to a cause do so in order to placate public opinion, the former coöperation is "voluntary" rather than the latter.

In a word, the *voluntary* method of providing for common needs is little used after the community has become too large for all its members to know one another and to act readily in concert; after it has become so differentiated that the sense of common needs to be cared for is dull in the minds of some; and after the community can be better served by the trained man than by the volunteer citizen.

The modern coöperative movement. The "coöperation" that has made such giant strides in a century has little in common with these historical forms. Most of it is "distributive," *i.e.*, an effort to capture for groups of producers or consumers some of the exorbitant profits that middlemen have been reaping. Of this sort are the British, Irish, Danish, Russian and American coöperative movements which have made such a noise in the world. On the other hand, in the productive process capital has become so mighty a factor that coöperative production has small prospect of success. Labor, to be sure, is joining in ever-larger groups with ever-closer organization, but its purpose is to affect the terms of the labor contract rather than to produce or distribute goods.

Why is it that Americans have been so slow in developing distributive (consumers') coöperation? One reason is that those who might have led local coöperative enterprises saw more alluring ways of getting on. Another is our pioneer background. Offering uncounted opportunities for advancement, the frontier begat a tradition of the possibility of success being within the common man's reach. A third is our racial and cultural heterogeneity. From 1850 to 1914 immigration was making us more and more "a crazy quilt." [4]

Then it is a question whether we struck the right note in training our children. In his study of coöperation and competition among school children Maller finds coöperativeness "associated with other forms of socialized behavior, such as helpfulness, charitableness [and] honesty."

[4] E. A. Ross, *The Old World in the New*, 1914.

The large differences in coöperativeness from group to group; the relative homogeneity in coöperativeness within each of the groups; the evidence from the correlations with age, and the resemblance among siblings, friends, and partners; and the evidence from the experimental attempt to teach coöperativeness—all lead to the conclusion that coöperativeness as measured by our tests is influenced by environmental factors. It is a habit pattern acquired in accordance with the general laws of learning.

The frequent staging of contests, the constant emphasis upon the making and breaking of records, and the glorification of heroic individual achievement and championship in our present educational system lead toward the acquisition of the habit of competitiveness. The child is trained to look at the members of his group as constant competitors and urged to put forth a maximum effort to excel them. The lack of practice in group activities and community projects in which the child works with his fellows for a common goal precludes the formation of habits of coöperativeness and group loyalty.[5]

The social division of labor. When the services to be combined or interchanged are unlike, we have a social division of labor. Part of society renders certain services while the rest render it counter-services. This arrangement may grow up spontaneously—as we see in the trades and professions—or of set purpose—as we see in the various public services. In the former case the services are paid for by the individual recipients of service, in the latter case by the group collectively.

The earliest differentiation of function seems to be have been between tillers and fighters. Barton shows that:

A semi-agricultural cultivation of the palm in the oases was the chief food supply of the Arabs almost from the time of their settlement in the peninsula. No company of men could gain possession of an oasis and hold it for cultivation without organization for defense. Such an oasis would not support them the year round, they must either hunt or keep flocks and herds. In Arabia there was little hunting. If flocks and herds were kept they must be led forth to pasture. While some were cultivating the oasis, the younger and hardier men took the more dangerous part of leading the flocks and herds out to graze.[6]

Payne likewise finds functional cleavage between workers and warriors at the dawn of agriculture.

[5] J. B. Maller, *Coöperation and Competition*, 1929, p. 163.
[6] G. A. Barton, *A Sketch of Semitic Origins*, 1902, pp. 33-4.

An agricultural tribe permanently settled upon productive lands which its labor has rendered additionally valuable, stands in a new relation to neighboring tribes. While its permanently stationary condition exposes it to attacks, which its women, food stores and miscellaneous possessions naturally invite, the social changes produced by increasing reliance on agriculture render its members as a whole incapable of offering effectual resistance. Hence the warrior class. Such a class, having as its primary function the defense of the community against external aggression, is found in all advancing agricultural tribes. Where an aggregate of such tribes, as happens in favorable circumstances, has been welded into a nation and has consequently come to make a figure in history, this class has always been the principal agent in the process. An advancement not defended by an adequate military organization would be fore-doomed to extinction.[7]

Origin of feudal dependence. Taine traces the old French *noblesse* to hard-hitters who in the anarchy of the tenth century gather a force which can protect a district. Each canton acquires a local police corps in which from father to son one is always a policeman. The peasant now sows in security. He knows that in case of danger he can find asylum in the palisade at the base of the castle. By degrees a tacit contract grows up between the chieftain of the *donjon* and the early settlers in the open country. They will serve and pay him if he will protect them. As for the wretched who take refuge with him from the general disorder he plants them on soil which without him would be uninhabitable and they become his serfs.[8]

Of course such a relation degenerates inevitably into exploitation because the cultivators cannot curb the fighters. Able to bully the population they protect, these local chieftains become headstrong lords, absorbing the best of everything and scorning every business but fighting. Many a local population which in the Dark Ages agreed to feed a wandering band of armed men in return for their military protection was eventually crushed into serfdom by these hired guards. When, five or six centuries later, the "king's peace" spread over the land and defense was cared for by a royal army, the scions of these feudal chieftains became an elegant parasitic *noblesse!*

Rise of the standing army. The ancient societies had no armies distinct from the civil population. The free man was at

[7] *Op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 1, 2.
[8] *L'Ancien Régime*, ch. I.

once citizen and soldier. The Roman Empire created a professional army of four hundred thousand soldiers, by means of which one hundred and twenty millions lived in a peace and security such as the earlier societies had never known. But the people lost their liberties while the martial spirit so decayed among the civil population that, once the regular troops had been beaten, they put up but a feeble resistance to the barbarians.

The union of weapons and prestige in the same hands makes it very difficult to keep the military always subordinate to the civil authority, *i.e.,* to keep the armed servant from becoming master. In Europe the army has been the private preserve of the aristocracy and therefore a hotbed of reactionary intrigue. Dreading army ascendancy our forefathers decried a standing army and put undue faith in a militia. The modern device of universal military service rather than an overlarge professional army avoids the peril of a gulf opening between the military and the civil parts of society.

Origin of the governing class. Another differentiation is that between the governing class and the rest of society. This class arises out of those who, possessing wealth and leisure, have gained the intelligence and organization needed for the control of public affairs. Usually they cultivate the martial spirit and skill in arms. Such an element gains the upper hand partly because it knows how to govern, whereas the unlettered masses are too ignorant and narrow-minded to rule the state. In England of the eighteenth century, the country gentlemen; in our South, the planters; the Junkers in East Prussia; the *hacendados* in Chile, exemplify a governing class. The two former had to let in traders and capitalists. The last is still a governing class because in Chile trade is in the hands of foreigners, who have no share in politics.

Such a class may rule vigorously and intelligently but it never uses government to promote social ends or to elevate the masses. In time it is almost sure to come into serious economic dependence upon the government it controls. Witness how the prosperity of the English gentry became involved with the "corn laws," of the Chilean *hacendados* with paper money, of the East-Prussian Junkers with appointments in the army and the civil service. Thus a governing class gradually becomes less public-spirited and more parasitic. Over much of the world modern representative

government has shorn power from the governing class although by its control of party machinery, newspapers and "society" the latter has weathered democracy better than was expected. The manning of the state by trained men recruited from all classes has been another blow to the monopoly of government by a class.

The learned class. A learned class dominating in matters of religion, morals, education and law, may grow up owing to the prestige which learning has in ages of general ignorance. The priests and scribes of Israel, the "philosophers" of classic Greece, the Druids, the Christian clergy of the Middle Ages, and the *literati* of China are examples. Such a class aspires to do all the thinking for the people, is contemptuous of the folk culture, exaggerates the difficulty and worth of its learning, and discredits or suppresses the unprofessional thinkers and teachers. It rarely dominates or exploits the people, but it covets influence and likes to be distinguished by privileges and insignia, such as "benefit of clergy," special representation in government, monopoly of certain offices, academic degrees, cap and gown, academic professions, functions and honors. The differentiation of the learned professions so that each is held in check by all the rest, the provision of free education culminating in the university, and the great increase in the number of callings which utilize the well-educated, have made impossible a small, unified and self-conscious learned class.

CHAPTER XXX

THE ORGANIZATION OF EFFORT

Organization is an effective way of combining the efforts of many for the achievement of a common end. From planless, haphazard coöperation—settlers fighting a prairie fire or rioters storming a jail—organization is approached by a number of steps. One is *the submitting of like efforts to direction,* as when planters fortify a levee against a flood or citizens come together as a sheriff's *posse.* Another is *the combining, under direction, of unlike efforts,* as in road building, barn raising, or a "round-up" of cattle. When, as in railway operation, a military envelopment movement, or a fleet manœuver, *the several diverse efforts must be very precisely timed and adjusted to one another,* direction will be very minute and authoritative. If the work is difficult, an authority will be needed to *assign tasks according to individual aptitude or skill,* and, if the organization is permanent, *to provide that individuals are especially trained* for the performance of their special functions.

The determinants of organization. Certain factors account for the very great differences among organizations in structure and spirit.

a. *The nature of the task.* If something is to be *done,* say erect a building or move trains, an organization is called for the parts of which work smoothly together like the wheels and levers of a machine. But if the aim is the *beneficial influence* which members may exert upon one another, an organization to promote association and fellowship suffices.

Again, is the effect aimed at *physical* or *psychical?* On a plantation or in a factory, the spirit of the workers is by no means so important as in the case of a newspaper staff, a relief bureau, a propagandist society, or the soliciting force of a life-insurance company—all of them working in the realm of *mind.* Sullen men who hate their work may still cut sugar cane or tend machines, but no one who feels himself to be a slave, a drudge, or a cog-

wheel can teach, persuade, or inspire. All organizations, therefore, which work on *people* rather than on *things* have to pay heed to the *morale* of their force. They must appease their workers to the point of contentment and provide motives which arouse the higher faculties to activity. Pure nonsense, therefore, is the notion of some (so-called) "practical" men that the head of a college or a school system should be a glorified mill boss!

In *life-and-death matters,* responsibility must be definite, and strict obedience required even from an intelligent personnel. After trained nurses came into hospitals, a great quarrel broke out between nurses and doctors over the question whether the nurse should be entirely subordinate to the physician or should enjoy some discretion. The issue was settled by the complete subordination of the nurse. So is it in the management of railroads and ships.

Still greater is the subordination required in dealing with tasks which are subject to crisis. When weal or woe hinges on what is done in a few hours or even a few minutes, mistake and failure must be eliminated at all costs. A fighting force, then—whether it is to cope with foes, mobs, fires, surf, floods, or epidemics—tends toward a *military* organization. Not only is literal and prompt obedience enforced by severe penalties but, in order that the right thing may be done in the emergency, it must be ingrained as habit. Hence, all organizations which are subject to crisis make much of *drill.*

Military organization, just because it reached a high development as early as the middle of the eighteenth century, has unfortunately served as a pattern for later types of organization which are not subject to the strain of crisis. Hence, in government bureaus and in business administration the false idea has prevailed that the usefulness of the subordinate to his superior consists in executing orders and furnishing reports. But why repress the natural doubts, queries, or remonstrances of the intelligent and loyal subordinate in a non-fighting organization? In an industrial concern, a school system, or a government bureau there ought to be an interchange of thought between those who determine policies and those who have to carry them out. Question or criticism or demur from the intelligent under-man, with reference to orders or policies that seem to him—and may prove to be—unworkable, ought not to be treated as tantamount to the

murmur of a soldier under fire against the commands of his officer.

In sharpest contrast to the discipline imposed by crisis stands *monastic discipline,* which is imposed not by the needs of a common task but by the difficulty of realizing the religious ideal of life. Under the Rule of St. Benedict, the disobedient and unruly monk should secretly be warned by the deacon once, and again. If this warning prove fruitless, he should be shut off from the common table or from common prayer. In the case of a serious misdeed the monk is also forbidden intercourse with other monks; but, in order that no offender should be driven into obstinacy, the elder monks, with the permission of the abbot, should sometimes approach him to comfort him and try to move him to repentance. A monk hardened in wickedness should suffer bodily punishment; if this is unavailing, the abbot with all the monastery should pray for his recovery. If he remains obstinate, he should be turned out of the monastery. If a monk who has been turned out sees his fault and prays penitently to be taken in again, his wish should be granted to him, even to three times; but the fallen monk should prove his humility by taking the lowest place.

What working organization could afford to be so patient with a recalcitrant?

Again, does or does not the task in hand *put a great strain on ordinary human nature?* The more it does so the stricter the discipline will have to be, the harsher the penalties for disobedience. This is the reason why military discipline is more methodical than any other, why rigid training is insisted on for a man of so little skill as the common soldier. To build a habit that shall hold him steady before the cannon's mouth and cold steel—this is the reason for the endless drill, the rhythmic regularity, the automatic obedience exacted by the makers of armies. "A perfect army would be one in which each part would respond to the will of the commander as quickly and certainly as the muscles of the body respond to the impulses of the brain."

The monk like the soldier is under a strain, but the end sought is utterly different. Military organization has in view physical action, while monastic organization is for the sake of the spiritual life. Hence, the rules of the former are clear-cut, to be carried out without hesitation; while the rules of the latter, although in

their effects on personality they are far more gripping than military rules, are undefined, fluid, subtle, as one would expect when it is the *soul* that is to be controlled and not simply the *body*.

Finally, a distinction is to be made between a working group the members of which from long practice have gained a smooth team play and one in which each man may readily be replaced. When, as in a football team, a magazine staff, or an orchestra, the members of an organization have become mutually adapted to one another, the loss of one hurts the whole, so that discipline will be milder than in an organization of interchangeable parts.

Although organization is likely to reflect the nature of the task, there is nevertheless a tendency for organizations in different fields to agree in pattern. *The principle of the dominant organization or organizations is likely to reappear in all the rest.* Thus if, in government, the relation of superior to subordinate is purely authoritative, this spirit may be expected to prevail in family, school, church, business, industry, and voluntary associations. If, on the other hand, government admits into this relation a consultative element, something like it will be found in most other organizations in society.

b. *The controlling purpose.* It makes a difference whether the purpose in an organization is *the doing of a worth-while work* or the *maximizing of profits*. As a rule, capable workers become interested in some concrete aspect of what they are doing. A railroad force will be keen for mastering snowdrifts and floods, for making schedule time, breaking records, beating a rival road, or perfecting the service. Now, this disinterested eagerness is best developed when the president of the railroad is a railroad man, when the newspaper owner is a newspaper man, when the schools are under an educator, and when the philanthropy is in charge of a social worker. But it dies when Capital comes out in plain view, takes the reins, and drives for profits without heed to excellence. Zeal is chilled in artisans required to make sham things instead of real, in reporters when their news stories are killed in the interest of advertisers, in railroad men when avaricious banker management denies their plea for safety devices, in teachers when their superintendent is an agent of property-owners, whose chief job is to keep taxes down, and in professors when their head is not a scholar but a money-raiser, or a conservative deputized to "sit on the lid." In such fields as

protection, education, health, communication, transportation and publicity, the ascendancy of the commercial motive kills inspiration and zeal. One object of extending government activity in these fields is the hope of substituting *service* for *profit* as the ruling motive.

c. *The character of the organized.* The peon, the green immigrant, the navvy, the needy working-girl, the child operative, are driven or underpaid solely because they are helpless. They are fined heavily for slight faults, not because discipline demands it, but just because they are weak. On the other hand, those who enjoy options, the accountant, the ship's mate, the experienced salesman, the engineering expert, must needs be driven with a loose rein. In a dramatic troupe or a symphony orchestra, the need of perfect coördination of efforts is much greater than in a factory, yet the discipline is never harsh, because actors and musicians are in a stronger moral and economic position than mill hands. The more intelligent is the rank and file of an organization the less is the need of prestige and severity. Before hinds it may be necessary to set the officer apart by sword, gold lace, feathers, charger, and sternness of demeanor, in order that he may be looked upon as a higher being; but intelligent enlisted men may regard their officer as above them in a military sense without feeling that he is above them in everything. Likewise the head of a school system, a hospital, or a bureau, while he must, of course, command the confidence of his teachers, nurses, or agents, needs not inspire them with fear or awe in order to get his plans carried out.

Volunteer workers cannot be disciplined by the crude methods of reprimand, fine, lay-off, demotion, or dismissal, but must be reached through *esprit de corps* or conscience. Unless it inflicts death, a secret revolutionary organization cannot punish without risking betrayal. A heavy hand on boy scouts, party workers, Red Cross volunteers, or friendly visitors will in the end disrupt the organization. The member of a relief party or an exploring expedition is controlled chiefly through pressure by his fellows. In the religious order, the priesthood, the ministry, or the foreign mission, the fulcrum for authority is the solemn vow and the acceptance of this vow by order, church, or mission board. The means of discipline—entreaty, rebuke, isolation, prayer, warning, and suspension—are not punishments so much as appeals to con-

science. The contrast between *exacted* and *volunteer* service is so broad that the executive successful with military or industrial organization may prove a total failure when directing a body of missionaries, social workers, or researchers.

d. *The spacing between the organized.* Men fall more readily into the grades imposed by the technique of associated effort *if they are already spaced.* Thus the relation of superior to subordinate chafes little if the former is *older.* The instructor cheerfully bows to the head professor's twenty years' advantage in experience. Boy scouts find it easy to obey their adult leader. The snowy crown of abbot or bishop lends a fatherly character to his authority. The young fellows in the ranks are literally "boys" to the grizzled colonel and they feel that "the old man knows." The cub reporters will run their heads off to execute the orders of the "old war horse" at the managing editor's desk. *Sex* reinforces age in making it easy for the male school superintendent to direct the work of young women teachers and for the male doctor to hold in obedience young women nurses.

Special knowledge and training set apart their possessor. The men on the team readily take orders from the star player who coaches them. Artisans accept as master the architect with his wealth of technical knowledge. To their lieutenant enlisted men attribute inscrutable wisdom acquired at West Point or Annapolis. Singers feel a wide gulf between themselves and the chorus director who from a thousand voices can create a single mighty instrument. Knowledge of the mysteries of navigation helps put distance between forecastle and cabin.

The benefits of organization. On the credit side of organization stand weighty items.

1. Things are done which cannot be accomplished by means of unorganized efforts. The soldiers of an army broken up into bands may still wage a feeble guerilla warfare, but in weather forecasting, canal digging, railroad operation, or the postal service, unorganized effort is completely impotent to furnish the desired result.

2. A common interest cared for intermittently by all citizens, such as fire-fighting, thief-catching, levee-mending or road-making, may be turned over to the continuous efforts of a trained and experienced few.

3. The division of a work into its natural parts and the as-

signment of these to different individuals permit the utmost advantage to be taken of special aptitude, knowledge, or training. Conversely, men with weaknesses may keep to lines of work in which they are not handicapped by them.

4. Concentration is favorable to the attainment of a higher degree of expertness. Deliberative bodies organize themselves into committees, each set apart to study and become conversant with a particular class of questions.

5. Many diverse efforts are fitted into a single comprehensive, intelligent plan. We see this not only in industry and war but also in a clearing-house, an educational system, a party effort, an agitation, a propaganda, a commercial campaign, weather observation, and scientific research, in so far as they are well organized. There is a tendency to form a thinking and planning branch of an administrative body—a general staff—which advises but does not execute.

One reason why many matters which might be looked after locally—such as public security, poor relief, the care of defectives, public education, the administration of highways and forests—have been taken over by the State is that the State has the better chance of finding able and expert men to provide the plan and determine the policies under which the work shall be conducted.

6. Coördination into a larger whole corrects that needless duplication of effort which often shows itself among agencies which are striving for the same end, such as charities, missionary undertakings, educational institutions, propagandist groups, and reform movements.

7. Elimination of the wastes of competition is possible. This is seen particularly in the economic field. Combination among producers in the same line ought to cut down their outlay for advertising, salesmen, selling agencies, and cross-freights.

8. Serving as a cog in a great beneficent, permanent organization provides some men with a large superpersonal end which appeals to their imagination and sustains them in their life work.

9. Not all men are fit for solitary work. Many a man finds in working on a team an inspiration and a stimulus he can find nowhere else.

The wastes of organization. 1. In a team or gang the man who directs is also a doer, but as the group becomes larger there

comes a time when he drops his tools, and from that moment begins the burden of "overhead expense." In large enterprises the cost of the timekeepers, checkers, inspectors, storekeepers, overseers, bosses, foremen, and superintendents becomes a serious offset to the saving effected by intelligently concerted effort.

2. In an organization that has not outgrown the powers of one man, the manager's eye checks waste of time and material and his memory holds the records; but in the big concern there must be installed an elaborate system of record, check, and audit which constitutes another deduction from the operative force.

3. Not without loss is energy transmitted through a series of shafts, belts, or cogwheels; nor is it possible for the intelligent purposes of the heads of elaborate organizations to be carried out without waste through friction between the parts. The center forms no true picture of the situation confronting the extremities. Orders are misunderstood or lose in force as they descend the chain of authority. As Burke said of the effect of the Atlantic on governing the colonists of Great Britain from London, "Seas roll and months pass between the order and the execution, and the want of a speedy explanation of a single point is enough to defeat the whole system. . . . In large bodies the circulation of power must be less vigorous at the extremities."

4. Formalism and red tape. A French commission on the naval budget found on shipboard "together with thirty-three volumes of regulations intended to determine the details of administrative life on board, a list of 230 different types of registers, ledgers, memoranda, weekly and monthly reports, certificates, receipt forms, journals, fly-leaves, etc." In the ministry it found that "hundreds of employees are occupied exclusively at calculating, transcribing, copying into innumerable registers, reproducing on countless fly-leaves, dividing, totalizing, or despatching to the minister figures that have no reality, that correspond to nothing in the region of facts, which would probably be nearer the truth if they were one and all invented."[1] Such waste is a disease to which only organizations are subject.

5. There is, finally, the relative *inflexibility* of all machinery composed of numerous correlated parts. No complex organization is prompt to adapt itself to rapidly changing conditions. Individuals who by themselves might quickly change their activities

[1] G. Le Bon, *The Psychology of Socialism*, 1899, p. 177.

or their methods find themselves gripped and locked, as it were, in an iron system.

The abuses of organization. 1. Executives may misapply the power intrusted to them. Nepotism may govern appointments and promotions. A post-office department may be made a political machine. High military commands may be used in order to win publicity and prestige. The railroad president may manage his road with reference to his secret stock speculations. The head of a central organization may encroach on the local chapters under pretext of efficiency, but really from a craving for power. Superior may misuse his authority over subordinate to gratify his lust of domination, to exact a tribute of flattery, to indulge a personal spite, to keep down a possible rival, or to cover up his own shortcomings.

2. When an executive insists on keeping everything "under his hat," he comes to lean too much upon his office helpers. The result is that his chief clerk handles communications to department heads who are his official superiors, and matters of moment may hinge on the decision of a mere office subordinate. The local mine manager justifies himself by showing that during the labor war he was continually reporting to his distant chief, while this overburdened chief pleads ignorance of the lawless policies pursued by his subordinate. Between the two stools real responsibility comes to the ground.

3. Organizations tend to become top-heavy—too many officers for the privates, too many planners and supervisors and too few doers, too many dawdlers about headquarters or the main office and too few at the front, on the road, on the firing-line, at the railhead, behind the crowbar, or before the mast. In 1910 in a Chinese government school of modern languages with twenty-seven teachers I found ten administrators half of them with nothing to do! In a higher commercial school with twenty teachers there were ten officials of whom three were mere sinecurists. In a law school with eight hundred students the non-teaching officials numbered twenty-five!

4. Men in different departments of a large organization may become too specialized to take one another's viewpoint or to work smoothly together. The soldier in the field, the salesman on the road, the engineer on the line, all have their troubles with the man in the office. Overspecialization may be prevented by

rotating men through related functions. Temporary details from the line are substituted for permanent appointments on the staff. Men in the forestry service spend half the year in the bureau and half in the forests. The hampering of good men by the mistaken vigilance of clerks in an accounting bureau thousands of miles away is obviated by sending out traveling auditors to examine accounts. Friction between engineer officers and regular officers of the navy is removed by amalgamating the two corps. General managers combat overspecialization by getting the heads of departments to lunch together frequently and "talk things over," or, better yet, group them into committees to examine and report on particular problems.

5. The organization becomes an *end* rather than a *means*. Army officers oppose a cutting down of the military establishment when the nation comes into a safer position. Partisans continue to work for the success of their party long after it has bartered away its principles and forgotten its ideals. The educational system cannot be induced to consider the child and ask itself what real good it is doing. Pious clergymen will labor to advance the ends of their church after it has become a soulless ecclesiastical machine, the foe of true spirituality. Railroad officials who have risen from the ranks develop a loyalty to the company which leads them to commit for it crimes they would not commit for themselves. In general, it is *outside* forces rather than *inside* forces which keep an organization in proper relation to its task and to other interests of society.

The sacrifices organization requires. Human nature adapted to an animal existence in the woods does not easily lend itself to the demands of technical efficiency. Night duty, monotonous toil, and sedentary work are made tolerable only by habit. Still greater is the strain of being a cog in some intricate machine. Unquestioning obedience, for instance—how revolting it is at first to any intelligent person! Team harness may be cruelly galling to such as are not quick at personal adjustment. Punctuality, schedule, method, regularity of stroke, standardized performance—how these go against the grain! Machinery should be built of metal, not of living, plastic beings. It is significant that the orator rarely and the poet never has struck fire on contemplating human organization.

Hence, in workaday society there ought always to be reserved

a large place for those who in organization feel like squirrels in cages, those to whom freedom and spontaneity are the breath of life. Society should leave a broad footing for the solitary worker who labors when and where and as he pleases. Under excess of routine we tend to become wooden and unresponsive, so that the artist type, that depends on mood and whim, that waits for the moment of inspiration, will be needed to revive and freshen us as the system of group labor extends.

Preserving freedom under organization. Since it is the fate of most of us to work in some kind of organization and since no organization can function without discipline, what is to become of freedom? There are various means of saving the member from being swallowed up in his organization:

1. By securing to every member a voice and a share in determining the rules and policies by which he is bound. This is "government by the consent of the governed." It is exemplified in faculty control of the university as against president control, in lay control of the church as against clerical control, in the determination of party nominations and policies by the "rank and file," instead of by delegate conventions and central committees. Even the inmates of a prison are allowed to form their "mutual welfare league," while school children make rules for the use of their playground!

2. By the organization confining its requirements to matters which clearly affect its legitimate work. Officers will not seek to control the political activities of enlisted men, the school board will not deny its teachers the freedom enjoyed by the ordinary citizen, the priest will not from the pulpit tell his flock how to vote, the employer will not control the life of his employees outside the workshop.

3. By protecting the right of members of an organization to have special unions of their own to look after their interests. While the impartial now acknowledge the propriety of trade unions, the right of public servants to organize themselves is called in question. But experience shows that often the bureaucrat will not pay attention to the reasonable protests of public employees unless there is behind them a union which can make him trouble. Such a union should exist, not for striking or sustaining strikes against the public, but for formulating, presenting or agitating grievances and aspirations. The bureaucratic horror

of unions of civil employees derives from the militarist theory that in the civil service "back talk" is as intolerable as it is in the army.

4. By preserving to the individual freedom of withdrawal from the organization. The *right to quit* is a great safeguard of other rights. The right of workingmen to strike should be upheld. Only lately has the seaman gained the right to quit ship whenever the anchor is down. Enlisted men ought to be allowed to get out of the army in peace time without excessive difficulty. The law sees to it that the terms of withdrawal from the convent, the building and loan association, the coöperative society, or the mutual life insurance company are not too onerous.

Some internal problems of organization. 1. As regards the selection and placement of men, it is not always best that the man in charge of a work should pick his helpers unaided. The master of a technique may be a poor judge of men. Not only is it costly to "try out" the unfit man, but often the man who has failed in one post would succeed in some other place in the organization. The difficulty of getting "the round peg into the round hole and the square peg into the square hole" is so great that some organizations, in adding to their personnel, call in the experimental psychologist or the character expert.

2. A vacancy to be filled raises the question: "New blood or promotion?" The shortsighted executive imports a seasoned outsider "who can do the work." This policy deadens the force and in the long run deters the capable from joining. To the more enterprising persons in an organization the prospect of rising is *the only thing in it which lends interest to the future.* Chance of advancement introduces that element of adventure or surprise, which induces the ambitious young man to enter army, navy, public service, or corporate service, instead of carving out a career for himself.

In a well-contrived organization there will be no "blind-alley" or "dead-end" jobs, leading to nothing. Normal promotion routes —with short cuts for the very exceptional man and cross-paths for one who changes his goal—should be worked out for every position, and posted charts showing such routes should visualize to each worker his path of possible advancement. The prick of the spur will be sharpest when selection for advancement is made

on merit as revealed in carefully kept records of each man's performance.

3. *Incentive* has to be carefully considered. The appeal to *fear* is the first recourse of the dull, unimaginative manager; hence, in keying up performance, much more has been made of *punishment* than of *attraction.* Yet the low productiveness of all slave labor in comparison with free labor ought to have shown that the normal man can be *led* at a faster pace than he can be *driven.*

Graduated reward lures one to do his utmost. Pay, in addition to a fixed element, should include an element varying with one's efficiency—premium, bonus, a commission on one's sales, or on the profits of one's sales—or with one's length of service. Insurance, permanency of employment, and retiring allowance after a term of service leave good men free to do their best work.

Since *honor* is coveted as well as *money,* honor should be as carefully graduated and as punctually paid. A non-discriminating treatment of those on different rungs of the organization ladder flings away a precious means of stimulation. In order to whet the eagerness to earn advancement, something, however slight, should be used to distinguish men of each grade from those below. It may be a uniform, a stripe, a band of gold braid, a cap, or a button. It may be the right of precedence, of dining at a reserved table, entering by a special door, sitting on a higher seat, or having one's desk behind a railing or on a raised floor. Whatever be the mark of honor, it should be *patent* without being conspicuous, its value should be *symbolic* rather than intrinsic, it should be *certain* to him who is entitled to it, and it should be consistently *withheld* from all others.

Pitting a man against his record or pitting gang against gang, shop against shop, branch office against branch office, school against school, battleship against battleship, rouses the spirit of emulation. The party organizer gets his workers vying to see whose ward will roll up the biggest majority for the party ticket. The gun squads of different battleships engage in the hottest rivalry for honors in marksmanship. The trusts stimulate production by playing plant against plant and mill against mill.

4. In contrast to the fostering of loyalty and *esprit de corps* the earliest authorities made little use of "imponderables." "Hear, tremble, and obey" was supposed to provide every incentive. But as we learn more about human nature more heed is given to

the spirit of the rank and file. It is good if the body to which one belongs is believed to render a valuable service to society. It is better yet if this value is openly recognized so that one feels himself a member of a popular and honorable organization. When the soldier's uniform commands respect, when a university is old and famous, *esprit de corps* comes of itself. Even street sweepers develop it after the public has been taught to appreciate the work of the street-cleaning department!

If the chiefs keep all the credit that comes from the achievement of their organization, the underlings have the sense of being mere tools! So, if he is wise, the commander passes the glory down to the common soldiers, the administrator ascribes his success to his zealous subordinates, and the railroad manager attributes the safety on his line to the men at the throttle.

The rivalry of one organization with another quickly kindles *esprit de corps*. The competition of two neighboring cities invigorates their commercial organizations. The approach of an election sets party workers "on edge" even if there is no real issue between the parties. Intercollegiate contests in debating and athletics are valued for their production of "college spirit." When competing transcontinental railroads have been merged it has been found wise to preserve their distinct organizations in order to retain the stimulus of rivalry.

Centralization. History shows a marked drift of authority from the local toward the general. Religion tends to lose itself in shallows unless the local congregation is knit up with others into a general church. A Greek-letter fraternity will see its standards lost sight of if it lacks in district organization and a strict supervision over its local chapters. Owing to chance, circumstances, and faults of leaders, any local association for general objects is subject to vagary and fatuousness unless it is steadied by membership in a general organization, which of necessity has attained to clear-cut aims and rational methods.

Possessing the advantages of experience, breadth of view, and able leaders, the general organization may well exercise control over the local. In the management of common affairs there is much to be said for the general as against the local political body. Too often local control sacrifices general and permanent interests to individual and immediate interests. Local control of education leaves its fate on the whole to smaller men than those who de-

termine it under state control. Local care of highways means less outlay on the roads of the commonwealth than sound economy demands. Local administration of forests or care of public health will generally be less enlightened than that of the state. Law enforcement by locally chosen officers permits each locality to be a law unto itself. In a word, removing control farther from the ordinary citizen and taxpayer is tantamount to giving the intelligent, farsighted, and public-spirited element in society a longer lever to work with.

The state, too, enjoys the economy of large-scale service. The county has too few blind, deaf-mutes, or feeble-minded to care for each class in a special institution. The management of state charitable institutions by a single central board instead of by separate local boards has proven highly successful.

On the other hand, matters which can be adequately appreciated by common sense, such as the providing of local conveniences, etc., should be left to the local community.

Meeting the strain of organization. We have seen that the requirements of combined effort go rather against the native grain. As organization comes to embrace more of us, certain adjustments will have to be made if human beings are not to become painfully warped. One is *ample provision for holiday and recreation,* to allow the bent bow to straighten. Another is *access to a variety of means of recreation.* The more closely the individual is boxed in while at work by schedule, routine, and direction, the wider should be his range of choice out of working hours and the more scrupulously should his freedom to choose be respected. The more one's work conforms to plan, or pattern, or order, *the more one's private life and one's disposal of leisure time must be relied on to nourish and to express an individuality.* This is why that unity in moral and religious ideas and in ground pattern of life, which often has worked out quite well among a peasant or fisher folk, is an utterly impossible and undesirable ideal for a people subject to the trying discipline of modern organization.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE ORGANIZATION OF WILL

An organization may receive its direction from the will of an individual or from the will of a group. The process by which a group will is arrived at may be termed the *organization of will.* In the *organization of effort,* the movement is from the one toward the many, *i.e.,* from the controlling purpose to the coördinated efforts of the various persons who contribute to its accomplishment. In the *organization of will,* the movement is from the many toward the one, *i.e.,* from the wills of individual members to the single purpose which finally directs and unifies the activities of the group.

Organizing of both will and effort in same group. In the operations of an army, a railroad, a government department, a municipal service, we see only *organization of effort.* In a church framing its creed, a party drawing up its declaration of principles, a Futurist group hammering out its manifesto, a guild standardizing mercantile usage, a labor union passing upon a trade agreement, we see only *organization of will.* On the other hand, workingmen engaging in a strike which has been ordered by the union, farmers delivering their milk to a creamery established by their coöperative effort, the fellows of a learned society prosecuting coöperative research upon lines laid down by the society, illustrate how, with respect to the same matter, both will and effort may be organized within a single group. This double process marks what is at once the most difficult and the most evolved type of organization.

Informal organization of will. Consider the assembly of the Russian *Mir* or village community as described by Wallace: [1]

> The meetings are held in the open air . . . and they almost always take place on Sundays or holidays, when the peasants have plenty of leisure. . . . The discussions are occasionally very animated, but there is rarely any attempt at speech making. If

[1] D. M. Wallace, *Russia,* 1905, pp. 116, 117.

any young member should show an inclination to indulge in oratory, he is sure to be unceremoniously interrupted by some of the older members, who have never any sympathy with fine talking. The assemblage has the appearance of a crowd of people who have accidentally come together and are discussing in little groups subjects of local interest. Gradually some one group, containing two or three peasants who have more moral influence than their fellows, attracts the others, and the discussion becomes general. Two or more peasants may speak at a time, and interrupt each other freely—using plain, unvarnished language, not at all parliamentary—and the discussion may become a confused, unintelligible din; but at the moment when the spectator imagines that the consultation is about to be transformed into a free fight, the tumult spontaneously subsides, or perhaps a general roar of laughter announces that some one has been successfully hit by a strong *argumentum ad hominem*, or biting personal remark. In any case there is no danger of the disputants coming to blows.

The village elder is the principal personage in the crowd, but to call to order those who interrupt the discussion is no part of his functions. He comes forward prominently—

when it is necessary to take the sense of the meeting. On such occasions he may stand back a little from the crowd and say, 'Well, orthodox, have you decided so?' and the crowd will probably shout, *Ladno! Ladno!* that is to say, 'Agreed! Agreed!' Communal measures are generally carried in this way by acclamation; but it sometimes happens that there is such diversity of opinion that it is difficult to tell which of the two parties has a majority. In this case the elder requests the one party to stand to the right and the other to the left. The two groups are then counted, and the minority submits, for no one ever dreams of opposing openly the will of the *Mir*.

The chief improvement that has been made on this procedure is the regulation of discussion to the end that it may be kept to the point and not be smothered in confusion and disorder.

Formal organization of will. How faithfully the decision of an assembly reflects its will depends on various conditions.

(*a*) How well is the assembly protected from disturbance, interruption, or intimidation?

(*b*) Is it in the power of any one to dissolve the assembly against its will?

(*c*) Can it consider *any* matter? Or can it consider only such matters as are mentioned in the summons or are brought before it by the summoners?

(*d*) Is the assembly convened for the purpose of ascertaining the wills of the members as to a matter, or in order to make known and win support for a policy which has already been decided upon by the head men?

(*e*) Who may speak? Only officials, chiefs, or distinguished persons? any one invited by the presiding officer? any one "called out"? or any one "recognized" by the presiding officer?

(*f*) Is discussion ample and complete before a vote is taken?

(*g*) Is the prevalent will expressed by cheers, shouts, or clash of weapons—which method expresses intensity of conviction as well as numbers—or by registering the wills of individuals?

(*h*) In case voting is *viva voce* instead of by ballot, is the order of voting haphazard or according to age, rank, or other mark of distinction? This is important because in the latter case the early voters may have an influence upon those who vote later.

(*i*) Does a majority vote decide or is unanimity requisite as it was in the old Russian town assemblies and in the Polish diet?

Varieties of will organization. As the matters to be settled become numerous or technical, the method of always taking "the sense of the meeting" becomes too burdensome, so that a board will be chosen to make minor decisions for the group, major matters still being reserved for the general assembly. These men may be granted power for only so long as the majority of the members are satisfied with them, or for a stated term. If experienced management and continuity of policy be essential to the prosperity of group affairs, and if the superior fitness of certain members for handling these affairs be evident, the group may clothe them with authority for a long term or for life and cease to reserve certain fundamental matters for group decision.

In case an association becomes large and its membership scattered, the periodical convening of all has to be given up. The local assemblies sometimes take turns in looking after the common concerns of the entire society, as was the practice during the early years of certain British trade unions. Next, delegates are sent by these local assemblies to sit in a deliberative body which acts for the entire group, save perhaps in certain reserved matters. When the delegate becomes member of a permanent body during a fixed term and speaks for his constituents on all matters that may come up, he is a *representative* and the group comes under *representative government*.

With the officials who execute or serve the will of the group, this representative body may have various relations. It may appoint them, or they may be the choice of the group membership. It may mark out their sphere, or they may have a sphere independent of it. It may make laws which they are to enforce, adopt policies which they are to carry out, or it may leave them for the most part a free hand, contenting itself with granting money according to its degree of satisfaction with their conduct. In the case of a hereditary executive, claiming rule as a matter of inheritance or of divine right, the representative body may serve as little more than a forum for free speech where the "state of the country" may be discussed, grievances ventilated, and criticisms brought to the attention of the government.

In short, the will of an organized group may be derived directly and in the simplest way from the wills of the members, or it may be so independent of them as to be able to defy them or to mold them at pleasure. The members may decide everything, they may decide only certain fundamental matters, they may decide only *who shall decide*.

Now, what determines how the group will shall be organized?

The stage of development of the group affects its will organization. Much depends on whether or not a society is in its *formative* period. A young society, holding out to the public rosy prospects rather than realized benefits, will be ostentatiously democratic, for it must be able to assure the inquirer that the members control everything, and that there is no "inside ring." One of the forces which favored the extension of political democracy in the United States during the period of settlement was the sharp competition among young Western states to attract settlers.

On the other hand, a society that has a good record of service and has accumulated property, prestige, reputation, or other valuable assets, will attract members even if it gives them no voice in its management. This is one reason why old and successful associations develop a government as centralized as their affairs may require, whereas young associations must be democratic whether or not their affairs prosper under democracy. It also helps to explain why an old prospering association is liable to come under the sway of a small governing clique.

The composition of the group determines its will organization. Is membership in the group a matter of free will?

If it is then there is a curb to overriding of the wishes of the rank and file by the head men. Arbitrary, high-handed action may provoke so many withdrawals as to weaken or break up the group. It is because one cannot quit civil society at will that in political government persist abuses of power which would never be tolerated for long in a voluntary association. The cheapness of travel, however, has made population so mobile that by migration people react in a very noticeable way to local differences in the excellence of government. This imposes, no doubt, a certain check upon the irresponsible use of political power.

In case quitting the group entails a serious sacrifice, members tolerate the unauthorized exercise of power. Therefore, the more solid and obvious the advantages an organization offers or the worse the lot of the man who is outside it, the more patiently will the members submit themselves. The doctrine, "No salvation outside the Church," reconciles the devout to the control of a hierarchy. In China the deference of the member to gild authority is very great for "the craftsman who is not a gild member is as one exposed to the wintry blast without a cloak."

When the members of a group differ little among themselves in experience or intelligence, the head men will be limited in power and held to account for their official acts. In reform associations, social clubs, professional bodies, and learned societies one never finds blind submission to the dictates of the executive council or board. But in religious bodies and communities, the great inequality among members in respect to wisdom, fervor, and vision often lodges mastery in the natural leaders. If, however, such individuals have ample opportunity to act upon and lead the opinion of the rest, they need no large grant of authority, seeing that they bring their superiority to bear through *personal influence* rather than through *power*. This is why a community under direct membership control may still be guided by its best men. Sam Adams, working within that purest of democracies, the town meeting of Boston, came, nevertheless, to be known as "the master of the puppets," "the king of the caucus" ("calkers").

Manifest integrity inspires a willingness to confide power. It is possible that the decline of interest in local civic assemblies, which has become so marked among Americans in the course of a century, and the disposition to leave everything to the local board, reflects a growing confidence in the integrity of their fellows.

Conversely, one reason for the "almost pure democracy" of the Chinese craft gild appears to be "the deep-rooted distrust of delegated authority or agency which is constant in every Asiatic mind." [2]

The shift from direct democracy to a representative system may come about as a consequence of mere growth in membership. When an assembly includes more than four or five hundred, oratory and crowd feeling are apt to overbear good judgment. Advocates of sane and conservative policies are often hissed down, rational deliberation is easily upset. The history of the *ekklesia,* or general assembly of Athens, shows what happens in a gathering so large as to induce in both speakers and hearers the theatrical spirit. At this point it is necessary to form a small representative body to take over all questions which cannot be answered by a simple "Yes" or "No." The town meeting gives way to government by mayor and common council. Boston, which did not go over to representative government until 1822 when it had 40,000 inhabitants, went about as far with the popular assembly as it is possible to go.

Again, if the members of the group dwell dispersed over a large territory, its control will be monopolized by the members who live near the place of meeting, together with such as have the leisure and means to attend from a distance. Such an unfair advantage calls for the early introduction of the representative system.

The purpose of the group determines its will organization. In an association formed for a *temporary* purpose, the will of the majority naturally prevails; while in an *enduring* group there are others to be considered than the present members. The rule of the older and wiser is urged on behalf of members past and to come. A society for registering and focusing *opinion* will be directly controlled by its members, whereas a group formed for *action* is likely to feel the need of conferring broad powers upon its executive. In case this action is to bear directly upon the *members themselves,* they will be more careful to define and to hedge the powers of their agents than if this action is to be exerted only upon *outsiders.* In missionary, propagandist, philanthropic, and educational societies, one finds less jealousy of delegated power than in town meetings, coöperative societies, trade unions, and communistic groups.

[2] H. B. M. Morse, *The Gilds of China,* 1909, p. 12.

The willingness to leave everything to the leaders, which is so marked when one risks merely an annual contribution, does not appear when the ordinary member *has much at stake*. In a society which may by its action compromise the safety, liberty, property, or prestige of the individual member, the rank and file are tenacious of their right to be consulted.

Usually the head exists to serve the body, but sometimes the body is called into being to serve the head. When an active group of municipal reformers feels the need of a sounding board, it builds up a "Committee of One Hundred" of well-known citizens and professes to be the mere mouthpiece of this committee. In churches which claim for their heads an authority derived through an unbroken line from the Apostles, the bishops do not regard themselves as organs of the body of believers, but rather regard these believers as in duty bound to furnish support and backing for the bishops.

When an organization considers itself sole custodian of a precious body of doctrines, mysteries or rites, its control will be highly centralized. Only the well-tested and fully initiated are held worthy to be intrusted with the transmission of the sacred lore. In religious orders, in the Masonic Order and other hoary secret confraternities, in venerable gilds, and ecclesiastical bodies, the care to hand on an uncorrupted tradition centers authority in some Supreme Chapter or Grand Lodge, composed entirely of head men, or else confides it to a select circle of the older and more experienced. The early appearance of presbyters or elders, bishops and metropolitans in the Christian church seems to have been due to the need felt of keeping the faith pure from the heresies spread by unauthorized teachers and prophets. Thus Clement urges: "Let us esteem those who have the rule over us, let us honor our presbyters," while Ignatius declares he heard the voice of the Spirit proclaiming the words: "Do nothing without the bishop."

The administering of corporate property is not favorable to the keeping of power by the general assembly of the members. Hence, a group that becomes wealthy is likely to lose its pristine democracy. A town meeting may make wise decisions as to roads, ferries, and common lands, for these are well understood by all; but diversified property interests requiring intelligent care if they are to remain productive, press home upon a membership the wisdom

of intrusting their management to a select few. From his study of village communities, Sir Henry Maine concludes that "the autocratically governed manorial group is better suited than the village group for bringing under cultivation a country in which waste lands are extensive. So also does it seem to me likely to have been at all times more tolerant of agricultural novelties."

The nature of the matter to be dealt with determines will organization. If a matter lies within the ken of all and the proper disposal of it does not call for technical knowledge, it may well be *settled in general assembly*. The folk-mote of the ancient village community was quite at home in considering the time of mowing the common meadow, the rights of pasturage on the waste, the re-allotment of plow land, and the upkeep of roads and irrigation canals. In the town meeting of our ancestors, the opening of highways, the building of bridges, the treatment of strayed stock, the maintenance of the school, and the care of the poor were well within the grasp of common minds lit up by sober discussion.

But when a group is obliged to deal with matters outside the experience or knowledge of its ordinary members, *power is likely to be delegated*. The running of a coöperative store, elevator, or creamery lodges decision in a manager subject to a board of directors. The proper adjustment of dues and benefits is so technical a matter that, once the insurance feature has become prominent in a fraternal order or a friendly society, power tends to concentrate. The miners' courts of the California gold diggings dispensed a rough-and-ready justice so long as disputes related to sluice-boxes and claims; but as soon as property relations became complicated by leases, contracts, and debts, the camp chose a judge to try cases.

When *external relations* are in the foreground, the members of a group are conscious of being on thin ice. Knowing little of the outside forces with which the group must come to terms, they have to trust the few who appear to understand them. Hence the delicate process of *adjustment*—to church, to law, or to civil authorities, to other like groups, to a central body, to antagonists, or to competitors—prompts a more liberal grant of power to the head men of a group. When attention shifts again to internal affairs, the membership is likely to tie down these men again. When home affairs are overshadowed by foreign affairs, the situ-

ation strengthens parliament against public, ministry against parliament, throne against people. The security of a sea-girt or mountain-girt people favors the growth of popular government, but the pendulum swings the other way if the national economy comes to be based on foreign trade or if wide-flung empire permanently exalts remote matters above near matters. *Imperialism is of necessity anti-democratic.*

Does the question to be dealt with relate to *policy* or to the *means of carrying out a policy?* The latter is likely to involve technical considerations and naturally will be passed up to the better informed. The full congregation will decide on the question of church union, but hardly on the precise terms of such union. The members of a coöperative society are fitter to debate the formation of branches than to formulate the rights and duties of the daughter society respecting the mother society. To the citizens may well be referred the questions: *Shall we build a capitol? Shall we bond ourselves for highway improvement? Shall we establish "mothers' compensation"? Shall we protect game?* But they are not qualified to settle the plan of the state house, the type of road to be built, the conditions of granting aid to the mothers of dependent children, or the length of the closed season for game.

Again, the membership may set up certain agencies or institutions, leaving their precise mode of operation to be otherwise determined. Whether a scientific society shall found a research laboratory, a town organize a fire brigade, a trade union start an out-of-work fund, or a church establish a mission board may be decided by the members; but the many subordinate decisions which hinge upon their affirmative action in such cases must be made upon the basis of a fuller knowledge of details than they can hope to acquire.

A further distinction to be made is that between the adoption of a rule and its application to particular cases. Usually the former calls for a more general participation of wills than the latter. The chapter of the Knights of the Order of Hospitalers prescribed the rules of discipline which the superior enforced. The town meeting passed ordinances which were to be carried into effect by its chosen officials. The assembled gold miners agreed upon the laws of the camp but their standing committee or judge saw to their enforcement. The organized physicians adopt a code of ethics

for their profession, leaving the punishment of its violators to individual practitioners or to the local medical society.

Even if the members of a group confide to a select body the making of laws, creed, ritual, declaration of principles, or code of discipline, they will keep their hands on matters in the deciding of which their agents *may have an interest contrary to that of the general membership.* It is, therefore, in *financial affairs* that the resistance to the centralization of power is most stubborn. Let the head men hold the steering wheel if only their constituents grasp the brake![3] In a jealous control of the alienation of corporate property, the incurring of debt, the audit of accounts, the tenure and compensation of officials, the appropriation of funds, the distribution of burdens, or the entering into trade agreement, alliance, or merger, the spirit of self-government may show itself long after all other corporate decisions have been passed up to the select or the expert. To be convinced of this we have but to recall constitutional restrictions on the size of the public debt, the requirement of a referendum on a bond issue, and the rule that the vote on appropriation bills shall be recorded and larger than on other bills.

Why fighting groups centralize decision. Frequent emergencies, calling for quick decisions, favor the concentrating of power in a small nucleus. When *promptitude* is clearly essential to success, the molding of many wills into one is felt to be too time consuming. While the meeting deliberates or the election goes on, the golden moment for action may have passed never to return. Under such circumstances the handicap democracy imposes is plain to all. Hence, the more recurrent the need of prompt decision, the more willing are the members of a group to intrust large powers to a few.

The need of *secrecy* has the same effect. It is impossible for many to take part in making a decision if that decision has to be concealed from foes or competitors.

Now, in all forms of strife—commercial rivalry, industrial struggle, political contest, negotiation, diplomacy, and warfare—*both promptness and secrecy are necessary.* Hence, *fighting groups*

[3] In the old Castilian Cortes, as in the early English Parliament, the point of insistence was not the right of the representatives of the people to participate in law making, or to control royal policy, but that no tax should be levied without the assent of Parliament.

finally lodge large power in the hands of the trusted few. Stockholders limit themselves to the opportunity at stated intervals of turning out one board of directors and putting in another. Trade-unionists may insist on the ballot for the calling or ending of a strike, but, while the fight is on, they allow decisions of the gravest import to be made by their officials. The rank and file of political parties may pick the nominees, but the conduct of the campaign is left in the hands of an irresponsible committee. A democratic government at war is evidently handicapped as to promptness and secrecy of decision. The consequence is that during a serious national war public discussion is damped, the press is curbed, the legislature becomes less responsible to the electors, and the executive becomes less responsible to the legislature.

The mode of organizing will affects character. Taking part in the making of group will strengthens character; exclusion weakens it. In Canada, under the old French régime, no local self-government was tolerated. Roads and bridges were under a royal official. Only in church matters had the people a voice, but no parish meeting to consider the cost of a new church could be held without the special permission of the *intendant*. There were no municipal officers. The ordinances of the *intendant* and the council were law. All aspirations for a larger liberty were thwarted by governor, *intendant,* and bishop, acting on instructions from the king of France.

What was the type of character produced? When, during the Revolution, the American conquest brought the French creoles of the Illinois country under institutions of self-government, they were, in the words of Roosevelt, "hopelessly unable to grapple with the new life. They had been accustomed to the paternal rule of priest and military commandant and they were quite unable to govern themselves, or to hold their own with the pushing, eager, and often unscrupulous new-comers." The early withdrawal of the Americans left the French free to do as they pleased. "Accustomed for generations to a master, they could do nothing with their new-found liberty beyond making it a curse to themselves and their neighbors." The judges they had elected "had no idea of their proper functions as a governing body to administer justice. At first they did nothing whatever beyond meet and adjourn." Finally they went to granting one another immense tracts of adjacent wild land. Plunged into chaos, the creoles sent petition

after petition to Congress. "There is one striking difference between these petitions and the similar requests and complaints made from time to time by the different groups of American settlers west of the Alleghenies. Both alike set forth the evils which the petitioners suffered, and the necessity of governmental remedy. But whereas the Americans invariably asked that they be allowed to govern themselves, being delighted to undertake the betterment of their condition on their own account, the French, on the contrary, habituated through generations to paternal rule, were more inclined to request that somebody fitted for the task should be sent to govern them." [4] Yet these creoles were descendants of people who had once managed their common affairs in local assemblies.The most beautiful products of the Middle Ages, the churches, town halls, and cathedrals of France and Flanders, were financed by the people living all their lives near them, every man having a voice in the matter.

The outlook for will organization. Various modern developments are affecting the current mode of organizing will. Thanks to the rising plane of popular intelligence, the members of open groups continually gain in capacity to judge common affairs. The printing press and improved electoral methods facilitate the forming and focusing of the will of dispersed persons. On the other hand, questions once plain have become technical and simple matters have become complicated. Large-scale effort being called for, small societies are often obliged to merge into wider organizations, the result being that decision is farther removed from the members. In many lines mere experience is no longer enough and the trained man steps into the shoes of the amateur. To the expert, restrained by his professional conscience, strict control is nagging and hampering. Nowadays, too, at the elbow of the power holder stands imperious public opinion, so that there is less need to tie him down in advance by the mandate of his constituents.

The net outcome of these numerous fundamental changes is not the same in different fields. In some kinds of association the trend is plainly democratic, in others it is unmistakably toward small boards and expert permanent officials. What is to be the general trend is a matter upon which wise men may utterly disagree.

One thing we can be sure of—the Fascist rejection of anything resembling democracy will not captivate politically maturer na-

[4] Theodore Roosevelt, *The Winning of the West*, 1889, vol. II, p. 184.

tions. The Fascist régimes may survive so long as *external* affairs —war, peace, armaments, colonies, outside influences fomenting revolution, etc.—can be kept in the forefront of public attention. But when *internal* questions come uppermost—as they are bound to do eventually—"What is it that most of us want?" will be seen to be the one way out of endless jangling and bitterness. And this is the principle of democracy!

The panic and rage the Fascist régimes fall into at any voicing of criticism or opposition betray how little they trust the foundations on which they rest. On the other hand, the patience and tolerance democratic régimes show toward critics and opponents evidence their consciousness of stability.

CHAPTER XXXII

THE ORGANIZATION OF THOUGHT

Mohammedan theology, Roman law, or the *Nibelungen Lied* is no less a team product than is the Panama Canal. No pyramid or cathedral embodies the labors of so many generations of artificers as the science, let us say, of astronomy. The Common Law of England, the Yogi philosophy of India, or a matured branch of knowledge like Physics, constitutes an integrated system, yet no one head, or even score of heads, can claim the credit of so much logic. The process of thus articulating ideas from different minds as steel beams are fitted together into a bridge span may be termed *the organization of thought.*

Common opinion, too, is usually the residue of many individual contributions which have been winnowed each in the minds of the rest. Behind the eighteenth-century Liberal movement, the Romantic movement, the Oxford movement, behind Impressionism, Realism, Symbolism, or Anarchism, lies a complex of ideas which no one man propounded. A "school" of thought, of literature, or of art starts not always with master and disciples, often it begins with a band of like-minded rebels against the conventional, who stimulate and influence one another until they work out a creed, a style, or a manner which can make its way. The public clamors to be shown the "father" of the labor movement, of industrial unionism, of scientific charity, of the new penology, or of the public-recreation movement. As likely as not, he turns out to be a group of seminal minds coming gradually into touch and finding their way to a common doctrine or program.

There is intellectual team work, too, on much smaller problems than those of the great society. In each group—church, college, trade union, or coöperative society—there goes on a joint working out of opinion as to the special problems and policies of that group; and, while opinion *may* but reflect the counsel of some sage member, it is usually the outcome of the coöperation of a number of minds.

Thought specialization begets intellectual parasitism. The primitive tribesman had more influence on current ideas of right and wrong than has the common man after theologian and philosopher have had their say in the setting up of moral distinctions. Early law springs from the customs of the folk, but the time comes when judges and law-givers have most to do with its fashioning. Poetry improvised, sung and danced, stanza by stanza, in the primitive festal crowd, ends as the handiwork of a few gifted wordsmiths. About the time of Socrates we see fruitful philosophic thinking quit street corner and market-place to hide with a circle of choice spirits in some secluded garden. In Athens, says Zimmern, "the first people to make a regular use of private gardens and to look upon them as indispensable were the philosophers." [1]

You see as society develops fewer of us share in organizing its thought. More and more our headaches come from trying to appropriate the fruits of *other men's* thinking. The reason is, *team-thinking goes on only among persons well matched in equipment.* Hence, as soon as there appear in any field men of special knowledge, with exceptional facilities in the way of collections, laboratories, travel, mutual access, and stimulating association, the rest of us content ourselves with walking henceforth in the trails such men have blazed. The rise of scientific medicine makes it impossible for "wise" women with their herb gardens to contribute henceforth to the art of healing. With the spread of agricultural experiment stations, the intelligent farmer with only his own experience to go on makes no further contribution to agriculture. Just as we become parasites on the experts who wire our houses and test our food, so our minds become parasites on the specialized minds engaged in rearing law, morality, religion, literature, and science. More and more we "dubs" retire to the side lines and watch the star players advance the ball. The bulk of us become mere passengers, doing nothing to get the ship forward but pay the wages of those who work her.

But while without protest we drop out of society's *thought organization,* we cling jealously to our place in its *will organization.* Although most of us no longer discuss the foundations of right and wrong for fear of getting beyond our depth, we insist on choosing freely between the traditional ethics and the new moralities. For all that the framing of religion now goes on far above

[1] A. E. Zimmern, *The Greek Commonwealth,* 1911, p. 56.

his head, the ordinary man is not mentally enslaved so long as he may please himself as to the type of religion he adopts. The committing of the technical tasks of government to trained men does not, as some allege, substitute "government by experts" for "the people's government." The determining of functions and policies still rests with the citizens or their representatives. State highway engineer, food chemist, forester, or pathologist, is there only as a servant to carry out effectively the people's purpose.

UNCONSCIOUS ORGANIZATION OF THOUGHT

How language grew. Worn path and made road are collective products, but the makers of the former knew not what they did. Until writing or printing made it possible to fix and identify the product of the individual artist or thinker, the organizing of thought into stable forms must have gone on mainly in an unconscious way. That greatest storehouse of thought, *language,* came into being by a process which scholars describe as *growth,* rather than *production.* Tarde gives all the credit of language to word inventors, forgetting that every word or phrase they coined had to run the gauntlet of the tribe. Only those which struck their fellows as pat or fit survived, and these were trimmed or twisted to suit better the tongues or minds of the users.

So was it with the making of popular proverbs, sayings, and riddles. Some, no doubt, were struck off perfect in an inspired moment; but others reached their terse and telling form only after many wits had helped to file, and point, and barb them. No end of sayings failed to "make a hit" and were forgotten; so that the ones treasured and handed down were just those which "rang a bell" in the average mind.

Communal origination among preliterate peoples. Nor are myth, fairy tale, legend, folksong, or ballad to be looked upon as handiwork of the individual artist, like the modern poem or drama. Scholars now assure us that they were "communal" in origin. This does not mean that the "people" was their author, but that unknown numbers had a hand in fashioning them. Since such proverbs and sayings were transmitted only by oral tradition, they were so easily molded to the general taste, that each embodies and expresses not an *individual* mind, but the soul of the *tribe* or the *folk.* The author of the ballad, insists Professor Gummere, is "the singing, dancing, improvising crowd." Among

primitives, as among old-style European peasants, nearly every one can improvise. In the festal dance songs are built up bit by bit, one after another contributing a short improvisation in the intervals of a chorus. Winnowed, handed down in tradition, and gradually perfected, they become ballad and folksong.

One reason the verses of negro folksongs are so broken and fragmentary is that they originated in the communal excitement of the religious assembly. "A happy phrase, a striking bit of imagery, flung out by some individual was taken up and repeated by the whole congregation. Naturally the most expressive phrases, the lines that most adequately voiced the deep, unconscious desires of the whole people, were remembered longest and repeated most frequently. There was, therefore, a process of natural selection by which the best, the most representative verses, those which most adequately expressed the profounder and more permanent moods and sentiments of the Negro, were preserved and became part of the permanent tradition of the race." [2]

Literary research has shown the folk epic, *Iliad* or *Mahabarata,* to be a unified collection of song stuffs which had long been accumulating. For arranging and harmonizing the traditional materials, filling the gaps, rounding them all into an artistic whole, and writing it down, the epic poet got all the glory of the epic; but we now recognize him as, in truth, the artistic organizer of the lays of many forgotten singers.

Why the communal fount dries up. When a folk takes to reading, it loses the knack of improvising; communal poesy dies out and the individual artist holds the center of the stage. Thus arises a kind of parasitism, the people at large becoming passive consumers of literature, while the producer is the one in ten thousand—the creative man of letters.

Once written down or printed, a man's work is tagged and stays as he left it. As such works accumulate, the communal fount dries up. Specialists and schools arise, so that the people at large no longer bear a hand in advancing thought or art. The folk being out of it, why does not the individual take the bit in his teeth and bolt? Surely there will be confusion, a riot of temperament and caprice! No, the thought of an age shows much consistency and dovetails fairly well into the past. Most of the literary master-

[2] R. Park, *Publications of the American Sociological Society,* vol. XIII, p. 55.

pieces of a period show certain common characteristics, as if the writers had been taking account of one another.

One reason is *the dependence of the creative genius on other geniuses, living and dead.* Few minds become pregnant with a literary work until they have been fructified by close acquaintance with the best that has been said or sung. Taine exhorts the striving artist: "Fill your spirit and your heart, however great they may be, with the ideas and feelings of your century and the work of art will come." Another organizing influence is the *public,* which acts as a sieve, retaining some products of genius, letting others drop to the scrap heap. Since thinkers cannot give ethics or law a slant that will bring it into constant clash with the popular sense of right, since poets and artists cannot long run counter to the popular taste, the barren public is after all "a sleeping partner" in the culture of the time. "They reckon ill who leave *me* out!" The public, however, has little to do with the rising structure of *science.* Unlike jurisprudence or literature, which have to suit themselves to *the people,* science has to conform to *reality.* Its line of advance is determined by its own canons of truth, not by popular favor. A music the people will not listen to, a literature they will not read, a morality they will not approve, can hardly be said to exist for them; but *a science they do not comprehend may be serving them in countless ways.*

CONSCIOUS ORGANIZATION OF THOUGHT

Dialectic. Commenting on the modes of organizing thought Wallas says: [3]

The simplest and oldest is that which is constituted by a small number of persons—from two to perhaps seven or eight—who meet together for the purpose of sustained oral discussion. This form may be studied at its finest point of development in the dialogues of Plato. It is, as the Greeks knew, extraordinarily difficult. At first sight it might appear that the main condition of its success is that it should be as little "organized' as possible, that the group should meet by accident, and that each member of the group should freely obey his casual impulses both in speaking and in remaining silent. But a closer examination shows that the full efficiency of argument, carried on even by the most informal body of friends, requires not only that each should be master of the most delicate shades of the same language, and

[3] G. Wallas, *The Great Society,* 1914, pp. 242-43.

that each should be accustomed to make use of similar rules of Thought, but that they should have a large body of knowledge in common, that each should be familiar with the peculiar strength and weakness of each of the others, and, above all, that each should be influenced by the same desire to follow truth "whithersoever the argument may lead." All this requires that the group should consist, not of men of average powers who have come accidentally together, but of men selected (as Socrates, for instance, selected his disciples) in some way which should secure that the worst of them should possess a rather unusual share of natural ability, acquired training, and interest in ideas.[4] And normally, the necessary discipline and concentration cannot be secured unless some one of the party is accepted by the others as a leader, and does not abuse his position.

The neglect of dialectic in our own time he attributes to the difficulty of modern thinkers coming together frequently, to the use of print in circulating ideas, and to the fact that the modern scientist does much of his thinking while he is closely observing the concrete in the laboratory or the field. He insists, however, that we now rely too much on reading and solitary thinking, and that, in branches whose subject matter is human action and feeling, oral dialectic "has magnificent possibilities of fertility." One advantage is "a great extension of the range of immediate mental association." The solitary thinker, having tackled a problem, "waits till some promising idea comes into his mind and then dwells on it till further ideas spring from it." But if a group is engaged upon the problem, the waits are shorter, and each gets the benefit of such happy thoughts as occur to the other.

Apart from this, many minds are keyed to their best only when at grips with other congenial minds. Solitude is needed, to be sure, for working out and fusing together ideas, but usually one's mind

[4] Testifies Dr. Arthur E. Morgan of the Tennessee Valley Authority:

For a good many years I have sat on boards of trustees and boards of directors. . . . As a rule the process of reaching a decision which characterizes small groups of experienced administrators, while it is very informal, is nevertheless a very complex process. As discussion proceeds there is a constant weighing of what is said, as well as of the intelligence, judgment, experience, motives and interests of the speakers. Sometimes the silence of one or more of the group is more eloquent than anything which is spoken. Gradually there tends to emerge a dominant weight of opinion which is recognized by the group as a whole, becomes the consensus of judgment, and takes form as the decision is reached. Sometimes the decision grows out of the general give-and-take of discussion, sometimes it represents the opinion of a single person who is especially well-qualified to appraise the issue. *Social Forces*, Vol. 13, p. 1.

leaps and mounts best in discussion with a few kindred spirits who have like intellectual background and interest, attach the same meaning to words, and recognize the same rules of thought. The visible effort of each suggests a like effort to the rest. Challenge rouses the emulative spirit, and one is stirred by the evident zest of one's fellows in the sport of chasing ideas.

Such dialectic is, however, rare, for it presupposes a technique which few know, or knowing, will observe. Apart from such obvious pitfalls as lack of real mental sympathy among the participants, use of terms in different senses, neglect to define the issue, and straying from the question, we see countless discussions end in nothing because there has been, in fact, no coöperation. One welcomes the opportunity to air his prejudices. Another loves to hear himself talk. This disputant thinks he is in a tourney, while that one knows nothing on the subject, but will display his versatility. If any one participant lacks respect for others, good manners, or a love of truth greater than love of self, the discussion turns into fireworks, a sparring match, or a monologue.

Printed discussion versus oral. Print eliminates personal factors—appearance, voice, manners, etc.—which in oral discussion often prove a stumbling-block to concerted thinking. On the other hand, it is less stimulating to the minds engaged, and the participants may miss a close grapple. Sophistry, insincerity, and pose are not so promptly unmasked as in oral intercourse. Contrasting the mode of organizing thought in government departments with the oral methods of Parliament, Mr. Wallas observes:

> The total effect, therefore, of a modern official organization based solely on writing is the combination of great efficiency in the handling of detail on established lines, with the existence of an "official atmosphere" which may be incompatible with some of the finer intellectual requirements of government, and has, in fact, often produced a general dislike of official methods among the outside public.[5]

The decline of disputation. How formal disputation has fallen into discredit as an instrument for ascertaining truth! Recall the breathless interest in theological and metaphysical disputes in Christian Alexandria, Antioch, and Byzantium. In the Middle Ages it stood in high favor, and it was not until well into the modern era that Sir Henry Wotton observed: "The itch of

[5] G. Wallas, *The Great Society*, 1914, p. 270.

disputing makes the scab of the churches." Once scholars could think of no better feat for the budding Doctor of Philosophy than to take an intellectual position and maintain it against all comers. Long ago in the University of Berlin I saw a youth qualify for his doctorate by defending his "thesis" against three friends, each attacking it in a speech prepared in advance by the candidate himself and gracefully surrendering after his objections had been neatly bowled over!

That we now see disputation as *futile wrangling* rather than *coöperation* is owing, no doubt, to the triumphs of science. The students of nature have got on so wonderfully, not by wielding sharper wits than the Schoolmen had, but by resorting to *observation, experiment, measurement,* and *record.* Their technique succeeds even in attack upon the problems of mind, government, and society, so that every year sees it carried into new fields of inquiry. We realize now that *full knowledge of the relevant facts* is a prerequisite for profitable discussion.

When men of science meet, much time is given to presenting the results of investigation, little to discussion. Such difference of opinion as may develop touching the correct interpretation of these results is presently traced to some flaw or ambiguity in the data, which can be removed by ascertaining certain facts not yet brought to light. If genealogies and herd books leave students of heredity still in doubt, they devise crucial breeding experiments which will settle the question one way or another. If geologists differ as to the number of glacial periods the deposits indicate, instead of wrangling they scatter to renewed study of moraine and drift. Let sociologists disagree as to whether fewer births mean declining fertility or limitation of the family, and soon some one settles the matter by drawing out confidential information from some hundreds of married couples. The continual expansion of government statistical inquiries testifies to the growing demand for adequate data as a basis for the profitable discussion of proposed laws and policies.

The waning of forensic debate. Despite the glowing testimonials lawyers give it, doubt is spreading as to the value of the time-honored contentious procedure of the courtroom. The best qualified man there, the judge, it reduces to a mere umpire; hence a rising demand that his rôle be magnified. More and more, chemists, physicians, and alienists testify *for the court,* not for

one side, and some of our courts retain such experts on their staff. In the juvenile court the methods of drawing out the truth and reaching a judgment resemble those of a clinic. Before the great administrative boards that have been set up in some of our states —trade commissions, public utilities commissions, industrial commissions, etc.—a direct, matter-of-fact procedure borrowed from science leaves small scope for the battle between opposing lawyers. On a question of grade crossing or factory ventilation, instead of hearing advocates, the commissions have their trusty agents get the lie of the land or analyze the factory air.

There is good reason why on public questions people are coming to hearken more to intellectuals outside of public life—university presidents, inventors, scholars, philanthropists, and captains of industry—and less to parliamentary orators. Owing to the clamor of each locality to have its own man in the legislature, the law-making body is so large that only by courtesy can it be called "deliberative." It is there *to register will,* and this function keeps it bigger than any thinking group should be. It includes too many who are inert, or who talk "buncombe" for the "folks back home." The thinking members themselves are vitiated. Before an assembly so large they fire off "speeches of the lamp," which so poorly focus upon the issues developed in discussion that opponents glide past each other like locomotives on parallel tracks. They are tempted to oratory, the foe of logic, and to partizan debate, the foe of reasonableness. Hence the "House" limits itself to ultimate decision, while the hammering of laws into shape goes on only in committees of a dozen men or less.

The democratic-looking proposal to make all committee sessions public is a newspapermen's proposal to hunt frank and fruitful discussion from its last refuge in capitols. The barrenness of the average full-dress legislative debate is due to pose, the participants addressing, not their fellow members, but a less enlightened outside public. Instead of candid man-to-man talk, we get claptrap and sparring for party advantage. Publicity would introduce a like insincerity into committee discussions and oblige the majority representatives to talk matters over informally in advance in order to clarify their minds before the curtain went up!

Rubber-stamp participation. The bodies charged with thinking upon the policies of business corporations, colleges, charities, associations, and clubs are small, rarely including more than a

score of members. Such a group is not unwieldy, but still it is a problem how to get all the members to keep their minds taut. Thus Mr. Wallas testifies:

> I have myself, during the last twenty-five years, sat through perhaps three thousand meetings of municipal committees of different sizes and for different purposes, and I am sure that at least half the men and women with whom I have sat were entirely unaware that any conscious mental effort on their part was called for. They attended in almost exactly the same mental attitude in which some of them went to church—with a vague sense that they were doing their duty and that good must come of it. If they became interested in the business it was an accident. Of the remaining half, perhaps two-thirds had come with one or two points which they wanted to 'get through,' and meanwhile let the rest of the business drift past them, unless some phrase in the discussion roused them to a more or less irrelevant interruption.[6]

Such persons are prone to follow the lead of dominating individuals who will spare them brain wear and tear. At one time the governing boards of some great American corporations had so abdicated their thinking function that directors intrusted with the interests of thousands of stockholders would in ten minutes dispose of motions involving tens of millions of dollars. The arrogant order, "Vote first and debate afterward," shows how the magnate had come to look upon the board as his private rubber stamp. Says the Interstate Commerce Commission of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company: "A number of directors appear in many instances to have voted without knowledge and to have approved the expenditure of many millions without information. . . . They merely approved what had been done by some committee or some officers of the Company. The directors' minutes reveal that it was largely a body of ratification."

The ruin that followed in the wake of such financial dictatorships shows how barbarous it is in vast and complicated affairs to rely on individual judgment rather than on concerted thought.

A skilful chairman may do much to invigorate his board. By suggestion here and there a man gifted with imagination may so link the business in hand with vital persons and issues as to whet interest. By feigned skepticism or carping criticism of the good ideas put forth he may irritate the more inert members to the point of attention. Or he may dart a timely glance, a query, or

[6] G. Wallas, *The Great Society*, 1914, p. 276.

a personal allusion that will rouse the flagging mind to effortful thought. The fact is that the psychology of small deliberating groups has never been properly brought to book.

Must reading displace listening as a source of ideas? Thanks to our growing dependence on the vast impersonal organization that goes on far above our heads, reading is taking the place of oral intercourse as a source of ideas. Machine clatter, and shop supervision are squeezing spoken discussion out of the working hours of wage earners, while the reading habit restricts it in their leisure. Most urban minds feed on newspapers as silk-worms feed on mulberry leaves. Upon the consciousness of multitudes the daily sheet stamps impressions, ideas, and beliefs, just as the Hoe press prints endlessly the same thing upon miles of white paper.

Even if the wider reading of magazines and books should check the manufacture of public opinion in this wholesale way by irresponsible newspaper owners, it would still be bad for the bulk of people never to get beyond so unstimulating a way of gaining ideas. Welcome, therefore, be the newer pedagogy which encourages the pupil to self-activity and trains him to debate and the oral interchange of ideas! Even more promising is the spread of "social centers" where neighbors in their common hall consider community problems of which they have first-hand knowledge.

THE PLANNED ORGANIZATION OF THOUGHT

Intellectual coöperation within the political party. Where, as in South America, no machinery exists for eliciting judgment on public questions from numerous scattered persons, the formulas of a party emanate from a few leaders, who put forth in a "manifesto" the best compromise they can make between what they think and what they imagine will appeal to the voters. In our early history a political program would be worked out by the members of Congress belonging to the same party. In a later stage local party supporters chose delegates to a convention which considered the declaration of principles laid before it by a large and representative "committee on the platform."

Although the delegate convention exists primarily to arrive at common *purposes* rather than at common *judgments, i.e.*, to find out what the members *want,* rather than what they *think,* the deliberating element of a party does tend to become larger. That the ultimate sources of their opinions may be half a score of states-

men, publicists, or philosophical writers does not qualify the statement that the political party is moving toward a more comprehensive organization of thought.

Intellectual coöperation in government. Now that government every year touches the lives of its citizens at more points, there is need of a wider organization of thought respecting particular projects of law. One means of getting more thought behind a law is the public committee hearing in which the spokesmen for scientific and professional bodies and for public welfare organizations frequently contribute judgments which a great many first-class minds have helped to form. One foresees not only that legislative committees will more often sit between sessions and hold hearings in different places, so as to sample thoroughly the mind of the country, but that they will more frequently resort to the principal *thought foci* in society. Groups of disinterested experts such as are found in the Council on Foreign Relations, the Genetic Association, the Life Extension Institute, the Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, and many like bodies, will be invited to give an opinion as to legislative proposals within their field, or even to formulate the essentials of a sound public policy.

In the older theory of self-government the civil servant was an inert tool, from whom the representatives of the government could learn nothing. We now see that the trained permanent official is quite as able a man as the legislator and possesses, moreover, a fund of valuable technical knowledge and experience which the legislator lacks. In the interest of rational law-making, there should be nothing to hinder the head of an inspection service, the chief forester, the superintendent of insurance, or the chairman of the farm-loan board from appearing before a legislative committee on a matter within his ken and shedding on it such light as he may have.

Intellectual coöperation in scientific inquiry. Team work in seeking truth is very old. The Academy of Plato, who bequeathed to his followers his walled garden and appointments in the place in Athens named after the hero Hekademus, became the model for all scientific bodies and universities, just as the famous Museum of Alexandria gave its name to all our collections of scientific materials. In the great research institution maintained in Alexandria by the Ptolemies, the state makes its first appearance as promoter of the arts and sciences. The brilliant contribu-

tions of the Alexandrian school were due not wholly to the observatory, library, dissecting house, laboratories, and collections provided, nor even to the endowment of productive scholars. In the Museum, as in a modern university, were gathered astronomers, geographers, mathematicians, physicists, naturalists, and historians, who not only studied and meditated, but, through converse and debate, kindled one another to a brighter incandescence, like embers laid together.

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed the founding of several academies of inquirers, who examined and discussed one another's contributions to knowledge and decided which deserved to be published. Italy led the way in forming such groups, the most famous of which is the *Accademia dei Lincei* ("of the lynx-eyed"), which had as one of its earliest English members the great champion of the inductive method, Lord Bacon, whose forecast of a great research institution in his "New Atlantis" was in a way realized in the founding in 1662 of the Royal Society of Great Britain. The Paris Academy of Sciences, instituted in 1666, has the most brilliant record of all for the sending out of scientific expeditions, the support of fruitful research undertakings, and the coördination of inquiries. The French Institute, incorporated shortly after the Revolution, has undoubtedly done more than any other single agency to focus choice minds upon the problems of pure knowledge.

In modern science, the tendency to vaster and more sustained coöperation is pronounced. Some learned societies have embarked on undertakings which have required well-nigh a century to complete. The investigation of natural events which recur infrequently, like earthquakes and sun-spot periods, or of very slow processes like star movements, climatic alterations, land elevations or subsidences, and the evolutionary changes in organisms, call for a volume and continuity of effort far surpassing the scope and span of life of any individual inquirer. There is even an international association of academies which has brought about world-wide coöperation in solar research and in the anatomy of the human brain.

No doubt such teamwork is more successful in providing data than in discovering new truths. The history of science shows that the guiding and fruitful ideas which contain the seeds of later developments spring up in the mind of the solitary investigator

or thinker. Remember Wordsworth's lines on Sir Isaac Newton's statue at Cambridge:

> The marble index of a mind forever
> Wandering through strange fields of thought alone.

It is certain, however, that he who wrests new secrets from the Sphinx must watch the product of his co-workers everywhere and keep in constant and vital touch with everything that any creative mind the world over is doing in his field. Bound closely together by their special societies and journals, the attackers of the same problem in many lands form, as it were, a single band of treasure seekers digging in neighboring spots for buried gold.

No coöperation in artistic creation. While many may join forces in working out a group of alkaloids, investigating radioactivity, or carrying out a vast experiment in heredity, it is not so in the sphere of art. Never does the work of art bear the name of a group. Normally, the book, the poem, the play, the picture, the bust, the song, is the product of an individual.

This is because a scientific truth in order to be utilized does not need to attract the attention of the public. A discovery about vitamins or bacteria may serve mankind just as well if it reaches only physicians or sanitarians. A work of art, on the other hand, is intended to act upon us directly. The poem, or picture, or song is not a means to something beyond, but makes an immediate appeal to the human mind. It is the inevitable rivalry of artists to attract the notice of the busy preoccupied public that calls into being the professional critics of literature, music, art, and drama. Without them to advise it what to read, listen to or look at the public would be at the mercy of the megaphone and the "ad" man.

VEILED PROPAGANDA

The most sinister foe of the orderly organization of the people's thinking on public questions is sly, artful *propaganda, i.e.,* "an effort deliberately to manufacture popular opinion and attitudes and thus to control popular conduct; usually the implication is that the aims of the propagandists are concealed." [7]

Propaganda reaches the intellect through the emotions. Its instruments are myths, legends, and stereotypes, and these become effective through the use of suggestion. "The emotional associa-

[7] Kimball Young, *Social Psychology,* 1930, p. 653.

tion of words and pictures with ideas and attitudes is provided by our early conditioning. Through the technique of suggestion the propagandist plays on these suggestions." [8] The materials are consciously manufactured and are usually hammered out of half truths, many times out of downright falsehoods.

In the course of the World War it was discovered that factory methods can be applied with success to the manufacture of opinion and the technique of propaganda was brought to a high level of efficiency. In the post-War epoch this instrument has been carried to still higher stages of diabolical perfection. In the old days when the spoken word was the sole medium, the masters of the art of swaying crowds were under some restraint; they could not be indifferent to what wise and decent people thought of them! But propaganda put out from invisible and anonymous sources (unlike the public-spirited endeavors to popularize religion, health, or temperance) is under no restraint whatever. There is as yet no means of bringing responsibility home to those who set it going. Integrity and credibility are not called for, it is all a matter of how much money is cleverly expended! A hundred thousand dollars will produce a certain perversion of public judgment to your ends, a million dollars will produce a much bigger perversion! This means that our money masters, working under cover, can employ a portion of their ample resources to make themselves shapers of public policy. No deadlier weapon against public welfare has ever been fabricated.

When we consider how a foreign power with designs of its own might secretly set afoot a propaganda intended to fool naïve citizens into favoring something detrimental to their country, or how an objectionable commercial interest intent only on profit—the liquor trade, the stock-market operators, or the public utilities—can pour unlimited sums secretly into a vast propaganda against any needed form of public regulation, it should be obvious that at least two new measures will have to be taken for the protection of the public mind: One is that the money that feeds any propaganda of size be traced to its sources and become a matter of public record, which any one can publish; the other is that persistence in circulating false or misleading statements may afford a ground for criminal prosecution.

[8] Kimball Young, *Social Psychology*, 1930, p. 655.

PART VI

CLASS AND CASTE

CHAPTER

XXXIII. Stratification

XXXIV. The Rise of Gross Inequalities

XXXV. Gradation

XXXVI. Segregation and Subordination

XXXVII. Equalization of Opportunity

XXXVIII. The Social Circulation of Individuals

CHAPTER XXXIII

STRATIFICATION

Quite aside from conquest, layers form within a people in consequence of certain processes. Examples of stratified society are numerous enough in both ancient and modern times.

Ancient Babylonia. King Hammurabi ruled

a group of city-provinces in process of unification through the influence of a nationalized religion, a powerful centralized government, a closely interdependent commerce, and a well-recognized legal system which protected property rights and stimulated agriculture and industry. The state was personified in the priest-king, in whom were joined personal prestige and divine authority. Crown lands were held under a feudal tenure by a class of priests, devotees, nobles, military and civil officials, in whose interest the laws were in certain respects carefully framed. To presumably the same social status belonged a class of landowners, bankers, and merchants. Next in the social scale came the tradesmen and artisans, followed by the tenant farmers who held their lands under the metayer system. In the next stratum were the free wage-earning laborers; while last of all came a great body of house and other slaves, upon whose labor the entire economic structure was largely based.[1]

Babylonian society was pyramidal. The King was the apex, and the broad base rested upon a foundation of slaves. Social control was mediated from class to class. Caste and status are embedded in the code. In precise tariffs human values are set forth.[2]

The later Roman Empire. The caste system here was not built up by Roman conquests but was the product of forces within society. Says Dill:

An almost Oriental system of caste has made every social grade and every occupation practically hereditary, from the senator to the waterman on the Tiber, or the sentinel at a frontier

[1] G. Vincent, "The Laws of Hammurabi," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. IX, p. 741.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 753.

post. In a society where poverty is almost branded with infamy poverty is steadily increasing and wealth becoming more insolent and aggressive. The middle or bourgeois class was almost extinguished. Roman financial administration was paralyzed, and at its close the real victors and survivors were the great landholders, surrounded by their serfs and dependents.[3]

The tendency of the later Empire was to stereotype society by compelling men to follow the occupation of their fathers, and preventing a free circulation among different callings and grades of life. The man who brought the grain of Africa to the public stores of Ostia, the baker who made it into loaves for distribution, the butchers who brought pigs from Samnium, Lucania or Bruttium, the purveyors of wine and oil, the men who fed the furnaces of the public baths, were bound to their callings from one generation to another. It was the principle of rural serfdom applied to social functions. Every avenue of escape was closed. A man was bound to his calling not only by his father's but by his mother's condition. Men were not permitted to marry out of their guild. If the daughter of one of the baker caste married a man not belonging to it, her husband was bound to her father's calling. Not even a dispensation obtained by some means from the imperial chancery, not even the power of the Church could avail to break the bond of servitude.[4] In a caste society social feeling spreads only in a horizontal direction.

It is difficult for a modern man to conceive the bounded view of society taken by people like Symmachus and Sidonius, the cold, stately self-content, the absence of sympathy for the masses lying outside the charmed circle of senatorial rank, the placid faith in the permanence of privilege and wealth, the apparent inability to conceive, even in the presence of tremendous forces of disruption, that society should ever cease to move along the ancient lines. They had little care for any but their own caste and family, as the representatives of Græco-Roman culture. With what was regarded as a laudable ambition to add to the 'honours' of the family, and a strenuous devotion to the study and imitation of the great authors, there seemed to the stately noble no reason why the calm ceremonious senatorial life should not go on forever. Society had been elaborately and deliberately stereotyped. As a rule, whatever a man's energy or ambition, he was doomed to work out his life on the precise lines which his ancestors had followed. All ideas of improvement were nipped in the bud, blasted by the stifling atmosphere of a despotism which, with whatever good intentions, received no guidance or inspiration from the thoughts or needs of the masses, and spent all its strength in maintaining unchanged the lines of an ancient system, instead of finding openings for

[3] S. Dill, *Roman Society*, 1904, p. 100.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 194.

fresh development. The same immobility reigned in the education of the privileged class. They felt no material need to stimulate invention and practical energy, and their academic training only deepened and intensified the deadening conservatism of unassailable wealth and rank.[5]

The "old régime" in France. In France before the Revolution the one per cent of the population belonging to the privileged orders possessed half the soil and this the richer and better improved half. A third of the soil was held by absentee lords who, having abandoned their castles to live at court, had lost sympathy with their people and considered only how to squeeze revenue out of them. The resident lords, in order that they might hunt as their ancestors did when France was half-wild, preserved game until the peasant's crops were devoured, while he was forbidden to rear fences which might hamper the chase. The clergy claimed exemption from taxation and all they contributed to the state was a free-will offering. The nobles were free of *taille, corvée,* and military conscription. More than half of what was spent on the army went to the officers, not one of whom could be a plebeian. To be a captain it was necessary to prove four degrees of nobility. All ecclesiastical properties went to abbés and bishops of noble family. All high posts, ecclesiastical and lay, and all sinecures, were reserved for nobles and their protegés.

Feudal Japan. When in 1854 Commodore Perry opened relations with Japan its social organization embraced: first, the throne and the court nobles; second, the military class, *daimyos* and *samurai;* third, the common people or *heimin.* The function of the Mikado was to mediate between his heavenly ancestors and his subjects while all affairs of state were entrusted to the Shogun and the military class. The court nobility, descendants of former mikados, comprised one hundred and fifty-five families. They ranked above the feudal chiefs, filled the court offices, and devoted themselves to literature and art.

About fifty-five out of a thousand of the population were hereditary *samurai* who served as retainers of the two hundred and fifty-five *daimyos* or chiefs of great feudal estates. Half of the peasants' assessed income went to these feudal chiefs and their retainers. Below this class come about fifteen-sixteenths of the population known as *heimin,* or commoners. They were divided

[5] *Ibid.,* p. 176.

into three classes: husbandmen, artisans and traders, the last standing lowest. Below these came the *eta* (defiled folks) and the *hinim* (outcastes), altogether about a million people.

Contemporary India. Of the 240 millions of the Hindu faith in a population of 353 millions six per cent are Brahmans, the highest caste, and a fourth are "untouchables" quite below the caste hierarchy. Strictly speaking what counts is the sub-caste, *i.e.*, that group of families into whom you can marry, from whom you can take water and food. Of these the Census recognizes some thousands. The citadel of caste is South India where there has been the least Mohammedan control.

The practical side of caste is brought out in a personal experience. In the city of Mysore a fine-looking intelligent Brahman told off to show me about in a state automobile, regretfully declined when I invited him to lunch with me at the state guest house.

"It would be breaking caste," he said.

"Just what would that imply?" I asked.

"Should I eat with you, I would be expelled from my caste. None of the families I now associate with would call upon my family, or receive us, or marry their children with mine. We should find no fellowship at all save among the excommunicated."

The fifty-five million outcastes or "untouchables" include scavengers, garbage collectors, sweepers; only they handle dead bodies, animal or human, or dress leather. They contaminate at a distance, some defile a caste man at a distance of sixty-six feet! If a Brahman coming from his bath in the river even *sees* an untouchable he feels obliged to go back and bathe again. The untouchable realizes this so if he sees a Brahman coming he hastily hides himself. Naturally the outcastes may not visit the temples or draw water from the village wells and in some parts they are even barred from the public highways built at the expense of all.

Contemporary Iowa. Professor Earl H. Bell [6] has described social stratification in "Shellstone," a simple Iowa agricultural community with a small trading center.

Social position is largely determined by the function which one fulfills in the economic process and the subjective valuation placed

[6] "Social Stratification in a Small Community," *The Scientific Monthly*, Feb., 1934.

upon that function by the community . . . modified by the concept of permanency of occupation and stability of character. . . . One must constantly guard against the erroneous idea that the individual's personality is overshadowed by the class label. . . . In Shellstone, one is first an individual, and then, because of his personality, a member of a class.

The banker stands at the top of the economic and social hierarchy. Economically he is the lord of the community. He knows everyone by name and financial standing. In time of financial stress or crisis he is appealed to for aid. The farmers ask his advice about renting a different farm, holding or selling their hogs, buying more land, or making improvements on their farms. The merchants and townspeople seek his advice concerning new ventures and are backed by him financially. In cases of disputes . . . he is usually appealed to. . . . Such human understanding and service is the secret of the popularity of benevolent despots. The authority of Shellstone's despot remains almost unchallenged by rivals or the people themselves.

Next in the hierarchy are . . . "business men." The important item is to have a regular place of business. The blacksmith and barber are considered as much business men as are the merchants. . . . As a rule the employee who works in one store for a long period enjoys the same social position and respect as his employer. . . . The doctor and dentist are included in the business group.

The next class is landowners, including either active or retired farmers. Like the business men they are subject to the general rules of permanency and stability. This group is very close to the business group in prestige.

The farm renters, as a group, rank somewhat below the landowners although here again the factor of permanency and stability complicates the picture. The individual who lives on the same rented farm for many years and is a successful farmer enjoys the same social recognition as the landowner. On the other hand, the poor farmer who moves from one farm to another at frequent intervals ranks with the occasional laborers. . . . the latter are the odd-job men. Economically they are as indispensable as any other group, but socially they do not mingle with the other classes.

The local teachers and ministers . . . reside in the community but are not of it. They are considered outsiders and treated as such. . . . Their tenure of office is short, for, regardless of the quality of their work, the people desire changes.

The bankers and their associates, the business class and successful farmers, the poorer farmers, mostly farm tenants, and the occasional laborers are the social classes based upon the economic function plus the stability and permanency of the individuals. The lines of demarcation are vague and elusive. The upper and lower limits of the classes shade into each other. They are not institu-

tionalized and the populace do not recognize the classes as such. Neither inheritance nor wealth are important items in determining the class to which one belongs.

The classes include only adults. Children are free from class distinction. The children of the business men, occasional laborers, farmers, and bankers, play together on equal terms except when the undesirable traits of the parent are actually present in the children. . . . The boy or girl of worthless parents is aided and encouraged to make good . . . every individual will aid them during their youth in getting an education.

The genesis of social stratification. One cannot survey these formations without wondering from what motives and by what processes they are built up. Caste rests upon an exploded theory of heredity. That the idle should lord it over the diligent smacks of topsy-turveydom. The stigma on manual labor flies in the face of common-sense. It seems incredible that the productive should consent to go on forever feeding a race of drones. Why should business men be so esteemed, while culture bearers like teachers and clergymen are treated as outsiders? Things so preposterous need to be accounted for.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE RISE OF GROSS INEQUALITIES

All about us we see men rising or sinking in influence, responsibility, or power on account of their personal traits, but this does not result in distinct layers. Social strata do not appear unless there is some kind of *inheritance*—of profession, of office, of authority, of property, of prestige, on the one hand; of lowly occupation, servitude, or disability, on the other.

Superiority founded on fighting capacity. In the predatory epoch, out of which grew the barbarian culture, the subordination of women and their treatment as chattels arose from the fact that, having babies to look after, *they could not fight*. Since the core of the tribe was the body of warriors, and everything was subsidiary to martial activity, persons and sexes were rated according to *fighting capacity*. Mere workers, including women and those weak of body, fell, therefore, into a lower social position.

God-descended families. When the intermingling of men of different kindreds had broken down the tribal system and substituted the tie of a common worship for the tie of blood, not all the members of the community could be thought of as children of its god. But since such gods were, in origin, the deities of certain old families, the members of these families might plume themselves on their descent from the gods and make such a pedigree a basis for aristocratic pretensions.[1] Thus, among the Greeks

[1] Significant is the evidence of a growing passion among successful Americans for distinguished ancestry. About 20,000 practising genealogists are tracing lineage in this country and among the results of their diligence are:

The Order of the Crown of America, which admits only those "descended lineally and legitimately from the royal houses of the Old World."

The Baronial Order of Runemede, composed almost entirely of bankers, business men and manufacturers. There are two classes of "knighthood": first, one made up of the 100 Founders of the Order and, second, one composed of the "lineal male descendants of one or more of the 25 barons who were selected to be sureties for the proper observance of the statutes contained in Magna Charta."

The Imperial Order of the Yellow Rose admits only those of royal descent.

The Order of Colonial Lords of Manors in America is open only to descendants

as well as among the Semites, royal and noble houses long continued to trace their stem back to a divine forefather.

Wealth as foundation of aristocracy. A great fortune not only exempts a family from work and enables it to play peacock, but usually it has commanded ennoblement. Birth may rank *individuals,* but the root cause of the rank differences among *families* has been wealth—wealth, moveover, *in a large block,* therefore not gained by unusual ability, character, or diligence. But through the thousand channels it controls, the dominant class always propagates the idea that social distinctions originate in differences in personal capacity and virtue and owe nothing to crime, fraud, corruption, favoritism, or privilege.

Booty may give a class its start. Thus in the Dark Ages peaceful agricultural communities hired *scholæ,* or bands of unruly men gathered about *hirdmen,* or temporary chieftains, to protect them. But the warrior bands had more opportunities for enrichment than the peaceful tillers in the communities. Success in fighting brought them iron, slaves, droves of cattle. Says Kropotkin:

> There was plenty of waste land and no lack of men ready to till it, if only they could obtain the necessary cattle and implements. . . . And if one of the *hirdmen* of the armed brotherhoods offered the peasants some cattle for a fresh start, some iron to make a plough if not the plough itself, his protection from further raids, and a number of years free from all obligations, before they should begin to repay the contracted debt, they settled upon the land. And when . . . these pioneers began to repay their debts, they fell into servile obligations toward the protector of the territory.[2]

Priority is one basis of acquisitive advantage. In the infancy of the medieval towns, which of two fugitive serfs should be master and which servant, chiefly depended on which *ran away the earlier!* It was not long before the "old burgher" families drew a line against newcomers. The former ran the guilds, ruled the town, monopolized trade, and reserved for themselves the benefits from the communal lands. The city thus became divided into "burghers" and "inhabitants."

of one "who enjoyed feudal rights in any of the American Colonies prior to July 4, 1776 . . ."

The Scions of Colonial Cavaliers is composed of "Palatines" and "Landgraves," all descendants of British nobles who fought for Charles I against Cromwell.

[2] P. Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid,* 1902, p. 156.

In early Australia enterprising sheepmen pushed into the public domain in advance of the government surveys, and "squatted" with their flocks on vast areas from which their shepherds drove away all settlers. Great stretches of valuable crop country lay untilled in the hands of pastoralists, who soon became wealthy and powerful men. When the state later attempted to resume its rights over these tracts the "wool kings" were too strong socially to be dispossessed.

Landgrabbing explains what happened among the Cossacks who had been granted large communal lands by the Tsars on condition of special service in the army.

> Each Cossack who wished to raise a crop plowed and sowed wherever he thought fit, and retained as long as he chose the land thus appropriated; and when the soil began to show signs of exhaustion, he abandoned his plot and plowed elsewhere. But this unregulated use of the communal property could not long continue. As the number of agriculturists increased, quarrels frequently arose and sometimes terminated in bloodshed. Still worse evils appeared when markets were created in the vicinity, and it became possible to sell the grain for exportation. In some *stanitsas* (stations) the richer families appropriated enormous quantities of the common land by using several teams of oxen, or by hiring peasants in the nearest villages to come and plow for them; and instead of abandoning the land after raising two or three crops they retained possession of it, and came to regard it as their private property. Thus the whole of the arable land, or at least the best parts of it, became actually, if not legally, the private property of a few families, whilst the less energetic or less fortunate inhabitants of the *stanitsa* had only parcels of comparatively barren soil, or had no land whatever, and descended to the position of agricultural laborers.[3]

Grants of land as foundation of a privilege class. Landed estates have been the economic foundation of nobilities, hence grants of land play a mighty rôle in social destiny. Well says an ancient Indian land patent, "White parasols and elephants mad with pride are the fruits of a grant of land." When the elders of Israel importuned Samuel for a king, the aged prophet warned them: "He will take your fields and your vineyards and your olive yards, even the best of them, and give them to his servants." [4]

Early Egyptian kings bestowed on distinguished military officers

[3] D. M. Wallace, *Russia*, 1905, p. 362.

[4] I Samuel, VIII: 14.

portions of the crown domains. The absorption of the Roman *ager publicus* by senators and other power-holders made them enormously rich and started the senatorial aristocracy on its career of six centuries. William the Conqueror distributed subjugated England into about sixty thousand parcels of nearly equal value from each of which was due a "knight's service on horseback." As the Castilians drove back the Moors in Spain the newly won land was carved into huge fiefs and given to "insiders" on condition of their rendering military service.

In 1586, under Queen Elizabeth, the plan for peopling the province of Munster in Ireland proposed to divide it into seignories of from 4,000 to 12,000 acres, to be offered to the younger sons of gentlemen, who would "have the manrode of so many families and the disposing of so many good holdings," being "a thing fit for gentlemen of good behaviour and credit and not for any man of inferior calling."

Wholesale manufacture of social superiors in the New World. Throughout Latin America the tilling natives were divided among and "commended" to, the conquerors, and as the growth of a colony brought more land within reach it was always passed out in large tracts to those within the governing circle, or their friends. Not one rood of good soil went straight to the actual cultivator. To-day nowhere down the West Coast of South America is there a local population of independent small farmers.

After the separation from Spain and Portugal, the public lands of the Latin American republics continued to be passed out in the old way to capitalists, speculators, and "insiders." Mexico, up to the recent revolution, was owned in a few thousand holdings, most of them very large, and one of them embracing eight million acres, or as much as Connecticut and New Jersey combined. The deplorable recognition of huge Mexican grants to the extent of nine million acres of the choicest land by the American courts after our occupation of California gave society there an early plutocratic cast from which it has not yet fully recovered. In 1855 a justice of the United States Supreme Court declared that "principalities are won by an affidavit and conferred upon the unscrupulous few, to the exclusion and detriment of the many."

In Argentina there are ranches which a train takes the best part of a day to cross! The pampa cleared of Indians by General Roca's expedition in 1879 was promptly alienated at a price of

three cents an acre, after great quantities had been presented to the officers who took part in the expedition. The government allowed one man to acquire, at an average price of three and one half cents an acre, *a hundred square leagues* of land which, after having made some scores of millionaires, is now worth *five hundred times* the purchase price. Until lately the smallest unit of public land ever considered by the government was the square league, and the only question was how many such leagues the grantee should obtain.

In Australasia burglary of the public domain went on in such wholesale fashion that, about the end of the last century, in New South Wales, South Australia and New Zealand, 105,500 persons owned thirty thousand square miles in lots of less than a thousand acres, whereas 1,255 persons owned fifty-five thousand square miles in holdings of ten thousand acres and above!

Land-hogging in the English Colonies in America. In colonial Virginia manorial families got their start by huge land grants obtained through favor or bribery. Generations of wealth and pride on the one hand, of dependence and humility on the other, might hinge on a secret agreement among the members of the provincial council to carve great estates for one another out of the public lands temporarily in their custody.

Even worse was the land grabbing in colonial New York. An Amsterdam merchant, Van Rensselaer, acquired from the Indians for a few "duffels, axes, knives, and wampum" an estate of seven hundred thousand acres, which, entailed to the eldest son for over two hundred years, gave that family an utterly factitious political and social importance. After New Netherlands became New York, the creation of great landed proprietors with feudal rights over the people on their estates was facilitated by a royal governor, Fletcher, who in the closing years of the seventeenth century gave princely grants in return for bribes. A Bayard received twelve hundred square miles; a Smith, a block fifty miles long; a Beekman, one estate sixteen miles long and another twenty miles by eight miles; a Schuyler was given land extending for fifty miles, while a Livingston became lord of a manor of four hundred square miles. Despite the strenuous efforts of Fletcher's successor, Lord Bellomont, the robbers were too strongly intrenched in provincial assembly and courts to be ousted from their booty.

Even after a royal order was issued limiting a future grant to

two thousand acres, great estates were built up by the trick of using "dummies" as co-grantees. With some of the New York patents went the hereditary right to a seat in the legislature. Thus by a few shrewd strokes at an early day certain grasping and scheming men were lifted to be founders of aristocratic families, society was forced from its normal course into the path of patronage and dependence, and the seeds were planted for a hundred years and more of privilege, bitterness, and strife.

The sharing of the public domain of the United States. The disposition of our public domain, undoubtedly the largest and most valuable body of land that has ever been distributed by government, reveals an incessant struggle between the intentions of statesmen and the wiles of the greedy. In spite of the Homestead Act of 1862 which, with the Preëmption Acts, brought about the best distribution of virgin land ever achieved, and, in a single generation, undoubtedly contributed more to human welfare than any law in history, there has been a serious engrossment of natural wealth. In 1909 the pending cases of alleged fraud and illegality in the acquisition of public lands involved a value of one hundred and fourteen millions of dollars. Seven thousand square miles of land were granted to canal companies. A quarter of a million square miles went to railroad companies. Out of a hundred thousand square miles taken up under the Swamp Land Acts vast areas were of the richest agricultural land, acquired by means of perjury, fraud, and corruption. In 1884 thirty-two cases of illegal fencing reported by the Land Office involved the use of seven thousand square miles of the public domain. In 1903 a Land-Office report estimated that in the preceding twenty-five years more than sixty million dollars' worth of timber had been stolen from the public.

In 1885 an honest and fearless commissioner of public lands declared that he found himself "confronted with overwhelming evidence that the public domain was made the prey of unscrupulous speculation and the worst forms of land monopoly." Twenty years later the Public Land Commission reported that "perhaps in general a larger proportion of the public land is passing into the hands of speculators and corporations than into those of actual settlers." "Inquiries made as to how a number of estates, selected haphazard, were acquired," showed that "almost without exception collusion or evasion of the letter and spirit of the land laws was involved."

The state as creator of inequality. Whether the state will rear up or pare down inheritable social differences depends altogether on *who runs the state.* The class-ruled state puts itself squarely behind social inequalities, but the democratic state resists the development of privilege and caste.

Beginning as an organization for fighting, the state creates a fresh and sharp differentiation. The passage of the Israelites from the régime of judges to that of kings brought into existence a nobility which soon usurped the authority of the tribal elders. The relatives of the king and his chief war captains became the great men of the realm, so that the old assembly of the elders of the tribes fell into disuse. Later the pristine equality of the priests among themselves was lost, owing to the fact that superiority was conceded to priests from families from which high officials had been taken or which had been favored by the king.

Although the Roman Republic chiefly protected inequalities which it had not itself created, the Empire came to be a fountain of disparities. From Diocletian on, the rankings of the servants of the state fixed degrees of social distinction. Says Bury:

> In the time of Constantine only those who had held the highest official rank, consuls, proconsuls, or prefects, were members of the senate. The new forms of court ceremony, which were instituted by Aurelian and Diocletian and elaborated by their successors, gave to such personages precedence over lesser dignitaries, and they were distinguished by the title of *clarissimi,* 'most renowned.' Social rank depended on precedence at court, and precedence at court depended on official position.[5]

In the Teutonic war bands which more and more filled the foreground as the Empire lost its grip, the thing that counted was nearness to the prince. To be "friend" of the headman became a title of honor in address and inscription. The *comes* or "companion" became ancestor of all "counts" and the *comites,* the first rank of nobles. "County" once meant *countship.*

Monarchy as source of privileged orders. In all kingdoms founded by such war bands the service of the king was the chief source of distinction. In France in the sixth century the top layer consisted of senators, noble by ancestry and rich by hereditary wealth. A century later, under the Frankish kings, the nobles were

[5] J. B. Bury, *History of the Later Roman Empire,* 1889, vol. VI, p. 39.

simply the high royal functionaries, the big men of the palace. They all got rich, to be sure, but chiefly out of the high offices to which they had been lifted.

The feudal system was a crude means of organizing the nation's military strength, and for a long time the enjoyment of a fief carried with it the obligation to maintain armed forces and render military service. But the fiefs, at first granted for life, became hereditary and later all feudal dues were wiped out! National defense came to rest on the shoulders of all citizens while the lordly estates granted expressly for the maintenance of this vital public service became private property, pure and simple!

There is a widespread impression that in modern Europe ennoblement has rarely amounted to more than royal recognition of the success of the fortunate. It is true that since Europe beheld a king under the guillotine monarchs have been chary in using the public wealth to enrich their favorites. But one needs only to go back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to find, not only titles and honors, but also crown lands, confiscated estates, money grants, monopolies, lucrative offices, sinecures, and hereditary pensions lavishly bestowed by kings upon their servants, supporters, and favorites. Up to the third quarter of the eighteenth century, when great fortunes began to be made in trade and manufacturing, the sovereign had immense power in determining who should constitute the leisure class.[6]

Laws and institutions as props of social hierarchy. To keep a nobility splendid you need *primogeniture and entail.* When landed property is divided equally among the children, the prolific family soon loses its splendor. If the title passes to all the sons, it loses its scarcity value. Where, as in Germany, all the sons of a baron are barons, the title becomes insignificant. Italian counts and Portuguese marquises impress only those who do not know how numerous they are. In old Russia, owing to the fact that lands

[6] In his scathing reply to the Duke of Bedford, who had the temerity to criticize his pension, Edmund Burke said: "The grants of the House of Russell were so enormous as not only to outrage economy, but even to stagger credibility. The Duke of Bedford is the Leviathan among all the creatures of the crown. He tumbles about his unwieldy bulk, he plays and frolics in the ocean of royal bounty. Huge as he is, and whilst 'he lies floating among the rood,' he is still a creature. His ribs, his fins, his whalebone, his blubber, the very spiracles through which he spouts a torrent of brine against his origin, and covers me all over with the spray—everything of him and about him is from the crown."

as well as titles were inherited by *all* the descendants of a noble house, the aristocracy always shaded down into the common people. The merest cab driver might turn out to be a "prince."

Often the unfree are serfs because the law gives a far-reaching effect to the act of some ancestor. Fustel de Coulanges writes: [7]

> The sources of the mass of serfs that covered the soil of France for a thousand years are as follows: Some were serfs by birth, having descended from the slaves of Roman Gaul, or of Germany. Some were the captives of some raid. Some became slaves in consequence of crimes committed. Finally, there were many descended from free-born men who from various motives consented to become serfs, and became such usually by writing a letter stating that of their own will they become so and so's serf.

The stratum of unfree is thickest when the law allows a debtor to pawn himself for a loan, when the starving man can legally contract himself into servitude, when the parent can sell his child, and when slavery is a hereditary condition. Had we such laws every economic depression would precipitate millions of our unemployed fellow citizens into unfreedom. Apologists would then insist that their hard lot was the "natural" recompense of inefficiency, just as apologists now insist that the monstrous private fortunes among us are the "natural" recompense of extraordinary ability.

In the American colonies there were great numbers of white bond servants in a state of temporary involuntary servitude. Aside from prisoners taken in civil war they were "felon convicts," which did not always imply great turpitude in a time when every excuse was snatched at to stock the tobacco plantations with labor from the submerged classes of English towns.

Their social status is thus described:

> None could marry without consent of the master or mistress, under penalty of an addition of one year's service to the time set forth in the indenture. They were worked hard, were dressed in the cast-off clothes of their owners, and might be flogged as often as the master or mistress thought necessary. If they ran away, at least two days might be added to their time of service for each day they were absent. Father, mother, and children could be sold to different buyers. Such remnants of cargoes as could not find purchasers within the time specified were bought in lots of fifty or more by a class of speculators known as "soul-drivers" who drove

[7] "L'alleu et le domaine rurale," pp. 289-90, in *Histoire des Institutions Politiques de L'Ancienne France.*

them through the country like so many cattle and sold them for what they would bring.[8]

Besides these there were great numbers of "redemptioners" or immigrants too poor to pay their passage, who, on their arrival in America, sold themselves to him who for the shortest term of service—usually five years—would reimburse the captain of the ship for the cost of their passage. The sole reason we do not have "bond servants" and "redemptioners" is that American law recognizes no such status.

Embryos of feudalism. A bit of wealth may confer advantages which bring more wealth. The founders of the Danish aristocracy were simply peasants who fortified their houses during deadly village struggles and then used their advantage. For this reason the laws of the Frisians forbade any one to rear himself a house of stone! In old English times a hardy refugee from another community offered himself as fighter to that man in the community who appeared to be ablest to keep and protect him. Such "house carls," having no ties to the rest of the community, became tools for imposing their master's will just like the "toughs" certain of our industrial concerns employ to beat up leading labor unionists and strikers. Thus the man who had a little the start of his neighbors became able to browbeat them, override community rights, appropriate community land, and make himself lord of the district. Came then centuries of power, incense and "swelled head"!

Wealth's advantage grows in the degree that the state fails to furnish equal protection and justice. In the imperial domains of the later Roman Empire the members of the senatorial aristocracy got out of hand and encroached upon the small neighboring landowners. Since in criminal matters the nobles were responsible to no one save the Emperor or his immediate representative, the pretorian prefect, and since the lawsuits were decided by judges drawn from this class, the man whose land had been seized by a noble had no certain redress. Hence, the commoners sought from the strong that protection which the law should have afforded them. Each deemed it prudent to "commend" himself to some lord, so the *patron* relation spread through society. Petty landowners became tenants-at-will upon their ancestral acres, and over them the nobles wielded sovereign powers filched from the state.

[8] J. B. McMaster, *The Acquisition of the Social and Political Rights of Man in America*, 1903, pp. 34-35.

Before the advent of effective governmental regulation our great railroad companies, by giving or withholding special rates, rebates, and facilities, destroyed or built up industries, rewarded or punished cities and states, made or ruined business men, and nursed monopolies like the oil trust and the anthracite coal trust. The failure of the state to exact equal treatment for shippers led to the shipper (as it were) "commending" himself to the railroad company. In the same way nothing but the heroic struggle of the labor unions against company ruffians spared the laborers in some industries, *e.g.*, the coal-mining industry of Colorado, from the necessity of giving up all appeal to the laws supposed to protect them and "commending" themselves to the conscience and humanity of their employers!

Static times compared with dynamic times. In static times the social landscape alters but slowly; from generation to generation its features remain much the same. Generally the high stay up, while the low must stay down. Wealth, income, social power, sometimes even place and office, pass automatically from father to son. Differences in ability and character bring about few interchanges between the social strata. The family line prevails and, in the absence of new fields of opportunity, the lot of a man depends much on his inheriting or failing to inherit such advantages as wealth, place, connections, or access to education.

On the other hand, headlong economic progress, the cropping up of money-making chances in unexpected places, permits the sudden rise of new men. Social strata are bent or broken by the upthrust of new fortunes and new prestiges. The discovery of the New World no doubt caused in the end more displacement of social power than any happening in history. But on a smaller scale we see the same thing under our noses. The "boom" of a big city means great profits to some from rising land values. A new region is a fascinating gamble, since the discovery of rare minerals or an outlet for ore, coal, or lumber owing to the advent of a new railroad or the clearance of a waterway, is sure to lift some prospectors or settlers into Millionaires' Row. The furious exploitation of Colorado and California gold deposits made great changes in American social registers.

But new fields, like the electrical and the automobile industries, offer opportunities as rich as do cornucopia provinces like British Columbia or Sao Paulo. Inventions, such as the telephone, the

motor boat, the airplane, the motion film and radio hatch a brood of new fortunes. The introduction of some new crop—sugar beets, hops, or citrus fruits—throws chances in the way of the foresighted and enterprising, while some bright men mount into the empyrean on the wings of a clever idea, such as teaching by correspondence, popularizing health foods, or pushing a method of curing stammering or pursuing physical culture at home. War, like a continental upheaval, alters most of the wealth runnels, ruining old families while new Crœsuses are made through munitions, shipping, army contracts, and the floating of war loans.

When army promotion goes by seniority, how slow is the rise of the talented subaltern; whereas war gives a "leg up" to a Clive, a Bonaparte, a Skobeloff or a Kitchener. During a dull era in politics reëlection is customary, office loves certain families, political dynasties appear; but a political upheaval by disillusioned farmers or workingmen brings into public life "blatherskites," demagogues and constructive reformers who otherwise would never have been heard of.

Scientific eminence cannot be entailed like a fortune; but there are times when the prestige of the discoverer is, at least, a life estate, whereas in epochs of great intellectual fermentation laurels are constantly redistributed. In our time, thanks to the discovery of radioactivity, the germ origin of disease, immunity, vitamins, obsessions, mental suggestibility and psycho-analysis, a host of eager investigators are sharing in a glory which ordinarily would be monopolized by the retired explorers of older fields.

Still, the *channels* of social power may not shift as much as do its *sources*. The top people sometimes prove to be very "light on their feet." Wealthy old families may "get in on the ground floor" of rubber or traction or motion pictures, gather cream from a virgin mineral region or a field like the electrical industry, instead of keeping to father's line of investment. Our great capitalists have gained control of much of Alaska's resources, while the gold of the Transvaal has repaired the fortune of many a British noble. Likewise a scion of an old political family may be nimble enough to get on the winning side of a popular agitation, while the scientific investigator may keep his laurels green by leaving his worked-out vein and going over into a new and more fruitful field of research.

LEGITIMATION

How frequently the fortunes which support social superiority originate in force, fraud or corruption! One recalls the estates carved out of the church lands by Henry VIII after the dissolution of the monasteries; the profits from mingled crime and trade piled up by means of the Dutch East India Company; the Oriental loot brought back to England by the "nabobs"; the lucrative Indian monopolies of tea, salt, opium, and spice; the wealth heaped up in the African slave trade; the infamous fortunes of the tax farmers under the old régime in France. Coming nearer home, there are the American fortunes founded on cheating in the army supplies during the Civil War, on railroad wrecking, on customs frauds, on the stealing of public lands, on proprietary medicines and food adulteration, on public franchises won by bribery, on tariff favors corruptly obtained, on prison-labor contracts, on vice catering, on tax dodging, and on numerous other iniquities. I refer not to methods of wealth-getting which a later generation has learned to condemn, but to *acquisitive practices which outraged even the contemporary standards of right* and were pursued to a triumphant conclusion only because bribery and corruption turned the edge of every instrument the people sought to use against such practices, or because a secret control over sources of opinion deceived or confused the public as to what really was going on.

In order that these dungheap fortunes may be deodorized they undergo a process of *legitimation,* whereby ill-gotten wealth is made to smell precisely like well-gotten wealth. The gatherer of tainted money may have to endure lifelong odium, but his descendants, when they get ready to retire from acquisition and devote themselves to enjoyment, may exchange it for sweet-smelling forms of property yielding less dividend but more prestige. Then, too, as the crimes, frauds, bribes, and rascalities which lie at the base of family pride and pretension recede into the past, they are quickly hidden under a veil of oblivion.

Many motives, not all of them bad, bring this about. The present holders of ill-gotten fortunes not only have every interest in suppressing the truth, but they may be quite innocent of misleading the public as to the real character of the Founder of the House. Then the rising generation is regularly plied with fairy stories which cloak the grim realities of the social *mêlée.* Its

school-teachers, moreover, are nearly as credulous as their pupils respecting the origins of private accumulations. To spare national pride, the shameful episodes and scandals, particularly those which reflect on conspicuous and influential families, have been expurgated from school history. Persons interested in institutions of social welfare, higher education, and scientific research, cherishing the hope of recovering portions of ill-gotten wealth for public uses, refrain from alluding to historical facts which might alienate possible donors.

The newspapers are so dependent on the financially powerful that they generally keep silent as to the skeletons in the ancestral closets of such persons. Wide as is the range of partisan political discussions, they rarely acquaint the public with bits of history which might be resented as offensive by valued party workers or contributors. Then the present holders of ill-gotten fortunes may be very decent and generous persons, so that it will seem wanton and malicious to rake up the piracies of their grandfathers.

There results a "conspiracy of silence" as to the origin of many fortunes sustaining present social pretensions. If a scholar should dig out the truth from court records, assessment rolls, reports of public officers, and findings of committees of investigation, he would hardly find a publisher. So, of all important historical matter, this is the most perishable, the soonest forgotten, the hardest to revive. Yet such oblivion leaves cesspool accumulations legitimated and millions of capable and useful people looking up to commonplace men who have no title to distinction save that conferred by the skilful expenditure of income from inherited plunder!

SECONDARY DIFFERENTIATION

Great differences in social status presently give rise to *contrasts in character* which accentuate and validate these differences. Normally, the personal ideal that grows up within a hereditary upper class is to be proud, free-handed, and high-spirited. Born to wealth and power, the members of a privileged order may manifest an independence of character, a frankness of speech, a simplicity of manner, and a dignity of bearing which are interpreted as natural traits of the *aristoi* or best. Hence, it is possible to popularize the myth that the nobility had its origin in the deliberate recognition and promotion of the best.

On the other hand, by the presence above them of the privileged,

the commoners are warped out of their true line of character growth. They accept the master idea of the disgracefulness of work; yet for them there is no other lot. Their enforced economies and frugality of expenditure are taken as proofs of meanness. In so far as they lack adequate legal protection they find themselves under the necessity of combating force with deceit. In case the masses are landless, they lose the property sense and are despised for their petty thievery. Thus, when concentration of wealth and power in the upper class is marked, the resulting want of manliness and truthfulness in the common people is held to reveal a natural defect, and inferiority of social status is justified as being the inevitable recompense for inherited weakness of character!

It is thus that enduring distinctions in rank are set up, and made to appear wise, sound, and inevitable.

CHAPTER XXXV

GRADATION

Wealth and power are coveted not only for themselves, but as bestowers of high social standing. For the successful the "struggle for status" takes the place of the "struggle for existence."

Occupation as basis of social rating. Differences in status, although in many societies they claim to hinge on *birth,* run back at the last to what you do, what you've got, how you live or how much power you wield. At the barbarian stage men are graded chiefly according to the dignity of their employments. The most honorific employment is *fighting,* a better test of personal prowess than *work* and graced, moreover, by exploit. As a rule warriors lord it over workers. The taproot of the European feudal nobilities was not landholding so much as military prowess. One did not lead fighting men because he held a fief; he held a fief because he led fighting men! "Who would be a gentleman, let him storm a town." Even now "in monarchical countries tradition, if not law, requires that army and navy officers be of gentle birth for at least two generations."

Closely related to martial pursuits is *government,* which has always been an honorific occupation. The notion that those who govern should be "servants of the people" came up only in the late eighteenth century and even yet has not got very far. Throughout Southern and Southeastern Europe, Asia and Latin-America the head of the state regards himself, and is regarded as *master.* Generally those high in government wreak their personal wills. The military-dynastic prestige of states like Prussia and Japan exalts even minor civil officials above leading merchants and professional men. The reason why Britain has been able to recruit for the governing of her empire the pick of her young men is that, in the eyes of her upper caste, diplomacy and magistracy are more honorable by far than business. The type of man who in our country works to the helm of a great business, in England spends

his best years in exile, with a rare visit home and a little money, rather than lose caste in "trade."

The professional offering of sacrifice and prayer is another ancient honorific occupation. In the early phase of religion the petitioner approaches his god directly; but eventually it is deemed prudent to leave your case to an expert, who can sacrifice, supplicate, imprecate, or cast spells, according to a complicated ritual and who is believed to enjoy the god's favor. In Homeric Greece the priest was generally a man who by repeated sacrifices and services had made himself dear to a god and had then set up an altar on his own account, or else he was a noble to whom his fellow-tribesmen had confided the care of a common shrine. As supposed expert in "getting results" from a sacrifice the priest could command fat fees, so that he ranked as a man of substance. In Homer's eyes all priests were rich.

Not only does the priest enjoy a social standing which reflects the exalted status of his divine master, but he becomes the parent of various intellectual pursuits and learned professions. In Greece there began to be visible a scholar's pride, and it was a Greek who protested that the mathematicians of Sicily degraded their science when they applied it to the problems of machines!

Agriculture has generally stood higher than trade and *wholesale trade* higher than retail trade. "Merchants were completely barred from feudal and ancient gentility." "The mercantile taint could, however, be removed in two generations instead of three." [1] In England a nobleman may engage in banking or wholesale trade without loss of dignity, but he may not keep a shop. In Venice, however, a commercial city-state, the rich merchant who was ennobled "kept right on doing business at the old stand." The most modern view regards the wealth resulting from business success as reward of prowess rather than of work. The infatuation of the American public with business men, which reached its peak in the "Coolidge era" (1923-29), did not root in the older American past—which was fairly sound in its estimates—but was pumped up by a huge sycophantic newspaper propaganda.

The disgracefulness of manual labor. The age-old scorn of work with the hands sprouts from the distinction between planning and performing, giving orders and taking them, dealing with *persons* and dealing with *things*. In early Greece, according to

[1] *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. 6, p. 618.

Giraud, "nobody held in contempt manual labor and even the King's sons could be seen busy with the work of an artisan. Later on, first of all aristocracy, next *bourgeoisie,* finally all free citizens more and more gave up manual work." Thebes came to deny citizenship to any one who had practised a trade within ten years. To-day through a large part of the world the stigma on hand labor keeps the proud work-shy and steels them to offer desperate resistance to any move which threatens to cut their incomes.

How disdain of manual labor overcomes one like a creeping paralysis may be seen from the observations of a U. S. Government agent in Hawaii.

> The presence of Orientals demoralizes some white mechanics. A carpenter wants a board and tells a Japanese to get it, then he finds it convenient to have the man saw it, hold it in place, nail it, and so unconsciously he gradually begins to confine his own activity to the mental side of his trade alone, to the entire exclusion of any further muscular exertion than is necessary in order to keep out of the way of his Asiatic helpers. This flatters his race pride, he begins to associate an idea of degradation with the manual part of his craft, and he becomes morally and physically unfit to ply his trade under the conditions surrounding him.

In China and Malaysia the well-to-do wear their fingernails long in order to advertise their exemption from labor; frequently the nail is six or eight inches in length, supported by a silver case, and in some instances it reaches a growth of twenty inches! Or they will have a wife crippled by bound feet, which proclaim her unfitness for housework just as did the woman's wasp waist in high favor among us two generations ago. To the Oriental mind, what offends most is *work that soils the hands.* The copyist or clerk will starve rather than turn to begriming tasks. In China the American professor of engineering has to speak sharply to his surveying students to get them actually to carry chain and to drive stakes, for they deem it "coolie work." The old-school mandarin looks upon the foreign mining engineer as a kind of coolie because he soils his hands.[2]

In South America everybody "who is anybody" shuns physical labor as if it were an infection. In Argentina the American machinery expert setting up a steam thresher on a ranch has to check his impulse to doff his coat and "pitch in," lest at evening

[2] E. A. Ross, *The Changing Chinese,* 1911, Chapter X.

he find himself with the peons in the barn instead of sitting at the rancher's table. The observatory assistant considers it beneath his dignity to unpack a box of costly astronomical instruments just from Paris, so turns the job over to a stupid peon. In Peru, university seniors in mining engineering, who had been given the run of an up-to-date mine under an American engineer, refused to follow him in donning overalls and operating the greasy machinery. Their idea of a gentleman's technical education is to stand by in clean raiment and watch the machine go while the expert explains its operation. The high-school professor of chemistry in Peru finds great difficulty in inducing his students to perform with their own hands the assigned laboratory experiments.

In our ante-bellum South the presence of the ignorant and servile Negro imparted a spiritual stigma to manual labor. Certain skills had been built up in the brighter slaves; when after emancipation these crafts were taken up by white workmen, they were found to reek with opprobrium. The slaveholding planter rode about his plantation on horseback and often gave the closest attention to farm work; but never would he doff his coat and wield an implement himself.[3] After the Civil War many planters were reduced to tilling their land themselves; to Southerners the pathos of their fate lay not in the irksomeness of field work but in the mortification it brought them!

In South Africa the presence everywhere of raw natives doing rough and dirty work for little more than their keep causes the white to shy at any job that is not highly skilled or of a supervisory nature; for to do "Kaffir work" makes one a social outcast.

Manual labor has been tainted by its associations with sweat, grime, bad odors, ill-kept teeth, black fingernails, and neglect of body; hence, it gains dignity with the appearance of educated, well-paid tool-users. In the well-groomed electrician or engineer who still soils his hands, manual labor loses its old offensive associations. If generally it were performed by cleanly, intelligent, self-respecting people, the stigma on it could not be maintained. So the diffusion of bathtub, shower-bath, underclothing, tooth brush, nail scissors, safety razor, and leather shoe, along with shortening of the working week, is sapping the very foundations of the traditional class distinctions.

[3] One recalls the nobles of Louis XIV who in camp before Lille preferred to go hungry rather than lift bags of rice from their wagons!

The ignominiousness of menial service. Aside from some American colleges there are probably no institutions of higher learning in the world where a student can wait on table without losing status. In missionary schools in China the pupils at first refused to bring in chairs for the seating of guests; it was "coolie work." In Cuzco, Peru, the ladies in the English mission hospital lost caste with the Peruvian ladies because they had been seen sweeping the walk and dusting the windows. The inference ran: "They must have been servants in their own country." So, too, the Chinese of Chêngtu inferred that the French officers they saw walking about in the streets—instead of being borne in chairs—"must be coolies at home." In Mexico a horde of *porteros* invade the first-class coach when the train stops; for no true gentleman will let himself be seen toting his hand luggage!

"Dignity of labor" does not redeem menial service. Disdain of manual labor is deepest in a caste society, for slavery always taints whatever is usually done by slaves. Aversion to menial service on the other hand, may be strongest when the spirit of democracy makes the worker too proud to be at the beck of another. This is why native American young women will not do housework save as "help" rather than as "servant." The scarcity of native-born domestics is largely owing to the unwillingness of many housewives to forego the airs of the "mistress." The higher social position of factory girls explains why, the country over, domestics *with* board earn about the same wages as mill girls *without* board. The latter are willing to take two-fifths less pay in order to be respected. That working girls at their dances hang out the sign, "No servant girls admitted," is not quite so undemocratic as it appears. The same feeling accounts for the great difference in popular attitude toward marrying your stenographer and marrying your cook. One is romance; the other, comedy![4]

Wealth distinctions. After the barbarian stage, what one *does* matters less than what one *has*. Says Sorokin:

> As a general rule . . . those who have been noble have been rich and *vice versa*. When a discrepancy between nobility and wealth appears (the nobles are poor; the wealthy are disfran-

[4] Distinctions based on *what you do* are the most natural things in the world. "In an American penitentiary," writes an ex-convict, "the bank burglar assumes an air with a house burglar; a house burglar sneers at a pickpocket; a pickpocket calls a forger 'a short-story writer'; and they all make common cause against the stool-pigeon."

chised), such discrepancy has usually been very short-lived. Either the poor nobles, through violence and plundering, appropriated the wealth and became rich; or the rich bought and obtained privileges and nobility.[5]

In Homeric Greece all kings were wealthy. In republican Rome the figures yielded by the "census" fixed one's rank. To the Roman it seemed perfectly natural that the rich should have privileges; still, he recognized that time adds to the respectability of wealth and felt a certain contempt for the *parvenu*. Only slowly might one work up into the aristocracy, for advancement from grade to grade was strictly regulated. To raise one's family a single step was the ambition of a lifetime. Under the Empire classes were yet more distinct. In theater or hippodrome men were placed according to rank. Knights could not mix with senators nor *plebs* with knights. The senator had a purple band on his toga; the knight wore a golden ring.

Distinctions among employments reinforce wealth distinctions. The rich reserve to themselves "noble" occupations, such as warfare, government, sport, exploration, learning, the fine arts. If they cannot bar the commoner, they make access to such pursuits costly. Knighthood has been reserved for the cavalry arm, since it takes money to provide a mount; the gallant foot-soldier has not been knighted. In the same way the wealthy seek to monopolize the major posts in government, the motive being not so much to control the administration of government to their own advantage as to gain prestige. At Oxford and Cambridge universities, the training schools for the British ruling class, the students are obliged to live "like gentlemen" in commons or in private apartments quite as expensive. There is no place whatever for the poor young man, let alone one who is "working his way." Likewise in England preparation for the learned professions has been made needlessly costly to give an "edge" to the sons of the well-to-do.

Wealth *acquired* is far less honorific than wealth *inherited*. The money-getter is presumed to have slaved or kowtowed for his money. But in a generation the sweat has dried; the tricks stooped to, the fawning for orders or contracts or patrons, has been forgotten. In his sons visible exertion, solicitude and eagerness have been replaced by the unanxious dignity of opulence. Although the money-getter had to be accessible, his heir may be

[5] P. A. Sorokin, *Social Mobility*, 1927, pp. 175-6.

as exclusive as he pleases. The one compromised his personality for gain; the other has absorbed the wealth into his personality.

One kind of wealth may have rare prestige. In the pastoral life the size of one's herd is what counts; in the agricultural life it may be the number of one's slaves. In feudal society, the size of one's landed estate was decisive, but in modern society it matters little what kinds of property are represented in one's sheaf of securities. Nevertheless, in England no millionaire is really in line for recognition until he has struck root on his country estate, while a like fondness for a rural property as a social springboard is showing among rich Americans. In the Middle Ages the rich Jews, being obliged to keep their wealth in mobile form—money, jewels, etc.—never got from it the prestige land ownership brought.

DERIVATIVE CRITERIA OF SUPERIORITY

Even when wealth is the foundation of superiority, actual rating depends on certain tokens of opulence. Among these are:

Scale of living. Conspicuous lavishness wins high social repute. Roman senators vied in offering table guests such costly delicacies as peacock hearts, while our splurging millionaires keep private airplanes or spend a hundred thousand dollars on a party! In dress, furnishings, equipage, and especially entertainment, good form fixes costly standards. Phrases like "cheap skate," "a cheap coat makes a cheap man," are charged with contempt for frugal spending. Hence the disdain of the useful as compared with the ornamental, the value of mere rarity, the insistence on "stylishness," the esteem of material above form and the preference for the handwrought over the machine-made.[6]

Abundance of personal service. The aristocratic spirit of the later Roman Empire prompted the senatorial families to keep about them swarms of servants; one never appeared in public without a cortège resembling an army. In India to-day the cheapness of servants results in incredible standards of being waited on. A little Anglo-Indian girl at her first tea in England wept at being expected to *stir her own tea.* In the Old South the planters kept numerous house servants to wait upon them. In Congress a Southern representative expressed amazement on learning that a Northern colleague blacked his own boots and declared that "no gentleman" could do a thing like that. Even now at Oxford an

[6] See T. Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class,* 1900, ch. V.

American Rhodes scholar will be "queered" by doing for himself things which the British student has done for him by his "scout."

In South America the guest who *will* be waited on is respected by the servants; if he looks after himself, he is despised and insulted. The Peruvian lady goes to church attended at a respectful distance by a small servant carrying her prayer book and umbrella. The Argentine astronomer shrinks from dusting off and covering his telescope. The American rector of a Peruvian university set an example of self-help in order to rid his students of the idea that in their archæological excursions they must take along servants to care for the horses and prepare the meals.

Ceremonial cleanness. To give servants enough to do there grow up among the wealthy standards of cleanness which are quite mystical compared with that admirable hatred of dirt which shows itself in the Dutch, Yankee, or Japanese housewife. Thus, in order that his hands may be immaculately clean, the man who tends door in a fine family is kept from the heavier labors of the household. Then he is supplied with a tray to receive the visiting card in order that even his clean hands may not touch it, and, finally, the hands which hold the tray are covered with white gloves!

Abstention from gainful pursuits. Not to work for a living argues a fortune exempting one from the common lot. The gentleman may be very busy, but he will be busy with his pleasures, his sports, his hobbies, his philanthropies, his public services; not with gainful pursuits. In the seventeenth century in the best circles it was considered praiseworthy to write, but vulgar to publish one's writings and let them be offered for money! The gentleman got into print only through the "betrayal" of some friend or the "theft" of some printer.

Good breeding. A leisure class eventually gives great attention to the art of social intercourse. Those "to the manner born" despise *parvenus* as lacking the gracious self-effacing ways of "gentle" folk, and insist that nothing but breeding can form the soul of the gentleman or the lady. They see nobility as "bred in the bone," beautiful manners as its outward expression, not a veneer put on to impress others. When wealth shifts to new families, dignity, quietness, and refinement are the emphasized assets of the old element. For instance, an English traveler visiting Frankfort in 1803 observes that the nobility there lose no opportunity to point out

the distinctions that ought to be made between their families and those of the bourgeois, who, though they have by commerce or some profession equally ignoble attained great wealth, which enables them to live in a style of magnificence unbecoming their rank; yet their noble neighbors insinuate that they always retain a vulgarity of sentiment and manners, unknown to those whose blood has flowed pure through several generations, unmixed with that puddle which stagnates in the veins of plebeians.[7]

A hundred years later a visitor in Charleston, observes:

The highest society of Charleston displays contempt toward the plutocrat. Although at its most exclusive functions may be seen a seamstress or a street-car conductor whose family, impoverished by the 'war between the States,' has in no way lost its social status, the merely rich are inexorably excluded. No newspaper there would venture or care to print an account of these exclusive assemblies. The social set that provides the standard of social taste and tone for the city would not tolerate the sycophancy of the 'yellow journals' that devote whole columns to what rich women wear at the New York Horse Show.[8]

Possession of an ornamental culture. Another means by which the well-born fend off the pushful bourgeois is the possession of lore and skill which the self-made have had no time to acquire. Such lore will be as remote as possible from the knowledge underlying the useful arts and professions. It will have to do with means of self-expression and sources of enjoyment rather than with the utilitarian branches. Thus Dill observes of the aristocracy in later Roman society:[9]

This class, separated from the masses by pride of birth and privilege and riches, was even more cut off from them by its monopoly of culture. An aristocrat, however long his pedigree, however broad his acres, would have hardly found himself at home in the circle of Sidonius if he could not turn off pretty *vers de société* or letters fashioned in that euphuistic style which centuries of rhetorical discipline had elaborated. The members of that class were bound to one another by the tradition of ancestral friendships, by common interests and pursuits, but not least by academic companionship and the pursuit of that ideal of culture

[7] Moore, quoted by F. H. Giddings, *Readings in Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, 1906, p. 265.

[8] E. H. Abbott, *Religious Life in America*, 1902, p. 119.

[9] Dill, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

which more and more came to be regarded as the truest title to the name of Roman, the real stamp of rank.

Learning. The early knight regarded it as "clerical" to know how to read and write. Among the ancient Irish, however, learning had a high prestige value. Honors and rewards were conferred upon the poet, teacher, or historiographer. In body-fine and social rank the several grades of learned and professional men were on a level with the chieftain grades. In China public monuments are erected to eminent teachers, a commemorative arch records the pride of a town in a son who won honors in a state examination. In pre-War Germany productive scholarship enjoyed such prestige that a stream of first-class ability continually poured into university careers.

Personal rating versus social class. What is the relation of the gradations just described to the ratings men continually make of their fellows in terms of ability, character and accomplishment? Sorokin insists: [10]

> With the exception of periods of anarchy mobility is strongly controlled by the complex social machinery of testing, selection and distribution of individuals with regard to various social positions. The family, the church and the school test the general intelligence and character of the individual according to their standards. . . . These institutions serve as social sieves. . . . Thus at any given moment the population of any social class is composed of persons recruited from the most diverse walks of life.

Now and then this happy sorting does occur; but for much of the time since the barbarian era, the successful have been "in cahoots" to keep later succeeders from pushing their children off their perch. So the social hierarchy is little impressed by preeminent intellect or character. At best it takes some account of them, but not as if they were the natural foundation of social grades. We consider a society remarkably healthy when the man of unusual achievement, the artist, thinker, scientist, or explorer, has *entré* to the highest social class; but when does one find such a class composed entirely of achievers?

Character counts a bit in placing one on the social scale. The folk hero or saint, the founder of a religious order or a new philanthropy, is likely to be a privileged person, above all con-

[10] *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 10, p. 555.

ventional distinctions. Conversely, the aristocrat who shows himself mean or craven, or makes a fool of himself in public will be cast out by his class. Nevertheless, such incidents should not blind us to the fact that definite and inheritable social gradings *never* rest on personal worth-differences, but *always* on differences in respect to employment, function, wealth, and the conventional signs of wealth.

Results of gradation. The recognition of impersonal differences affects the classes in various ways:

1. *The inferior is required to hide all signs of emotion in the presence of the superior.* In Japan under the old régime the code of a military camp governed the contacts between classes. Talking in the presence of the superior, or laughter, or curious questions, or expressions of surprise—anything revealing the slightest emotion on the part of the humbler—was considered discourtesy and punished with great rigor.

2. *Personality is very unequally developed in superior and inferior.* Says Gulick of Old Japan:

> There was no redress for the peasant in case of harshness. It was always the wise policy, therefore, for him to accept whatever was given without even the appearance of dissatisfaction. This spirit was connected with the dominance of the military class. Simple trustfulness was, therefore, chiefly the spirit of the non-military classes.
>
> While, therefore, it is beyond dispute that the old social order was communal in type, and so did not give freedom to the individual nor tend to develop strong personality among the masses, it is also true that it did develop men of commanding personality among the rulers. Those who from youth were in the hereditary line of rule, sons of Shōguns, daimyos, and samurai, were forced by the very communalism of the social order to an exceptional personal development. They shot far ahead of the common man. Feudalism is favorable to the development of personality in the favored few, while it represses that of the masses. Individualism, on the contrary, giving liberty of thought and act, with all that these imply, is favorable to the development of the personality of all.[11]

3. *Status, not bargain, regulates dealings between superior and inferior.* Says Gulick:

> The idea of making a bargain when two persons entered upon some particular piece of work, the one as employer, the other as

[11] S. L. Gulick, *Social Evolution of the Japanese*, 1905, pp. 121, 375.

employed, was entirely repugnant to the older generation, since it was assumed that their relations as inferior and superior should determine their financial relations; the superior would do what was right and the inferior should accept what the superior might give without a question or a murmur. Among the samurai, where the arrangement is between equals, bargaining or making fixed or fast terms which will hold to the end, and which may be carried to the courts in case of differences, was a thing practically unknown in the older civilization. Everything of a business nature was left to honor and was carried on in a mutual confidence.[12]

4. *Fines and indemnities are graded according to social status.* The code of Hammurabi (Babylon) fixed damages with reference to the social status of the injured man. With the rise of class distinctions in early Europe compensation came to be different for persons of different classes. The *wergeld* or social value of a man was the basis for fines and indemnities, and every man had a *wergeld* fixed by law. Thus in the code of the Alamans the life of a freeman is valued at 160 sous, freedman 80, slave 40. The Visigoths fix for the life of a freeman a compensation twice that for the life of a freedman. The Frisians make a long tariff of indemnities for every sort of blow, then add: "these figures are for freemen. For nobles multiply by three, for serfs take half."

5. *The inferior comes to be regarded as existing for the sake of the superior.* In a Vedic metaphor describing "the altar of the King's state," the priests and the nobles are the bricks, while the common people are "the filling between the bricks." Slavery in Greece and Rome was defended by philosophers on the ground that it provided leisure for the superior minds. In the political thought of our slave-holding South the planter and merchant class were the people for whose benefit society existed—the "Spartans"—while the slaves and manual laborers were to the social edifice what mudsills are to a house. In the Orient woman has worth, not in her own right, but as a means to an end, namely the gratification and comfort of the male. Her lot is summed up in "the three obediences," viz., to father, then to husband, lastly to son. "A woman," says a Japanese manual on ethics, "should never weary of yielding to her husband, must form no friendships or intimacy save as sanctioned by him, must obey her husband with fear and trembling."

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 120.

CHAPTER XXXVI

SEGREGATION AND SUBORDINATION

If the sense of worth-difference becomes so keen that the social superior regards the inferior as of a lower species, society comes to be made up of closed hereditary classes. Thus among the Saxons of the eighth century social divisions were cast-iron, the law punished with death the man who should presume to marry a woman of rank higher than his own. The Lombards killed the serf who ventured to marry a free woman, while the Visigoths and Burgundians scourged and burned them both. Among the early Germans the descendant of a freedman remained under the taint of ancestral servitude until the third generation, *i.e.*, until he could show four free-born ancestors.

Genesis of caste. Class hardens into caste when the jealous upper class bars the eligible commoner. In the later Roman Empire the law did not absolutely prohibit a *curial* from rising to a higher grade in society, but it made his progress so slow and difficult that escape by legal means was possible to very few. Even when a man had surmounted all barriers and become an imperial functionary or a senator, his children born before his elevation retained their original rank and his property remained liable for the municipal charges of his class. If a man attempted to hasten his rise or his deliverance by overleaping some of the stages of duty, he was sent back to the original starting point.[1]

Thus those who are up take care to kick down the ladder by which their forefathers climbed. Birth finally counts for more than the differences of occupation or wealth which raised up the original social inequalities!

Segregation. In a true caste society looking down on somebody has come to be a spiritual necessity. The snob flourishes, *i.e.*, "one who, on the ladder of life, licks the boots of the one above him and kicks the face of the one below." Aloofness shows

[1] Dill, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

itself first in the highest class, but soon the middle classes catch the infection, and each grade shrinks from all below it. In Victorian England the wholesale tradesman looked down upon the woman who let him lodgings, and she in turn looked down on the man who cobbled her shoes. In reverse the man who worked with his hands looked up to the petty shopkeeper, who looked up to the big tradesman, who looked up to the banker or manufacturer, who looked up to the landed gentry, who looked up to the peers, while at the apex of the whole organization stood the throne!

Each class avoids its inferiors as if they tainted the air. In India the outcastes are excluded from the temples, the highways, the village wells. In England there is (was?) a rule that the railway porter should not put any one into an apartment occupied by one of the nobility. Moreover, the holder of a first-class or a second-class ticket is entitled to a refund in case a passenger with a ticket of a lower class (his own compartment being full) is put in his compartment; the ticket holder has paid for exclusiveness as well as for accommodation. In a quiet way the lowly born, save the winners of scholarships, are effectually excluded from the great endowed schools like Eton, Harrow, and Rugby, and from the two old universities.[2]

As society becomes aristocratic humane feeling becomes class bound. Thus an English newspaper gave thanks that while six hundred persons lost their lives in a Chicago theater fire, none of them was of any distinction. On the other hand, tenderness for the highborn makes even-handed justice impossible. It was easy to find law for imprisoning Stead, the fearless London journalist who in his *Maiden Tribute to Modern Babylon* (1885), exposed the villainies of men in high social position, but none was found for punishing the villains themselves. The worst discoveries of the commission which investigated the frauds committed by British officers in the purchase of army stores during the Boer War were never made public, because of the social eminence of the persons involved. Their own class ostracized them, but it would not give the lowborn a handle for scoffing.

Origins of hereditary economic dependence. Inequality is never so hopeless as when the inferior *becomes dependent for security or livelihood* upon the favor of the social superior. Be-

[2] I am not sure how much of this is entitled to the present tense.

fore the reign of law the weak had to seek the protection of the strong. In Homeric times power regularly fell to the strong hand. Amidst disorder and insecurity the submitting of one's self to the powerful constituted an insurance; better periodic exactions and dues than utter ruin. So men "commended" their lives and goods to personages strong enough to protect them unless, indeed, they fell directly beneath such power through being conquered by it.

The feudalism Julius Cæsar found among the Gauls came neither from the conquest of one people by another nor yet from the fidelity of retainers to a military chief, but arose out of economic inequality coupled with state weakness. The state, being but rudimentary, was unable to exact obedience from great as well as from small. Hence, the weak man, finding no shelter in the public powers, became an *ambact, i.e.,* he sought the support of some strong man and paid for it with service.

If the state *recruits its officials chiefly from the superior class,* the lower orders will sink into dependence. Thus under the Roman Empire justice was administered, not as with us by those "learned in the law" but by high functionaries, governors and prefects, all recruited from the senatorial nobility. Between the official and the local nobles there soon grew up such a freemasonry that it was rare indeed for a man of humble station to win a lawsuit against a noble. Accordingly the weak man seeking justice had to provide himself with a powerful patron. For years after the conclusion of peace, we are told, certain branches of the Federal Government bore the impress left upon them by the dollar-a-year Big Business executives called to Washington after America entered the World War.

The surrender of state powers to the social superiors instead of committing them to paid and responsible public servants completes the subjection of those dependent on such superiors. Says Fustel de Coulanges of the effects of the grants of immunity by the Frankish kings of the seventh century:

> In the public functionary the weak will find a support. Freemen will have no need of other patronage. The small landowners will not be under the necessity of yielding up themselves and their holdings. Tenants will have a regular contract and the guaranty of the laws. Freedmen and *coloni* will have certain well-defined rights. Even the serfs will be protected. But behold, the

grant of immunity removes the public functionary, forbidding him "to enter." For the great landowner such an officer no longer exists nor does he exist for the mixed population inhabiting the domains of the great landowner.[3]

Economic calamity falling particularly upon the smaller property-holders will crush them into permanent dependence in case the law tolerates such a relation. The loss of an independent status by the petty landowners of the Roman Empire seems to have been due to wars and disasters in the third century, which brought many farmers into debt to the great proprietors. This plight, together with the advantage of the big man in all legal contests, compelled great numbers to part with their land by pretended sale or gift and to occupy it under the *precarium* tenure.

The small peasant who solicited protection began by transferring to the protector almost everything he had. He did not leave his holding, but his sons had no claim on it. By donation or fictitious sale the man transferred the land to his protector, receiving in return a gracious permission to live out his days upon it. The proprietor might impose on the precarist any conditions he pleased. He might exact an annual rental or require manifestations of gratitude and deference, the *obsequium*. Since no formal contract defined the dependent's obligations, he might be lawfully dispossessed at any moment. His tenure was entirely at the pleasure of the patron. Hence he must gain and constantly keep the good will of the great man. He had to be always in the posture of a suppliant. Short of slavery, no system more destructive of manliness can be imagined; yet under the later Empire freemen and small property-owners, no longer sheltered by the state, were continually turning over their holdings to neighboring great proprietors, in order to receive them again under a precarious tenure. The Church bitterly denounced the practice, but was powerless to check it.

Modern peonage. When in 1898 the Philippine Islands came under American rule, the mass of the agricultural Filipinos were tenants on large estates. The owner was the *amo* or master; his tenants were his *dependientes*. Most of them were hereditary bonded debtors of the *amo*. The debtor himself might not know

[3] *Origines du système féodal, op. cit.*, pp. 411-412.

the origin of the obligation which came down to him from his father, he was ignorant of its amount, nor did he understand how it increased or might be decreased. In crisis or trouble he appealed to his *amo,* thus adding new links to his chain. He had nothing laid by for the future nor any means of storing food to carry him from one harvest to the next. The *dependientes* were bound, not only to work for the *amo* on account of their "debts," but also to stand by him in all matters. If he took part in a revolution they fought for him, if he joined the Aglipay secession from the Catholic Church, they also became *Aglipayanos.*

Throughout the western part of South America, from the Isthmus to Cape Horn, there is no free agricultural labor. Slavery has disappeared, but the institution of peonage binds the rural masses to the *hacienda.* In Southern Colombia, for example, four days in each week the agricultural laborer is bound to work at a wage of from five to ten cents a day in return for the use of a plot for his house and truck patch. Of course, such pitiful earnings do not suffice for the needs of his family, so he is obliged to run into debt to his *amo* for money or supplies. Since he can never work off this debt and the law does not permit him to leave the estate until it has been liquidated, the peon becomes virtually a serf bound to work all his life for a nominal wage. He can change employers only in case some one pays his debt, and this binds him to a new master. In general, the rural population of the tropical Latin America are in a like state of dependence and subserviency.

Fruits of peonage. The Mexican revolution 1913-1920 abolished peonage but it is still possible to observe the type of character it produced. In 1923 I spent a few days upon San Gabriel, a 23,000-acre estate in Mexico. Here are my impressions: [4]

> You might think yourself on one of the *latifundia* of Roman Africa in the time of the Emperor Augustus. Of modern democracy not a trace. Don Manuel is young and contemporary, a product of the oldest of English schools and an Oxford graduate, but he has to play the patriarch with his people. If matters are at odds between husband and wife, he is expected to straighten things out. If a son is incorrigible, Don Manuel gives the scamp a serious talking to. If a peon gets drunk and beats his family, they bring the matter to Don Manuel. It is he who builds the

[4] E. A. Ross, *The Social Revolution in Mexico,* 1923, chapter VI.

church and paves the streets. He provides what passes for schools, as well as medicines, and in dire cases a doctor. He puts up houses for his folk, and three-fourths of his three hundred cabins huddle near the huge mansion where the *amo* lives when he is not in his town house. The rest are on outlying *ranchos*. Half a regiment of men work on the *hacienda* and its population can hardly be less than two thousand souls.

Corn is grown on shares. The *amo,* who furnishes seed, implements, oxen, and supplies for the peon's family, gets half. Rare is the peon who saves his half and prospers. When Juan has sold his sacks of corn he pays for the seed and supplies which have been advanced to him, buys new clothes, and goes on a spree. Soon his pockets are empty and he calls upon his *amo* to let him have provisions on credit.

Since all live in his houses and on his land, Don Manuel is master of the situation. No one to whom he objects can come upon his principality. He owns six million mescal plants and his huge distillery is not a stone's throw from his house; but if any one on the place is caught supplying liquor to his peons, off he goes. Don Manuel is not above sowing wild oats himself, but when one of his peons makes his cabin a bawdy house or a gambling-den the man is evicted at once.

The system is fitter to produce human vegetables than to make men. Hence the typical peon is afraid to stand alone and look out for himself. An American told me how, some years ago, he acquired a *hacienda* on which were about four hundred peons. With the place, of course, he bought the accounts against the peons, which amounted to twelve thousand pesos. Upon taking charge he called the peons together and told them that the work would go on as usual, but that in order to start right with them he forgave all debts from them to him. Henceforth they were legally free to leave the *hacienda.*

The next day to his surprise no peons appeared for work—nor the next. On inquiry he found that the peons felt that with the wiping out of their accounts they could no longer look to the master for help in trouble; so that sorrowfully they contemplated departing from the *hacienda* on which their forefathers had lived and died. The forgiving of their debts released them from the *hacienda,* it is true, but at the same time *it released the hacendado from them.* The master whose peons owe him nothing will the sooner rid himself of those who displease him. Hence, they were going away to seek a master who, by staking them, would restore to them their lost sense of *security.* When the American learned this he called his people together and announced that their accounts would be recognized as still binding. At once their forebodings left them and the life of the place resumed its wonted course.

The company collar. The appearance of very large employers in places remote from the centers of population, monopolizing employment of a certain kind or within a certain district, as also the more and more cunningly concerted action of employers, through their "associations," are creating in some parts of the United States a half-feudal dependence of the wage earner. Workingmen are herded in company towns, lodged in company houses, required to trade at company stores, paid in company money, and hampered in their comings, goings, and meetings by company gunmen. Even churches and schools are built and controlled by the company! Moreover, a hundred lumber companies united in an association may confront the applicant for labor with a printed form to sign, in which he declares that he is competent to do the work required and is familiar with all its duties, and furthermore requests his previous employers to furnish the company information as to his character and record. This means that, to obtain employment, the applicant must waive his right to sue under the law for injuries received in the course of his work and to sue under the law for defamation of character! "Freedom of contract," so dear to the hearts of company lawyers!

Subordination and fixity. When the inferiors are severally in a state of dependence upon their superiors, the social circulation of families practically ceases. Peasant genius finds hardly a path up, while sloth or incapacity rarely drops a "gentle" family into the toiling mass. Generation after generation, high families stay up, while lowly families stay down. Handicapped by dependence, ignorance, and tricky laws, the farmhand, no matter how hard-working and capable, never breaks into the charmed circle. In western South America no agricultural laborer rises through tenancy to ownership as he does at times in Argentina and far oftener in the United States. With the whole machinery of law and the state in their hands, the proprietors see to it that the clever lads from the people shall not elbow aside their own sons, be they never so lazy, stupid, or spendthrift.

In Chile, for example, the ruling class keeps the bright boys from the mud huts of the *inquilinos* out of the better-paid occupations by providing a public elementary school which in no wise connects with the free state high school and university. Only private pay schools fit pupils to enter the state system;

so that the children of the poor have no access to the government service and the liberal professions.

Effects of subordination on character. Constant immediate dependence upon the favor of another blights self-respect and self-assertiveness. The "tip" fosters obsequiousness in the servant and a patronizing spirit in the served. The growing economic dependence of American wives upon their husbands owing to the decay of household industries threatens to sap the character of the married woman. The dependence of professors of the social sciences upon governing boards composed of wealthy men or reflecting the wishes of donors, jeopardizes that candor of utterance essential to their largest service. The dependence of the clergyman upon the financial "pillars" in his church leaves him hesitant to apply the touchstone of Christian principles to current business practise. Advertiser or "interest" control makes many newspaper men feel like helots.

Economic dependence "gets you where you live." However stiff the native backbone of a race, three generations under the yoke will make them worms. The cringing, "slippery" character we stigmatize as "Asiatic" comes not in the least from any weakness in the races of Asia, but from their long subjection to arbitrary power. The nearer a class is to the bottom of the social heap, the worse will its members be crippled in spirit, the less often will they manifest normal traits.

In born dependents, servility, sycophancy, lying, ruse and petty thievery are as natural as it is natural for a starving crop to be yellow; yet these by-products of pressure are pointed to as proofs of a poor moral endowment. Against a background of such faults stand out the more brilliantly the high spirit, manliness, and sense of honor of the hereditary superiors. Ignoring their underpinning of privilege, the superiors point to the low-caste and say: "Look, *they* are the dull-witted, the incapable; *we* are the well-born, the fittest. *We* are the cream that rises to the top of the milk."

Social inferiors generally cannot prove their mettle until they have freedom and opportunity, and hardly can they command these so long as they are quite shut out from any influence on government. Hence, since beings so rude and benighted are clearly unfit to have a voice in governing, *social inferiority tends to perpetuate itself*. The "low-born" stay low until some historic up-

heaval, such as the Crusades, the Black Death, the invention of gunpowder or of printing, the discovery of the New World, overseas migration, the rise of cities, or the coming in of the capitalistic method of production, gives able and ambitious commoners their chance to win knowledge, power or wealth and break into the master circle.

Subordination calls for charity. Religious doctrines or humanitarian ideals may kindle in the superiors a sense of responsibility for the welfare of their dependents. Wanting generosity and charity the social superior may be ostracized by his own class. An American who goes to reside on an English estate he has fallen heir to is aghast to learn how much a "county family" is expected to give away. Far from being a good sign, such a growth of charity often means simply that the ruling class has so cunningly "stacked the cards" against the unprivileged that many of them are unable to provide for their sickness or old age. Whenever in normal times more than one in twenty-five are being helped, one may be sure that a dominant element has made itself keeper of the doors of opportunity.

The fate of a closed upper class. An upper class foresighted enough to admit to its ranks rising energetic and talented plebeians may stay long in the saddle. The new blood absorbed makes up for the thinning of "blue" blood; the heroes and achievers admitted brighten its fading prestige and back up its claim to natural superiority. But, alas, those who control a good thing come to want it all for themselves and their children. The greater the luster of a nobility, the more loath are its members to let in outsiders. Hence, unless the iron hand of a monarch holds open the door in order to appease his successful commoners or to stimulate the zeal of his servants, an upper class *closes itself to upstarts and becomes a hereditary caste.*

Thenceforth it moves slowly but fatally toward its doom. As the capable founders of their houses recede into the past the patricians more and more owe their high position to inheritance of privilege rather than to personal worth. With the aid of the props which an aristocracy well knows how to provide, its high-born fool or weakling stays up, while the capable lowborn are shut away from the chief sources of wealth and honor. Shielded from much of that natural elimination of unfit members to which commoners are exposed, a closed upper class loses in the course

of a few generations most of the virility of its achieving ancestors and becomes an imposture. Nevertheless, thanks to mating continually with the most beautiful women there are, it gains in good looks and is never so patrician in feature as in its decline, when it is unable to produce from its loins enough men of force to vindicate its privileges.

Its tendency to beget handsome zanies does not, however, cause an aristocracy to abate by one jot its pretensions to better clay. It nurses its prestige and spares nothing in pose, manner, and surroundings that will keep up the illusion of its superiority. It realizes that entailed estates are not everything, for if their owners miss too many kinds of distinction they will cease to be looked up to. So it not only parades its ancestral glories, but, whenever a new source of prestige appears, it promptly gets close to it. Aristocrats take under their patronage such dispensers of glory as minstrels, troubadours, poets, artists, orators, priests, and clerics. If hardihood is admired, their young men will be sportsmen and explorers; if letters are honored, they will play Mæcenas; if learning is prized, they will varnish themselves with a thin coating of scholarship. Aristocrats of long lineage dare not let themselves be outshone. They must be the best groomed, the best mannered, the most splendid, must be seen against the richest background or in the brightest limelight. They must be among the first to fly, to navigate under water, to scale a peak, to cross a desert, or to visit a closed land. War with its command of the many by the few gives them their chance, for nobles have a traditional affinity for the martial.

Thus an effete upper caste contrives to keep itself at the apex of the social pyramid until in some crisis it cannot meet the test, its hollowness is dramatized and seen by all. Then its privileges are wiped out, it collapses like an empty sack, and the way is open for an abler element to occupy the apex, or else for the social system to be so modified as to give freer play to competition.

CHAPTER XXXVII

EQUALIZATION[1] OF OPPORTUNITY

I have shown that social inequalities become stereotyped because the high conspire to block the upsurge of merit. The holder of a title, a high office, or an honorific function keeps it in his family line if he can. Proud as he may be of having risen by his own efforts, the "self-made" man leaves his money to his son, even if it spoils his son's chance to "make" himself. Generally the successful will hand on to their children their every social advantage even if thereby they deform the system which let them succeed!

Historic rôle of the middle class. Now, who thwart this endeavor of the well-placed to "freeze" the class structure? Certainly not the unlettered masses; *they* are quite too short-sighted to make the sacrifices that will open gangways for the ascent of their posterity. They crave some *immediate* benefit—bread and circuses, largess and festivals—rather than "elbow-room" for their children. So it is the *middle class,* which has at once the wit to prize open the doors of opportunity and the capacity to fill the posts to which they admit, that leads in fighting for the restoration of competition.

The civic state supplants the class state. A long stride toward such restoration is to wrest the state from control by the showy idlers and run it for the benefit of the doers. The feudal state knew subjects, not citizens, and these subjects were under magnates rather than under the state itself. The owner of a fief became "the sovereign of all that dwell therein." The civic state, on the other hand, allows no fealty to persons to limit allegiance to it and it bears upon the individual directly instead of leaving him in the power of his social superior. It suppresses the superior's rights to judge and to punish, to coin money, to keep armed men, to wage private war. Public offices, no longer inherited, are intrusted to those loyal to the state rather than to

[1] By "equalization" I mean not *making equal,* but *making less unequal.*

their order. Law-making is wrested from the nobles and shared among the rising elements. Then begins the razing of the rampart of privilege and the recognition in the erstwhile inferior of rights which give him a chance to show what he has in him.

The widening of personal freedom. How much power of one person over another does the law allow? Is the husband at liberty to chastise, let, or sell his wife? Can the parent lease or sell his child, or control its marriage? Is the son bound to follow his father's calling? Do debts or dues descend automatically to one's children? Can the creditor seize the delinquent debtor, cast him into prison, hold him to labor, or sell him?

In the heyday of ancient slavery the slave had, in the eye of the law, no rights of any kind. He could not attend the gymnasium or the public assembly nor follow certain arts reserved to the freeman. He could not atone for an offense with a fine; he must "pay with his body," *i.e.,* be whipped. He could not testify save under torture, *i.e.,* he "spoke with his body." But in time the law curbed the master in punishing his slave and gave the slave the right to support, the right to hold property and to dispose of it by will.

The serf, who, being attached to a farm, could not be sold from home and family was better off than the chattel slave. Fixed dues in work or money might be substituted for his unlimited obligation to serve his lord. Then doors of escape opened—manumission, purchase of one's freedom, military service, living for a year and a day in a borough. Yet even into the nineteenth century traces of serfdom survived in the system of agricultural labor under year contract, with imprisonment for breach of contract. On the European continent the rootage of domestic service in serfdom was long manifest in the custom of employing servants by the year, with imprisonment or holding back wages as a means of enforcement. In the second quarter of the nineteenth century, when annually 75,000 persons were imprisoned for debt in the United States, the new legal principle that failure to pay a debt cannot impair one's personal freedom cut the nerve of the practice. In 1867, to bar the revival of slavery in our South under a new guise, peonage was made unlawful. The refusal of American law to require "specific performance" of the contract to labor saves men from being shackled by a promise made in a moment of rashness or distress. The recognition in 1915 of the

seaman's right to quit his ship any time the anchor is down wiped out the last vestige of involuntary servitude under American law.

Every such enlargement of personal freedom has been decried as "a blow at the foundations of order." To free the serf from the glebe would result, it was said, in weed-grown fields and tramp-infested roads. To take away the creditor's power over the person of the insolvent debtor would bar the poor from borrowing. To abolish the master's power to flog or jail the quitting worker would kill enterprise by legalizing strikes. To cut the lariat of debt slavery by which the planter holds the peon would cause the peons to run away and lead a lazy half-wild life in the jungle. Yet none of these predictions came true because in each case a better type of relation was discovered. When, in 1898, Hawaii became a part of the United States the Hawaiian sugar planters foresaw ruin because American law would not punish their Japanese laborers for striking in the critical cane-cutting season and exacting thereby an exorbitant wage. What happened, however, was that groups of laborers entered into agreements to raise cane on shares under the planter's direction, so that adjustment, instead of being made by *coercion,* was brought about on a higher plane—that of *partnership.*

The recognition of "inalienable" rights. In early law freedom to bind one's self as one chose was the badge of a free man, since any fetter on this freedom assimilated him to the slave, who is below the plane of contract. It was only after a long and ghastly experience with debt slavery that the lawgivers of antiquity, recognizing that *free will is not the equivalent of a will to freedom,* denied a man the power to bind himself into thralldom or to pledge his person for the repayment of a loan.

Under feudalism the law of contract was sovereign. By the oath of commendation men could wipe out at a stroke their own freedom and that of their descendants. The giving of such far-reaching effect to a promise was freedom-of-contract gone mad. The famous doctrine "men are born free and equal" is not an assertion of natal equality in body or mind (sheer nonsense, of course!) but a flat rejection of the principle that *owing to the act of an ancestor one may be born unfree.*

Gradually it was seen to be wise to recognize certain essential powers which one cannot legally surrender, *i.e.,* "inalienable rights." Modern law gives no force to a contract which without due equivalent cripples one's future freedom to act or to contract, *e.g.,* to live in a certain place or outside a certain place, to marry or not to marry a certain person, not to carry on one's trade or business, not to exercise the right of franchise or to exercise it in a certain way, or to forego one's legal rights, as *e.g.,* the passenger's right to damages for injury through the fault of a common carrier. In some of our states the debtor cannot waive the statutory exemptions in his favor nor the mortgager his equity of redemption. Legal standard insurance policies have virtually removed insurance from the domain of contract. Personal safety is not to be contracted away; one cannot legally bind himself to engage in dangerous work or to remain in a dangerous place. Statutes clothing the worker with the right to be paid his wages in cash and the right to indemnity for injuries received in the course of his work will not allow him to contract himself out of these rights. An agreement to assign to one's employer the patents of all one's future inventions is invalid unless restricted to inventions of a particular character. The courts throw out an unlimited contract of a technical employee not to set himself up in business, not to use in the service of another knowledge of secret processes which he may have acquired in the course of his employment. In all these cases, the seeming fetter is really a safeguard, since it prevents the stronger from snatching out of the passing distress or helplessness of the weaker a lasting advantage over him.

So the electrifying assertion of the American Declaration of Independence that men "are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights" is no "glittering generality," as our slaveholders liked to style it, but *the climax and epitome of a great historic movement!*

The right to organize. "History," said Carlyle, "is red with the blood of the unorganized." Only demonstration of mass strength wins the lowly their first bit of consideration from social superiors, officials, lawmakers, political parties, or public opinion. Uniting to formulate grievances, frame demands, foil foes, reward friends, or choose candidates may give political weight to a class hitherto a cipher. Then organization opens the way to

boycott, strike, concerted restriction of output—by which the numerous weak may make their oppressors blench. *Any useful class by hanging together can hold back something its superiors want.*

So the strong scheme and plot to keep this resource out of the hands of the weak. If they dare they crush all lower-class organization as "conspiracy." A century since, in England, the combining of workmen to raise wages or shorten hours was punished without mercy; over all the rest of Europe anti-trade-union laws were in force sixty years ago. Even yet, in many parts of the world, a strike is dealt with exactly as if it were an armed rising! The union of Irish tenants (the Land League) made the tenants so strong in dealing with their landlords that a landlord government smashed it.

If they dare not crush labor's organization at a time when capitalists are organizing just as far as they please, the strong wrest from it all its weapons. They suppress picketing, outlaw the sympathetic strike, ban the strike to force out non-union men, and seize trade-union funds to pay damages to employers caused by acts ordered by the agents of trade unions. In the same way our railroad companies refused to allow farmers to build a coöperative elevator beside their tracks, while a landlord government threw Irish tenants into jail for agreeing not to take a farm from which a tenant had been unjustly evicted.

Another recourse of the strong is to *blacken the character* of the unions formed by the weak. They picture them as lawless and revolutionary, set the police on them under the pretext that they mask a "political" movement. Among us farmers' coöperatives were declared to be tainted with "agrarianism," workingmen's unions with "socialism." The secrecy of such organizations —which is but that of the ordinary business concern—is pictured as a cloak for sinister purposes and seditious plotting. Every unguarded utterance of an organizer is eagerly caught up and circulated as proof of their subversive aims. The leaders of the movement are portrayed as unprincipled self-seekers, while their followers are scolded for wasting their time and money on meetings and agitators instead of sticking to their work. This capitalist campaign of calumny against the organizing of labor is the dirtiest thing one finds in the last fifty years of our social history. Men making every imaginable use of organization to ad-

vance their interests employ law to smash all organization among their workers!

The diffusion of economic opportunity. There is a pseudo-equalization which should fool no one; confronted with rich upstarts the hereditary superiors have to share with them their social power. In ancient India trade begat differences in wealth which cut across the caste system and led the Brahmans to make a sharp distinction between the very rich and the ordinary members of the third estate, who still remained a despicable caste "created for the king to devour." Sang the epic poet: "That which is called *the wealthy* is a very important member of the state; for verily a man with money is the top of all creation." As the Roman Republic garnered the spoils of conquest, the old patrician families were quite outshone by the new aristocracy of wealth. With the rise of the modern state the feudal hierarchy was compromised by the creation of competing ranks by state authority. In seventeenth-century France hereditary nobility was conferred on grand councilors and officers of the chambers of accounts, on doctors, regents, and professors of law, and on judges of the higher courts; so that nobility no longer implied the possession of a fief. Later John Law's financial schemes enriched thousands of nobodies and created a race of *parvenus,* who by their enormous wealth forced admittance into the *noblesse,* frequently intermarried with them, and so weakened the caste taboo.

Between Waterloo and the World War the economic and financial expansion of Europe loosed upon its old landholding nobility countless winners of new fortunes from foreign trade, colonial exploitation, railroad building, manufacturing, and the seizure of natural wealth all over the globe—gold fields, diamond fields, oil fields, mineral deposits, nitrates, forests, and water-power. To save themselves the aristocrats had to open their ranks and admit, if not the new rich, at least their children. Fools hail this as "democracy," but the struggle *to settle who shall sit highest* does nothing to lessen social inequalities. In the words of the social historian, R. H. Tawney: [2]

The upper classes were glad to be reinforced by individuals of means and influence, who sprang from below, provided that, as a

[2] *Equality,* 1931, p. 141.

class, they remained on their eminence. They were not seriously disturbed by the spectacle of Lazarus in the House of Lords; for they were confident that he would behave like a gentleman in his new surroundings, would ascribe his translation to his own thrift, independence, and piety, would denounce the failings of beggars with the expert knowledge of a professional mendicant, would be an admirable illustration of the virtues of a society in which even the humblest could climb to ease and affluence, and would acquire a reputation for philanthropy for himself and his order by his generosity in financing supplies of cold water for the economically damned. What they neither understood nor admired, what, indeed, with rare exceptions, they feared and despised, were the aspirations that found expression, not merely in the claim for an open road to individual advancement, but in collective movements to narrow the space between valley and peak. Their welcome to individuals was conditional, therefore, on the latter identifying themselves with the sphere which they entered, not with that which they left. It was accompanied by a not less emphatic conviction of the necessity of preserving the great gulf fixed between Us and Them, the chasm which separated the elect from the mass of the population.

Real equalization is brought about by the leaking out of the jealously guarded secrets, the "mysteries," of the various "crafts" and arts, by the abolition of the caste requirement that the son shall follow the calling of his father, by the breaking down of gild restrictions upon entrance to the skilled occupations, and by the abandonment of the policy asserted under the old régime in France that "the right to labor is a royal right which the prince may sell and subjects must buy." Equalizing, too, are the abolition of primogeniture and entail, the limiting of the right of testation, and the adoption of the principle that the estates of persons who leave no will shall be divided equally among the heirs. Coöperative credit and consumers' coöperation have a like tendency, as well as the extension of government credit to farmers and the appointment of an expert ("county agent") to advise them how to get the most out of their farms. The development of skill by public vocational education as well as by free professional schools preparing youth for the higher walks makes the well-paid callings more accessible.

Much depends upon the shifting ratio that "poor men's opportunities" bear to opportunities for possessors of capital and technical knowledge. The gratuitous distribution to actual settlers of some two hundred million acres of the American public domain

had an incalculable effect in raising the economic, and therewith the social, plane of millions who work with their hands. Alluvial gold deposits have yielded small fortunes to tens of thousands of "placer" miners, whereas gold occurring in ore, since it can be extracted only with the aid of elaborate machinery, has largely gone to possessors of capital. The abandonment of the simple hand-labor processes for extracting natural wealth and the growing necessity of large initial capital for success in most lines of productive enterprise have greatly lessened the ratio of "poor men's opportunities" to "capitalists' opportunities." At the same time the perfecting of credit institutions enables the man of proved capacity to gain earlier control of the capital which he needs and thwarts many endeavors to make business enterprises hereditary. Besides this, entrepreneur ability—so scarce as to command that exorbitant price known as "the rewards of business success"—is in the way of being made more plentiful by schools of business administration, which disseminate a knowledge of the technique of such success.

Will the equalizing measures, taken together, countervail the patent tendency of wealth to collect in fewer hands? Doubtful! I fancy social policy will have to go twice or thrice as far in this direction if the concentrative forces are to be held in check. Nearly all the technological and economic drifts of our age are in the direction of lodging more power in the hands of "inside" capitalists and "management."

The downward percolation of culture. To buttress their primacy in wealth and power the ruling class covet a monopoly of literature and learning. They require their children to take a varnish of the higher learning, cultivate the *literati*, play patron, and encourage the courtier spirit in artists and scholars. Nevertheless, culture may gradually seep down among the people and dull the sense of class. The strong sentiment of equality among the Chinese comes from the wide diffusion among them of Confucian ideas. Among the ancient Jews the proud Sadducees stressed worship in the Temple at Jerusalem; but the Pharisees set up in every village a synagogue, the earliest example of congregational worship without priest or ritual. The Reformers' translation of the Scriptures into the vernacular broke the Church's monopoly of knowledge of the means of salvation and laid a foundation for modern democracy. The great growth of demo-

cratic feeling among the French since their Revolution reflects the permeation of the lower social levels with the national culture, so that in urbanity, self-possession, and household decencies the masses are much like the classes.

The spread of leisure. Until the toiling masses win free time the words of Jesus ben Sirach hold good.

The wisdom of the scribe cometh by opportunity of leisure;
And he that hath little business shall become wise.
How shall he become wise that holdeth the plow,
That glorieth in the shaft of the goad,
That driveth oxen, and is occupied with their labors,
And whose discourse is of the stock of bulls?
He will set his heart upon turning his furrows;
And his wakefulness is to give his heifers their fodder.
So is every artificer and workmaster . . .
So is the smith sitting by the anvil . . .
So is the potter sitting at his work . . .
They shall not be sought for in the council of the people. . . .[3]

But the plain people are gaining time to look up from their work and eye the common weal. Smaller families, bringing a let-up in the struggle for food; the fabricating of myriads of iron slaves to do man's bidding; the greater speed and concentratedness of labor, permitting a shorter working week; these grant the workers time to read, to think, to confer together, to organize; whereby they gain ability to conquer and to wield for themselves political power.

The multiplying of educational opportunities. Knowledge is light, only the illumined can make their way up the social ladder. Ignorance is the darkness in which thrive the fungi of superstition, falsehood, and prejudice. Hence, social superiors always try to keep their hands on the control levers of education. The medieval church taught the people's children the plan of salvation, but had no idea of fitting them to rise in life. The state at first institutes universities to provide it with trained servants; only as it gains social purpose does it push general education. In fact, the spirit of a government may be gauged by noting its educational policy. If it is generous in elementary schools but stingy in high schools, it reflects the ideas of the comfortable classes, who can pay tuition. If, as in Egypt, the

[3] *Ecclesiasticus,* xxxviii. The passage is too long to quote here in full.

child requires two years of instruction before it can enter the lowest grade of the public primary school, one may be sure the object is to keep out the children of the *fellahin*. Only when the state opens a path to the educational summit for every able youth is it in the way of democratizing knowledge.

Cost of instruction is, however, but one item in the cost of education. The power of the bright sons of the poor to compete with the sons of the well-to-do is limited by the financial inability of their parents to keep them long in school. Of 100 children entering the first grade of American schools about 25 drop out before reaching the eighth grade. Of the remaining 75 not more than 62 enter the ninth grade, and of these about 26 finish the high school course. Of these 26 high-school graduates 9 may be expected to enter college,[4] but no more than 4 will graduate. From studies made in representative cities it appears that beyond the sixth grade low family income is increasingly responsible for dropping out. Since education above the "grades" is rapidly becoming requisite for the better places in industry, business and government, it is plain that free instruction goes only a *part* of the way toward putting the children of the poor on an equal footing with the children of the well-to-do in vying for these places. *A society bent on really equalizing educational opportunities will let no capable child quit school because its parents cannot support it or spare its earnings.*

The democratization of government. Possession of a vote does not endow an ignoramus with the wit to use it to realize his ends. The diffusion of political power does not, therefore, automatically and at once bring government under the control of the broader layers of the people. But when it *does* respond to the will of the masses rather than to the will of the classes, there are many things it may do to reduce inequalities.

It may realize the equality of all before the law, neither riches nor poverty, neither intelligence nor ignorance to receive special consideration in bureaus or courts. It may also offer equal opportunity for citizens to serve the public according to their ability.

[4] "Taking the ratio of students (of the University of Washington) in 1937 to total wage-earners in the state (Washington), we find that a child of the business or professional class is approximately seven times as likely to be in college as a child of the agricultural or labor class." S. C. Menefee in *Sociology and Social Research*, Nov.-Dec., 1937, p. 126.

Banishing inheritance of offices, property qualifications for office holding, nepotism and favoritism in the award of office, it may make all appointive offices accessible to competence as ascertained by impartial tests.

Government takes a serious slice, so it is no small matter whether it taxes above or below. By heavy levying on luxuries and on the "unearned increment," as well as by a progressive taxation of property or incomes, the peaks are made less towering. The anti-social haughtiness that, after two or three generations of exemption from real work, grows on a family like a toad stool may be forestalled by inheritance taxes so steeply graded as to thwart Crœsus's endeavor to endow his line for all time.

There will be fewer unearned fortunes, too, if nuggets of public wealth, such as forests, minerals and water power, are not carelessly left lying about. Forethought and care in handling the public domain will cause natural resources to yield livelihoods for many instead of fortunes for a few. The curbing of monopoly in its protean forms by government regulation or ownership means fewer centers to poison the social body with the virus of competitive extravagance and contempt for labor.

On the other hand, the state may do much to protect the *little* properties—so precious in fostering family independence and self-respect—against their enemies. "Blue sky" laws, wise usury laws, the suppression of "loan sharks," the regulation of pawnbroking, public pawnshops, in some backward countries the inalienability of the cultivator's holding, have this tendency. American law has been solicitous to limit the power of the creditor over the debtor. Instances are the *homestead exemptions,* which are general in our states, *personalty exemptions,* which reserve the tools of the artisan, the library and instruments of the professional man, and the stock and implements of the farmer from seizure by the creditor, and *wage exemptions,* which put sixty days' wages of the head of the family beyond the reach of legal process.

Finally, the state uses means to encourage the formation of small properties. Among these are found mechanics' lien laws, the regulation of insurance companies and savings banks, postal savings banks, the fostering of savings and loan associations and other forms of coöperative endeavor, the protection of the small investors in big companies, and, in some countries suffering from landlordism, the disintegration of large estates by special taxa-

tion, or the state purchase of such estates in order to create small proprietors.

Of course not all *social* legislation is anti-class. The provision of parks, playgrounds and forest reserves, public health measures, health centers, factory inspection, legal minimum wage, legal dismissal wage, public employment offices, workmen's compensation, social insurance, old-age pensions, etc., diffuse welfare but leave intact those inequalities of power, prestige, and pride which underlie the class hierarchy.

The coming up of social science. Wealthy neverworks will be envied so long as people think in terms of *private* aims, for they possess what each most covets. But as men consider them in relation to *social* well-being, the idle rich appear as the drones of a hive, the camp followers of an army, the stowaways of a ship, the deadbeats of a business. Leisure, to be sure, is honorable in those who, having cut a good swath, retire betimes to rest and enjoy; but *unearned* leisure is an altogether different thing. In the eyes of the social scientist, the hale man who all his life does nothing to balance his account with his fellow-men is a leech. That he lives on the income from property he has inherited does not redeem his position. After all, a man's account is with his own generation rather than with his forbears. What he consumes costs the toil and sweat of his contemporaries; so that they may well say to him, "This is what we are doing for you; now *what* are you doing for us?"

The scandal of able-bodied persons loafing through life in the midst of their busy fellows "gets under the skin" of the leisured, so they hasten to exculpate themselves by dwelling on the services they render society,—their unpaid work for the public, their charitable activities, their attention to community affairs. But, while their property claims against society are clear-cut and enforceable by law, their obligations are only such as they choose to acknowledge. With perhaps a twentieth part of what the leisure class costs it, society might go into the market and procure as much service as they yield it.

Up to a certain point private capital is truly a social-welfare institution because the hope of acquiring productive property powerfully stimulates economic activities. But when accumulations are so handed on as to create endless generations of drones and butterflies, they are not blower but damper. Hence, just as in-

heritable functions, offices, and privileges have been abolished with good results, inheritable great fortunes will some day be made impossible.[5] Not that a child may not inherit enough to live on, but none to inherit a fortune so large as to leave him no incentive to work and tempt him into an extravagance of expenditure which humiliates or corrupts useful onlooking persons.

DIFFUSION OF OPPORTUNITY IS NOT ENOUGH

These four or five centuries of endeavor to diffuse opportunity —have they had the hoped-for effects? No, all these noble efforts to let the useful in on the good things of life, though they have wrought wonders, have fallen far short of bringing in anything that can fairly be called an "ideal" society. Despite the best efforts of the foes of privilege and openers of doors to opportunity, constantly the social edifice leans out of plumb in new ways, needs more shoring up. Only by recourse to measures radical, invasive and stringent can society check the drifts toward the squeezing out of little fellows by their big corporate competitors, toward merger, monopoly and consumer gouging, toward bad labor conditions, wage cutting and unemployment, toward concentration of ownership and of income from property.

The hopes of the great liberals—Locke, Voltaire, Rousseau, Adam Smith, Franklin, Condorcet, Thomas Jefferson, Bentham, John Stuart Mill—to achieve the happiest social results by the recognition in all citizens of the greatest possible number of rights and the binding of the state to non-intervention in the struggles among contending interests (*laissez-faire*) have been by no means fully realized owing to the increasing domination of economic life by the Machine. It looks as if the future holds in store a socially controlled capitalism, such as is evolving in Sweden, and continuous redistribution of purchasing power by taxation of the swollen incomes.

[5] The Italian sociologist Rignano proposes that a fortune be subject to an inheritance tax which shall be heavier with increase in distance from the ancestor who accumulated it.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE SOCIAL CIRCULATION OF INDIVIDUALS[1]

Change of position in society may be either *horizontal* or *vertical*. If you do not shift to another group at the same level, you shift to a "lower" group or to a "higher." Much of the struggle, pathos and romance in the life of individuals springs from these "ups" and "downs."

HORIZONTAL MOBILITY

Migrancy. Suppose we knew the distance between christening place and burial spot of all the inhabitants of Britain for the last five centuries. No doubt in the earlier centuries for nine-tenths of the people it would be no greater than that between the inside and the outside of the parish church. Then come the Elizabethan expeditions, the overseas wanderings from 1583 on, the great townward drift beginning in the latter half of the eighteenth century, the rise of the Empire with redcoats leaving their bones over half the globe, and lastly, the great internal movement of the railway era. It may well be that nowadays the average Briton is buried *twenty times* as far from the spot of his birth as he was in Sir Walter Raleigh's day.

To visualize the time when the bulk of men were born and died within sound of the same church bell look at India. According to the Census of 1911 all but 3 per cent of the natives of India live in the district in which they were born or in an adjoining district. The chief cause of this immobility is the caste system.

The restrictions which that system involves make a man's life very uncomfortable when he is separated from the members of his own social circle. Not only is he unable to marry beyond its limits; he may not even eat or drink with members of other groups, nor may he smoke from their *huqqa*. He often finds it

[1] In writing this chapter I have been greatly aided by Professor P. Sorokin's *Social Mobility*, 1927.

difficult to find any one to cook his food; and if he dies, there will be no one to perform his obsequies, and his body may have to be removed by scavengers. Nor is it only a question of the inconveniences to which a Hindu is exposed during his absence. A man who is long away from home is often looked at askance on his return; he is suspected of having broken the rules of his caste and he may find it hard to regain his old position.[2]

We can now measure internal migrancy. In Sweden in 1860 the proportion of people living in a department other than that in which they were born was 7.0 per cent; in 1890, 13.5; in 1910, 17.4. For Switzerland the corresponding figures are: 1850, 7.3; 1900, 13.9; 1920, 18.5. The percentage of the Bavarian population born elsewhere was in 1875, 1.2; in 1890, 2.4; in 1900, 3.0; in 1910, 2.9.

In the interval between 1880 and 1910 the foreign-born in England increased from 0.3 per cent to 0.7; in Germany from 0.6 to 1.9; in Austria from 1.6 to 2.1; in Sweden from 0.4 to 0.9; in Switzerland from 7.4 to 14.7. As for the United States her turnstiles registered *thirty-six million* immigrants in the period 1820-1924. The international flow of human beings in the last hundred years is unique in the history of mankind. Within the memory of living men the conditions of mass movement have been utterly revolutionized. Not only has steam made far travel swift and safe and cheap, but the long-distance carriage of human beings has been organized as never before. To-day a peasant living within sight of the Rock of Prometheus or the Cedars of Lebanon may buy a through ticket to a frontier point in the Canadian Northwest! Hence, more and more, mankind deliquesces and, if unhindered, flows in broad streams toward any land which holds out a fair prospect.

Circulation of ideas. Mental contacts are multiplying even faster than migrants. In 1913 the average inhabitant of the civilized countries received seven times as many letters as in 1875. Between 1910 and 1913 the number of telegrams dispatched more than doubled. In 1913 the number of interurban telephone conversations was ten times what it was in 1896. As for the radio, who knows the number of listeners? Thus the circulation of news, ideas, fashions, standards, emotional attitudes, and other social products becomes ever wider and more rapid. In antiquity the

[2] *Census of India,* 1911, vol. I, Part I, p. 91.

substitution of one style for another went on at a snail's pace. Petrie figures the average longevity of a style in ancient Egyptian Art as about 1350 years. In Greece, according to Walters, the period of domination of the principal types of the ancient pottery was: Pre-Mycenæan period, about 1000 years; Mycenæan, 700; Græco-Phœnician, 400; Hellenic, 350. But now a decade sees more change than a century used to see. Observes Sorokin:

> At the present time a radical change in the arts, in painting and sculpture, and in literature and music happens within a few decades and often within a few years. The nineteenth century alone witnessed a succession of at least from four to six quite different schools in literature and painting and music and even architecture. Futurism and ultra-futurism arose, developed, spread through Western societies and died within some fifteen to twenty-five years. Small modifications are happening within a few weeks and months. As to the fashions and fads, their rapid circulation and change are well known. Professor Bogardus's data show that about 80 per cent of all fads live less than one year.[3]

Labor turnover. The drift from job to job and factory to factory has become startling. Among us the workers who stay on a job for less than a year are probably as numerous as those who stay longer. One hundred per cent a year is considered a normal turnover. Some concerns will hire in a year three or four times as many hands as they employ. In England of 1,000 entrants in war time there remained among the factory workers after one month of service, 917; after two months, 868; after four months, 791; after six months, 730.

Divorce. The marriage partnership used to last "till death us do part"; but all over the civilized world (save in the Irish Free State where Catholic canons govern and in Japan where the former excessive rate has been brought down by change in the law) the divorce rate shows an upward tendency. In the United States about *one union in five* ends in the divorce court. Continually the craving for change of partner seizes more spouses and is indulged on slighter grounds.

Inter-group circulation. As never before men quit their natal church and join another, leave their political party and support its rival. Less and less can the voting future of a pre-

[3] *Social Mobility*, 1927, p. 392.

cinct, a county, a city or a state be foretold from the figures of the last election. In all countries with representative government the proportion of "loose" voters is rising. The growing instability of church membership causes religious bodies to experience startling ups and downs. By 1916 17 denominations which had been in existence among us in 1890 had disappeared while 31 new sects had come into being. Of the survivors some were growing like mushrooms while others obviously had one foot in the grave.

Causes of greater horizontal mobility. Aside from such obvious causes as improvement in the means of transportation and communication and the growth of education in two dimensions one should note:

The emergence of huge political units. Gone are the innumerable petty tribes ready to treat the stranger as an enemy. Local communities are no longer jealous, suspicious groups of blood kin. To-day with sixty passports you gain the right to look in the face nineteen-twentieths of humanity.

The newspaper habit. The rise of a public that reads newspapers but not books is recent. As a rule books have exalted the social heritage; sacred books have been the most read and they purport to be a revelation of God's will made ages ago. But *newspapers,* playing up what happened yesterday or will happen to-morrow, make us vain of our own time.

Loss of prestige by the past. Ancestor worship and naïve veneration of forefathers are dying. The thrilling gains from science and invention admonish us not to revere "the good old times" but to have faith rather in "the good time coming." The United States Patent Office is issuing patents a hundredfold as fast as it was doing a century ago. Of the forefathers one cannot but reflect, "*We* know so much *they* didn't know." Seeing them no longer as supermen, we feel freer to toss away their life patterns and seize with both hands the gifts our time showers upon us. Literary backlooks may make us sentimental over the Homeric Age, the Augustan Age, the Age of the Medici, but the candid historian reveals how rude, benighted and hopeless the masses of those times actually were. In our time—and perhaps for much longer—more and more of mankind are going to set their faces toward the future. Nothing can halt the spread of a progressive spirit.

VERTICAL MOBILITY

No society or time is quite without vertical circulation. Even in stratified societies a few stalwarts succeed in rising. Conversely, in societies of freest circulation many individuals hold through inheritance positions for which they are by no means the best fitted.

Inheritance of occupation. In India caste involves descent of occupation from father to son; the son of a smith is a smith, the son of a barber is a barber. So was it in ancient Egypt, in Rome of the third to fifth centuries A.D., in Byzantium and in ancient Peru. But in Western societies of to-day the handing on of occupation rarely exceeds 70 per cent; in general it ranges between 20 per cent and 60 per cent. Moreover, such inheritance appears to be decreasing. Researches by Sorokin in Minneapolis show that 72 per cent of the grandfathers of the respondents had the same occupation as the great grandfathers; 39 per cent of the fathers had the same occupation as the grandfathers; and only 10.6 per cent of the respondents followed the calling of their fathers. For a group of Mannheim (Germany) families the inheritance of calling declined in a generation from 67 per cent to 42.5 per cent.

Conversely, the sons of fathers in a given occupation are found at all levels. In Rome in 1908 of 880 persons whose fathers were unskilled laborers 458 were skilled, 104 were in the middle class (business and the professions), and 55 were in the upper class; of 1159 whose fathers were skilled workmen 78 were unskilled laborers, 158 were in the middle class and 151 in the upper class; of 357 whose fathers were in business and the professions 19 were unskilled, 125 skilled and 116 in the upper class; of 731 whose fathers were of the upper class 17 were unskilled, 138 skilled and 84 in the middle class. On the other hand, of 195 workers in a Vienna automobile factory 6 were sons of business or professional men; in another Vienna factory 17 per cent were sons of small business men, minor officials, teachers and professionals. In a German factory 10.7 per cent of the operatives came from middle-class families. Thus it appears that in our day the children of men in the same calling are scattered through the whole gamut of occupations.

Vertical occupational ascent. Among 885 leading American men of science, a fifth are sons of farmers. Among a thousand men of letters, a seventh come from the farm and a twentieth are sons of men in mechanical, clerical or unskilled occupations. Of our presidents, half came from farmer, laborer and humble professional families. Of 45 state governors in 1909, 41 were sons of farmers or other plain people. Of members of Congress at that time, 69 per cent were country-bred. Of 56 cabinet officers 1869-1903, 47 were from the farms. Of 47 railway presidents, more than a half have been country boys. Of 18,356 notables in *Who's Who in America,* 23.4 per cent were sons of farmers, 6.3 per cent sons of skilled workers and 0.4 per cent sons of common laborers.

On the other hand, Taussig and Joslyn [4] find that seventy per cent of American business leaders have been drawn from ten per cent of the population. Comparing the social origin of different age groups of the business leaders, it appears that the proportion of farmers' sons has decreased while the proportion of business men's sons has increased. The proportion of manual laborers' sons has remained stable and very small, not keeping up with the growth of the working class. The fact that two-thirds of the business leaders of age 35-39 are sons of business men carries a strong suggestion of wire-pulling by "dad."

In England of 63 managers and employers in cotton manufacture, three-fourths had started as mill operatives; of 88 employers in the building trade, 63 per cent; among directors of spinning companies, 73 per cent. Among German leaders born since 1860, an eighth came from the working class. Of 2,186 members of university faculties in Germany and Austria, 90 were sons of petty officials, 74 sons of teachers, 52 sons of artisans. The German university has been a great social ladder. In 1871 three-fourths of its students were sons of university graduates; forty years later, only one-fourth. Study of the origins of the students of Halle, Leipsic and Würtemburg show that the proportion from the nether social strata has been increasing; even by 1900 more than half were from families of laborers, artisans, farmers, teachers and minor officials. Of 1653 persons who between 1898 and 1921 passed the law examination in Baden and were candidates

[4] *American Business Leaders, A Study in Social Origins and Social Stratification,* 1932.

for the higher civil service, 9 per cent were sons of innkeepers, artisans, etc.

The post-war rush to the universities in all countries grows out of youth's realization that the choice posts go to those prepared by a higher education to fill them. Because the universities of Central and Eastern Europe are now frequented largely by the sons and daughters of social classes that did not attend them before the World War, the doctor's degree is sought more as a passport to a position. This clashes with the old view that the university is primarily a place of research and gives deep concern to the friends of scholarship.

Channels of vertical ascent. Various are the ladders by which one mounts. There is the *army*. The punishment for letting titled donkeys lead armies is so dire that in the course of a long war men of any origin rise to command provided they win battles. Thus of 92 Roman Emperors, at least 36 mounted *via* the army ladder. Of 65 Emperors of Byzantium, 12 were upstarts who had risen to high military command. Napoleon and his new nobility came to the top by the army ladder.

On its up-curve the *religious organization* affords chances. In the stratified Roman Empire the Christian Church was the main channel by which able sons of serfs rose to influence and power. Clerical celibacy facilitated the process by making necessary a constant recruitment of outsiders. As the Church approached the zenith of its glory its dignities were monopolized by the nobility, so that it was less of a ladder. The organization of Judaism, Mohammedanism, Hinduism and Buddhism likewise gave the gifted lowly means of rising to lofty places.

Service of the ruler or the state has always been a ladder. In our democratic era the man with rare gifts as stump orator, tribune of the people, conciliator and vote winner, party organizer, or practical statesman may rise to power whatever his social origin.

The school has come to be our *widest* ladder. China was the first great society to require learning as a qualification for public office. In Western society the school is more and more a means of rising; hence, the endeavor to make it costless and the flooding of ambitious youth into our high schools and universities. Dependent on the school are the *learned professions*. Their high entrance qualifications exclude favoritism and inheritance, and the growing

accessibility of learning enables gifted youths from poor families to rise to fame and fortune by some profession.

Historically the ladder most used has been *money making*. In England after the Wars of the Roses had thinned the feudal nobility the new rich largely superseded the old families. From the Crown they bought such titles and privileges as they wanted. In the reign of James I "mercers, grocers, customs comptrollers, goldsmiths, merchants, and mayors of provincial towns appear as country gentlemen with their coats of arms." About the same time "money began to rule France; everything could now be bought: power and honors, civil and military positions and even nobility itself." "From Louis XIII up to the Revolution every rich man became a noble. . . . In this period money meant everything and was everything."

In our time the British aristocracy, according to Mrs. Sidney Webb, an insider, owes its vitality "to a perpetual process of casting out and renewal, younger sons and daughters falling out of social rank to sink or swim among their fellow commoners, whilst the new rich of the British Empire and the United States were assimilated by marriage, or by the sale of honors . . . in order to replenish the electoral funds of the 'ins' and 'outs.'" "Any family of outstanding riches, assuming that its members were not actually mentally deficient or legally disreputable, could rise to the top, marry its daughters to cabinet ministers and noblemen, and become in time ennobled itself." [5]

Vertical occupational descent. This colorful up-current is balanced by a drab down-current. Certain American tables (Burdge) show that 6.4 per cent of the sons of the professional man; 7.6 per cent of those of the business man; 10.3 per cent of those of the executives; and 7.4 per cent of those of the officials became unskilled laborers. Among 2,943 factory operatives in Berlin one-ninth were sons of professional men, entrepreneurs, businessmen and officials. Among 4,374 employees and operatives in a German printing concern 4 per cent were sons of fathers of high social standing. Among 886 operatives of a big German jewelry factory 5 per cent of the men and 7.3 per cent of the women came from the business, professional and official classes.

Whatever occupational groups we take we come upon this

[5] *My Apprenticeship*, 1926, p. 45.

descending current. Family influence or inherited money for a while buoys up incompetents; but in time many of them sink to their due level. Under normal conditions these ups and downs are slow, being controlled by the social mechanism of testing and distribution. The would-be climber must evince specific ability and years of training are necessary to acquire it, years of work to demonstrate it. Hence rise is slow and so, too, sinking is slow. Thanks to education, money and connections, a son inherits his father's high place; with only average ability and application he can keep it. Usually his first failure does not start him down hill; persistency in failure is necessary to doom him.

The time factor. Mark the destinies of immigrants from the country into the German city of Karlsruhe. Their distribution among lower, middle and professional classes was 82 per cent, 14 per cent and 4 per cent; that of their sons was 41 per cent, 49 per cent and 10 per cent; that of their grandsons was 40 per cent, 35 per cent and 25 per cent. The series 82, 41, and 40 in the lower classes, 4, 10, and 25 in the professional classes, picture the gradualness of social rise. Then men in the higher posts *run older* than those in the lower. The manual and clerical occupations swarm with the youthful but not the professions or officialdom; which means that climbing takes time and many in the lower ranks are "on their way." The sons of prosperous American farmers came into farm ownership at the average age of 26½ years; but those who started as hired men came in ownership at the average age of 36 years. For the same reason popes are older than cardinals, cardinals than bishops, generals than colonels, colonels than captains.

In revolutionary epochs these ups and downs become sudden and wild. Individuals are flung as by an earthquake to the higher terraces of the social pyramid or else hurled therefrom into the social deeps. Moreover, there are abrupt shifts in the social status of entire classes. In a time of war or reform these ups and downs are speeded up but do not lose their selective character.

High mobility of American society. Observes Dr. Robert E. Park:

> Changes in status are constantly taking place in every society. Certain individuals and certain classes rise and invade the higher levels of society. As a consequence the prestige of other individuals and other classes is diminished, with the result that they

are forced to decline and to accept a lower position. In America, where changes in underlying conditions proceed more rapidly than they do elsewhere, changes in status are correspondingly rapid. There seems under ordinary conditions to be no barrier in America to advancement—except failure to succeed. . . . The spectacle of American life is amazing and inspiring. No man, it seems, is so far down that he cannot hope to rise.[6]

Mobility not equalitarian. There are two rival conceptions of democracy: as *opportunity,* as *equality.* We Americans have imagined that they harmonize, *i.e.,* social mobility makes for social equality. But is this true? When for generations social climbing has been greatly hampered many thwarted talents rust in the huts while many nincompoop "sons of theirs fathers" occupy high posts. But, after there have long been wide staircases leading up, the children of the high-placed will generally show superiority in native talent to the children of the nether strata. The constant escape upward of bright sons and daughters will have left the workaday mass like a fished-out pond or an overcropped field. In the degree that social classes become true ability grades you get "looking down" and "looking up"; so in the long run democracy as *opportunity* says "no" to democracy as *equality.*

CHARACTERISTIC EFFECTS OF SOCIAL MOBILITY

Versatility. The man who stays in the same niche becomes a creature of habit; but he who goes on from rôle to rôle, from status to status, does not build up rigid habits, for continually he has been obliged to alter his behavior. In a mobile society one who is not versatile and adaptable will not rise far.

Breadth. In a frozen society the bulk are so indelibly stamped by their life rôle that they are dwarfed or warped. Beholding the human scene from one point only, they have a narrow outlook. But the member of a mobile society, who in his time may have been both servant and master, hand-worker and brain worker, underling and chief, has seen life from various angles. He realizes what "social atmosphere" does to one, perceives the relativity of group standards and codes, knows "from inside" the soul of the farm hand, the clerk, the executive. Hence, he is open-minded and tolerant, understands those of other up-bringing or craft than his own.

[6] *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* vol. CXL, (Nov., 1928), p. 13.

Mental strain. Once adjusted to his task and niche the member of an immobile society carries on largely by routine; he can "get by" even if his higher faculties fall asleep. In a mobile society, however, from time to time one is called upon to adopt a new idea, tackle a fresh job, learn another technique, cope with a novel situation, gain footing in a strange social circle. This keeps one alert and supple, to be sure, but it adds to mental strain and may have something to do with the rising volume of mental wreckage in modern society.

Detachment and loneliness. In a stable society permanency of social position insures you associates of long standing that you can know intimately; but in a fluid society either you shift from group to group or else the make-up of your group changes; so the chances are against the ripening of deep satisfying intimacies. Much shifting snaps the ties that bind one to birthplace, kinfolk, boyhood playmates, work comrades, lodge "brothers," church "brethren"; one may become a floating thistledown attached to nothing and nobody. In spite of ease in meeting and "taking up with" new people, of numerous light touch-and-go relationships, the feeling "I don't belong" or "nobody cares" becomes intolerable.

To such loneliness Sorokin traces much of the restlessness, the "seeking for something lost," of our time.

> If it (loneliness) is unbearable, is it not natural to try to break it by mad dancing, by mad rushing into a crowd (theatres, unions, factions, clubs), by the hope to secure intimacy in the way of hasty marriages, hasty love affairs, numerous dancing embraces, through imitation of 'intimacy actions' among a host of quite "new friends"? People remind one often of those heroes who have lost their "Blue Bird" and are forever trying to catch it; but in vain: psychology cannot be deceived. All these means do not give the desired intimacy and do not break the loneliness. . . . Hence permanent restlessness, flapperism, dancing, craving for excitement and similar phenomena. People are looking for what has been taken away by mobility.[7]

Disintegration of conventional morals. Life in face-to-face groups makes for steady and consistent morals. Cooley is right in saying:

> We are dependent for moral health upon intimate association with a group of some sort, usually consisting of our family,

[7] *Social Mobility*, p. 525.

neighbors and other friends. It is the interchange of ideas and feelings with this group that makes standards of right and wrong seem real to us. When we move to town or go to another country or get into a different social class, a common result is a partial moral isolation and atrophy of the moral sense.[8]

The right person in the right place. In the ideal mobile society all children enjoy equal chances and the tests do really separate the "sheep" from the "goats." The round peg is likely to get into the round hole and the square peg into the square hole. No popinjay holds a soft berth because he is "Soandso's" son; no competent is kept down because his father was a junk dealer. The strong win the posts that call for the making of momentous decisions while the weak gravitate toward jobs in which they take orders. Far from being a one-story bungalow society is still a skyscraper, but on the broad staircases brogans are mounting and patent leather shoes are descending!

Social stability. Unless people believe that the actual social system is God-ordained and Heaven-sent, the mobile society is the more stable. A gifted and ambitious youth is not going to assail a social order that will let him rise to something worth while. Vigorous spirits of humble origin, who would stir up sedition if they saw no paths up, champion the existing system when they have found how many doors are swing doors! In a frozen society the time comes when, as in late eighteenth-century France, the exalted doubt their superiority and make but a half-hearted defense of their privileges. But in a mobile society the power holders, who have been recruited from every social level owing to their demonstration of personal capacity, feel sure of themselves, remain perfectly convinced of their right to be where they are and will defend their posts to the last ditch. Moreover, in a fluid and competitive society there accumulates little high-explosive in the way of foiled ambitions, blighted hopes and rankling grievances.

[8] *Social Process*, p. 180.

PART VII

SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

CHAPTER

XXXIX. Socialization

XL. Estrangement

XLI. Social Control

XLII. Liberation

XLIII. Anticipation

XLIV. Individualization

CHAPTER XXXIX

SOCIALIZATION

By "socialization" I mean *the development of the we-feeling in associates and their growth in capacity and will to act together.* Socialization with respect to *one* group does not imply, of course, socialization with respect to your fellows generally or to the members of opposing groups. Loyalty to a criminal gang involves disregard of the rights of your fellow citizens. Hectic patriotism desocializes you with respect to non-nationals.

CONDITIONS OF SOCIALIZATION

Common background. *Sons of the same land* have a bond in the identity of their early impressions. Not that they will cleave to one another—unless they are homesick in a far country—but when they have to choose between aliens and their countrymen they will prefer the latter. The recurrent unheeded impressions from one's surroundings constitute, as it were, the stable background of individual experience. When strangers discover that they have a common background they are pleased and draw together.

In "The Native-Born" Kipling brings out what it is that makes one people of those reared in the same climate and scene. The Australian calls upon his friends to drink

> To the hush of the breathless morning
> On the thin, tin, crackling roofs,
> To the haze of the burned back-ranges
> And the dust of the shoeless hoofs—

The Canadian's toast is

> To the far-flung fenceless prairie,
> Where the quick cloud-shadows trail,
> To our neighbor's barn in the offing
> And the line of the new-cut rail;
> To the plough in her league-long furrow
> With the gray Lake gulls behind—

South Africa has characteristic odors as well as sights and sounds. Her son drinks

> To the home of the floods and the thunder,
> To her pale dry healing blue—
> To the lift of the great Cape combers,
> And the smell of the baked Karroo,
> To the growl of the sluicing stamp-head—
> To the reef and the water-gold.

Thus it is that each land becomes "home" and, however sharp the strife among its sons, they draw together when opposed by an alien people. Here you have the first strand of nationality.

A common speech. This does not socialize but it enables certain socializing factors to function.

The primitive dance. Students of primitive life stress the social importance of the dances of the hunting peoples. Warmed up by the dance the participants are fused, as it were, into one being. They are so completely socialized that the dancing group feels and behaves like a single organism. It accustoms men who in their loose and precarious conditions of life are driven hither and thither by various individual needs and desires to act under one impulse with reference to one object. It is significant that among the American Indians one is not permitted to continue a feud with any tribesman with whom one has danced. Furthermore the dance is consciously used to strengthen amity and solidarity among different groups.

Common emotional experiences. From the reminiscences exchanged on "old settlers' day" it is evident that what knit the hearts of the pioneers was the vivid experiences they passed through together, intense social pleasure at merry makings and celebrations, as well as suffering and anxiety caused by floods, drouths, blizzards, prairie fires, and Indian outbreaks. If foreign born are interspersed among native settlers such experiences bring them all "into tune," then interchange of ideas gradually assimilates them. The non-British immigrants into the American colonies in the eighteenth century were assimilated much sooner when they settled on the Indian-fighting frontier than when they dwelt in groups on the safe seaboard.

Expansive emotions enlarge the heart more than do depressive emotions. Golden moments, when one escapes from confining walls and beholds wide horizons, when one has a delicious sense of free

and onward life, beget the we-feeling. Religious conversion is such an experience, and it normally shows itself in a greater force and range of sympathy and love. During the early days of the first Russian revolution people were exalted out of themselves. Total strangers met and suddenly talked like old friends. In a milk shop people would help themselves and leave the right pay. The worst-looking specimen of a man would step off the path into the wet snow to make room for a woman or child. "A boundless bright good will flowed like waves from all the streets up into every room in the town. It was one of those vast miracles that come to a nation only at moments."

Common hardships, perils, and maltreatment, as well as common deliverance, success, and triumph, socialize those who react to them in the same way. But *unlike* reaction to strain sunders men, as we see in the antipathy of martyrs to apostates, of fighters to skulkers, of rebels to cringers. Not those *in the same situation* but those *who react alike in the same situation* are drawn together.

A *master experience* is likely to segregate those who have had it. The converted keep to themselves, for the unregenerate cannot understand them. Revolutionaries with incompatible principles are brothers while persecuted, but not for long after they have come on top. To war comrades the civilian is forever an outsider. Simple seafaring men are never quite themselves with "landlubbers." Motherhood may inspire a sisterly feeling among women. A free-masonry unites lovers of outdoors, wilderness hunters, or bird wooers. Those who have been "up against it" or "down to the bottom dollar" are of a fraternity to which the darlings of fortune can never belong.

Enjoyable eating together. The joint enjoyment of good food and drink has been the favorite reviver of good feeling and the seal of amity. Nor have intoxicants and narcotics been without a social rôle. They have been, in the words of Giddings, "the crude excitants of social feelings in crude natures." Feasting together begets a genial and expansive emotion. The ancient village community set such store by it that every available opportunity, such as the commemoration of the ancestors, the religious solemnities, the beginning and the end of field work, the births, the marriages, and the funerals, was seized upon to bring the community to a common meal.

In the medieval guild "the common meal, like the festival at the old tribal folk mote—the *mahl* or *malum*—or the Buryate *aba*, the parish feast, and the harvest supper, was simply an affirmation of brotherhood. It symbolized the times when everything was kept in common by the clan. This day, at least, all belonged to all; all sat at the same table and partook of the same meal. Even at a much later time the inmate of the almshouse of a London guild sat this day by the side of the rich alderman." [1]

Even now, when we wish to weave a bond of fellowship or to fire men to join in a generous undertaking, we gather them about the banquet board. Indeed, to "break bread together" has a symbolic, even a mystic, significance, and we will not sit at meat with those against whom we intend to draw a color line or a social line.

The festival. In olden time the larger societies provided for periodical assemblage in order not to disintegrate into bickering local groups or social classes. The socializing value of such assemblage lies in this: that in one another's presence people are deeply moved in the same way at the same time and are conscious of their community of emotion. In the words of Tarde [2] a festival is

> That sovereign process by which the social logic of the sentiments resolves all partial discords, private enmities, envies, contempts, jealousies, moral oppositions of all sorts, into an immense unison formed by the periodic convergence of all the secondary sentiments into a greater and stronger feeling, into a collective hatred or love for some great object, which gives the tone to all hearts and transfigures their dissonance into a higher harmony. Hence, the more a society in becoming complicated multiplies these dissonances, the more it has need of magnificent and frequent festivals. This major feeling, this tonic note of the public heart, is sometimes a national hatred which is magnified and intensified by expressing itself in mimic combats, by the slaughter of captives, by all these bloody and ferocious criminal festivals in which primitive civilizations delight. Sometimes it is a great national love for a god or for a man, a national worship or admiration, religious, patriotic, or political in tinge.
>
> In the multifarious Hellenic festivals, Olympian games, Isthmian games, Panathenian processions, the triumphal return of the victorious athlete, etc., was expressed intense admiration for strength, agility and beauty, and for the heroes in which these

[1] P. Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid*, p. 175.
[2] G. Tarde, *La Logique Sociale*, 1895, pp. 325-6.

qualities were embodied, also respect and love of the god or the goddess of the city—piety and patriotism blent in a unique combination. Rome had its triumphal marches of generals to the Capitol, its apotheoses of emperors which, like its gladiatorial games, glorified its love of glory, its appetite for dominion and conquest. The Middle Ages had its canonization of saints, its coronations, its jousts, its exposure of reliquaries in procession, all of them expressions of chivalric, feudal, or monarchic mysticism.

We have our patriotic, political, or humanitarian festivals, such as military reviews, the funeral of Victor Hugo, the bringing back of the ashes of Napoleon, the unveiling of statues in honor of great writers, great artists, greater or lesser statesmen. There are no festivals . . . which have not the virtue of binding for the moment all souls into one bundle, united by a dominant feeling.

"The most important functions of ancient worship," says W. Robertson Smith, "were reserved for public occasions, when the whole community was stirred by a common emotion. . . . Universal hilarity prevailed; men ate, drank, and were merry, together, rejoicing before their god. Feasting, dancing, songs and music were present." A people without letters, arts, or trade, living in scattered rural settlements, has little to keep alive mutual interest. Wanting are the ties created by education, travel, news, common literature and central authority. But at the periodical religious feast a common emotion lifts the people to a consciousness of their oneness.

Group life as a socializer. The members of a large well-ordered family are socialized by constant adjusting to others for the common good. Hence, among those apt in winning and leading men—politicians, labor organizers, evangelists, and promoters—are found an unusual number who grew up with several brothers and sisters and so never formed egoistic habits.

Participation in an enduring and exclusive organization takes one "out of himself." The common name, war cry, or flag, symbolizing the identity of the group, becomes in time an independent center of emotion, a charged Leyden jar. With its distinctive banner, colors, slogans, songs, festivals, and commemoration day, the group takes on personality and attracts a love which is not the same thing as love for its present members. Not only state and church gather such stimuli to feeling but colleges, guilds, political parties, and religious and fraternal orders as well.

To be hated and set upon by a common enemy generates the we-feeling. This is the case of the boys' gang, which can survive the persecution of other gangs only if the members are loyal to one another. In the gang, therefore, is born that spirit of loyalty which lies at the foundation of most social relations.

This gang loyalty, however, is by no means a loyalty to individuals only; it is a loyalty also to ideals. The boy refuses to "squeal" under pressure, partly to shield his fellows, but still more because squealing is contrary to the boys' moral code. He joins the tribal wars, partly because, like the good barbarian he is, he loves his neighbor and hates his enemy, but quite as much because certain fightings are demanded by the gang's standard of honor.[3]

Disloyalty is the one unforgivable offense in boyish eyes, the one crime which inevitably leads to expulsion from the gang. . . . Among twenty-one boys who had been expelled from their gangs eleven were put out for disloyalty, three for fighting in bad causes, and but one each for all other reasons. There is no other institution on earth that can take its place beside the boys' gang for the cultivation of unswerving loyalty to the group.

Close beside loyalty and fidelity come the related virtues of obedience, self-sacrifice, and coöperation. The boy who will not obey the captain cannot play with the group. Baseball and football are impossible without coöperation, and they demand constant self-sacrifice of the individual to the team. The gang fight, brutal and useless as it commonly is, also calls for the highest devotion. It is fought not for personal ends but for the honor of the gang.[4]

The boys' club, under wise supervision, may have a magical effect in socializing even the little Ishmaelites of the street—the newsboys and bootblacks. With growing interest in the club comes eagerness for its success, *i.e., the corporate spirit.* The joint ownership and management of the club and its common property is a most effective check upon the thievish propensities of its members. "When a boy has so far conquered the covetousness his hard lot of deprivation has bred into him that he can, night after night, use tools and games which all boys desire to possess, and at the closing hour put them in their places and leave them behind him, he has taken his first lesson, probably, in that social conduct which makes of the individual a good citizen of his community." [5]

[3] J. A. Puffer, *The Boy and His Gang,* 1912, p. 144.
[4] *Ibid.,* pp. 151, 152.
[5] M. W. Law, "Our Ishmael," *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. VIII, p. 844.

Common prized possessions socialize. Feeling is fitful but fluctuation in we-feeling may be overcome by the interest attaching to common group possessions. The medieval guilds insured their future when they reared their beautiful guild halls. A religious society strikes root when it builds its own church and parish house. A college fraternity is quite justified in desiring a chapter house of its own, a literary society in fitting up a hall for itself. Noble municipal buildings—schools, libraries, museums, art galleries, and parks—fan the fading embers of civic feeling in the people of a city. The splendid town halls of Ghent and Bruges were inspirers as well as achievements of city patriotism. The "old homestead," the ancient roof-tree, the entailed estate play a great rôle in keeping alive family feeling. On the other hand, the nomadic tenant family is likely to be loosely knit and to have no sense of oneness with ancestors. Always the well-to-do, who can build themselves homes which last for centuries, have preserved family solidarity better than the poor, whose flimsy habitations bring them little from their forebears.

Sport as a socializer. A common master enthusiasm socializes. In congested urban quarters the passion for play which springs up after the opening of a recreation center levels moldering barriers between nationalities and confessions, Americanizes the foreign-born, and begets a neighborhood consciousness. With access to wholesome pleasures the laborer no longer drinks and beats his wife in sheer reaction from his grinding existence. The community becomes humanized. Children who hurt themselves at play cease to inquire anxiously, "Will it cost much and will my mother whip me?" The young people drop their rough manners, and foreign-born mothers no longer shrink from allowing their sick to go to the hospital.

At American colleges in the Orient athletic sports have been great teachers of democracy. Youths of diverse races, religions and castes find their level on the football field, where a prince may be tackled by a peasant, and on the baseball diamond, where the son of a pasha may be caught out at first base by the son of a licorice grower. At first the haughty, slow-moving scions of the ruling race—Turks, Druses of Lebanon, or Manchus—stand idly by watching the "madness" of the Americans and wondering why they do not *spare themselves exertion by hiring servants to play for them!* But presently their pulse quickens, the

game "gets" them, and they forget their rank in novel thrills and pleasures.

Antagonistic team games have the further merit that they teach the players *to be good losers*. In the earlier football matches between the teams of the mission colleges in China a team would retire from the field with great dignity when the game was going against it and it was in danger of "losing face." The lesson it gradually learned of taking a thrashing with a smile is greatly needed in some other parts of the world. The ready resort to revolution in Latin America comes from the inability of the losers of a political contest to reconcile themselves to defeat. In Peruvian universities one is struck by the dearth of associations among the students—no fraternities, no athletic teams, no social, literary, debating, press, dramatic, musical, or scientific societies such as flourish in our universities. One finds no class feeling, no university spirit, no love of Alma Mater, no heart-warming reunions of alumni, in a word, none of those corporate forms which loosen the hard soil of natural egoism and prepare it to admit later the spreading roots of public spirit and good citizenship.

The cause is not indifference. The students want societies, but fail in their endeavors to coöperate because individually they *will not compromise*. Again and again valuable organizations serving a real common purpose are wrecked by the touchiness and self-will of the members. Clubs break up because those outvoted on some question leave in a huff. This exaggerated sense of personal dignity is a heritage from the old aristocratic Hispano-American social order, which intensified self-feeling to such a degree that it became a bar to organization and team work.[6]

THE GENESIS OF SOCIAL ATTITUDES AND IDEALS

It is one thing to become socialized with reference to those with whom we have enjoyable experience or share a common life; it is another thing to gain social attitudes toward human beings generally. Various agencies "socialize" us in this latter sense.

The primary group as birthplace of social ideals. Cooley has shown that social ideals spring up out of experience in "primary" groups, *i.e.*, groups characterized by intimate face-to-face relations and coöperation. "Where," he asks, "do we get our notions of love, freedom, justice and the like which we are ever

[6] See E. A. Ross, *South of Panama*, 1914, pp. 235-7.

applying to social institutions? Not from abstract philosophy, surely, but from the actual life of simple and widespread forms of society, like the family or the play group."[7] Such behavior patterns as kindness, loyalty, good faith, service, lawfulness develop from living in primary groups and then are carried out into the life of larger (secondary) groups wherein relations are rarely face-to-face. In Cooley's view the chief organized social influences in the life of Western peoples to-day are Christianity and democracy—the one seeking to universalize the behavior patterns begotten in the family, the other to universalize the behavior patterns that have grown up within the neighborhood. Advance in socialization has not come by pitching ideals higher—what, indeed, could be higher than brotherhood or neighborliness?—but by inducing people to treat *more* of their fellow-men as brothers or neighbors.

Scouting as a socializer. In the Boy Scouts and Camp Fire Girls movements we see a most ingenious interweaving of a dozen social ideals with the gratification of youth's instincts by means of woodcraft, nature lore, hunting, stalking, tracking, fire-building, signaling, and watching outdoor life. The scout must learn to build a fire with two matches; to rescue a companion in the water; to handle canoe, boat, or horse; to find his way across country and through woods to a designated spot and back within a specified time; to track a companion by his foot marks; and to spy upon a (constructively) hostile camp without being discovered. There is, of course, no necessary connection between scout law and outdoor life. Many a skilful hunter or backwoodsman is "yellow" clear through. Many a high-minded gentleman cannot build a fire or pitch a tent. But the tremendous appeal of the scout activities and stunts "sells" to the boys the scout ideals. They accept the obligation to speak the truth, be friendly, show courtesy, and serve others because of their keen enjoyment of the things which scouts do. There could be no happier illustration of applying ingenuity to the problem of socializing the boy.

The school as a socializer. Of late it has been perceived that the school as a small, intimate, durable, supervised society may prepare children for later social responsibilities. There is the *socialized play hour* in which supervised team games may induct playmates into the arts of coöperation and self-control. There is

[7] *Social Organization*, 1912, p. 32.

the *socialized curriculum* which emphasizes humanistic subjects such as literature and the social studies and makes much of the social application of truths learned. There is the *socialized recitation* which organizes the members of the class into committees, each committee investigating the topic assigned it and fusing the findings of the individual members into a committee report.

Finally there is *pupil self-government*. In the "school state" or "school city" popularity is won not, as in the autocratic school, by slyly or defiantly breaking rules, but by loyally living up to them, for they embody the wishes and sense of right of the pupils. Then, too, the apprentice-citizen is nipped by the inexorable logic of obeying yourself the laws which you expect the others to obey. A boy elected to the presidency of the George Junior Republic by unanimous vote of his fellow citizens felt impelled to call them together the next day, confess a theft committed some months before, surrender himself to the police, and go to jail! A lad who has learned the difficult art of team work and submits willingly to restrictions growing out of the very nature of associate life is well on his way to becoming a good citizen in a democracy.

Religion as a socializer. The social rôle of religion is a large and much-controverted subject. Disciplinary? Yes; but whether it *socializes* depends greatly on its spirit. A traveler in India saw at a great center of popular religion so many and such pitiable child widows and outcastes for whom nothing was being done that he raised the question with a Hindu holy man and spiritual seer. He received the answer: "It is the glory of Hinduism that it concerns itself not with incidental things but with the relation of the individual soul to God." Probably the overwhelming majority of the world's spokesmen for religion share this conception and religion so conceived may not socialize. On the other hand, the Japanese Christian leader Kagawa declares:

> I stand against all learning, all institutions, all governments, all arts, all religions which reject love. I protest against any so-called church which preaches faith and fails to love. . . . If any one desires me to revere him let him offer me love. To the loving I shall grudge no word of reverent praise. Even if his love be but imperfect for me it is a revelation and a way leading me toward God. Where Love is, there is God.

The sincere follower of religion so conceived should be powerfully lifted above such feelings as suspicion, jealousy, anger, hate, and greed.

INTEREST AS JOINER OR DIVIDER

Community of interest. When we become intensely concerned about something we regard gratefully those who help us toward our goal. Whiting Williams [8] tells of the factory superintendent and gang of men who worked two nights and a day to save their shop from a flood and ever after greeted one another as "pals." Fellow feeling quickly develops among fighters in the same cause. "Comrade" is a word to conjure with. Agitated by strong common emotions—fear, anxiety, grief, and elation—those who have long striven shoulder to shoulder against the same foe become dear to one another.

Even when blood kinship was *the* social bond, kinsmen became strangers unless they had a common interest. Says W. Robertson Smith: "A subgroup or horde which habitually lived apart from its brethren was very likely to form covenants with aliens, and this often led to a conflict of obligations in case of war and loosened the old tribal bond. In the long run, then, the strict bond of kinship could not maintain itself except within the limits of a local group habitually moving together." [9] On the other hand, if two groups had a vital common interest they "made believe" they were brothers. "A covenant in which two groups promised to stand by each other to the death was originally accompanied by a sacramental ceremony, the meaning of which was that the parties had commingled their blood." [10]

Meeting a crisis links the unlike. The exigency saps prejudice, so that members of different classes, races, and faiths willingly work side by side. During the World War American white women of the higher classes worked cheerfully with the lower class of Negro women though previously they would not tolerate a Negress even in the same elevator with them. Athletic and debating contests between colleges generate "college spirit"; matches between town ball teams and hose companies foster "local spirit." In the open country the accepted remedy for petty bickering

[8] *Mainsprings of Men*, 1925, pp. 190-191.
[9] *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, 1885, p. 24.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

among neighbors is to get them to *do* something—anything—*together.*

As a city grows its people split into occupation groups and social classes; but the we-feeling revives if fresh common interests are discovered as, for example, public sanitation, the extermination of the malarial mosquito, or protection against impure food. The same happens if the encroachments of a public utility company sow in the hearts of all the nettle of common grievance and set them the common task of curbing an "octopus." The persuasion that typhoid, drunkenness, prostitution, and degrading poverty are not inevitable, but can be banished by appropriate community action, renews the feeling of "our" city.

Collision of interests. While finding others helpful to us kindles sympathy, finding others constantly in our way engenders hostility. Harmony of interest socializes; clash of interest alienates. Observes Hornell Hart:

> If we have to take orange juice with castor oil, we come to hate the orange juice, not for its own sake, but because it has become associated with a distasteful experience. How much more are we likely to become angry and bitter with people who block us off from achievement, who cause us to be disgraced, who take power from us, who despise and reject us! Such people become parts of one's antipathies and antagonisms. . . .[11]

This is why brotherhoods have always been solicitous lest their unity be shattered by feuds. In the ancient village community every quarrel between individual members was treated as a community affair, even the bitter words uttered during a quarrel being considered an offense against the community. Every dispute was brought before arbiters, or, in the gravest cases, before the folk mote. The medieval guild took measures that no quarrel between guild brothers should fester into a feud or breed a lawsuit before any other court than that of the guild itself. The sects which take primitive Christianity as their model aim to settle by brotherly counsel or by friendly arbitration every dispute between the brethren, and even cast out the member who incontinently hales another into the law court. In rural America to-day it is accounted a blot on the neighborhood if two worthy neighbors are allowed to become embroiled in a lawsuit.

Another precaution is to *set up rules* which make clear what

[11] Unpublished manuscript quoted in *Community Conflict,* 1929.

each is entitled to in every case in which the interests of fellow members may be opposed. Forewarned, the brothers accommodate their expectations to what the established rule awards them and thus glide by ticklish situations which would certainly breed trouble were there no accepted formula of right. There is a noteworthy lessening of bad blood between employers and employees after thy have joined in setting up machinery in which both parties have confidence for hearing and correcting grievances which previously had remained without redress and poisoned the feelings of each party toward the other.

THE EXPANDED SELF

Socialization may be figured as an expansion of the personality which takes in other persons and their interests. Now of such selves there are as many as there are axes along which one can expand.

The spheric self. This incorporates persons chiefly according to their propinquity. Those who are dearest are the *neighbors*. One cares most for those one sees oftenest and least for those below the horizon. Until lately this was the prevailing type; but reading, travel, city life, the rise of the professions, and social stratification are unfavorable to it. It is the basis of neighborhood consciousness, community coöperation, and local self-government.

The linear self. This self keeps to the family line, ranging back among one's ancestors—particularly the illustrious—and forward among one's hoped-for descendants. It prompts a man to sacrifice much in order not to dishonor his forefathers or handicap his posterity. It nourishes a character which wins respect but not love. This concern with the dead and the unborn detracts from sympathy with one's fellows—save blood kin—so that family feeling is often a rival of social feeling. Democracy distrusts and fears loyalty to family, because it has been so stressed by its traditional enemies, kings and nobles.

The flat self. Confinement of social feeling to those within one's stratum results in a self which excludes those below one in the social scale because as beings of coarser clay they inspire only contempt. Although those above are admired and envied, the we-feeling does not extend to them because they are "different" and, moreover, they look down on one. This horizontal socialization weakens the barriers of dislike and jealousy between

neighborhoods, parishes, and provinces but, on the whole, it creates more ill-will than it removes. Hostile local communities can avoid trouble by having little to do with one another, but hostile social classes from being intermingled cannot avoid contacts and relations.

The vein self. In big democratic cities fellowship tends to follow occupational lines, steamfitter consorting with steamfitters, newspaper man with newspaper men, the artist in Bohemia with other Bohemians. They are competitors actual or potential, to be sure, but this fact is overshadowed by their community of interest, grievances, and hopes. Those not in love with their calling or without a calling may follow a slender vein of interest, so that they are brotherly only with a special group—baseball fans, stamps collectors, bird lovers, spiritualists, Y. M. C. A. Men, Browning enthusiasts or Marxian socialists.

The star self. Naturally the expanding self will be discriminating and selective when it has many to choose from. The developed personality, however, ought to have a number of strong tastes and interests which bring it into sympathy with several veins of people. Hence the *star* self which radiates into various planes. The many-sided Theodore Roosevelt was linked up with Harvard men, boxers, big game hunters, bird observers, history writers, explorers, saga lovers and civic reformers, in each case by one of his interests.

There is room for all types of the expanded self but the functional differentiation and complexity of modern society are favorable to the development of the *star* self. On the other hand, the great number of matters calling for team work by the organized local community put a premium on the citizen with a *spheric* self. The development or combination of these two holds the most promise for the future.

OBSTACLES TO SOCIALIZATION

The perception of difference in aspect, ways, beliefs and sentiments checks the outflow of sympathy. With the rude, personal appearance and dietary habits count for much. One stigmatizes the objects of his antipathy as "niggers," "greasers," "round heads," "fuzzy-wuzzies," "red necks," "high brows," "red-haired foreign devils," "silk stockings," "hard collars," or taunts them as "rat-eaters," or "frog eaters." Somewhat higher is the type

who thinks of the alien as "mick," "parley-voo," "goddam," "wop," "sheeny," "heathen," "papist," "heretic," or "infidel." Higher yet is the man who is struck by cultural differences only and who recoils from those who are "savage," "barbarous," "benighted," or "depraved." The most alienating differences are those in diet, manners, and religious exercises. Socializers, therefore, by means of education, agitation, organization, change of custom, etc., strive to bring about a resemblance along these lines, or else to belittle unlikeness.

Prejudice. The most trifling unpleasant childish experience may become the basis of an adverse lump-judgment or hostile attitude. Mother's dislike of a Swedish cook or an Italian vegetable huckster "may mean a long-enduring hostility on the part of the child toward all Swedes and all Italians." The mother is exasperated because the Irish maid left some dust under the dresser; the general rule becomes, "Irish are dirty." A college student had acquired in childhood the concept of a Catholic as one who "hoped to wade knee-deep in Protestant blood in a religious war." The figures of Shylock in *The Merchant of Venice* and of Fagin in *Oliver Twist* have begotten myriads of anti-Semitic attitudes. A man who as a twelve-year-old boy had been chased by an irate Mexican whose dog he had "canned" still feels "a natural repugnance whenever I see or hear the word 'Mexican.'" The teacher ought to take steps to extirpate these childish prejudices as the surgeon removes juvenile adenoids.

Arbitrary discrimination raises a barrier. Discrimination on some relevant basis excites little protest. No one demands that weaklings be put on the football team, ignoramuses matriculated, bunglers allowed to practise medicine. But those are embittered who on account of color, race, origin, or religion are shut out from merited good. The detached immigrant into the United States is readily assimilated because America has drawn no line against the foreign-born. Any unreasonable discrimination against him, as, for example, restricting the proportion of foreign-born which may be employed on public work, would check the process. It would produce the state of things formerly seen in Eastern Europe, where the socialization of dissimilar elements was at a standstill. Hence, no one should be admitted to this country whom we are not willing to treat soon as "one of the family."

Of course, not all discriminations are written into law. If there

is a tendency to elect to office or promote to the head of a bank, a business or an organization the inferior native-born just because he is of "good old American stock," the capable foreign-born and his friends will feel themselves to be, after all, "outsiders," and will be confirmed in their hyphenism.

A resented imputation of inferiority is a stumbling block to socialization. A "chosen people" will not have many friends among other peoples. A Messianic hope isolates the nation that cherishes it. A race or class is not likely to feel drawn to another race or class which claims superiority. If, however, the alleged "lower" race or class accepts the inferiority imputed to it and cherishes no pretensions to equality, the two may come into the relation of older and younger brothers in a family. Deference and trust on the one hand, compassion and a sense of responsibility on the other, may result in such reciprocal affection as sometimes appeared between lord and liege under feudalism, or between master and slave in our *ante-bellum* South.

One reason why athletic games between white men and the races they rule so contribute to good feeling is that they imply equality. The governing race comes down from its "high horse" and takes it chance of being beaten in sport. The Malays of inner Borneo do not resent their being governed by the English, after these English have met them as equals on the football field. Once they have scored off the white men, they do not much mind conceding their superiority in the matter of government.

Finally, *traditionalism* hinders the socialization of diverse elements when otherwise conditions are favorable. It may be that Irish Catholics and Orangemen, Transcaucasian Armenians and Tartars, Lithuanian coal miners and Polish coal miners, are alike oppressed and ought to feel and act together; but if they are swayed by the past they will stay apart on account of prejudices, hatreds, and memories of ancient wrongs, coming down to them from their forefathers. On the other hand, of course, traditions of friendship and mutual aid may perpetuate good feeling among people when living currents of interest are bearing them in opposite directions.

THE SOCIALIZING PROCESS IN OUR TIME

Thanks to the recent wonderful improvements in the means of communication sundered peoples have ever broader contacts,

learn more of one another and therewith come to think better of one another. Once they were alienated by hearing only of those strange traits and practices travelers told of to amaze the home folks; but as they are brought into closer touch each discovers how sound and normal the other is.

Slowly but unmistakably people are *growing together*. In France a millennium-and-a-half ago province fought against province as only nations do now. How divided England was in the days of the Heptarchy! The global China of to-day is the outcome of ages of assimilation of settled tribes and peoples. In the U. S. S. R. unification is going on at a rate never approached under the Czars. Twelve centuries ago all Europe had a settled population, but not one of the clear-cut self-conscious nationalities in modern Europe had come into existence.

By interpreting with sympathy the culture of backward peoples and explaining *just why* the savage does this or that queer thing which stands between him and us, the cultural anthropologists create a little understanding and good-will among peoples outwardly very unlike. We come to see that there are no scalawag peoples although every people has its scalawags; no people is found devoid of a sense of responsibility and a feeling for justice. From tribe to tribe, from people to people, mothers differ little if at all in their readiness to sacrifice their comfort and themselves in order to rear their little ones. Watching the ways of mothers with their children, one marvels to see how much peoples at different culture levels have in common.

That unrelated peoples are steadily being knit together by ties faintly reminiscent of family bonds is more evident if you take a generation than if you limit yourself to a decade, if you take a century than if you limit yourself to a generation. Not that men are better but that *their social horizon is changing!*

War and vast preparation therefor do not prove these gossamer filaments to be merely a figment of the imagination. Bellicose gestures spring from the rivalry of empires for more possessions, rather than from the culture of our time. Governments about to fight systematically pump up popular hostility as you pump up an inner tube; but our wars do not germinate in the spontaneous antipathies of peoples.

Imperialistic governments and capitalist groups marshal their platoons of hired speakers and writers to blacken artfully the

character of any weak people that stands in their way; but, more and more, there is among us a chivalrous element which scoffs at malign official propaganda and resolutely lays bare the inner meaning of what is going on.

The puncturing of falsehoods and misconceptions which make bad blood between class and class, region and region, section and section within the nation is hailed as a fine patriotic service. But the puncturing of falsehoods and misconceptions being employed to make bad blood between peoples, far from being widely applauded, is often looked upon as a "traitorous activity" because it thwarts an official hate propaganda set afoot to prepare the public mind for some aggressive move of their government. These high-hearted sowers of wholesome truths are stigmatized as "internationalists" and sometimes persecuted.

In any society the intellectual and moral *élite* are the first to feel sympathy with those on the other side of the frontier, the continent, the ocean, or the globe; and, being gifted in the arts of expression, they infect others with their sympathy. This goes far to explain why 53,000 missionaries are maintained in the foreign field by Christian bodies, even if they are actuated not solely by altruism, but also by hope of heavenly reward.

The more intelligent and imaginative become concerned over commonwealth interests while yet the bulk of their neighbors do not look beyond the parish pump. This same element will be thinking in terms of nation while the others have no horizon wider than their province or state. The time comes when on many matters this *élite* arrives at an international point of view while the rest, by cunning propaganda, are kept to a narrow nationalistic outlook. In other words, at one time it is the *élite* of the people that perceives and stands up for national interests, centuries later it is the baser sort that sees nothing beyond national interests.

In the past the nationalists were not right every time they withstood the champions of provincial interests or state's rights. No more are the internationalists of to-day right every time they withstand the nationalists. But it is certain that when it was only the *élite* that perceived national interests, their opponents had ignorance, narrow-mindedness, short-sightedness, and prejudice as allies. Now it is the nationalists that have these low-brow allies; while the internationalists comprise only the high-minded and their thinking is not adulterated by base emotions or motives.

Owing to the recent screen, radio and airplane developments, and other wonders still just below the horizon, the growing of mankind into something like one big family is likely to go on at such a quickened rate that in two centuries a sense of oneness should pervade eighty per cent of humanity to perhaps as great an extent as it now pervades the one-fifteenth comprised within the American people.

CHAPTER XL

ESTRANGEMENT

There is no fixed and final socialization. However solidary the group, one can never be sure that the current of events will not shatter it upon some rock. Old ties are snapped because a cross current pulls one part of the group away from the other. Families are rent by quarrels, neighborhoods by feuds, churches by doctrinal controversies; unions which lack face-to-face relations are yet more unstable. So there is a process, quite the reverse of socialization, which may be called *estrangement;* it may not desocialize individuals but it tends to decompose groups. For all that facile communication, common experience, and common reading matter may be making a people, as it were, "one big family," there is no assurance that a sharp turn in industrial development or a strange doctrine will not set them "at loggerheads."

ESTRANGEMENT WITHIN PRIMARY GROUPS

The family. The elaborate studies of the Polish peasant by Thomas and Znaniecki show that the old peasant social system is becoming disorganized as a result of the breakdown of the isolation of the peasant community. Emigrating to work for a time on Prussian farms or in the neighboring industrial towns, the young people return with new needs begotten from acquaintance with previously unknown values. The new kinds of food, drinks, tobacco "develop a hedonistic tendency, a search for sensual pleasure for its own sake, which in matters of consumption makes the individual dissociate his own interests from those of his family." Then the young worker who brings with him from the city new clothes, jewels, etc., wins for himself a community recognition which is quite independent of the status of his family. Outside his community the standing of his family avails him nothing; where his family is not known he wins recognition solely by the "front" he is able to put up. "Thus interest in personal appearance

takes more and more the place of the interest in the social rating of the family."

The real cause of all phenomena of family disorganization is to be sought in the influence of certain new values—new for the subject—such as: new sources of hedonistic satisfaction, new vanity values, new individualistic types of economic organization, new forms of sexual appeal. . . . The specific phenomenon of family disorganization consists in a definite modification of pre-existing attitudes under the influence of the new values . . . while the attitudes which existed under the family system were essentially "we"-attitudes (the individual did not dissociate his hedonistic tendencies, his desires for recognition or economic security, his sexual needs from the tendencies and aspirations of his family group), the new attitudes, produced by the new values acting upon those old attitudes, are essentially "I"-attitudes—the individual's wishes are separated in his consciousness from those of other members of his family. Such an evolution implies that the new values with which the individual gets in touch are individualistic in their meaning, appeal to the individual, not to the group as a whole; and this is precisely the character of most modern hedonistic, sexual, economic, vanity-values.[1]

Among the concrete manifestations of this family disorganization are: greater reluctance to marry "for family reasons"; sharpening of personal cupidity; less interest in building up the family property; more quarrels over the division of family property made by the father; going to law over family disagreements; and treatment of the aged parent as a burden.

The community. The disorganization of the Polish peasant community is likewise conditioned by the return of young people from work elsewhere with a taste for good clothes, trinkets, smoking, fancy foods and drinks, so that the local standards they were reared in seem to them mean or queer. Conscious of the disapproval of the old folks the young people with new and socially non-sanctioned attitudes tend to form associations of their own. Moreover they try to proselyte the rest of the young people of the community and "cut" or persecute those who fail to respond. The outcome of the spread of new outside values among the young generation is *a dissolution of social opinion.*

The community begins by losing the uniformity of social attitudes which made common appreciation and common action pos-

[1] W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America,* 1927, vol. II, p. 1167.

sible; the introduction of new values breaks it into two or more camps with different centers of interest, different standards of appreciation and divergent tendencies of action. If the process continues, social opinion degenerates into gossip; public interest centers on matters of curiosity instead of those of social importance, and, except in the condemnation of the most radical crimes, no unanimity can be reached on any point. . . . Unless a new basis of unity is reached, there comes a more or less marked decay of social solidarity, both because divergence of appreciation and action breeds hostility and because most of the forms in which solidarity used to manifest itself are no longer adequately enforced by social opinion. . . .[2]

Among ourselves we see the local community riven not only by the return of young people who have acquired outside standards, but also by the coming in of strangers with whom mental exchange is difficult; *e.g.*, raw European immigrants; by the flooding of a remote fishing settlement with summer visitors; by the introduction of factory industry with its contrast of types and classes; by the bringing in of a clergyman, school superintendent or college president who cannot help setting people by the ears, or else by criticism ruptures the community's self-complacency; by cultural differentiation, so that a highly cultivated, thinking or traveled few come to look with impatient or frank contempt upon the Philistine leanings of the majority; by visits of evangelists, experts, labor agitators or Ku Klux Klan organizers who make the community realize shortcomings or oppositions it has been unconscious of; by diversity of response to outside issues, *e.g.*, the "wet-dry" fight, the "color line," the fundamentalist-modernist controversy.

ESTRANGEMENT WITHIN SECONDARY GROUPS

In regional, denominational, or national groups the estranging processes have often been traced for us by the historian.

Rise of opposition of economic interests. The growth of sectionalism during the half-century before the American Civil War illustrates how a new economic tendency may thrust people apart. After the invention of the cotton gin the South more and more went over to the growing of cotton, a slave-made crop, so that slavery became the corner stone of its prosperity. In the North slave labor was less productive than free labor, so that

[2] W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, 1927, vol. II, p. 1206.

slavery died out. Thus "King Cotton" laid the foundation for the strife between North and South.

Extracting gold by washing down low-pay dirt with a jet of water under high pressure so clogged certain California river beds as to cause the rivers to overflow and smother rich bottom lands under a mantle of silt. The feeling between the ranchers of the valley and the mining companies of the mountains became very bitter before the state legislature put a curb on hydraulic mining.

An acute fall in prices, beginning with the last quarter of the nineteenth century and exceeding the decline in cost of production, by increasing the burden of all debts brought on a political conflict in America between creditors and agricultural debtors which culminated in the heated presidential campaign of 1896. Soon afterward the great increase in gold production started prices on an upward movement which drew *that* thorn out of our flesh!

The early population of Australia, although fairly homogeneous, was torn over the question of tolerating the continuance of the penal transportation of convicts from England. The big landowners favored a system which automatically provided them with cheap labor. The artisans and small farmers opposed this flood, both in their own interest and for the sake of the future of the colony. Another source of bad blood was the opposition between the sugar-planters of North Queensland, who manned their cane fields with kidnapped South Sea Islanders held in virtual slavery, and the people of South Queensland who, living outside the sugar belt, could foresee the evils which "black-birding" would fasten upon the country.

Even the gold discoveries brought riot and bloodshed to Australia. In order to prevent the ranches and towns from being stripped of labor, the property-owners prevailed upon the government to undertake to check the mad rush to the gold fields by requiring a state license to dig gold. The gold-diggers rioted, burned licenses publicly, fortified their camp, and ran up a flag bearing the words, "Republic of Victoria."

Much of the early political history of certain Australian colonies is made up of the struggles between "squatters" and "selectors." The former without the warrant of law, seized upon great tracts of public land and insisted upon using them for sheep-grazing, although thousands of landless men were eager to settle on this land and farm it.

There is, indeed, no end of ways in which an economic turn may breed strife. A pastoral people falls asunder because the men of the plain take to the plow and the men of the shore to shipbuilding and trade, while the hill folk continue to tend their flocks. In republican Rome slaves, the booty of foreign conquest, thrust a wedge between the large landowners and the small cultivators. The English Black Death of 1349 fired a train which is said to have led to the Peasants' Revolt of 1381. In the eighteenth century "the enclosure movement brought on a conflict between the two rural interests in England and was even more sharply marked in Spain." [3] The issuance of paper money, a natural makeshift in a young community, long vexed the peace of the American colonies. The Constitution laid the specter for three-quarters of a century but it reappeared as the "greenback" question. The federal tax of 1791 on distilled spirits provoked a revolt among people west of the Alleghany Mountains, who had been accustomed to convert their corn into whisky in order to carry it to a distant market.

The possibilities of trouble mock the foresight of statesmen. Government action to stamp out a popular vice may exasperate a district devoted to breeding race horses or to growing the vine or the poppy. A new industry or a chance to build up an export trade may make one region restive under a tax or a trade policy acceptable to all the rest. The people of our Atlantic Coast may resent the obstacles to trade with the Orient raised by a national immigration policy demanded by the people of the Pacific Coast. In California, with the rise of fruit-growing, there broke out a great agitation by orchardists against the general property tax, under which they had to pay taxes on their fruit trees for some years before they came into bearing.

Loss of likemindedness. The soul molds of a people may so change that discordant types develop. The commercial regions become critical and progressive, while the rural parts cherish old traditions and dynastic loyalties. The town artisans become free-thinking but the peasants remain devout. An urban type develops, having little in common with farmers. Mining the precious metals fosters a restless speculative spirit that rasps the home-loving get-rich-slow spirit bred by agriculture. Machine industry gathers myriads into its tentacular grasp and stamps them. Mixing of

[3] *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. I, p. 524.

bloods brings race war nearer by multiplying the number of mulattoes and near-whites who resent the drawing of the "color line."

Unequal appropriation of culture weakens fellow-feeling. The residents of the littoral become cosmopolitan, while the people of the interior stick to the "good old ways" and deplore the "apostasy" of the ports. From the Book of Maccabees one may divine what strifes were produced by the penetration of Hellenism into the peoples about the Eastern Mediterranean during the century after Alexander the Great. Since Peter the Great Russia has swung like a pendulum between the party standing for imitation of Europe and the party standing for Muscovite tradition. The Chinese in contact with foreigners want to introduce railroads, sanitation, and girls' schools, which the back country regards as impious. Stalled in the eighteenth-century stage, our Appalachian highlanders imagine our cities to be sinks of wickedness, while our cities look upon those old-fashioned mountain-dwellers as "degenerates."

Likemindedness is lost when a *motley immigration* makes the country "a huge polyglot boarding-house," a Babel of tongues, a medley of races, a jumble of human "odds and ends." When the well-clad are neighbors to primitives at the breech-clout stage and the intelligent perforce rub shoulders with wearers of amulets, worshipers of idols and fearers of the "evil eye," society inevitably splits into castes.

Religious schisms. Likemindedness is ruptured also by movements in the sphere of ideas. In the eighteenth dynasty ancient Egypt was rent by the conflict between the priesthood and the new worship of Aton, the sun god, led by the Pharaohs. The ancient Jews were torn by the discord between Pharisees and Sadducees. After Christianity became the religion of the Roman Empire schisms and heresies gave trouble. Africa was convulsed by the Donatist movement; Egypt was dissatisfied owing to Monophysitism and, no doubt, for this gave herself the more readily to her Arab conquerors. The persecuted Montanist sectaries of Phrygia revolted in the sixth century. In the eighth century the Christians of the East were rent by the quarrel over the use of images, and the migration of fifty thousand Greek image-worshipers to Southern Italy gave that region a Hellenic stamp which it has never lost. Later, Latin and Greek Christianity diverged in

their paths of development. The rise of Protestantism in the sixteenth century, coupled with the repressive policy of the Church, plunged Europe into civil strife and gave birth to the bloody "wars of religion." Since Galileo the contradictions between dogma and science have produced countless estrangements. Under our eyes the Protestant bodies are being riven by the strife between modernism and fundamentalism. In Egypt and Turkey the Mohammedans are rent by precisely the same issue. Nor should we overlook the disturbances which in our own time have followed the rise of such sects as the Mormons, the Babists, the Taipings, the Boxers, the Mahdists, the Senussites.

Rending by new doctrines. "In all ages of active progress, the warfare between the ideas and fashions of a young critical generation and the old strongly intrenched opinions and customs which the innovators mock and assail always presents points of divergence leading to a certain amount of estrangement." [4] In South America to-day we see bitter controversies engendered by the introduction of ideas of religious liberty, separation of church and state, public education, civil marriage, and divorce. A century ago the propagation of anti-slavery doctrines among us aroused intense hostility. From time to time we have been divided by angry disputes over dress reform, vaccination, "woman's rights," faith healing, "higher" Biblical criticism, evolution, land-value taxation, censorship and prohibition. At present such ideas as workers' share in the control of industry "direct action," the single standard of morals for both sexes, "companionate" marriage, birth control, and the sterilization of the unfit range people into hostile camps. By the time these controversies have passed new "burning" questions will have drifted into the spotlight.

Do societies *have* to age and die? The idea of social old age and dissolution (Spengler) is nonsense. Every organism has a million generations behind it. Its life course has been fixed by heredity. It is like a watch that under even the best conditions can run only about *so* long. A social aggregate, on the other hand, has not been rigidly pre-determined by its inheritance. It is a clock that can be rewound when it gives signs of running down. All the time, of course, societies are changing, strengthening their claim on the loyalties of their members, their grip on individual

[4] *Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. VI, p. 389.

wills. Or else their inner bonds are loosening, the society is splitting, disintegrating.

But "it's never too late to mend!" Society can be rejuvenated. That a society has endured a hundred years, half a thousand years, does not seal its fate. There is no cemetery for societies unless it be a military cemetery where are buried not the senile but those that stopped a bullet!

THE MEANS OF PREVENTING ESTRANGEMENT

Social cost of estrangement. The fermentation set up by the spread of new knowledge or ideas is inevitable if there is to be progress in culture. But how rarely we see a clean fight between truth and error! How often conflict is between systems of ideas equally arbitrary! Indeed, it is the clash of ideas farthest from a fact basis which most rouses animosity. Now, when controversies reach the pitch of alienating fellow countrymen, the consequences may be serious. Migration, secession, or civil war is possible, and, in any case, there is less willingness to work together. National defense may be fatally weakened, government thwarted in carrying out essential policies, the will for civic and social coöperation lost. Friendly intercourse may lapse, while sectarianism grows until the people are divided by walls which are no less real for being invisible. To keep alive the we-feeling is of such moment that the true statesman will bestir himself to counteract estranging tendencies whenever they appear.

How to deal with oppositions of interest. In general, since there is no trouble in locating the sore spot, the oppositions of interest created by economic development are the easier to deal with. Sometimes what is needed is to extend government authority into a neglected field. The deadly struggle in frontier society between "moderators" and "regulators," after the latter have become infested by rogues who take private vengeance under the guise of lynch law, ceases with the establishment of regular courts. If cowboys and shepherds of the Far West empty guns at each other over the use of the natural pastures in the public domain, a leasing system is called for. The conflicts between cattlemen, who without warrant had fenced great tracts of government land, and settlers asserting their rights under the Homestead Law ceased when President Theodore Roosevelt made the fences come down. "Gun law" among the salmon-canners on Alaskan rivers was ended

by devising wise rules enforced by government agents on the spot. Hostilities between workingmen and "mine guards" should cease with the advent of a well-managed state police. Sniping among the oyster tongers of Chesapeake Bay calls for a system of leasing of bay bottom for oyster-growing. Bad blood between employers and wage earners is a challenge to the lawmaker to see to the wiping out of such glaring evils as seven-day labor, preventable industrial accidents, and industrial espionage.

A festering of grievance in any worthy element respecting an established policy raises the presumption that something is wrong. The useful classes do not riot "for fun," so resort to bayonets confesses bankruptcy of statesmanship. Not that every aggrieved interest can be given just the redress it demands. It may ask for the wrong remedy, or it may have flung itself directly across the path of the advancing general interest. But ordinarily a persistent outcry is a symptom of serious maladjustment. Change has gone on unheeded until some law or institution chafes. Finer adjustment, greater elasticity, or special treatment is called for. The complaint of timber-owners that the annual taxation of their trees compels premature cutting points to a tax collected only when the timber is harvested. Labor's protest against the importation of shiploads of aliens for strike-breaking purposes justifies the exclusion of "alien contract laborers." Such legal distinctions as those between Quakers and others in respect to bearing arms and taking oaths, between "slackers" and "conscientious objectors," between "labor" and "commodity," between ordinary businesses and those "affected with a public interest," and between "reasonable" and "unreasonable" restraint of trade illustrate how law discriminates for the sake of realizing justice and preserving social good feeling.

Whenever laws and policies cannot be made flexible enough to suit growing regional and local peculiarities, the time has come for the "devolution" of certain governmental functions. The unitary state should become federal. Colonies and distinct geographic provinces ("regions") should be conceded a sphere of "home rule," while local preferences respecting schools, poor relief, taxing system, and liquor regulation may justify the grant of "county option" or "local option." The centralized state, by affording a leverage for the *élite* and the expert, speeds up social advance; but for a motley or diverging people decentralized government is more conducive to the keeping of the social peace.

To avert sectional strife no section should be denied representation in the legislature according to population; be overlooked in appointing judges, diplomats, army and navy officers, civil officials; miss its due share of internal improvements, tariff protection for its special industries, public institutions, public buildings, postal facilities, experiment stations, aviation fields, national forests and "relief money." Then the *sectional* bearing of legislation should be considered. True statesmanship will foresee that the Burlingame treaty with China will rouse the Pacific Coast; that national prohibition will pit East against West; that Federal interference with lynching will solidify the South in opposition.

How to deal with speculative oppositions. How society may be spared the animosities which opposition of beliefs or ideals engenders is a difficult question. Long ago statesmen came to value likemindedness and sought to conserve it by certain policies which experience has shown to be futile or even pernicious. *Withdrawal from foreign influence* by excluding the alien, restraining travel abroad, and avoiding foreign intercourse succeeded for a time in ancient Sparta and in Japan, but much good was missed and the inevitable adjustment when it came was the more violent from having been delayed. *The suppression of free inquiry* preserves religious unity only by chaining the mind and impeding intellectual progress. *An established state religion,* secure in its endowments, is likely to lose much of that appealing warmth and life which make it a social bond. The *relentless persecution of heresy* foments internal strife and weakens the race by extirpating the more daring and original minds.

It seems a paradox to urge total separation of church and state, religious liberty, and full freedom of communication as means to social good feeling. But, in truth, the diversity of opinion which springs up under freedom begets a minimum of hostility. Disagreements irritate little so long as the adversary is not allowed to climb into the saddle. No privileged orthodox may glower upon another as "heretic." None is embittered by being discriminated against or persecuted. No one is galled by being forced to contribute as taxpayer to the propagation of a creed he does not believe. Contradictions are softened by a spirit of tolerance and playful good humor, so that, after all, mental heterogeneity proves to be a nettle that stings least the hand that grasps it brusquely.

Still, clash of opinion *does* interfere with community team work.

Sectaries are often clannish, slow to mingle fraternally with outsiders or to join with their neighbors in the furtherance of public health, recreation, community development, education, or the advancement of secular knowledge. In the American population there have been thousands of local groups sewed up in separatist dogmas and numb to most of the feelings which thrill the rest of us. Cooperation has been checked by the rise of numerous "peculiar" religious sects, each cut off from the general population by its fancied possession of a special prophet or revelation.

A self-conscious society will therefore endeavor to limit sect-forming by providing for the *widest possible diffusion of secular knowledge*. An ignorant people, if it breaks away from the guidance of ancestral churches and trained ministers, is likely to be endlessly divided and redivided by futile variations of creed and worship. On the other hand, the general enlightenment resulting from a system of universal education cramps the power of the fanatic or the false prophet to gain a following. The public university, moreover, rears leaders who will draw men together with unifying thoughts, instead of dividing them, as does the sect founder, with his private imaginings and personal notions.

CHAPTER XLI

SOCIAL CONTROL[1]

Unless he has arrived at behavior notions all his own, the socialized member of a group willingly adapts his conduct to the ideas of individual rights and duties held by his fellow members. Unfortunately society is by no means composed wholly of socialized persons. People may be neighbors or workmates long before they are sufficiently socialized with one another to live at peace or to act together for the protection of their common interests. Even if most of them show consideration, one for another, there will still be a few selfish or malicious individuals who will cause trouble if they are not in some way intimidated or influenced.

Although a rude order may come of itself, the far-sighted members of the community perceive that a better order and a smoother team-work may be had if troublesome varieties of conduct are suppressed while helpful varieties are called forth. Often the means for such suppression lie at hand in the shape of central organs which may have been created for the purpose of military coöperation, but which can be used for instituting a régime of law. Then, too, religious ideas may be present which lend themselves to the building of a system of control backed by supernatural rewards and punishments. Thus, under the guidance of its *élite,* society develops an apparatus of control designed to repress harmful conduct and to encourage desired conduct. How far it shall be elaborated depends on the felt need of controlling behavior.

The need of social control. *Coöperation in vital matters* for the benefit of the group as a whole gives occasion for the exercise of social control. On the American frontier the earliest sign of it is community pressure to make shirkers do their part in holding off the Indians, fighting prairie fires, or rearing levees to protect the river bottoms. When coöperation is complex, even willing cooperators need an authority over them which will prescribe the

[1] Seeing that in 1901 I put forth a sizable book entitled *Social Control* I shall here do little more than bring out the fundamentals and certain new points.

times, places, and amounts of their individual performances. This is why *warfare,* in which good team work may be a matter of life or death, is the mother of obedience. Even headstrong barbarians are rational enough to submit themselves to iron discipline while on the war path.

High organization implies a regulative system. Without it the leakage and waste on the one hand, the friction from the checks and safeguards required to prevent such loss on the other hand, make it unprofitable to set up any kind of complicated social machinery.

The institutions of *private property, contract,* and *inheritance* consecrate inequalities of possession which affront the we-feeling and which mere good will will not protect. Such contrasts can survive only in a more or less artificial social order. It is property institutions which call into being detailed codes of law, strong courts and an elaborate penal system.

City residence calls for stricter social control. In the care of his sick, in the making of unnecessary noise, in the burning of soft coal, in his driving on the streets, in the doing of work at home, or in the keeping of domestic animals in his domicile, the city-dweller is not free as one is in the country.

As capital gains in mass and importance, it calls into being agencies strong enough to insure order. In the Tropics, for example, the ease of rearing a shelter is such that the common people are in no great dread of civil strife. In a political contest they are by no means slow to take up arms. But the creation of costly forms of capital which can be destroyed in a few hours by bullet or ax or torch—herds of fine stock, cane-fields, sugar mills, orange groves, cacao orchards, rubber plantations—puts an immense financial interest against the time-honored practice of "fighting it out" and behind a government which appears strong enough to insure order although it may deprive the masses of their accustomed political rights. This is one reason why it is so hard nowadays to maintain in the Tropics genuine popular government.

In countries which have to reckon seriously with *winter,* the rural buildings are so substantial and costly that the tillers of the soil are at one with the large capitalists in desiring order at all hazards. In the temperate zone, therefore, the capitalists do not distrust popular government as they do in the Tropics.

In *capitalistic mining* interruption of labor may cause irreparable

damage from flooding of the mines, while a single lawless hour may sweep away costly surface properties. Hence, in our mountain states the mine operators make common cause with the farmers in maintaining *strong* government, or by means of secret control of nominating machinery and elections make local self-government a mockery. To avoid shut-downs, intruding labor agitators and organizers are brutally maltreated, while occupants of the company "camps" are denied free speech, free press and free assemblage.

The extending of social control. Thanks to the constant intensification of capitalism the invested capital per worker over most of the field of American industry is to-day at least *ten times* what it was in 1850. Hence capitalists have more at stake in an industrial dispute; strike or tie-up loses them money ten times as fast. Now, the faster a man is losing money the more he is tempted to resort to desperate measures. The contemporary capitalist goes further than the capitalist of two generations ago in hiring labor spies and gunmen, in secretly controlling local or state officials in order to be able quickly to inject police or militia into the situation. The strikers realize this so they, too, "go the limit" in their measures to prevent the strike being broken. The outcome is that both parties are more willing than formerly to ignore morality and law in order to avoid defeat.

Such a situation begets more control by society. About 1890 the court injunction began to be used to defeat strikes; between 1898 and 1908 not less than one thousand injunctions of this type were granted, some of them going so far as to restrain the distribution of food to strikers. Doubtless no such expansion of the judicial power would have taken place but for the fact that the mass of capital affected by the strikers had become so great that the strike could be represented as sterilizing property of great public importance. But for the check imposed by manhood suffrage the strike by now would have been utterly outlawed by the courts.

Another line of endeavor has been to compel correction of certain evils out of which industrial disputes arise. Thus society has devised legal remedy for the long working day, child labor, the sweat-shop, unsanitary conditions, preventable work accidents, truck payment, "yellow dog" contracts, etc.

In other quarters we see the scope of social control broadened continually *as a result of more knowledge*. From the germ theory

of disease spring requirements that we shall cover up a cough or sneeze, avoid spitting and submit to quarantine or fumigation. New light on heredity causes us to be blamed for having children if our stock is bad and for *not* having children if our stock is superior. Knowledge of the law of population gives birth to the feeling that the father of fifteen children ought to justify himself. New views of natural resources condemn certain wasteful methods of mining, lumbering and tillage, restrict us in the killing of fish and game, and oblige us to treat any forest tract we own from the standpoint of the social future.

The curtailment of social control. Let none jump to the conclusion that inevitably the individual will be caught in an ever-finer mesh. Along with the latter-day extension of control has occurred in various parts of the world a relaxation of many traditional restraints which, pretending to safeguard social interests, were really imposed in the interest of a class, or from sheer love of dominating. Such were the old game laws, restrictions on working-class freedom of movement and of settlement, the old, inhumane discipline of army and fleet, restraints on speech, teaching, the press, assemblage and organization. We know too much psychology to uphold the old harsh correctional system in home and school and we know too much sociology to countenance the repressions by which a dominant social class protects its special privileges against criticism. So binding and loosing are going on at the same time and it is not easy to strike a balance between them.

The motives behind social control. Instincts make themselves felt in the social reaction to offenses against nature—such as incest, prostitution and abortion. The social frown is bent on senseless luxury and wilful waste because they outrage the common man's sentiments of economy and thrift. Sympathy prompts the punishment of cruelty to animals, the suppression of infanticide, and the protection of the dead from desecration. Sympathy with the affronted divinity leads to social repression of profanity, blasphemy and sacrilege. Sympathy with the feelings of the victim of wrong yields that "moral indignation" which impels the community to block aggressions which do not directly concern it. After allowing for *collective sentiment* it remains true, however, that corporate *self-interest* is the chief motive behind social control. Society frowns on conduct believed to hurt it; smiles on conduct

which appears to help it. Sometimes it is a disinterested bystander trying to prevent A wronging B; but more often it is an interested party striking at acts which it deems noxious to itself. This is why laws and social imperatives—instead of being universal and immutable as they would be if they reflected certain moral sentiments in human nature—are as various as the situations in which a group may find itself. This is why the deeper we go in the study of a legal code, the more it appears to be bound up with the needs of its society. Finally, this is why public morality is lower than private morality. Society expects its agent—diplomat, statesman, or warrior—to lie, steal or kill for it, yet condemns him if he does such things for himself. This proves that it controls its members, not so much to make righteousness prevail as to safeguard what it regards as its interests.

The radiant points of social control. The power behind moral and legal codes may be virtually the whole power of society, and yet be directed by the element which, for the time being, enjoys the most confidence. Whether social power will thus be wielded from a center or centers depends on *whether or not men feel themselves dependent*. In early society the seat of authority is the Elders. In a disorderly time the hind creeps under the castle wall, the trembling burgher pours out his florins for protection and the Soldier strikes the dominant note. To the degree that men connect their fate with the good will or the ill-will of unseen beings they come to depend greatly on the Priesthood. Men depend economically upon those who buy their wares or their labor and hence the Wealthy have always enjoyed great influence. The State is supposed to be a *channel,* and not a *source,* of control; but the paternal state may render its citizens so many vital services that it acquires glamor and becomes a center of social power.

Another radiant point in society is the Learned, such as the *literati* of China, the *pandits* of India, the *Gelehrte* of Germany, the clergy of nonsacerdotal bodies, and the rabbis of the Jews. Finally, there are the *élite,* who are the natural leaders of society in virtue of their intellectual and moral superiority. The Greek philosophers, the Stoics, the Christian Fathers, the Schoolmen, the Humanists, the Pietists, the Liberals, are examples of a small active element able to leaven the whole lump.

The tenor of social control will reflect its source. When the Elders have the say much will be made of filial obedience, while

parricide will be punished with torture. The Priests color social codes with their own high estimate of celibacy, devoutness and unquestioning belief. Soldier ascendancy shifts the accent to obedience, loyalty and valor. When the moneyed man holds the baton we hear much of such virtues as honesty, sobriety and thrift. The *élite* aim to control men by *ideals* rather than by *punishment* and stand for *reason* rather than a slavish following of *custom.*

When social power is diffused, *i.e.,* resides in those whose necks are galled by social requirement, its yoke will be made as light as possible. On the other hand, the more distinct those who apply pressure from those who must bear it, the greater will be the volume of social requirement.

The instruments of social control. Some of the instruments society employs bear upon the *will;* others, upon the *feelings;* still others, upon the *judgment.* In the first group are *social suggestion, custom and education,* which use direct means to give the will a certain bent, and *public opinion, law* and *religious belief,* which employ punishments and rewards. In the second group are *social religion, personal ideals, ceremony, art,* and *personality.* In the third group, *enlightenment, illusion* and *social valuation.*

Public opinion is the germ out of which they all develop. Out of the mobbing, whipping and branding of the enraged public develop on the one side the measured and graduated physical penalties of *law* and *legal religion;* on the other, the guidance of the individual by such refined means as *education, personal ideals,* and *social valuations.* All of these hit the mark better than public opinion, which reflects the shortsightedness and impulsiveness of the mass. It strikes furiously at vivisection but is limp before bribery, adulteration and monopoly. The thoughtful penalize peculation, ballot-frauds and the neglect of fires in forests while the foolish public is gnashing its teeth at vaccinators and body snatchers. Unless directed by the wise, public opinion is a poor cuirass for protecting the vitals of society.

The religious and legal codes are far more intelligent than public opinion. Religion mounts guard over the fundamentals which do not appeal immediately to the feelings of the public, such as chastity, marriage, filial obedience, and property. But, owing to the worshiper's indignation at any slight to his divinity, the religious code hits at many things which are not anti-social, *e.g.,* swearing, Sabbath-breaking and impiety. The law is the least

sentimental of controls because it is shaped by picked men, *i.e.*, judges and lawmakers. It is so progressive that it strikes at conduct not yet condemned. It makes using a bakery for sleeping purposes or soliciting divorce business by advertisement a crime before public opinion deems it a "wrong" or the Church deems it a "sin"! On the other hand more quickly than public opinion or religion, law can be twisted to suit the purposes of the dominant social class.

Economy and efficiency in social control. In conserving social order society should aim at greatest result for least effort, just as it does in fighting fires or building roads. Now, always the means of restraint which first suggests itself is *the infliction of pain.* Public opinion makes itself respected by hoots and boycott, the law by cell and noose, religion by penance and hell fire. But the rod is cruel to the offender, distressing to the lictor; so sages have cast about for methods of control which painlessly mold the individual to social requirement. One of these is *education.* You teach the young what conduct to admire and what to despise; or else build into the plastic mind some such moral cornerstone as the fear of God, reverence for the law, respect for magistrates, belief in the coincidence of virtue and happiness, or in the harmony of private and public interests.

Another refined means of restraint is *personal ideals.* We try to be like the type we admire, for otherwise we cannot respect ourselves. The wise take advantage of this by seeing to it that the type we admire shall be *social.* Mark how the "knight" ideal was transmuted into the "gentleman" ideal. In the tenth century the admired knight was an armed bull-necked ruffian on horseback. Gradually the troubadours and the women got these mounted fighters to incorporate into their ideal, courtesy, loyalty, self-control, consideration for the weak, and faith-keeping. Then this ideal was separated, first from the profession of arms, and then from hereditary leisure. The type was popularized by drama, poetry and novel until now the ordinary American will strike you if you tell him he is "no gentleman." In the same way the "lady," once one of the family of the lord of the castle, has become the ideal of at least half the young women in our society!

Again, society endorses and recommends *social valuation, i.e.*, the rating of the objects of desire from the collective point of view rather than from the *individual* point of view. Such traits as cour-

age, honesty, and justice become "moral values" "more precious than rubies." Pleasures which are exclusive or collision provoking, such as those of the palate or of sex, are constantly depreciated. Then society "appreciates" the *safe* pleasures—those which, like companionship or sport, are *coöperative;* those, like the enjoyment of nature, music or art, which are *inexclusive;* those, like health or beauty or humor or knowledge, which can be *expanded without clash with others;* and those which, being *ideal,* do not wastefully consume strength.

Iron or silken social control. At a given time suppose one man out of two respects the rights of others only from fear of punishment. Centuries later, when literacy is universal and nearly all understand the wherefore of social requirements, perhaps only one out of five keeps his eye on the rod of justice. In a democratic society in which self-respect is general it may be that not more than one in ten covets unfair advantage. When all the youth shall have received a socialized education and organized demoralization of the young in-order-to-make-money has been stamped out, we may find our situation so improved that only the mentally defective will need to be restrained by fear of penalty.

It does not follow, however, that criminal law is destined to take an insignificant place among the supports of social order. If the one rascal among twenty honest might aggress without hindrance, the higher forms of control would break down, confidence in fair play would disappear and man after man would abandon the honest majority. The deadly contagion of lawlessness would spread with growing rapidity till social order lay in ruins. The law, therefore, is still the cornerstone of the edifice of order.

Super-social control. If ideals, valuations, and designs for living are foisted upon society by some scheming group, then society, much as it may control its individual members, is itself controlled. This we may call "super-social control." There is no better example of it than the deliberate molding of German education, ideals, and public opinion for thirty years before the World War by an influential group headed by the Kaiser which had determined to use the German people in a vast scheme of aggression and conquest. Much the same sort of thing, though less elaborate, was going on in Great Britain in behalf of Empire. In view of the catastrophe it brought on the world, we have to consider how super-social control may best be guarded against.

The problem is *to keep the social mind in its various phases distinct from the organization of power.* This is difficult because, as new functions are committed to it, the state becomes more massive. In enrolls more servants, claims more of our income, touches our lives at more points. More than ever it needs to be effectively controlled by the people; otherwise it will obey the will of a class or else behave like a runaway train.

If government is not to control its people but be controlled by them, *it should have no hand in the processes whereby the people make up their minds about it.* It should not manufacture sentiment for itself nor meddle with the incubation of public opinion. It should not warp young minds by a tendencious education, nor distort the judgment of its citizens by veiled propaganda, nor secretly manipulate the guides and oracles of public opinion, nor gag critics on the ground that criticism obstructs its operations.

The people will be managed without their knowing it unless there are many founts of authoritative opinion independent of one another and of any single powerful organization. Up with towers from which trusty watchmen may scan the horizon and cry to the people a warning which no official or mob may hush!

The government should not maintain a "reptile press," such as Bismarck used, nor should it censor the newspapers save in war time and then only by a board on which private citizens preponderate. Public officials should give out impartially the news of their offices. Neither editors nor owners should be appointed to high posts in the public service lest newspapers fall into the habit of truckling to politicians. No periodical should be denied news service or forced off the news stands on account of its politics.

The school, as mother or molder of opinion, should be independent of government. By means of a non-partizan board the public schools as well as the state university should be kept out of politics. If appointed by mayor or governor, the members should enjoy security of tenure. But it is more logical that the board of education should be chosen at a separate election under a system of proportional representation. Instead of having to beg funds from a political body like the city council or the state legislature, it should be clothed with the power to levy a tax to support the schools. Now that the state is gathering mass and momentum, the school should stand wholly on its own feet, lest the state tamper

with the holy functions of enlightenment, character-molding and opinion-forming.

As we expand government in order to save ourselves from the clutches of the greedy strong, freedom of speech and of assemblage should more than ever be jealously upheld. We should no more allow an organization to rent all the halls in town during a critical time in order to prevent public meetings than we would allow a spiteful man to keep a street car empty by paying fares for all the seats in it. Open-air places should be provided at public expense in all municipalities for free public discussion on condition only that speakers shall not utter obscenity, slanderously attack individuals, or incite to definite offenses. The evening use, under such reservations, of public school buildings by an open association of citizens of the school district should not be gainsaid. Provided that the American democratic tradition survives and continues vigorous, the time will come when every community will have its "forum," available for any discussion for which five per cent of its citizens stand sponsor.

Formal public recognition of exemplary service gives direction to individual ambition. Hence, if the state monopolizes the granting of honors, it will stimulate the development of the type of character and conduct which serves it. *Recognition,* therefore, is altogether too great a moral power to be left to be wielded by *any* single institution. The state's right to confer title, certificate, medal, decoration, or honorary degree should be shared with other responsible independent agencies, such as colleges, institutes, libraries, and cultural societies. This should, signalized, insure that *all* the chief kinds of extraordinary social service will be noted and honored.

Why should not the exercise of control on behalf of society be entrusted some day to the confessed masters of social knowledge—anthropologists, economists, social psychologists, sociologists, political scientists? For the same reason that the wise man, although from time to time he takes counsel with his doctor, his lawyer, his banker, his clergyman, his "gym" director, does not put them, either individually or as a commission, in charge of his life. Similarly social experts, as their prestige rises, will probably be more often consulted by the power holders of society: but it is not likely that they will be invited to sit at the controls and handle the levers!

CLASS CONTROL MASQUERADES AS SOCIAL CONTROL

The studies by the Lynds, in 1925 and again in 1935, of an Indiana industrial city of about 50,000 inhabitants called "Middletown" reveal that in many directions control tightened up in the decade. The Daughters of the American Revolution is more active "in its militant safeguarding of local patriotic sentiment." It maintains "close and continuous dictatorship over the local Girl Scouts. The American Legion likewise appears to be more active." Incessantly, the newspapers circulate whole-cloth lies about Soviet Russia and maintain a constant drum-fire upon what is called "Radicalism." "Radical" young men have been warned by employment managers that they will "see to it that you never get a job in this town." The churches "have been warned by their financial supporters to 'stick to religion' and keep out of practical issues." At a moment when the schools are educating for "individual differences" "the local culture" is putting renewed stress on elements that make for solidarity and unanimity. "Never before . . . has Middletown's business life been so centrally controlled as at present, and never before has this control system been in a mood to tolerate so little dissent." [2]

The community pressure forces are mobilizing against dissent. Business knows what it wants. The patriotic groups know what they want. The D. A. R., always on a hair-trigger of watchfulness for 'disloyalty,' is reported to feel that both the high school and the college have 'some pretty pink teachers'; and it is reported as characteristic of its activity that sons and daughters in the classrooms of suspected teachers have been enlisted to check up on the latter's teachings. When a social-science teacher in one of the high schools spoke favorably of joining the World Court, a local editorial warned that teachers ought to remember that the schools are supported by taxes.[3]

With so much cracking of the whip

one frequently gets a sense of people's being afraid to let their opinions become sharp. They believe in "peace, but—." They believe in "fairness to labor, but—." In "freedom of speech, but—." In "democracy, but—." In "freedom of the press, but—." This is in part related to the increased apprehensiveness that one feels everywhere in Middletown: fear on the part of teachers of the

[2] *Middletown in Transition*, p. 225.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 235.

D. A. R. and the Chamber of Commerce; fear by businessmen of high taxes and public ownership of utilities and of the Roosevelt administration; fear by laborers of joining unions lest they lose their jobs; fear by office-holders wanting honest government of being framed by the politicians; fear by everyone to show one's hand, or to speak out.[4]

There are no doubts as to who controls. The

ceiling over Middletown is largely set and defined for the city nowadays by its business class. The chance for the mass of the population to "go up in the world" to affluence and independence appears to be shrinking noticeably. It so happens, however, that those who still retain the best chance to rise in the world, to skim the cream from the economy, also control the press, the radio, the movie. . . . They are thus in a position . . . to tell the cityful of people largely living off the skimmed milk of the economy what to believe.[5]

No one imagines all this controlling is "for fun." It has a very practical purpose.

. . . these service agencies are heavily dependent upon the volume of local industrial activity, and their resulting stake in helping General Motors, Borg-Warner, Owens-Illinois, and other national corporations with branches in Middletown to maintain the low-wage, open-shop conditions that brought them to Middletown is too patent to most local businessmen to require arguing. The resulting interlocking of arms by producers, trading and service people, and city officials to "keep down labor trouble" looks toward government-reinforced-strikebreaking; which is precisely what Middletown is today doing on a small scale.[6]

This dollars-and-cents concern is reflected

in the sudden increase of the city police force in 1935 from the usual thirty-nine to upwards of sixty, despite the greater mobility of the force afforded by radio cars . . . the alleged pledge of the city administration to local industry in 1935 that "There will be no labor trouble in Middletown." This assurance synchronized with the removal of the Toledo General Motors plant to Middletown following the Toledo strike in the spring of 1935. It also synchronized with the 5% increase in Middletown policemen.[7]

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 492.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 471.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 66.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 351.

The investigator arrives at the impression: [8]

That the lines of leadership and the related controls are highly concentrated to-day in Middletown.

That this control net has tightened decidedly since 1925 and notably with the depression.

That the control is at very many points unconscious and, where conscious, well-meaning and "public-spirited," as businessmen interpret that concept.

That the control system operates at many points to identify public welfare with business-class welfare.

That there is little deliberate effort from above to organize local bankers, businessmen, and leaders of opinion into a self-conscious "we" pressure group; but that this sharply centripetal tendency of Middletown's businessmen is normal behavior in a capitalist, credit-controlled culture where there is a potential control-center in the form of vast personal resources of demonstrated willingness to lend a friendly hand.

That, so long as the owners of such vast personal resources exhibit a public-spirited willingness to help with local problems, leadership and control tend to be forced upon them by circumstances, and their patterns tend to become the official guiding patterns.

That, viewed at any given time as a going concern, this centrally-hubbed control agency both may and does operate in many subtle and even ordinarily unintended ways to "welcome little fishes in with gently smiling jaws," with an accompanying loss to the latter of independent leadership. Those who try to be independent tend to be regarded, as the local phrase puts it, as "gumming the works."

This régime poses as "Americanism"; but what would the first three-score of men who made the American Revolution have called it?

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 99.

CHAPTER XLII

LIBERATION

Under certain conditions the grip of a group upon its members relaxes and we witness a process which may be termed *liberation.*

Loosening the kindred. When our Teutonic ancestors emerge into history nearly two millennia ago each man is the center of a united group of kindred who act on his behalf partly because they have his welfare at heart, but mainly because public opinion, the law, and their own views of life make them guilty with him if he commits a wrong, and almost equally liable to penalty; or, if he is slain, throw upon the whole group the responsibility for vengeance or satisfaction. Every relative of a slayer up to his second or third cousin contributes according to his degree or kinship to the *wergeld,* which alone can avert the blood feud. On the same principle the *wergeld* received is apportioned among the kinsmen of the man slain. In case of destitution the whole kindred is liable, the degree of relationship determining the contribution of each kinsman. The kindred has the right formally to repudiate an offending member, while in some societies a man can solemnly break the ties of kin by breaking his staff in a ceremonial act.

In South Germany traces of such kindred solidarity can still be found at the end of the twelfth, and even in the thirteenth century. Sweden gives evidence of it as late as the fourteenth century. In Holland and Belgium the kindreds remain active into the sixteenth century. In Denmark they give signs of life as late as the seventeenth century, while in Holstein and Schleswig certain of their functions continued to be exercised on into the nineteenth century. On the other hand, in Norway the disintegration of the kindred seems to have taken place between the ninth and thirteenth centuries. Anglo-Saxon England shows little of such solidarity when it first comes in view in the seventh and eighth centuries, while in Iceland and Normandy there are no signs of it. It is believed that armed migration by sea was deadly to kin solidarity because those who wandered from Denmark and Southern Scandinavia to Eng-

land, Norway, Iceland, Normandy, and Russia were not entire kindreds but the supernumerary heirs of different kindreds, who went on Viking raids to seek their fortune because there was no land for them in the home estate. Land migrations, on the other hand, involved whole kindreds, so that this grouping survived even the vast journeyings which carried the Visigoths into Spain.

However, Christianity and Roman law, with their notions of the responsibility of the individual for his offense, frowned on the kindreds, while the state looked upon them with a jealous eye. It is curious, that among our southern Appalachian mountaineers the kindred grouping reappeared. The lack of law-and-order in the mountains caused the kindreds to take it upon themselves to avenge the slain man, and burdened them with a heritage of feuds which ended only when the courts proved strong enough to execute justice. In other parts of our South the kindred constituted a mutual-aid association. Blood relatives, whether congenial or not, were cherished in the hope that if the breadwinner met with misfortune perhaps Cousin Jim and Uncle Ben and mother's folks would see that Molly and the babies did not come to want. So it was the custom to make much of the ties of blood, to exchange frequent visits with kinsfolk, and to go out of one's way to favor one's kin in business and politics. Northerners were astonished to see how, after the Civil War, very distant kinsmen came forward to assume the support of the widows and orphans of the Confederacy.

Now such mutual-aid association is being undermined partly by the development of official relief but chiefly *by the extension of insurance.* For there is scarcely an economic hazard to which one's family is exposed which may not be provided against. For an annual payment an insurance company or coöperative furnishes the protection for which one used to rely on one's kinsfolk. Then protection is universalized by a national system of compulsory insurance against unemployment, invalidity and old age. Hence, the claims of kindred are not so generally pressed or acknowledged. Why cultivate *all* your relatives when *some* are such dreadful bores? So friendship gains on kinship, and your sphere of personal choice is enlarged.

Loosening the family. Paternal authority was based at first on a fanciful idea of physiological inheritance. It was supposed that children inherited their qualities only from their father,

the mother's body being but a seed plot which nourished the paternal germ. We now know that the mother's contribution is not less than the father's, and that the proverb "Like father, like son" errs in ignoring inheritance from the mother. Furthermore, the meeting in the child of two distinct lines of heredity makes it certain that he cannot be a replica of either parent. He has, indeed, much closer kinship with his full brother or sister than with either parent.

Science thus vindicates the uniqueness of the child and shows it to be unjust that the son should inherit the father's honor or infamy. Why should this being, so distinct, starve because his parents neglect him, slave because a drunken father would exploit him, famish for knowledge because his parents care nothing for it, be punished for his father's misdeeds, or lie under a stigma because his father did not marry his mother? Wherefore should his father's calling, religion, indebtedness, or allegiance descend automatically to him? This conception that children do not "belong to" their parents underlies the laws passed by most American states which make it a crime for the parent to desert, wilfully neglect, or contribute to the delinquency of, the child.

In many Oriental societies to-day mating is entirely in the hands of the parents. The arranged marriage seems never to have gained a footing among the Celts and the Teutons, but under the name of *mariage de convenance* it played a great rôle in Latin Europe. In the course of the nineteenth century, however, it has nearly disappeared in favor of the marriage of inclination.

The individualistic movement of thought in the late eighteenth century not only stressed the rights of children and softened family discipline; it also questioned the testamentary power of the head of the family. It prompted the state to limit a man's right to will his property away from his children or to leave it all to one child. The growing freedom in the use of the inheritance tax betrays a new attitude toward the family. The state deems it bad for young people to be endowed for life and resorts to a progressive taxation which may end by obliging the children of the wealthy to take life standing up instead of lying down.

Industrialism impairs the unity of the family. On the farm the members of the family are busy with the same task, so that in some degree they are knit together by their work. The mem-

bers of the typical city family, on the other hand, scatter after breakfast to their respective jobs. Father is an iron-molder, Jim drives a truck, Sarah teaches school, Jessie is cash girl in a department store, while Harry is office boy to a doctor. They are borne asunder by different tasks, interests, contacts, and circles of friends. If this family holds the loyalty of its members, it does so *in spite of* their diversity of work.

The introduction of light machinery conferring a new earning power upon woman, a clearer view of the rôle of the female sex in the life of the race, and light on the historical process by which male domination became established, all are equalizing man and woman in the family. We see this in statutes giving the married woman control of her own property, granting alimony to divorced wives, and preserving to the husband only very limited rights in his deceased wife's estate. We see it also in the insistence that in sex conduct the same standard shall apply to both.

"Mothers' pensions" further individualize the married woman by providing that a mother with young children shall not starve or be parted from them because of the death or desertion of the father. The demand for the state endowment of motherhood, of which we hear more every year, testifies to the growth of the conviction that the fate of one adult individual ought not to be entirely dependent on the will of another.

The individuation of the members of the family has not come solely out of thirst for personal freedom, but partly owing to the transfer of functions from the family to larger social groups. Schooling has been made compulsory and the school takes over such matters as the medical inspection of the children, play leadership, and vocational guidance. School and home are linked by parent-teacher associations. The kindergarten reaches down nearly to the cradle, and neighborhood nurseries are probably not far off. Baby-feeding stations and classes and anti-child-labor laws insure that the children of the poor shall have their chance. The social center competes with the fireside for the child's leisure time. The "court of domestic relations" assumes functions which in olden time fell to the council of the kin.

The ecclesiastical doctrine that marriage, being a sacrament, is indissoluble sacrifices the individual to the institution when the demands of the two conflict. The disposition of the modern state to grant divorce for grave cause shows that the law-maker deems

human happiness to be of some importance. The passage of marriage and divorce from the custody of the Church to that of the State causes them to be regarded no longer as sacraments, *i.e., promises to God,* but as matters to be settled in the light of reason and experience.

Liberating effect of the money economy. In the early Middle Ages the relation of the individual to the group was all or nothing; but to-day, thanks to the money economy, people are able to form unions for limited and specific purposes. Says Cooley: [1]

> In primitive society membership is intimate and exclusive, the individual putting his whole personality into it. But as groups become numerous and complex there comes to be a kind of parcelling out of personal activities into somewhat impersonal functions, with special associates in each function. A person, while as much dependent as ever upon the group system as a whole, grows less and less identified with any one group. His relation becomes selective, each man working out for himself a system of life different from that of any other man, and not embraced in any one set of connections. Personality becomes more and more an organization by itself, distinct from that of any group, and forming itself by a special choice of influences.
>
> We are coming more and more to base our social order upon this selective association. In accordance with the ideal of equal opportunity, we try to facilitate special personal development in every possible way, holding that it not only does the most for the individual, but enables him to do the most for society. In this way modern society recognizes and fosters individuality as the earlier epochs never thought of doing.

It was a great stride towards emancipation when the feudal villein commuted his obligation to work so many days a week on his lord's demesne, or to deliver to his lord such-and-such produce of his fields, into a fixed money payment which he might raise as he pleased. No longer was he tied down to a single occupation or to residence in his birthplace.

Among ourselves when the laborer takes part of his pay "in kind," *i.e.,* in food and lodging, he is not so free as when he gets his pay all in money and lives where he will. The factory girl paid in cash is freer than the domestic who must take such food and lodging as her mistress provides, hence she works for less. In England the "shop assistants" who are fed and lodged by their

[1] *Social Process,* 1918, pp. 240, 250.

employers are doubtless more discontented than any mercantile help in the United States. Where employers partly pay for service with board or orders on company stores or accommodations in company houses, the employees are restless or else the class of laborers is low. The worst cases of chronic feud between labor and capital are found, not in urban centers where the "cash nexus" is the sole connection between the two, but in isolated places—the mining camp, the lumber camp, the railroad camp—where labor is obliged to spend its money with the company.

In the landlord-tenant relation the substitution of cash rental for a share of the crop, makes for the freedom of both parties. Often the share-tenant has to accept the landlord as a sleeping partner in his undertaking and is not at liberty to farm the land as he will.

Liberalizing the state. *The decline of warfare* normally weakens the grip of the state upon its members. The doctrine that the individual exists not for himself and his family, but for the state, is so revolting that it flourishes only when national team work appears to be a matter of life or death. So long as the state is thought of as primarily for fighting, it is logical to deem its claims paramount, and to regard the people as just a taxable and soldier-yielding mass. On the other hand, with the decline of fighting the state comes to be thought of as an agency for promoting the happiness of the people *in several*. Centralized coercive rule is no longer called for. The citizen's individuality, instead of being sacrificed to government, is to be preserved and defended by it. Justice, *i.e.*, making each secure in his rights, becomes the touchstone of good government, while the state multiplies means of hygiene, education and recreation which each may lay hold of or not, as he sees fit.

So long as the state is worked by a dominant race or class it will not spare coercion. Its yoke will not be light so long as those who impose it do not have to bear it. But, in the degree that the advance of popular sovereignty obliges the state to obey the will of the greater number, it loses its ruthless and arbitrary character. Some maintain that democracies sacrifice freedom to equality when the demands of the two conflict. But is this true? Granted that people-rule heaps restrictions upon the former ruling class, *i.e.*, landholding nobility or *bourgeoisie*, may not this be necessary in order to correct the evil results of class rule in the

past? Popular governments no doubt resort freely to legislation; but perhaps this is because the great democratic advance has happened to be contemporary with movements for the protection of the public health, the regulation of industry and the eradication of widespread moral evils. These movements would have made themselves felt in any case, for they have bred about as much legislation in autocratic states as in democratic states.

Nevertheless, *pride* is the distinguishing trait of a ruling class; its members resent legal restrictions to which workaday people cheerfully submit. This is why the democratic state may prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages, ban habit-forming drugs, require those wishing to marry to undergo a physical examination, and subject congenital defectives to custodial care or sterilize them by surgery—measures which the aristocratic state abhors.

Liberalizing religion. Under ancient polytheism "the notion of there being any guilt in erroneous opinion was unknown." Christianity, however, like every other monotheism, regarded gods other than its own as "vanity" and their worship as an insult to the one "true" God. So, as soon as it had the strength, it stamped out "heathenism." As its doctrines crystallized, the right of private judgment was denied on the ground that *heresy* would bring down the wrath of God on the entire community in which it was tolerated. Heresy, moreover, was interpreted as difference; it was heresy to be better than the crowd or worse. Says Sumner: "There could be no definition of a heretic but one who differed in life and conversation from the masses around him. This might mean strange language, dress, manners or greater restraint in conduct. Pallor of countenance was a mark of a heretic from the fourth century to the twelfth." [2]

The hounding of heretics which terrorized thinking Europe from the thirteenth century to the seventeenth was abandoned owing chiefly to the decline of belief in collective responsibility for error. The maxim that the private conscience is God's affair and may not be forced by man has removed from the authority of government the whole domain of religious belief and practice. Moreover, the inviolability gradually conceded to religious convictions is visibly extending to other departments of thought and feeling; for what if fools were free to preach the near end of the world or the non-existence of disease while sages were not

[2] W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, 1907, p. 243.

free to urge birth-control or sterilization of the unfit. So there appears to be developing an inviolable *freedom of opinion and communication,* which will, however, no more shield incitement to violence than "freedom of conscience" shielded Mormon plural marriages.

Again, the grasp of the religious community on a member relaxes when men cease to believe that moral guilt is heritable. If in sooth God is "a jealous God visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation," surely a man ought to be restrained from carelessly bringing down upon his descendants Divine displeasure. If "the children's teeth will be set on edge" because the fathers have eaten a sour grape, let sour grapes be put out of reach. But Jeremiah declares, "Every man that eateth the sour grape, *his* teeth shall be set on edge"; while Ezekiel proclaims the new principle, "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son." By making the devout willing to leave the offender to God this happy doctrine of individual responsibility has enlarged personal freedom.

Hero worship. The liberalizing movement owes much to a golden vein of imaginative literature which runs back to early saga and epic. In Homeric times, for example, Hellenic adventures came upon Ægean lands rich in spoils, where a chieftain might sack a city and dower himself and his followers with sudden wealth. Settled splendor beset by unbridled adventure went to the making of a heroic age, with its strong lights and shadows, its seen beauty and its hidden ugliness. Under stable conditions, no doubt, most of these heroes would have ended on the gallows.

Now, early balladry and ritual dance reflected primitive tribal life in which the individual was nothing, the choral band everything. In the saga, however, the hero is everything while the mass is but a shadowy background for his brilliant clear-cut personality.

Says Miss Jane Harrison:

> The epic poet is all taken up with what he called *klea andron,* "glorious deeds of men," of individual heroes; and what these heroes themselves ardently long and pray for is just this glory, this personal distinction, this deathless fame for their great deeds. When the armies meet it is the leaders who fight in single combat.

These glorious heroes are for the most part kings, but not kings in the old sense, not hereditary kings bound to the soil and responsible for its fertility. Rather they are leaders in war and adventure; the homage paid them is a personal devotion for personal character; the leader must win his followers by bravery, he must keep them by personal generosity. Moreover, heroic wars are oftenest not tribal feuds consequent on tribal raids; more often they arise from personal grievances, personal jealousies; the siege of Troy is undertaken not because the Trojans have raided the cattle of the Achæans, but because a single Trojan, Paris, has carried off Helen, a single Achæan's wife.[3]

Joined by like currents of poetry from the heroic age of Celts and Norsemen and from Christian chivalry this Greek vein inspired a modern glamorous stream of thought and literature *glorifying the individual and celebrating the preciousness of self-determination.* Taking the nineteenth century alone, consider what Goethe, Shelley, Carlyle, Emerson, Thoreau, Whitman, Mazzini, Victor Hugo, William Morris, Ibsen, Tolstoi, and Shaw did to make their millions of readers yearn to be free of vain trammels and to develop a clear-cut individuality. Another line of thought has stressed the worth to society of the initiative of the exceptional man, and vindicated his right to be different and to have a pioneer's scope.

Critical thought. Emancipative also has been critical thought which, beginning in France near the middle of the eighteenth century, undermined ecclesiasticism and absolutism within a generation, and, in the course of the nineteenth century, summoned every institution and authority to justify itself. The whole social life of the Middle Ages was based on the principle of subordination. Less than two hundred years ago Rousseau set at the front of his *Social Contract,* "Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains." In religion, morals, philosophy, science, education, government, and economic life "authority" prevailed. For the great mass obedience was the law of life, obedience to the church, the ruler, the lord, the guild, and the head of the family. All these claims rested back on religion. God's will was behind them. Only the free activity of the critical intellect ripped up this strait-jacket. Once *reason* was taken as arbiter instead of *tradition,* or *faith,* or Pope, every kind of authority was called upon to exhibit its credentials. Every coercion of man over man

[3] *Ancient Art and Ritual,* p. 159.

was required to show itself to be for the good of the restrained person, or of the community. Chief among the critics of stultifying authority have been Voltaire, Reimarus, Paine, Jefferson, Strauss, Robert Owen, Spencer and Tolstoi. Among the great arraigners of regulative institutions stand Rousseau, Godwin, Bentham, J. S. Mill, Proudhon, Sorel, Marx, Lenin, Henry George, Kropotkin and Nietzsche.

Under their fire some old restraints have been cleared away; others have been softened; still others have been vindicated. Even at the bar of reason is justified the authority of the parent, the teacher, the military officer, the official acting within his powers. But what a clearance there has been, since the fall of the Bastille, of coercion for its own sake, or to give some one the pleasure of mastership, or to enable one human being to make use of another!

Nor is criticism a spent force. It is only in our time that the state of our jails and almshouses has received critical attention, while it is only within the last three decades that we have asked ourselves what life in the steel cage is doing to the inmates of our prison cells. Only lately has the justice of our prosecuting and ostracizing the prostitute been mooted. Long ago Shakespeare observed the urchin "creeping like a snail to school," but it has been only about fifty years since a few educators of imagination began to wonder whether children *have* to be forced to study. From this has grown a movement to make school work attractive to children, culminating in the "play school" from which the urchin "creeps like a snail" to his home!

Diffusion of the art of reading. Two centuries ago, when few but the privileged could read, what hearing would there have been for Turgenev's "Memoirs of a Sportsman," Stowe's "Uncle Tom's Cabin," Dickens' "Oliver Twist," Hugo's "Les Miserables," Tolstoi's "Resurrection," or Hauptmann's "The Weavers"? Now, thanks to the immensity of the hearkening public, honest newspapers and humanitarian artists have made the world a vast whispering gallery for the groans of the oppressed and the abused. The dim toiling masses whose lot, a century and a half ago, was hardly more regarded than that of the beasts of the field have found tongues of outcry and protest. All the dark corners of society are swept by shafts of light; and as the onlooking multitude grows, less and less dare lawgivers,

courts, police, prison officials, military officers, educational authorities or captains of industry to tyrannize.

This is why William G. Sumner, commenting on the fact that in Wickliffe's time the Bishop of Winchester obtained a handsome rent from the stews of Southwark, can say with truth: "Probably he and his contemporaries thought no harm. Never until the nineteenth century was it in the mores of any society to feel that the sacrifice of one human being to the happiness of another was a thing which civil institutions could not tolerate. It could not enter into the minds of men of the fifteenth century that harlots, serfs and other miserable classes had personal rights which were outraged by the customs and institutions of the time." [4]

MODERN JAPAN AS AN OBJECT LESSON IN LIBERATION

The old social order of Japan regulated the details of life with a minuteness unmatched in the modern world. To find its like, we should have to go back to the times before Homer. "Every detail of the peasant's existence was prescribed for by law—from the size, form and cost of his dwelling, down even to such trifling matters as the number and quality of dishes to be served him at meal times." Laws "regulated not only the size of one's dwelling, and the cost of its furniture, but even the substance and character of clothing—not only the expense of a wedding outfit, but the quality of the marriage feast and the quality of the vessels in which the food was to be served—not only the kind of ornaments to be worn in a woman's hair, but the material of the thongs of her sandals—not only the price of presents to be made to friends, but the character and the cost of the cheapest toy to be given a child!" [5] "The hierarchical organization of society was faithfully reflected in the conventional organization of language—in the ordination of pronouns, nouns and verbs—in the grades conferred upon adjectives by prefixes and suffixes." "Rules innumerable decided exactly what should be said—the word to be chosen, the phrase to be used." "Everybody had to learn that only certain verbs and nouns and pronouns were lawful when addressing superiors, and other words were permissible only when speaking to equals or inferiors." "De-

[4] *Folkways*, p. 531.

[5] Lafcadio Hearn, *Japan, an Interpretation*, 1905, p. 186.

meanor was most elaborately and mercilessly regulated, not merely as to obeisances, of which there were countless grades, varying according to sex as well as class—but even in regard to facial expression, the manner of smiling, the conduct of the breath, the way of sitting, standing, walking, rising. Every baby was trained from infancy in this etiquette of expression and deportment." It was a mortal offense "so to smile in addressing a superior that the back teeth could be seen." Iyèyasu authorized a Samurai to kill any person of the three inferior classes guilty of rudeness; and rudeness was defined as 'other-than-expected.' " [6] "The regimentation of society resembled that of all antique civilizations of the militant type—all action being both positively and negatively regulated. The household ruled the person; the five-family group, the household; the community, the group; the lord of the soil, the community; the Shogun, the lord." "Personality is wholly suppressed by coercion; and coercion is chiefly from within, not from without—the life of every individual being so ordered by the will of the rest as to render free action, free speaking, or free thinking out of the question." [7]

From this old matrix individuals are being released by various new forces. The pressure of feudal laws was removed seventy years ago, leaving custom as chief agent of restraint. In the agricultural districts the yoke of local custom is still heavy; but those who remove to the growing cities, who emigrate, or who wander from province to province, enjoy greater freedom of action. The economic self-sufficiency of the locality or district has disappeared. Custom no longer governs price. The extending competition of man with man, of place with place, of Japanese with foreigners, causes hampering restrictions to go by the board. As never before men are thrown on their own choices. With wider participation in government the Japanese learn to group themselves according to *political opinions* rather than by *clans*.

Christianity frees its converts from the group matrix, teaching that one saves his soul not by sharing in the ancestral or communal cult by an individual experience (conversion) or act (confession of faith). Says Gulick:

There is a marked increase in vivacity in those Japanese who become Christians. The repressive social restraints of the old social

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 188-193 *passim.*
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 275, 277.

order are somewhat removed. A freedom is allowed to individuals of the Christian community, in social life, in conversation between men and women, in the holding of public opinions, which the non-Christian order of society did not present. Sociability between the sexes was not allowed. The new freedom naturally results in greater vivacity and a far freer play of facial expression than the older order could produce.[8]

Western thought also encourages the governing Japanese to trust the individual more. From observing us they learn that freedom does not inevitably breed confusion, that a disciplined conscience may hold the individual in his proper orbit after custom has ceased to bind him. In the dramas and novels of the West they are thrilled by sublime portrayals of the human soul —its temptations, struggles, renunciations and victories—which are strange to a literature arising under a communal social order. The enthusiasm with which young Japanese greet the message of Carlyle, Emerson, Thoreau, Nietzsche, and Shaw, testifies that the idealizing of individual self-determination and initiative is balm to their souls.

[8] S. L. Gulick, *Social Evolution of the Japanese*, p. 168.

CHAPTER XLIII

ANTICIPATION

One means people employ in adapting themselves to the institutions and policies of their society is *anticipation* or *discount,* in consequence of which things often turn out quite otherwise than had been expected. The student of society will endeavor to anticipate these anticipations, thereby arriving at a judgment as to how particular policies will work in "the long run."

Let us examine now the more striking manifestations of anticipation in the various provinces of social life.

Anticipation in the treatment of wrongdoing. Authorities object to paying a reward for the return of an abducted person "no questions asked" because such a policy lays a financial foundation for the following of abduction as a business. There is a plain conflict of interest here between the wealthy parent, concerned only to recover his child, and society, intent on discouraging the practice of kidnapping. The practice of "compounding a felony" illustrates a like conflict of interest and is justifiably frowned on by the law.

The authorities very properly go to great expense in order to pursue, ferret out, or extradite the individual lawbreaker for the reason that, if it is apparent that frequently the lawbreaker comes off scatheless, the dread of the law will be weakened in the hearts of the evil-disposed and crime will increase. On the other hand, a show of resolution and relentlessness, a demonstration that the law will never give up and that in the end justice will always get its due, fills the hearts of bad men with a deterring dread.

The resort to the use of money by a railroad or public utility company in order to control a legislature acts in the end as a boomerang. The word runs through the political underworld that there is "easy money going" and grafters strive desperately to get themselves elected to the legislature. The quality of the legislators declines, "strike" bills multiply, the need of using money in order to protect the legitimate interests of the company

grows, so that in the end the company is harder hit than if from the first it had taken its chances with the uncorrupted representatives of the people.

One of the most shortsighted policies on which an employer can embark is the hiring of spies to worm their way into the labor unions and warn him of their plans. A demand for trouble will not long remain unsatisfied. In order to prolong their employment spies take the lead in inciting to policies of outrage and thus stir up much of the mischief which their employer pays them for reporting. Likewise for the employer to hire "watchmen" supplied by private detective agencies is to plunge into a quicksand. These agencies live off the dread of industrial violence; hence they see to it that there shall be no lack of violence. From the moment their mercenaries arrive on the scene a labor struggle enters a darker phase.

A repressive government is duped in the same way. Its dependence upon reptilian characters who can deceive their employers because they work in the dark is discounted to the extent of their organizing anarchist groups and devising the deeds of violence which cause the government to lean more upon them. Azeff, who for sixteen years was a paid agent of the Russian police, was himself the chief organizer of acts of "revolutionary" terrorism. No one will ever know the amount of bad blood crooked *agents provocateurs* stirred up between government and people in Russia and between employers and workers in our society.

The pardoning of convicted persons is much more likely to be discounted and to lead to crime than the forgiveness of injuries. If the wronged person forgives the offender after having him in his power—"heaps coals of fire upon his head"—the latter's sense of fair play is powerfully appealed to and he is not likely to discount such forgiveness by repeating the offense. The state, however, cannot safely pardon unless there is clear evidence of sincere repentance and a desire for amendment. Forgiveness not based upon such repentance may easily encourage evildoing. This, however, is not true of God's forgiveness of the wrongdoer, for God cannot be deceived by empty professions of repentance. The non-resentment of wrongs is more likely to lead to their repetition when *states* are concerned than when *persons* are concerned, for there is here no room for an appeal to the offender's better nature. A neutral's neglect promptly to protest against vio-

lation of its rights by a belligerent may encourage the belligerent to a contemptuous disregard of its rights which may end in war. On the other hand, the pursuance by the neutral of a policy vigilant and firm, yet without bluster, may restrain the belligerent and prevent the growth of bad blood between the peoples.

Anticipation in the sphere of government. Taxes laid on voluntary actions or on the results of such actions *have the same effect as fines,* for they modify behavior rather than yield revenue. Thus heavy taxes on windows may lead to shutting the light out of dwellings; on date trees may lead to chopping down the trees; on wine may cause the vines to be pulled up; on produce may throw land out of cultivation. Inheritance taxes may lead to gifts between the living unless these too are taxed; customs duties, to smuggling. A tax will thus deform economic society or economic life unless it is light, or is broad and general and presses uniformly.[1]

Despotic governments have often substituted taxation for arbitrary seizure from a dim perception of the principle of anticipation. The thoughtful perceive that where wealth is seized rapaciously without rule or right there presently no wealth is produced. If the tax-gatherer leaves nothing which the cultivator can count on for his family, he emigrates, and soon the land is empty of taxpayers. This is one reason why, long before the advent of popular control, the revenue system of government was rationalized so as to guarantee to the wealth-producer a fixed and fore-knowable share of what he may produce.

Anticipation in inter-individual relations. The doctrine that "the end may justify the means" has fallen into merited odium because, the moment you learn that people are acting on such a principle, you know not what to expect of them. Since the veriest saint may lie, steal, cheat, forge, defraud, or forswear himself for the sake of some larger good, to you unknown, you have to be on your guard against the good man as well as the bad man. No wonder a doctrine so unsettling became infamous!

"Honesty is the best policy" for one conducting a business or following a profession *in one place,* because in time customers or patrons anticipate the treatment they will receive and govern themselves accordingly. The merchant who overreaches his customers in ways they finally learn of presently has no customers.

[1] See Ross, "A New Canon of Taxation," *Political Science Quarterly,* Vol. VII.

It was this same perception that induced the wild American Indians not to plunder the fur-trader who ventured among them. Their leaders foresaw that if they robbed him no other fur-traders would come; so that the way to get guns and knives was not to take them by force, but to buy them with pelts.

Lord Bacon remarks how veracity creates a fund of confidence. "The ablest men that ever were have had all an openness and frankness of dealing, and a name of certainty and veracity; . . . when they thought the case indeed required dissimulation, if then they used it, it came to pass that the former opinion spread abroad, of their good faith and clearness of dealing, made them almost invisible."

The lawyer known to refuse every case he does not believe in is likely to have a slender practice at first, but in time his reputation for championing only righteous causes gives his pleadings great weight with a jury and he will be much sought after because he has the name of winning his cases.

The writer, speaker, or expert witness who yields to the temptation to produce conviction by exaggeration and emphasis finds, unless he keeps on the move, that his influence diminishes; whereas the man who is consistently guarded and accurate in statement steadily grows in authoritativeness, provided that he is able to keep in the public eye.

The eloquent but mercenary spellbinder, after shifting twice or thrice to the side which offers him the more money, finds himself in a few years without a retainer, because the public has learned to discount his hired stump eloquence to such a degree that his services are no longer of value.

We are wary of itinerant peddlers, doctors, and promoters just because we realize that they are not subject, like the local merchant or practitioner, to the operation of the principle of anticipation.

One "spoils" children, not simply by being "easy" with them, but by being so easy with them that they *count on* favor and leniency. They observe that if they will not wash or dress themselves, somebody will do it for them; if they break or lose their toys, they are promptly replaced; if they transgress, the threatened punishment is never inflicted. The parent or schoolmaster who keeps himself *unpredictable* in the discipline of his children may safely forgive or overlook much.

Anticipation in the sphere of charity. The workings of anticipation in the field of charity are startling. If the beggar's whine opens the purse, mendicancy will be followed as a trade. If the moving "hard-luck" story draws forth alms, imposture will be developed into a fine art. If the maimed and twisted capture the coin from the passer-by, artificial deformations and mutilations will be forthcoming, as if society had announced: "Produce me such and such ghastly spectacles and I will pay for them."

In the Middle Ages the profuse and indiscriminate almsgiving of monasteries, hospitals, guilds, and magnates made it easy for the shiftless to live without work. There sprang up a horde of parasites who wandered from place to place making the rounds of monastery, hospital, and religious festival, and ever increasing in numbers and boldness. "Around the gates of St. Bartholomew and other great foundations," says Ashley,[2] "gathered swarms of the miserably shiftless and idle, decrepit, halt, and maimed, covered with rags and filth, like those still to be seen around the entrance to many a Continental cathedral."

A system of public outdoor relief is likely to be counted on until it becomes in effect a bounty on idleness and improvidence. Under the Poor Law in force in England up to 1834 the pauper was often better off than the poor laborer, who was thereby disheartened in his struggle to maintain his independence; hence, the proportion of paupers grew. In some parishes rents were so generally paid by the vestry that the poor made no effort to provide their rent. Landowners have been known to tear down cottages so as to keep out pauper settlers and to draw their labor from surrounding parishes which made up the deficit in wages by an allowance. When farmers were allowed to have the labor of the idle at a shilling a day, the deficit being made up by the overseers of the poor, they turned away their laborers, thus creating an idle class, in order later to hire them back at the cheap rate. Where employers were required to hire paupers rather than the self-supporting, saving was seen to be a bar to employment, so that thriftlessness was encouraged. The policy of a regular allowance for the out-of-work prompted some laborers to be as lawless and useless at work as possible, in order that they might be discharged and supported in idleness.

[2] W. J. Ashley, *English Economic History*, 1892, vol. II, p. 324.

The readier relief of the married man than of the unmarried encouraged reckless marriage. Not only did laborers marry earlier than was the custom before the allowance system grew up, bnt it was noticed that they married younger in liberal parishes than in strict parishes.

The prospect of additional money for every child born into a pauper family removed the check which anxiety naturally places upon the size of the family. The granting of 2*s.* a week for a bastard child, but only 1*s.* 3*d.* for a legitimate child, on the ground that the former had no father to support it, probably encouraged illegitimacy. Since the mothers of such children were more comfortably kept than married women, many, we are told, considered it the best way to provide for themselves. Moreover, loose women with children were preferred as wives to modest women because of their incomes from the parish.

After 1834 the poorhouse became a workhouse; but its practice of giving lodging to destitute wayfarers created professional vagrants. The freedom to go and come called into being a class of loafers who availed themselves of the hospitality and the mixed company of the workhouse, but, when they craved a change, left it and lived as they pleased. When deterrent regulations were adopted, vagrants found jails more comfortable, and did little to escape imprisonment for a week or two for vagrancy or petty thievery.

A critic of the English workhouse writes:

> It was a curious experience in visiting a large number of workhouses to find, as one went from one place to another, that what one had to look for was the most spacious and prosperous-looking institution in the place, set in the best-kept grounds, surrounded with expensive walls and handsome gates. . . . "Indoor-relief" has bred a class of lazy parasites, willing to submit to any conditions so long as they are well fed and relieved from all responsibilities. They are not even precluded from injuring the outside community, inasmuch as the law permits them to go in and out at their pleasure, using the workhouse as a convenient resort and a protection to their noxious lives from the discipline of hunger and cold.[3]

The Poor Law Commission reporting in 1909 recommended that no outdoor relief be given save to persons leading respectable lives in decent houses. Slum areas should be proscribed, in-

[3] Helen Bosanquet, *The Poor Law Report of 1909*, p. 186.

asmuch as the attraction of these degraded areas lies, not in low rents, for they are really high, but in the absence of restraint, and the liberty to overcrowd and to lead irregular lives which is to be found under the slum landlord.

Nothing so lends itself to anticipation as *endowed* outdoor relief, which is sure to become widely known and which works blindly, in good years as in bad years. Not only has it been found that in English cathedral towns with endowments for the poor pauperism is far greater than in other towns, but fixed doles always attract to a place more than enough paupers to absorb them all. No doubt many a down-and-out has drifted to New York because of the publicity the Sunday newspapers gave to the midnight "bread line" maintained by the endowment of the baker who started it.

In unexpected ways anticipation spoils the effect of the best-intentioned acts. The tender-hearted public which habitually turns aside to buy the wares of the smallest newsboy or peddler is unwittingly drawing children out of school and into industry. An enlightened kindness deals quite otherwise with the children in the street trades.

The giving of tips to waiters, after it has become general and customary, is of no benefit to them. The poor wage received by porters in "standard" sleeping-cars in comparison with those of "tourist" sleeping-cars proves that the generosity of the traveling public has been anticipated and capitalized by their employer, the sleeping-car company.

The granting of a subsidy of public money to a private charity is often the beginning of a process of shifting the entire burden of supporting the institution upon the taxpayers without giving their representatives any control. "Those institutions that have received public aid the longest most commonly receive least from private contributors." Such aid "tends to dry up the springs of private benevolence."

Subsidies which vary with the number of dependents constitute "a standing premium to the institution to keep the inmates longer than is necessary and to develop the work in magnitude." Thus there is a "strong tendency on the part of subsidies to increase the problem with which the subsidized institutions have to deal."

In the beginning the payment of state subsidies is always urged

on the ground of economy. With a given number of dependents in sight it is cheaper to hire an existing institution to care for them than to maintain them in a public institution. What the legislator overlooks is that, as soon as subsidy-granting has become an established policy of the state with respect to private institutions doing a particular kind of work (*e.g.*, caring for dependent children), the number of qualified subsidy-claiming institutions begins to multiply, and ere long the charge upon the public is vastly greater than any one had foreseen. Who anticipated that the subsidy-earning institutions in Pennsylvania would grow from 8 in 1880 to 176 in 1905? In 1875 a speaker before the National Conference of Charities and Corrections, referring to the union of public and private benefactions in the charities of New York, predicted that most of the aided institutions would eventually become entirely self-supporting, thus relieving the public treasury. But he failed to take into account the effect of subsidy anticipation in drying up private benefactions and in increasing dependency. In 1870 New York City gave a third of a million dollars, *i.e.*, a fifth of its appropriations for prisons and paupers, to private institutions. In 1898 it gave three and one-seventh millions, or 57 per cent. At first the state is looked upon as coming to the aid of private charity; eventually, private charity is looked upon as coming to the aid of the state!

When subsidies are granted to institutions caring for dependent children there is a vast increase in the number of such children. In New York City the number grew from 14,773 in 1875 to 33,406 in 1895. The annual subsidy to orphan asylums in the state of California grew from $58,000 in 1800 to $410,000 in 1898. "It has almost killed any efforts to place the children in family homes, has in a large measure demoralized many families whose children are thus supported, and has reacted unfavorably upon the spirit and motive of many of the charitable societies themselves."

Anticipation in the field of education. H. G. Wells points out that the early endeavor to stimulate popular education in England by the government making grants in accordance with results obtained in examination gave rise to "grant-earning," by no means the same as education.

> The task of examination was intrusted to eminent scientific men for the most part quite unaccustomed to teaching. . . . Year after year these eminent persons set questions and employed

subordinates to read and mark the increasing thousands of answers that ensued, and, having no doubt the national idea of fairness well developed in their minds, they were careful each year to reread the preceding papers before composing the current one, in order to see what it was usual to ask. As a result of this, in the course of a few years the recurrence and permutation of these questions became almost calculable, and since the practical object of the teaching was to teach people, not science, but how to write answers to these questions, the industry of grant-earning assumed a form easily distinguished from any kind of genuine education whatsoever. [Competing firms] set themselves to produce textbooks that should supply exactly the quantity and quality of knowledge necessary for every stage of each of the five and twenty subjects into which desirable science was divided, and copies and models and instructions that should give precisely the method and gestures esteemed as proficiency in art. Every section of each book was written in the idiom found to be most satisfactory to the examiners, and test questions extracted from papers set in former years were appended to every chapter. By means of these last the teacher was able to train his class to the very highest level of grant-earning efficiency, and very naturally he cast all other methods of exposition aside. First he posed his pupils with questions and then dictated model replies.[4]

The policy of intimidating university professors uttering economic opinions distasteful to the men of wealth who constitute the governing board is most mischievous in its outworkings. Once it were understood that a professor is subject to supervision as to his utterances on questions of public interest and liable to dismissal when these do not please the governing powers, men of virile character and independent mind would avoid the calling. In the end the quality and standing of the universities would be lowered. Again, unless radical professors are safe, conservative professors lose the confidence of the public. The one thing that makes it worth while to cite the judgment of university professors in opposition to wild and crude proposals is the freedom with which, in our universities generally, opinions of a different tendency can be expressed. Let it be understood that the conservative professor *has* to teach and talk as he does or lose his living, and his influence with the public is at an end.

Anticipation in the realm of law. In the history of courts of justice one is struck by the fierce insistence that judges apply

[4] *The New Machiavelli*, 1910, p. 22.

law and not their own notions of right and wrong. In the absence of statute judges are to apply *customary* or *common* law and, wanting even this guidance, they are to follow the trend of earlier decisions. This seems to have been prompted, not so much by mistrust of the individual judge, as by the need of *knowing in advance the rules of conduct* in order that one might discriminate the licit from the forbidden. So hotly has uncertainty been resented that at times the people have sprung to arms because judges did the will of their royal master, or administered strange law instead of the ancient well-known laws of the realm.

It is just because a censor does not bind himself to decide according to explicit rules that censorship has such a paralyzing effect upon literary production. Thus Tolstoi once wrote:

> You would not believe how, from the very commencement of my activity, that horrible censor question has tormented me. I wanted to write what I felt, but at the same time it occurred to me that what I wrote would not be permitted, and involuntarily I had to abandon the work. I abandoned, and went on abandoning, and meanwhile the years passed away.

So blighting is censorship that our unlicensed press is considered a "free" press, although it is certainly subject to legal prosecution for defamatory or seditious utterances. The national motion-film board of censors has been subjected to great pressure to formulate the principles of its discriminations, so that manufacturers may know in advance of production which films are likely to find favor with it.

It is owing to the principle of anticipation that law may often be adjusted to social needs without damage to private rights. Some strongly denounce a bankruptcy law, not perceiving that its action will be anticipated by creditors, who will protect themselves by including in the selling price of their goods an insurance premium for the risk they run. In like manner, a homestead-exemption act need not wrong creditors, for they will reckon on it when they lend.

In tropical South America I have heard peonage justified on the ground that the peons are so destitute that they need the right to pledge their labor after a bad season in order to procure from the planter the food necessary to keep them from starving. The true policy is to abolish the contract of peonage and let the laborer develop the capacity to look out for his future himself.

Anticipating his plight without a master to fall back on, the laborer will be stimulated to save and to make himself a reputation for reliability. Thus he will rise in the moral scale.

Thanks to the principle of anticipation wise laws may be very potent in influencing economic life. Let the law provide adequate protection for some kind of property that does not exist—say artificial oyster beds on the bottom of Chesapeake Bay—and, if the state of the oyster market justifies it, capital will be invested. Since capitalists are likely to have both foresight and farsight, nothing is so shrewdly discounted as laws and conditions affecting invested capital. A general attack upon the institution of property will discourage saving or investment; but a discriminating agitation to curb a certain kind of property or to convert it to public uses need have no such effect. After a reform movement affecting some species of property has been worked up by radicals, it will succeed better if carried out by a conservative statesman who is not suspected of having other anti-property reforms "up his sleeve."

It is not well always to give property the benefit of the doubt. The historic decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of *Fletcher vs. Peck,* validating a huge grant of public land so fraudulent that every member but one of the legislative majority which voted it was interested and a party to the transaction, was an invitation to capitalists to engage in the corruption of legislatures. The decision made every grant of special privilege, every act bestowing property or creating new property, even if obtained by grossest bribery, a vested right which no subsequent legislative act could rescind. The Dartmouth College decision declaring all corporate charters and franchises irrepealable contracts was a standing invitation to the commercial company to bend every effort to control the lawmaking body long enough to obtain a franchise after its own heart.

Anticipation in the sphere of religion. Nothing seems more likely than that the endowment of a religious order will promote the cause of true religion. At a given moment the monks are observed to be devoting their spare time to the propagation of religion. If they were free from the burden of self-support and there were more of them, surely the cause of religion would be advanced. It is fallacious, however, to assume that after the order controls rich endowments the quality and spirit of the brethren

will be the same as it now is. The present members joined themselves to poverty and are spiritual men. But after an order is known to control wealth a different type crowds in, the prevailing tone changes, the spirit of enjoyment and ease spreads and the ideal of service fades out. In time society wakes up to the fact that instead of a brotherhood of apostles it is harboring a nest of dissolute parasites.

Heresy hunting seems defensible until one looks ahead and notes how the practice will affect the composition of the clergy. No matter how fixed in the doctrines of his church a man may feel himself to be at the time of his entering the ministry, he should allow for the possibility of growth and change. The greater his intellectual vigor and the more independent his mind, the more this possibility becomes a probability. Hence, the prospect of being unfrocked for heresy after one is committed to one's calling and well on in life will repel from the ministry virile young men likely to make the pulpit a power; but it will not deter those weaker in intellect or character. The church that is jealous for the dignity and leadership of its clergy will satisfy itself as to the orthodoxy of those whom it ordains, but, save in extreme cases, it will not pursue with a heresy trial the clergyman who has come into disagreement with its creeds. It will leave the question of his continuance in its pulpit to his conscience and sense of propriety.

Deductions and conclusions. It is recognition of the workings of this principle that makes the chief difference between the attitude of the intellectual and that of the emotionalist in matters of policy. The emotionalist says: "This couple are unhappy together. Why not let them go their separate ways?" The intellectual replies: "Make divorce too much a matter of course and instead of having fewer unhappy marriages you will have more. For people will form risky and unstable unions because they know they can obtain a divorce if the union turns out ill." The emotionalist says: "What is the good of hanging this murderer and orphaning his children? Have pity and let him go." The intellectual replies: "A too-free use of the pardoning power encourages the evil-disposed to yield to their criminal impulses, and thereby augments the amount of suffering among the innocent." An emotionalist in the United States Post-Office Department once directed postmasters to turn over "Santa Claus" letters to local philanthropic societies. It was not long before the number

of moving and apparently naïve petitions to Santa Claus from artful children for sleds, skates, and other objects of juvenile desire greatly multiplied, and the local societies came to realize that they were being "worked." The order had to be rescinded. The emotionalist set up a revolving cradle in front of the foundling asylum so that foundlings might be deposited secretly. The theory was that this facility of disposal would do away with the murder of undesired infants. It certainly resulted in an alarming growth of illegitimacy and an irresponsible dumping of children.

The principle of anticipation does not tell against the relieving of distress *which has not been brought about nor could have been averted by any act of the sufferer.* Widowhood, orphanhood, loss of health, and distress arising from such unforeseeable calamities as fire, flood, war, earthquake, or epidemic may be relieved without fear of pauperizing the unfortunates.

Again, *if only the lesser part of a particular kind of distress can be relieved,* the prospect of relief will not tend to augment the volume of such distress. Thus well-guarded accident or sickness insurance need not increase the number of cases of accident or sickness. Free medical clinics or hospitals or dispensaries will not cause people to neglect their health, although they may slacken their efforts to lay by sums to provide medical attendance.

The more the relief of the destitute and the pardon of the wrongdoer *are discriminating and based on a knowledge of merit in the individual case,* the less will such action be presumed on by the unworthy. Carried away by their discovery that help and mercy, by being reckoned on encourage idleness and crime, the early social scientists seemed to bring under suspicion all charity and pity beyond one's own circle. We now deem it safe to give rein to these nobler impulses provided that their action waits on thorough investigation. Wise relief or leniency implies not only discrimination, but discrimination based on a sound principle. This principle is that *anti-social types of conduct and character should not be encouraged.* In the administration of an old-age pension system the problem must be faced whether pensions shall be granted to habitual drinkers and persons who have gained their livelihood by vice, such as gamblers, tipsters, liquor dealers, panderers, and streetwalkers.

It is now clear that good things made gratuitous do not pauperize. Getting "something for nothing" does not pauperize. Only

those gifts pauperize *which, being anticipated, encourage undesirable types of behavior and character.* Free schools and universities, free lectures and libraries, free museums and art galleries, free social centers and churches, free entertainments and band concerts, free playgrounds, athletic fields, swimming-pools, and baths do not pauperize, seeing that they make people stronger and better and wiser, not more lazy, self-indulgent, or vicious.

The pioneers in social science also went too far in condemning mercy. A discriminating treatment of offenders is justifiable. The probation of first offenders holds no cheer for the professional criminal. The parole of convicts who have "made good" does not encourage lawbreaking. Substituting reformatory for penal institution does not lower the hedge against crime; for if there is one thing the evil-disposed regard with horror it is reformation, especially after they learn of the regimen by which reformation is brought about.

Publicity feeds anticipation; hence *we should shun publicity for things we do not wish people to anticipate.* Pardon, save of those exonerated, should be kept quiet, mercy should work under cover, charity should be furtive. "When thou doest alms, let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth." The secret help that passes between kinsfolk, friends, comrades, neighbors, fellow-workers, and fellow-members of the same church or lodge or union does little harm. On the other hand, endowments or fixed funds or special taxes set aside for the relief of the poor, because they become well known, are more likely to breed poverty than the fluctuating relief flowing from the current contributions of the charitable.

We should court publicity for things we wish people to anticipate—rewards or benefits held forth for desirable kinds of conduct or character. There cannot well be too much publicity for conditions of security of life and property, protection of contracts, low taxes, bounties, tax exemptions, military or civil pensions, thrift agencies, government aid to industry, honorary titles, scholarships, hero medals, and monuments or honors to public men.

Thanks to anticipation *social reform* is so much superior to *charity* in dealing with widespread or chronic misery. Think of the competition which determines the distribution of income in society as a race in which all who run receive, according to their speed

and endurance, prizes varying in value from a trifle to a fortune. *Charity* now comes in to relieve the distress of those who from lameness, or having stumbled, or being tripped, are unable to win even the trifle. But since running is not easy and the petty prizes for the slowest runners leave them worse off than those succored by charity, many resort to the trick of stumbling or giving up when they are really able to run. And the more *charity* does, the more malingerers there are.

Altogether different are the methods of *social reform*. It removes from the course the stones and pitfalls by which runners are thrown down. It punishes tricky runners who trip up or "spike" those who are just ahead of them and in their way. By a little forethought it greatly lessens the number of halt and ailing who cannot even enter the race. By providing all with a little instruction and training in the art of breathing, running, taking hurdles, etc., the number of those who can manage their feet well is greatly increased. Then, since there is much that is arbitrary in the relative magnitude of the prizes for swiftness, *social reform* aims to cut down the big prizes and add to the size of the prizes for ordinary running. Since it notices among the great throng of competitors some who without exertion are able to capture fine prizes in motorcycles or automobiles won in some previous race or left them by their fathers, it endeavors to handicap these contestants in the interest of those who rely on their legs.

To be sure, this image is faulty in that the running does not create the prize, while in the real world there would be no prizes were there no running. But for the purpose of contrasting the methods of *charity* and *social reform* the image is fair enough. *Charity* in caring for the crippled or unlucky unwittingly tempts others to drop out of the race. *Social reform* fits more persons to run, shows them how to develop their speed, clears their course, encourages the slow with bigger prizes, and altogether incites a much larger proportion to get into the race and do their best.

CHAPTER XLIV

INDIVIDUALIZATION

As little societies coalesce, as tribal and local cultures wither and die owing to the spread of a general culture, as men organize and more departments of human life are regulated, *there is less play for individuality*. More and more, human beings are lumped together, their differences being ignored. Tasks, manners, morals, laws, policies are fitted not to the *individual,* but to the *average*. Since most men are *un*-average most men experience discomfort under the social régime; as if all had to wear clothes of the same cut!

The factory lock-steps the workers. In handicraft industry the artisan works in his own shop at his own pace, beginning and ending the day to suit himself. When he feels like it, he can knock off a bit to stretch himself or smoke a pipe. To-day he may be up with the lark in order to quit early; to-morrow he may sleep late and make up for it by working into the night. Factory industry, however, subjects its workers to an *impersonal* régime. The speed of the machine regulates the pace of work. Length of the working day, time of beginning and ending, rests, holidays—all are accommodated to the average workman or else to the stronger. Labor under such circumstances will be more irksome than an equal amount of go-as-you-please labor. Since this is so and since machine production is here to stay, the machine tender's workday should be short in order that he may individualize himself along cultural lines.

The machine produces for the average, not for the individual. In olden days the carpenter made a chest for the silversmith, the silversmith made a cup for the carpenter; and they wrought in sympathy. Knowledge of human necessities and consciousness of human good-will entered into their work and thus men were linked together. But to-day the factory operative makes only a bit of a thing and has no thoughts about the man who will use it; while this thing is not made for this or that person

but for "the public." If you are suited by one of the types turned out by the machine, good; if not, it is impossible to obtain the kind of thing you really want.

Machine-made drama. When the art economy was dominant the people acted their own "mystery" plays in the churches. Each parish chose its "mystery," the parts were assigned to the best actors in the parish, and the representation was the result of the creative personal effort of the community. Oberammergau has long harbored a drama of this kind. Nowadays, when the machine economy is dominant, a motion-picture syndicate decides what shall be filmed. Each film must be suited to the average audience, for it will be shown all over the country. The local manager has no option as to the films he shall present in his theater. The films are dispatched from one town to another in their strict turn and an exception made for one town would derange the whole centralized distribution. Hence, photo-plays fall into a few well-marked types and rarely can you detect in them the personality of the maker. No wonder most of them die within a few months!

The army machine. The military régime overlooks personal *differentiæ;* since in warfare joint action triumphs over individual action, the tyranny of the average is well-nigh complete. Little consideration is given to the exceptional man, to the flow and ebb of energy and feeling in the individual. Barracks and camp are the places of sacrifice of myriads of innocent personal desires. Compare the pleasure from a beautiful stroll with that from marching with a platoon over the same route! The chief points in the soldier's day are fixed, his chief activities standardized. His golden moments are when "on leave" he can slip off his irksome harness and indulge in self-prompted actions.

The governmental machine. An imperial government, being without check from its subjects, ignores or overrides regional and national peculiarities. The later Roman Empire bore cruelly on the hearts and lives of men. In the words of Cooley: "A centralized bureaucratic structure left the individual and the local group no sphere of self-reliant development. Public spirit and political leadership were suppressed, and the habit of organized self-expression died out, leaving the people without group vitality and as helpless as children." [1]

[1] *Social Organization,* p. 114.

The present government of India, although, on the whole, conscientious and well-intentioned, is felt by the more sensitive natives to be alien and soulless. Eloquently the Indian poet Tagore characterizes it as "untouched by human hand" and likens it to "a hydraulic press whose pressure is impersonal and on that account effective." It is "a mere abstract force in which the whole population of a distant country has lost its human personality." The subjects feel themselves bound by "iron chains of organization which are the most relentless and unbreakable that have ever been manufactured in the whole history of man." The perfection of its espionage and intelligence service appals one. Its "tireless vigilance, being the vigilance of a machine, has not the human power to overlook or to discriminate. At the least pressing of its button the monster organization becomes all eyes whose ugly stare of inquisitiveness cannot be avoided by a single person among the immense multitude of the ruled. At the least turn of its screw, by the fraction of an inch, the grip is tightened to the point of suffocation around every man, woman, and child of a vast population."

The ecclesiastical machine. The religious bigot, eager to crush all other forms of religion in order that his own may prevail, is a prey of the lumping fallacy. Individuals differ in their demands on religion. They will be happier if they may choose freely among types, which are unlike in emphasis on thought and emotion, on dogma and rite. According to the pragmatist William James, "Ideas (which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true just in so far as they help us get into satisfactory relations with other parts of our experience." Such a view calls for diversity in religious beliefs and rites.

The educational machine. Arch-sinner against human unlikeness has been the educator. One would suppose that from the beginning teachers adapted mental pabulum to immature minds. Yet for thousands of years the content of children's education was the religious and literary classics. The idea of starting the child with simple matter suited to its comprehension is scarcely three centuries old! In *religious* instruction the idea of graded material has hardly even yet won the day. Again, the rigid *curriculum of study* has been a Moloch to which millions of personal tastes and needs have been ruthlessly sacrificed. Another insatiate idol is the *examination system*. Some intellects of

superior quality cannot "deliver" under this system. In excusing his little daughter to her teacher William James remarked, "No James ever could pass an examination."

In the little ungraded school the child progresses according to its capacity. Then a system grows up which impounds the child with thirty-four others in a class the pace of which is adapted to the powers of the average member. All thirty-five move in lock-step. The bright children are bored and demoralized; the dull learn next to nothing. No one would insist that they should all wear clothes of the same size; yet we lace them in an educational strait-jacket because our eyes fail to tell us of the grotesque misfits which result!

The machine of charitable relief. In dealing with the poor the besetting vice is *lumping them.* One social philosopher looks upon them simply as "the unfit." Another regards them as "the unadapted." To a third they are "by-products of our industrial system." To a fourth they are "victims of social injustice." Thrift, temperance, godliness, hygiene, education, single tax on land values, communism—each has been put forward as a sure cure for poverty! A hundred schemes have been broached for relieving the poor by wholesale treatment; but close acquaintance with them discloses a great variety of types and causes. No social worker expects poverty to disappear save by the coöperation of many agencies and policies. The only method followed in modern charity is the "case" method. Just as nostrums have been discredited and no physician thinks of treating disease save after study and diagnosis of the individual patient (case method), so the social worker insists on full knowledge of the case and adapts his form of help to that particular family.

The machine of criminal justice. At one time impersonal treatment of the wrong-doer seems very splendid. Let officials act "without fear or favor." We praise the editor who is impersonal in printing the news, who publishes impartially the disgrace of his best friend, the triumph of his worst enemy. We call for a clergyman who shall be "no respecter of persons." He must denounce the misconduct of his trustee or "pillar" as he denounces that of his humblest parishioner. The bandage over the eyes of Justice symbolizes that Justice knows not whether the suitor is lord or hind.

Out of this horror of partiality comes, however, "the classical

school of criminology" which will have offenders dealt with *impersonally.*

The eighteenth century reformers assumed that each law breaker is 100% morally responsible. It follows, then, that all who have committed the same offense are equally guilty and should receive like treatment. Punishment is to be meted out not according to the nature of the *offender* but according to the nature of his *offense.* Hence, the legislator attaches a fitting penalty to each type of crime and the sole duty of the court is to ascertain whether or not the accused has broken the law. This system does away, to be sure, with the old-time arbitrary judge, harsh or lenient according to the social importance of the culprit before him. But in order to get rid of this intrusive personal element, there is created a machine which grinds up alike the young and the hardened, the simple and the cunning, the chance offender and the professional.

Little by little the administration of Justice has been humanized by admitting exceptions and making discriminations. Is the offender of sound mind? Was he in full possession of his faculties? Were there extenuating circumstances? Was there great provocation? Is it his first offense or is he a repeater? Finally the idea that what is being punished is not a *deed* but a *man* triumphs and we have the modern school of criminology, which likens sentencing an offender to prison for a fixed term to prescribing so many weeks in the hospital for a sick man!

The misery of being lumped with the unlike. On the exceptional lumping imposes the pain of misfit. Too much of it produces a chronic distress like that of wearing clothes that "bind," sleeping on a slope, walking on soles of differing thickness or rowing with oars of unequal lengths. In those who are brought up under the lumping system, *e.g.,* the inmates of the old-fashioned orphan asylum, personality is stunted and they go through life less eager and reactive than they should be.

Individualizing education. If we are not to become automatons as more of life is standardized, school children will be grouped according to gifts and the class for teaching will comprise those with about the same natural mental gait. Class work may be individualized by encouraging the child on each topic the class takes up to do an amount of work corresponding to its powers; or classes may disappear and all instruction become

individual as under the Winnetka and Dalton plans. Promotion, instead of being confined to certain times, will occur whenever the child is ready for it. Mere passive absorption by the pupils will content no teacher; they will be stimulated to react. In the high school no single text will be swallowed whole, the pupil will do outside reading and compare viewpoints. In college the rigid curriculum will give place to the free choice of studies under advice, while the lecture will be relegated to a subordinate place.

Individualizing social work. In the care of dependents, the orphanage gives way to the placing-out system. The indiscriminate doling out of supplies to needy people becomes anathema. The maxim "not alms but a friend" strikes the true note. Promiscuous almsgiving comes to be thought of not as God-pleasing but as God-offending. Each poor family is held to present a problem by itself. For certain kinds of dependents guarded outdoor relief is more individualizing and humane than institutional care. By sorting out from it the children, the sick, the feeble-minded, the insane and the vagrant, the almshouse from being a dumping ground for the refuse of humanity becomes a home for the aged and respectable poor. The hazards along the path of the normal industrial worker are met not by charity but by social insurance against accident, ill health, disability and old-age. Thus the bulk of the population can be assured independence and self-respect.

Individualizing criminal justice. Lumping survives in the "jail bird" stigma which bars the discharged prisoner from honest employment, in the confusion of "political" with "common" offenders, in the treatment of "conscientious objectors" as if they were vulgar recalcitrants, in uniform treatment of types so distinct as the "born" criminal, the "habitual" criminal, and the "occasional" criminal. Individualization calls for the recognition of nervous disorders, passion, suggestion, and obsession as limiting responsibility in the sane; for the application of the suspended sentence with probation, and the indeterminate sentence; for the establishment of the juvenile court and the detention home for juvenile offenders; for the differentiation of work house from jail and prison; for the restricted use of the prison stripe; and for the treatment of convicts as so many human individuals.

Individualizing government. Government passes from arbitrary discriminations hinging on birth, sex, income, creed, nationality, or race through a period of "democratic," non-discrimi-

nating treatment to fresh discriminations based on significant differences. "One man one vote" looks good until it is discovered that 2½ per cent. of our draft registrants are weak-minded; if not "up to" soldiering, they are surely not "up to" voting. After local negro domination has done its worst negro suffrage is qualified by a literacy requirement. After the "open door" has filled this country with people who look upon it as a "polyglot boarding house" we apply the reading test to immigrants. We cease to lump children with adults; we bar them from the factory and send them to school. Working women are given a protection which does not extend to men workers. If a class is not able to protect itself against another class and there is a public interest involved, the courts deem a law on its behalf not "class legislation" but "reasonable classification." By this means that stiff plane, "freedom of contract," has been bent in a dozen places.

Instead of multiplying laws the detailed regulation of industry is effected by means of the easily-modified orders of a state industrial commission. Exemptions are granted that a statute would never allow and special orders are issued to take care of peculiar cases. Marriage, once an indefeasible right of the unwedded adult, is denied to certain classes of defectives. Instead of the old genial assumption that any citizen is fit for any post, the law creating a board provides that the members shall be engineers, physicians, psychiatrists, economists, social workers, accountants, employers, merchants, practical farmers, etc., according to the nature of the work to be done.

Individualizing industry. The wiser employers are not lumping their workfolk; individuals are studied in order to land them in the jobs they are best fitted for. Physical examination at hiring helps to a more intelligent dealing with the employee. A watchful nurse and a doctor look after the ailing. A well-handled "suggestion box" draws out of the force a surprising number of valuable ideas. The prompt and fitting recognition of unusual individual service or merit improves morale. A brass plate bearing the engine-driver's name is affixed to the locomotive. The highway commission puts up a sign on each stretch of state road showing who patrols it. In a business house the name of the man at the wicket is shown by a bronze marker. In some establishments each man's performance is studied and if it falls off unaccountably investigation is set afoot to locate the source of the trouble. Em-

ployees are not poisoned trying to digest their grievances, for a bureau will look into every man's complaint and get him justice. Instead of "firing" a workman at the instance of a single foreman, he is tried out in different departments until he fits in or proves hopeless.

Most lumping can be dispensed with. In general, lumping reflects either heartlessness or ignorance and stupidity. In military empires there is tender consideration for the interests and feelings of the members of the privileged class but ruthless iron uniformity for the despised masses. In green democracies uniform treatment prevails, not from heartlessness but because the past has made every form of discrimination hateful. In time, however, it is seen that equal treatment of unequals is crying injustice. As the odious old classifications are forgotten men dare to make new rational classifications based on need, service or social value. The finer these classifications, the less is the sacrifice to the average.

Individualization results in greater freedom and happiness. A sociologist of long experience in Hawaii visited a certain rural district in Japan from which many of the Hawaiian Japanese had come. After meeting the uncles and aunts of those he had known in Hawaii he observes:

> The mannerisms of the old country villagers seemed to an American to show a constraint not characteristic of the Hawaiian Japanese. There was less self-assertiveness, less expression of individuality. Their faces, especially those of girls, were less expressive. It seemed that the numerous little muscles about the eyes and the mouth that have to do with facial expression were relatively undeveloped from lack of use. These were the impressions one had from people in the mass and they were confirmed by a comparison of cousins. Under the freer conditions of Hawaiian life where personal incentives are more adequate and where there is a decided tendency toward a more individualistic outlook on life there has been a modification of mannerisms and facial expression in a direction that may be called American.[2]
>
> From a certain district in Japan about six thousand people or one tenth of the population came to Hawaii. Including their Hawaiian-born children a third as many have returned to their old home villages. . . . Most of the returned men who were interviewed seemed to be more or less disappointed and they expressed regret that they were not living in Hawaii. . . . Some

[2] Romanzo Adams, *Interracial Marriage in Hawaii*, 1937, p. 256.

spoke of their preference for the freer life of Hawaii. To them the Japanese forms of social intercourse had become burdensome. The returned Filipinos have had a similar experience. . . . For the most part they were disappointed with their old home villages.[3]

[3] Romanzo Adams, *Interracial Marriage in Hawaii*, 1937, p. 259.

PART VIII

OCCUPATION AND SOCIAL FUNCTION

CHAPTER

XLV. Society and the Occupations

XLVI. Commercialization

XLVII. Professionalization

CHAPTER XLV

SOCIETY AND THE OCCUPATIONS[1]

Unlike the churchman who considers occupation in relation to the saving of one's soul or the economist who considers it as source of one's livelihood, the sociologist inquires into the bearing of an occupation upon the welfare of society. A century ago, Comte, the founder of sociology, set up the sound principle:

> Every person who lives by any useful work should be habituated to regard himself not as an individual working for his own private benefit, but as a public functionary working for the benefit of society; and to regard his wages of whatever sort as a provision made by society to enable him to carry on his labor.

The gratifying spread of this view in the last fifty years gives ground for hoping that ere long it will be generally accepted. Our success in training ordinary citizens into soldiers ready to face any risk justifies us in looking forward to a time when most workers by hand or brain will be alive to the social significance of their work.

Occupations from the social point of view.[2] In offering for sale certain specialized services the motive is gain and the welfare of society may be little heeded; but in the degree that

[1] Not all of us carry on an occupation. Deducting youth, the aged, and the infirm, three-fifths of us remain as employable and of these one-third are housewives, who are not pursuing a gainful occupation. So two-fifths of us earn livelihoods and maintain social status for the rest.

[2] Before there were sociologists some religious leaders took the position that occupations should be regarded critically, and their effects upon one's own character and upon the welfare and character of others taken into account. The words "calling" and "vocation" originated in the doctrine that God "calls" one to this or that "sphere of usefulness."

"Recent studies of Protestantism as a force in the evolution of Capitalism show that it invested lay economic activity with new spiritual values; in providing the secular striving for monetary return with a substratum of meaning and dignity, it released human beings from the oppressive isolation into which they were sinking when the old guild system was being replaced by competitive Capitalism." *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. XI, p. 425.

a social consciousness develops the public reacts against callings of a dubious nature. The sociologist calls attention to repercussions which injure the consuming public, mar the future, or sap the foundations of the social edifice. For example, those who take the *private* view of business uphold the right of the vicious to buy whatever ministers to their vice; those who take the *public* view point out that vice caterers are always scheming and conspiring to draw the innocent into the coils of vice in order to keep their business brisk!

With every advance in the common endeavor to wipe out preventable incapacity and misery the case becomes stronger against tolerating occupations or businesses known to undermine health, efficiency, or character, discourage diligence, dissipate savings, or impair the will and power to safeguard the future. Stupid, indeed, would society be not to suppress lotteries, gambling resorts, betting rings, houses of prostitution, opium dens and the vending of narcotics and obscene matter; for each of these, by its wiles to attract customers, becomes an active center of infection and adds to society's burdens. Means of indulging in vice known and available only to addicts are a different matter.

For the sake of the future the socially-minded strike at the premature employment of children in industry, the sacrifice of the child's school opportunities for a pittance, the enticement of the young with habit-forming drugs, the traffic in children for immoral purposes, the mutilating of waif or stolen children for begging purposes, the employment of young women at work which impairs their maternal function, the cultivating of slopes too steep for permanent agriculture, devastative timber-cutting, the ruthless taking of fish and game, the wanton extirpation of birds. For in such matters a *laissez-faire* attitude on the part of society is suicidal. The progress made in the last forty years in winning Americans to these ideas constitutes a veritable social revolution. Nevertheless, as a result of business commanding the chief avenues to the public mind, the feeling is still widespread that to disturb a business man making money is as foolish as to disturb bees making wax. We have not yet got far in shielding children from the inflaming picture show, in saving the reading matter in periodicals from being streaked with "publicity," in protecting our privacy from the "cheeky" intrusions of "go-getters" and "super-salesmen," in hushing the ear-splitting din of

ten thousand advertisers, or in puncturing capitalist propaganda that it is folly for a community to provide itself with a public utility rather than let itself in for perpetual tribute (in the form of profits) to some business group.

Social rating of occupations. The current estimate of an occupation depends on: its money reward; grade of intelligence and education called for; characteristics, whether clean or dirty, manual or mental, directing or obeying; health conditions; opportunity for advancement; and services to society.

Among us the money reward of occupations has been overemphasized; our young people have been subjected to an elaborate, unremitting propaganda designed to exalt and glorify big profit-makers. In tests of the social status of forty-five occupations [3] American children ranked "banker" first and "ditch-digger" last. Similar tests on 72 Russian children from twelve to seventeen years of age ranked "peasant" first and "banker" among the lowest. The clergyman ranked fourth with the young Americans (306 high school seniors and 62 college freshmen) but last with the young Russians. The "prosperous business man" stood sixth in the American list and forty-fourth in the Russian list.

A study [4] of the pre-vocational attitudes of 861 students in six colleges of the University of Southern California shows that most are willing to accept *teacher, doctor,* and *lawyer* into their church or club, even into the family. The greatest aversion is toward *dope seller, bootlegger, hobo,* and *fortune teller.* Nearly all are willing to accept *day laborer, factory worker, servant* and *waiter* as fellow citizens but few stand ready to accept them into one's club or family. Towards the *farmer* there is little sense of social distance. The feeling toward *dance-hall keeper, jazz musician, vaudeville dancer,* and *player* varies with the student group, suggesting that the place of these is not settled in the *mores* or is undergoing rapid change. The antipathy to the socially-harmful groups indicates that many students are rating occupations from the social viewpoint.

A recent survey in Waushara County, Wisconsin, in which

[3] Jerome Davis, "Testing the Social Attitudes of Children in the Government Schools of Russia," *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. XXXII, pp. 947-52.

[4] F. Wilkinson, "Social Distance between Occupations," *Sociology and Social Research,* January-February, 1929.

2,123 schedules were filled out by rural young people is revealing.

Indications on a "desired occupation" check list show that 17 per cent of the young people prefer farming; 12 per cent teaching and homemaking; 11 per cent trucking; 10 per cent mechanics; 9 per cent each forestry, stenography, and clerical work; 7 per cent nursing; 6 per cent beauty culture; 5 per cent aviation; and less than 5 per cent each of all other occupations. The girls' preferences run to teaching, homemaking, stenography, clerical work, nursing, and beauty culture. The choices of young people in villages run to mechanics, stenography, forest service, clerical work, and nursing. Only a few village young people prefer to farm.[5]

Occupational pride. Tolstoi uttered the profound truth:[6]

Every person, to act, must consider his or her activity to be important and good. Consequently, whatever the position of a man may be, he cannot help but form such a view of human life in general as will make his activity appear important and good.

This is why the farmer consoles himself for his meager rewards by reflecting that but for him the cities would starve. The patrolman flatters himself that no one could sleep soundly but for him. Coal miners see the limits of their job "up there where factories would stop and children would freeze unless we sent 'em coal." The secretary of a Hoboes' Union exclaims, "The country can't get along without us! If we don't hop from the Northwest timber camp in the winter to the Oklahoma wheat fields in the summer—and get there on time, mind you—w'y crops go to waste and millions of dollars are lost."[7] The clergyman likes to assume the rôle of "God's ambassador." Unappreciated school-teachers find comfort in the proverb, "Just as the twig is bent, the tree's inclined." Even the "madam" finds solace in the thought that but for houses of prostitution "nice women" would hardly dare venture out of doors!

Warping by occupation. Many occupations leave an enduring stamp. Accustomed to make sweeping claims which their hearers are not in a position to challenge, clergymen assume an

[5] E. L. Kirkpatrick and Agnes M. Boynton, "Rural Young People Face Their Own Situation," in *Rural Sociology*, vol. I, No. 2, June, 1936, p. 161.

[6] *Resurrection*, Chap. XLIV.

[7] Whiting, Williams, *Mainsprings of Men*, p. 67.

authoritative, "ordering-forbidding" manner. Teachers of the young are likely to betray themselves by the naïve finality of their statements. The professional charity-worker, usually of middle-class origin and without first-hand acquaintance with the mental processes of the working classes, slips easily into the attitude that most applicants for relief are frauds and should be made to "run the gauntlet" of her chilling manner and rough questioning.

The attorney lauds the costly contentious procedure of the law court as the ideal way of arriving at the truth. Among doctors there is an element claiming, as it were a "vested interest" in disease, which distrusts public-health promotion and socialized medicine lest not enough disease survive to afford doctors a livelihood! Medical ethics, and particularly medical etiquette, strikes shrewd outsiders as cloaks to hide the doctor's blindness from the public and protect his fees.

The training of army and navy officers, like that of theological students, seems designed to *tie* the mind. Only rarely does the thought of either the soldier or the priest travel much beyond the prescribed range. The typical military man shows small respect for human dignity, troubles himself little over the hardships and cruelties heaped upon recruits, and exacts of those under him the same unquestioning obedience he mechanically yields his superior officers.

Not a few newspaper men who started with sentiments of common decency eventually come to behave as if private individuals exist for no other end than to have private affairs which may be blazoned on the front page in such a way as to woo a cloudburst of coppers from the curious public.

Such biases lessen the effectiveness of specialists and blind them to the social meaning of their work. In craftsmen and tradesmen the warping by occupation may be forestalled by a good general education. For the practitioners of the professions the remedy is the requirement of a broad liberal education before one embarks upon the training for his profession; also a steady fire of competent outside criticism of their practices.

Heroes of success. The business man is engaged in organizing the production of goods and services and getting them to the public. His recompense naturally comes in the form of money and his money is "clean" if he makes it in compliance with the

rules and expectations pertaining to his kind of business. Since more ability is presumed to be required to build up a large-scale business than to build up a small-scale business, there is no great harm in making the size of his fortune a large factor in rating socially the business man.

But how ridiculous it is to apply this measuring rod to other types of achievement! The glory of the surgeon is in establishing a new, difficult, needed operation; of the bacteriologist in finding the serum that stays a malignant disease; of the plant-breeder in creating more luscious varieties of fruits; of the architect in planning the Adelante Building, or the Church of the Ascension; of the engineer in creating a Niagara of power by capturing and harnessing the mountain waters up among the clouds; of the aviator in a new record non-stop flight; of the philanthropist in founding a great social settlement or inventing a better way of teaching the deaf; of the missionary in making the spirit of the Gospel to prevail in new places. Who now asks how much money Homer made out of the *Iliad?* Shakespeare out of *Midsummer Night's Dream?* Shelley out of *Queen Mab?* Harvey out of his discovery of the circulation of the blood? Jenner out of his vaccination against small-pox? Pasteur out of his proof of the germ origin of infectious diseases?

There is no surer sign that current American civilization is green than our habit of applying business touchstones of success *in situations where they ought not to be applied.* Only time will tell whether our big outstanding tone-giving business men can be persuaded to turn their backs on Mammonistic yardsticks and to apply to themselves and to their brethren more worthy, social, and satisfying standards of success.

CHAPTER XLVI

COMMERCIALIZATION

Commercialization is the subjection of an occupation to the profits motive. This implies the overriding of the various motives which tend to hold the profits motive in check, such as:

1. Pleasure in creative activity
2. Pride in the perfection of one's product
3. Accepted standards of technical excellence which forbid the putting forth of a ware or a service which falls below a certain degree of merit
4. Abhorrence of sham or humbug in one's work. Desire to render loyal service, to market genuine goods
5. Solicitude for the welfare of the customer or patron, prompting one to refuse to supply him with that which will in the end disappoint, defraud, or harm him
6. Viewing one's work as a service to society.

Causes of commercialization. Now the notable encroachment of the profits motive on these other motives in our time is due not to the weakening of these motives so much as to certain changes which have occurred in our economic relations.

The greater social distance between producer and consumer. Less often is the user of one's ware a known person to whom one feels a sense of responsibility. One's product passes out into that vague mass, the "public," and is lost to view. Hence, the baker who kneads "chalk and alum and plaster" into his loaf may be no miscreant, after all, for he cannot know just who will eat that loaf or what gripe it will give him. Only a villain would fit out a customer with a life preserver filled with sawdust instead of cork; but the manufacturers who were found to be equipping excursion steamers with these spurious "life preservers" may have been far from moral monsters. They were supplying their treacherous wares not to concrete men and women, but to "the market."

The corporate form of business organization thrusts apart producers and consumers. The stockholders on whose behalf iniquity

is done do not consciously will it. It is not their wish that children should be worn out for them, or workmen maimed in avoidable industrial accidents, or consumers defrauded, or the public taste corrupted. They instigate such crimes only because they know not what they do when they clamor for dividends. What is reflected in the conduct of the business is their avarice, not their conscience or good will.

Not only does incorporation take personal responsibility out of business relations, but every year sees more savings banks, trust companies and insurance companies come between industrial concerns and those who provide them with capital. This makes it still more difficult for the conscience of the latter to influence the management.

Nevertheless, when a corporation becomes so large that it fills a place in the public eye, it may develop a sense of responsibility of its own. Its volume of output is so great that its products must be well spoken of everywhere. Hence, it strives for excellence in all its goods and acts on the maxim, "the satisfied customer is the best advertisement." Owing to its conspicuousness it is sensitive to public opinion. It feels obliged to have a reputation so good that it can draw into its service men of the highest character. Its labor policy is so well-known among workingmen that, if it acquires a bad name, it will be unable to attract labor of the best grade. Therefore, some great corporations take the lead not only in square-dealing with the customer, but in looking after the safety, health, and welfare of their employees.

The growing differentiation between principals and subordinates. In large concerns the men at the top may adopt greedy policies which they well know cannot be carried out without deceit or corruption. They would not stoop to such dirty work themselves, but they make others do it for them. They require their underlings to get "results," but shut their eyes to the crooked means by which alone the "results" they insist on may be obtained. The veins of business like the veins of the body have valves, their purpose being to check the return flow to the principals of knowledge of the odious practices and the blistering tirades to which the policies they insist on give rise. Safe behind their cordon of underlings they incite to crimes which they lack the nerve to commit in the open.

The increasing prominence of capital in the practice of an art or profession tends to subordinate artistic or professional conscience to profit. This is illustrated in the commercialization of the stage. As the theater-going public becomes accustomed to more sumptuous and costly stage effects, the actor-manager gives way to the capitalist-manager. The actor-manager is dominated by the idea of "elevating the stage," of making the drama a great and uplifting social force. His master-dream is to present Shakespeare, and "Shakespeare spells ruin." Great actors like Booth and Irving pass their lives either as "stars" accumulating a fortune, or as managers squandering it in giving the public drama finer than it is willing to pay for. But, with the greater costliness of theatrical production, the capitalist-manager comes to the fore, while the successful actor, even the greatest, remains throughout his career an employee. Generally this type of producer tries to see not how *high* one dare go, but how *low* one dare go. Ideals and social aims are contemptuously kicked aside. The only question is, "What will the Public like?" This is answered frequently by a vulgar avaricious man who has no comprehension of what the public will like *in the long run* and no idea that the taste of the public admits of being educated *upward* as well as *downward.*

The "corporation collar." When a lawyer sits in his office and cases are brought to him, he can choose which to undertake. But a large business, finding itself in need of a continuous supply of legal services, retains a lawyer to look after its interests in all its cases. Such a relation saps his moral independence, for, even if his client's cause is unjust, he is obliged to stand for it under penalty of losing his employment. He may be required to defend all suits brought by injured workmen or for violation of the child-labor laws, and to prosecute malicious eviction suits against striking tenants of company houses. Thus the practice of law becomes a mere tool of business and the lawyer's work is cut out for him by the business man.

The profits motive in art. It is said that half or more of the statuary made in the United States is not carved by the man who signs it. Sculptors of reputation sign the product of young unknown men, reaping for themselves the proceeds and the honor. "Monument associations" interpose themselves between sculptor and public. They have agents in the field soliciting contributions for the erection of a statue for some famous man or event. An

open competition will be announced, with a prize for the best model submitted, but the association sees to it that the prize goes to the model submitted by some young sculptor in its employ.

The commercialization of amusement and recreation. Formerly young folks' fun was not catered, but was self-made, home-made, church-made, or school-made. In the home there was the inevitable chaperonage of the old folks amiably looking on. Entertainments held in the school-house ordinarily were supervised by the teacher and, in any case, the school trustees were in the background as board of censors. Other social gatherings were sponsored by the church, or by some daughter organization. Now, the taste for amateur amusements is dying out. Thanks to good roads and automobiles, the country young people are turning from their home-bred fun to the professional amusement-makers to be enjoyed in the town. Since the art of entertainment has become specialized, the church no longer exercises in matters of recreation the initiative she once had. Less and less is she able to compete with the regular places of amusement, while her ban on dancing and theater-going has become a dead-letter.

In a word, as never before, recreation is being supplied *for money*. The danger of this is that commercial recreation tends to become a means for the economic and moral exploitation of the young. It is in the nature of play and amusement to lift or to lower. When catered and without regulation they lower, because more money can be extracted from young people by offering them the high-flavored, the *risqué,* the sensational, than by offering them the pure and elevating. If the individual amusement-caterer is restrained by scruples, he is likely to be forced out of business by a less scrupulous or unscrupulous rival.

Some benefit, no doubt, is to be had from the *regulation* of commercial amusement, *e.g.,* the censoring of shows and motion films and the supervision of public dance halls. The only policy, however, which holds out much promise is *the communal provision of recreation.* This is why, of late, there has been a wonderful expansion of the facilities provided by institutional churches, the Young Men's Christian Association, the Young Women's Christian Association, the social settlements, the social centers, the recreation centers, the public playgrounds, and the public libraries. Society *will not* consent to abandon this field to Mammon!

Sundry commercializations. The conversion of the old-time sociable tavern into the "saloon" bent on selling the customer the most intoxicants in the least time, evoked the unsuccessful endeavor to destroy by law all traffic in alcoholic beverages. The development of the purveyance of sexual gratification into a huge "protected" business yielding vast sums to property owners, "madams" and local politicians, in which the unfortunate prostitutes are hapless victims of conscienceless exploitation, explains the increasing hostility to "red light" districts on the part of American municipalities. Knowledge of the cunning propaganda for emigration maintained among simple-minded East-European peasants by steamship companies had much to do with our restricting European immigration. Revelations of the sly, sinister rôle of munition rings and battleship builders in subsidizing "professional patriots" and "national defense" societies to start war scares, stir up armament rivalry and torpedo efforts for international arms agreements, inspire the demand that the major means of national defense be provided in government navy yards and munition plants.

The degradation of the newspaper. In newspaper publishing the capital factor gains constantly on the service factor; less and less is the editor-owner able to hire the capital he needs, while more and more the owner is a capitalist who hires the editors he needs. The capitalist-owner is likely to run the newspaper as a pure "business proposition," *i.e.*, as he would run a theater or hotel; rarely does he see it as a great social instrumentality. Furthermore, the newspaper is peculiar in that it unites two services altogether different—the purveyance of news and opinions and the sale of publicity in the form of advertising. The former is a responsible public service, the latter the marketing of a ware. Now, constantly the revenue from advertising grows, while that from readers and subscribers dwindles. Between 1880 and 1915 the receipts from advertising rose from 44 per cent, to 67 per cent. It is safe to say that at present their advertisers yield American newspapers three times as much financial support as their readers, perhaps *four times* as much. Many of the big city dailies get 85 to 90 per cent of their revenues from their advertisers and let them have three-fourths of the space. Advertisers exercise an increasing censorship over the news and editorial columns of the newspapers, a censorship that is secret, of course,

for the journal known to be controlled loses readers and therewith its value to the advertisers. The newspaper makes a fine gesture of defying the individual advertiser who attempts to control space he has not paid for; but with rare exceptions newspapers glorify the element which buys advertising space, viz., the business men.

Business men the most indulged and spoiled element in American society. The clandestine prostitution of the great bulk of the newspapers to advertisers is the secret of the astounding domination the business class have gradually gained over us, a domination which arrests the attention of every philosophic foreigner on his first visit to the United States. This is why the grasping aggressive section of the business class almost always have their way whenever their wishes clash with those of the farmers, the wage earners or the professions. This is why here as nowhere else in the civilized world religion, philanthropy, education, literature, politics, and legislation bear the stamp of the motives, biases, and limitations of the commercial mind.

Here are some indications:

A national relief society which has not the funds to allot more than 2¢ a meal to some families rejects donations of fruit and vegetables from California, refuses to give addresses of starving farmers or unemployed to individuals who wish to contribute directly, and, instead of buying food in carload lots and distributing it to the distressed, give them orders on local food dealers, so that from ten to twenty per cent of the relief goes as mercantile profit.

An advertising journal announces with satisfaction that in a certain city the relief for the families of the unemployed, instead of being furnished in bulk quantities at low cost, will be in the form of orders for food in cans or glass jars or any other well-advertised and expensively distributed form.

An Eastern college professor in an address to school teachers in a California town said that the times were such as to call for consumers developing a degree of sales resistance. On the following day the superintendent of the schools was required to spend his time placating irate local shop-keepers and Chamber-of-Commerce zealots.

A study in a state university of the performance of some pieces of agricultural equipment was finally withheld from publication

because the manufacturers threatened to hold up the legislative appropriations for the University.

Home economists in state universities carry out elaborate and costly tests on oil stoves for the farm kitchen, on soaps, and on household machinery; but the findings are required to be set forth without any means of identifying the articles tested, so that they are of no practical use to the ultimate consumer.

Regulations which protect intermediate (business enterpriser) consumers primarily are more fully and effectively enforced and with far heavier penalties than those which relate to ultimate consumers' goods, even foods and medicines.

In carrying out the Caustic Poisons Act there is almost no enforcement activity until there has been a long period of "educational" or conference work to give the business interests affected an opportunity to adjust themselves. No notice is given the consumers to enable them to adjust *their* purchases or practices to non-enforcement!

A speaker for the U. S. Bureau of Public Health got into trouble by suggesting in a radio address that less consumption of meat during the summer months would be good for one's health. The Secretary of the Treasury ordered that future radio talks from the Bureau should have advance approval by the officers of the Treasury Department to avoid offending a trade interest, such as that of the packers, out of consumer sympathy!

The U. S. Food and Drug Administration has consistently suppressed information that should appear in publications or news bulletins whenever that information was of a type which would tend to discourage the use of a commercial product, or shift consumers' purchases from one field to another.

The elaborate tests of the Bureau of Standards on nearly two thousand dry batteries from a dozen different manufacturers are released free of cost to each manufacturer, but consumers are invariably refused access to the extremely definite and practical information which would aid them in buying doorbell or flashlight batteries. State and municipal governments are refused access to this information unless they will agree in advance that it shall not become available to their own citizens and tax-payers. Hundreds of commodities are tested by the Bureau for the benefit of the Government itself as purchaser of supplies and for business, just as business, without charge to it, while consumers as tax-

payers foot the bills and receive nothing which they can use directly!

The chief remaining obstacle to perfecting business control over the American mind is the educational staff including librarians, high-school teachers, university professors, and a segment of the clergy. There is therefore every reason to look for increasing insidious newspaper undermining and discrediting of bold spirits who, despite repeated hints or warnings, persist in letting out bits of truth which business wishes the general public to be ignorant of.

The pretensions of the commercialized press to a priestly status have come to be so ridiculous that increasingly the public is indifferent to the so-called "invasions" of the traditional "freedom of the press" by government officials and to the newspapers' clamor to be carried in the mails for a pittance. Why should taxpayers meet postal deficits caused by hauling to readers for almost nothing thousands of tons of advertising circulars containing only a little tainted reading matter? Perhaps the classic privileges should be withheld from newspapers which derive more than a third of their income from advertising. The "daily paper" would cost more to be sure, but then it might tell more truth!

Vanquished commercialisms. Let no one imagine, however, that the profits motive, so incredibly shameless and encroaching in our present phase, has had all the triumphs. The fact is *the path of man's advance is strewn with discarded commercialisms.* One might almost sum up the moral side of social progress as *the expulsion of the profits motive from those parts of the social order in which it has no business to be.*

De-commercialized mating. Time was when the father disposed of his daughter's hand to the highest bidder. Sometimes, as among the Tekke Turcomans yesterday, when a father is "coining money" from his daughter's services as rug weaver, he names a bride-price so high that she goes through life without a mate.[1] A century ago in Servia, what with purchase price and presents to members of the bride's family, a wife became so dear that "many a poor fellow was unable to marry at all." Finally a price-fixing law was passed restricting payment for a bride to one ducat. A common result of wife purchase has been that the rich old men

[1] For the effect of the great demand for "Bokhara" rugs in handicapping Turcoman maids in the matrimonial market see Ross, *Russia in Upheaval,* 1918, end of chapter V.

monopolize youth and beauty, while the younger and poorer men have only hags. On the other hand, in some societies a "marriage portion" has been expected with the bride, so that portionless girls go husbandless. In olden times an approved philanthropy was to provide poor girls with marriage portions. In the folk tales the crowning proof of romantic love was the lover's willingness to take his sweetheart without a portion. It is but forty years since Westermarck wrote, "In our days a woman without a marriage portion, unless she has some great natural attraction, runs the risk of being a spinster forever." How remote such huckstering now!

De-commercialized religion. When the religion of sacrifice prevailed a man won favor in proportion to his contributions to his divinity. The petitioner who offered the richer sacrifice believed that the god would surely be on his side. The gods were supposed to bestir themselves more for the rich man who could offer a hecatomb than for the poor who could offer only a brace of doves!

I inquire into the Great Temple of Madura, India. On its staff besides 500 menials there are 322 Brahmans who exercise priestly functions, *i.e.,* offer sacrifices. It is not a place of public worship but a place for the propitiatory offering of private petitions. Worried persons wishing to have a petition offered present themselves, specify what god they put their faith in, and state how much they are prepared to lay out on the sacrifice. They are told where to come and when and what sacrificial animal to bring. At the appointed time and place they find themselves in the hands of a priest of Vishnu, or Shiva, or Durga, or Ganesh, or Hanuman as the case may be. He offers their sacrifice in the best professional style with the right postures, gestures, and intonings. They pay the fee and go away hopefully. Thus was it in the great pagan temples of antiquity, *e.g.,* that of Diana of Ephesus.

Originally the priest was a pray-er. He knew just what formulas, postures, and gestures would compel the god to do his will. He would not exercise this mystic power on behalf of the worshiper without pay, any more than an attorney will plead his client's cause without fee. So the priest charged a stiff price for his services and grew wealthy. It is a far cry from this to faiths which make God's favor depend on the state of the *heart* of the worshiper rather than on his *sacrifice.* Jesus's parable of the widow's mite is a landmark in the humanizing of religion.

About the close of the second century Tertullian declared that

in heathenism the very gods are for sale, that no one is admitted free of charge to the knowledge of the gods. A fee is exacted for room in the temple, for even admittance thereto. Among Christians on the contrary, "no market value is set on anything in our religion. We have indeed boxes for offerings. . . . Contributions, however, are not compulsory, but of freewill."

De-commercialized government. It was customary for the Roman state to *farm out its taxes* rather than collect them by the hand of its own servants. Syndicates of business men bid against one another for the right to collect a particular tax in a certain province for a term of years. They hooted at government doing its own tax collecting just as our public utility executives hoot at a municipality supplying its householders with gas and electricity. The contract with the censor fixed the rate at which the publican or tax gatherer could collect, but there was little to restrain the practice of extortion. Only the powerful could profit by the subject's right to appeal to the governor. "Wherever the tax gatherers penetrate," says Livy, "there is no justice or liberty for any one." "Imagine," writes Cicero, "what is the fate of our allies in the remoter provinces when even in Italy I hear the complaints of Roman citizens." Among the Jews the publicans could not enter a court of law to give testimony, nor fill offices of judicature, nor engage in public prayers. Their contributions to charity were not accepted and they were ranked with thieves and murderers.

About the close of the seventeenth century the French Crown began to sell to sixty "farmers-general" the right to collect the indirect taxes. Adam Smith describes their profits as "exorbitant" and the collection as "wasteful and expensive." Commenting on the fact that their cruel methods often led to bloody conflicts, he remarks, "Those who consider the blood of the people as nothing in comparison with the revenues of princes, may, perhaps, approve of this method of levying taxes." When the Convention met it prosecuted the farmers-general as enemies of the people and guillotined thirty-five of them.

Farming out the poor is another instance of handling public responsibility as a business transaction. Early in the last century a report on the care of the poor in Massachusetts observed that where there is no almshouse the poor are "disposed of by the overseers in several ways—

"1. The overseers farm them out at stipulated prices to con-

tractors who are willing to receive them and keep them on condition of getting what labor they can out of the paupers.

2. Relief is afforded to the poor at their own habitations.

3. The poor are sold at auction—the meaning of which is that he who will support them for the lowest price becomes their keeper; and it often happens, of course, that the keeper is himself almost a pauper before he purchases, and adopts this mode in order not to fall a burden upon the town. Thus he and another miserable human being barely subsist upon what would hardly comfortably maintain himself alone—a species of economy much boasted of by some of the town officers and purchasers of paupers."

This report concludes:

"1. That the poor when farmed out or sold were frequently treated with barbarity and neglect.

2. That the education and morals of the children of paupers—except in almhouses—were almost wholly neglected. They grew up in fifth, idleness, ignorance, and disease, and many became early candidates for the prison or the grave."

Until sixty years ago commissions in the British Army were private property. The officer bought his commission and, when he had done with it, sold it for what he could get. The capable experienced officer could be jumped over in promotion by a mere youth. The high cost of a commission excluded gifted members of the lower and middle classes from desirable places in the army and made the command of His Majesty's troops a prerogative of the aristocracy. This class privilege was extinguished only by paying the owners of commissions $35,000,000 in compensation.

The loathsome aggressions of the profits motive in American society may be to-day but an eddy in a great historic current bearing us farther and farther from the practice of sale-and-purchase. That in modern society such indispensable things as love, salvation, clerical ministrations, protection, justice, education, access to the professions, access to the public service, promotion, and social recognition, are generally to be had on a basis of need or personal desert instead of cash payment, is owing to numerous triumphs of the spirit of good will, justice, and brotherhood over the commercial spirit.

CHAPTER XLVII

PROFESSIONALIZATION

The patron of the artisan or tradesman can look out for himself; bad wares he can reject, poor service he can refuse to pay for. But the patron of a calling which involves the use of highly technical knowledge, has to take the worth of the service "on trust." The patient cannot pass upon his doctor's treatment. The client cannot test the value of the advice his lawyer gives or know whether his cause has been skillfully presented. The student cannot plumb his teacher's learning, the reader gage the editor's disinterestedness, nor the creditor verify the audit of the public accountant. One will hesitate to commit one's dearest interests to such men unless one believes them to be worthy of trust. There is need, therefore, that callings of this confidential character be restricted to men of honor acting with reference to a high standard. The means of bringing this to pass is *to elevate the calling into a profession.*

The profession. The expert cannot raise the tone of his calling unless he is shielded from the blighting competition of bunglers, quacks and charlatans. So the first step toward creating a profession is *the exclusion of the unfit.* This is sought by restricting its practice to the licensees of some agency authorized to test and pass upon the proficiency and character of applicants. Along with this goes often the power to expel from the profession the practitioner whose conduct is such as to bring it into disrepute.

It is not enough to bar out unworthy persons. It is necessary that the calling *attract to itself men of good breeding and high spirit,* for such will do most to set and fix exacting standards of professional conduct. So the law generally accords the calling some *official recognition.*

Recognition of the professions. Army and navy officers not only hold their commissions from the head of the state, but under militarist governments they are authorized to cut down pitilessly any civilian "insulting the uniform." The clergy once enjoyed ex-

emption from the jurisdiction of secular tribunals, *i.e.,* "benefit of clergy," and even now the courts respect "the seal of the confessional." Ordinarily the physician is not required to divulge on the witness stand the secrets of his patients and in a great variety of juridical questions the law insists upon the testimony of medical men. A constitutional "liberty of the press" protects the journalist. Lawyers have been drawn into the judicial system until in the eye of the law the bar has rights and functions well-nigh as important as those of the bench. The more exacting legal requirements as to the audit of stock companies amount to a recognition of the profession of public accountant, while the statutes establishing administrative boards occasionally recognize the existence of such persons as architects, engineers, psychologists, economists, and sociologists.

Of even greater benefit to the tone of a calling is a *social status* high enough to protect the dignity of the practitioner. The lawyer makes clear to his client that he is a counselor, not a servant. The physician feels at liberty to remonstrate with the patient suffering from the consequences of his misconduct. The indispensableness of the clergyman in such cases as christening, marriage, and burial, together with the custom of prayer at public functions, gives him a place of much prominence. The scholar shares in the prestige of science although his will not be a position of real dignity until "academic freedom" is firmly established. The military enjoy a social status inherited from feudalism when officers were also territorial magnates. Gradually the professions have risen in public esteem until they are no longer overshadowed by the hereditary ruling or fighting castes. To use the old French terms, the "men of the robe" have come quite abreast of the "men of the sword." In modern society successful professional men mingle on a footing of equality with the wealthiest bankers and capitalists, although their position in relation to the hereditary rich—the leisure class—is still dubious.

The professional spirit. The natural effect of fencing the field and attracting into it superior men is the growth of *the professional spirit,* which is the very antithesis of the commercial spirit. In a true profession the pursuit of gain is subordinated to the aim of service. This implies for one thing that the practitioner will have but *one grade of work,* namely, *his best.* The cobbler may patch according to the pay, but no physician will be respected who

from carelessness botches a charity case. Again, the practitioner will be *loyal to the interests of his patron* even to the extent of opposing the patron's wishes. He will quit rather than render what he knows to be a disservice rather than a service.

As counselor in the intimate matters of life, the professional man must command the implicit confidence of his patron. Hence, he not only *keeps the secrets intrusted to him,* but he *forbears to use to the disadvantage of his patron anything he has learned in a confidential relation.* The architect will not accept a commission from a contractor and, if he has a financial interest in any building material or device, he will not specify or use it without the knowledge and approval of his client. The consulting engineer is expected to inform his client of any business connections which might influence his judgment and to take no royalty or commission on any patented article or process used in his client's work without written authorization from his client.

To keep the huckstering outsider from coming between patron and practitioner it is held unprofessional for the latter to *deal through a middleman or to conceal his personality under a corporate name.* The services of the salaried doctor of a ship, a college or a company ought to be free to the patient. The public accountant ought not to serve with an audit company nor the lawyer allow a collection agency to charge his patrons for his services. The practitioner ought not to pay commissions to laymen for securing business, divide his fees with persons outside the profession, nor allow any one to guarantee his honesty and efficiency. Working for a contingent fee is, save in certain cases, regarded as beneath the dignity of the profession.

The putting of service above gain-getting implies a willingness to serve at times *without fee.* The good physician stands ready to treat indigent sufferers,[1] the good lawyer to take up the cause of the penniless victim of injustice. Architect, engineer, and journalist are not called upon to serve the distressed individual but they may properly be called upon to contribute their professional services to a movement for the public good. Every successful

[1] It is significant that 44 per cent of the physicians in the United States practice in communities of 100,000 or over. The open country and towns of less than 5000 inhabitants have about half the people but only 30 per cent of the doctors. Were they public servants, as most teachers are, they would be distributed according to people's *need* of medical care rather than according to their ***ability to pay*** for such care.

member of an honorable profession ought to be willing to do some free work.

In consideration of the protection, recognition and rights enjoyed by the professions they generally acknowledge their obligation *to practise with due regard to the interests of society*. The scholar recognizes his obligation to proclaim the truth at whatever cost to himself, the journalist his duty to publish the news fairly and without bias, the clergyman his call to apply Christian principles no matter who may be wroth, the physician his duty to stay out a pestilence even at the risk of his life. The architect should not, under his client's instructions, look for a way to evade the building code, nor should the engineer show how to dodge the sanitary regulations. The lawyer's first obligation is not to win his case, but to see that justice is done. To stoop to fraud or chicane on behalf of his client or to find him a crooked path around the statute is to violate the bar's implied contract with society.

While engineers and architects are at liberty to patent their inventions, the medical profession has always set its face against secret remedies and the patenting of a means of relieving human suffering, insisting that it is a part of the physician's honor not to restrict the use of a medicine for the purpose of private gain, but to give it freely to the world. The doctors' fight with the makers of proprietary medicines is a duel between the professional spirit and the commercial spirit.

Soliciting employment, advertising, seeking publicity, underbidding, attempts to supplant or to injure maliciously the reputation or prospects of a colleague are frowned upon as tending to lower the profession to the level of a trade. Lawyers *ban advertising* as tending to stir up litigation; moreover competitive advertising would greatly add to the expenses of professional men without making them in any way more useful to the public. The psychology, however, underlying the professions' aversion to advertising is, doubtless, the fear lest competition degenerate into an undignified scramble for business by all manner of bragging, and "running down" of rivals. In barring any other means of commending oneself to possible patrons than worthy service, paid or unpaid, private or public, professional men are protecting not only their own interest, but that of society as well.

Client versus society. The older professions tended to *put loyalty to the patron above duty to society*. For example, the

leaders of the medical profession formerly insisted that the physician has no right to speak of any ailment or defect he may learn of in his practice. In view of what we know about the communicability of disease, is such secrecy ethical? If a health officer may nail a sign of warning on a house with a case of smallpox or scarlet fever, surely the physician is not bound to withhold all warning. Take the situation in Brieux's play, *Damaged Goods*. A young man not yet fully cured of a "social" disease plans to marry an innocent young woman. Is it right for his doctor to hold his tongue when her life and the sanity of her children are at stake?

Common sense justly condemns the advocate who defends an accused person whom he knows, or has good reason to believe, is guilty? The excuses offered are mere sophistries, spun to gloss over the irresponsible practice of law. The argument that the lawyer who treats the accused as a criminal is presumptuously putting himself in place of the judge is a quirk that any bright schoolboy ought to see through. No doubt the guilty man should have the benefit of those forms of procedure which have been worked out as safeguards for the innocent. But such defense, if offered by an advocate appointed by the court, whose prestige is therefore not at stake, will not go beyond the proper minimum. On the other hand, the attorney who voluntarily takes such a case has a strong interest in getting his client off. Acquittal will enhance his professional reputation. So he does his best to thwart the prosecution and frequently succeeds in turning loose on society an unpunished criminal. Yet we may not despise this mercenary who has deliberately thrust a spoke among the wheels of justice!

Society, always hard put to it to keep down crime, should never cease to resent and denounce the thoroughly immoral maxim that a lawyer unbidden can without dishonor undertake any defense.

Guild selfishness. In the codes of the professions are traces of a selfish guild spirit. In the ancient Greek oath, the Asklepiad or hereditary physician swears "to reckon him who taught me this art equally dear to me as my parents, to share my substance with him and relieve his necessities if required; to look upon his offspring on the same footing as my own brothers, and to teach them this art, if they shall wish to learn it, without fee or stipulation, and that by precept, lecture and every other mode of instruction, I will impart a knowledge of the art to my own sons and those of

my teachers and to disciples bound by a stipulation and oath according to the law of medicine, but to none other." Here one sees the endeavor to restrict the number of apprentices to the profession.

In "professional etiquette" are things which savor of conspiracy against the public. The old code for physicians forbade the consulting physician to give his opinion to the patient or his friends or any one but the attending physician. "Neither by words nor manner should any of the parties to a consultation assert or insinuate that any part of the treatment pursued did not receive his assent." "No hint or insinuation should be thrown out which could impair the confidence reposed in him (the attending physician) or affect his reputation."

This rule is at once a betrayal of the truth, of the sick man who pays for the consultation, and of the public who have a right to know if the attending physician has bungled the case. So the later code admits that "the benefit to be derived by the patient is of first importance" and declares that the consultant should be permitted to state to the patient or his friends the result of his study of the case in the presence of the physician in charge.

Even when the codes are flawless, the guild spirit prompts members of the same profession to hang together at the expense of the laity. We see this in the difficulty of extracting an adverse opinion from medical witnesses in a suit for malpractice. Far more flagrant is the tolerance by judges of the outrageous fees charged by attorneys appointed to administer the estates of bankrupts and decedents and as receivers of corporations in difficulties.

The purification of the professions. The promulgation of rules which formulate the common understanding of reputable practitioners is, no doubt, a great aid to well-intentioned but inexperienced members of the profession. But an altogether more vigorous policy is needed if the ideals of professions exposed to the full strain of modern commercialism are not to become mock. If high-minded practitioners are not relieved of the competition of the unscrupulous, they will starve and the profession will be taken over by men of low standards or of no standards at all!

It is therefore necessary to make it worth while for wobbly practitioners to live up to the code of ethics of the profession. Lawyers are regularly disbarred for flagrant practices and in some states physicians and public accountants may for unprofessional conduct

lose their licenses. Proposals have been made that, after the society of a profession has published its code of ethics, it shall create a "standing committee on ethics" which shall investigate all complaints submitted to it bearing upon the professional conduct of a member and after hearing the member involved shall report its findings to the council of the society. Publicity, reprimand, ejection from the society, dismissal from the profession would constitute a gamut of penalties which might strike terror into the hearts of the shysters, ambulance chasers, and jury-fixers who hang on the skirts of the law, or of the quacks and blackguards who slip into medicine.

Mere moral suasion no more suffices to keep the professions straight than public opinion suffices to keep the peace. In either case, tribunals and punishment are necessary. The good in each of the professions *ought to be organized in order to pursue and harry the bad*. Resistance to such organization comes chiefly from those who want a free hand in earning fees.

The extension of the professional spirit. The professional spirit has made itself felt in so many unexpected quarters that one must not be surprised to meet it in any calling. Nursing, teaching, accountancy, pharmacy, and social work are in the process of becoming full-fledged professions. We catch realtors in the very act of turning professional. Photographers, insurance writers, investment counsel, morticians, "ad" men, and credit men give signs of being on their way.

Limits to such extension. Seeing that the professional spirit affords a means of refining the workings of private interest without resort to the more or less uncertain method of regulation by law or administrative board, some want to foster the professional spirit in occupations in which it is quite incapable of producing the hoped-for benefits. It is too much to expect one to *put quality of service above gain* when one is the employee of a man who prefers gain to service; the servant will have to do his work according to the ideas of his employer. When, therefore, in the production of any service, *capital* comes to be a factor so prominent that the capitalist hires labor instead of the laborer hiring capital, we have a *business* rather than a *profession*. All the more will this be true, when, as in the case of the newspaper, the rendering of a public service is bound up with the sale of advertising.

Futility of professionalizing employees. Hence the hopelessness of trying to redeem the newspaper by fortifying with the professional spirit young men preparing for journalism whose probable lot will be to serve as salaried employees of newspaper owners actuated by the commercial spirit. Walk-out or boycott would, no doubt, bring to terms the newspaper proprietor who construes the acceptance of his pay as the sale of a soul, but it seems idle to expect newspaper men ever to develop such a professional solidarity as to present an unbroken front to the exactions of their masters. If the commercial newspaper rises to the high function committed to it in modern society, the cause will not be so much the substitution of high ideals for low ideals in the minds of newspaper makers and publishers as the ability of the reading public to tell the good newspaper from the bad newspaper and their willingness to support the former.

The stage is in much the same state as the newspaper. Acting may be a *profession,* but producing plays is a *business.* Little is accomplished toward making the stage the great social institution it is capable of being by creating among playwrights and players a sense of responsibility for what they do, so long as what they shall present and how is determined for them by theater managers, most of them swayed by greed unashamed. If the yoke of commercialism on the theater is broken, it will be by the rebellion of theatergoers rather than by the revolt of stage folk.

Can business be professionalized? It is easier to keep frauds and sharpers out of a learned profession than out of trade. In the absence of any means of clearing out the crooks, it is vain to hope to purify the morals of trade by fostering in the business man a professional pride. In the making and vending of goods the competition of the crooked man with the honest man is much more deadly than is the competition of the tricky lawyer or doctor with honorable lawyers or doctors. The latter may in some degree brand the trickster by refusing to be associated with him in a case. Moreover, in a profession the bad man can capture from the good man no more practice than one man can attend to, while in manufacture or commerce the man quite unembarrassed by moral standards may expand his business until he has stolen most of the customers of his conscientious rivals and forced them quite out of the trade.

Nevertheless, after commercial practices have been studied, thought about and debated, and the honest men in a given branch of business have come to an agreement as to where they ought to "draw the line," it is possible for them by joint action so to expose or punish the dishonest competitor that he is no longer a menace to them. In so fluid a medium as business, indeed, *war to the knife* is the only honorable reply men can make to the silent sapping and supplanting to which they are subjected by unscrupulous rivals. The crooks are not obliged to fight the honorable men in order to eliminate them from the business; but the honorable men must openly and relentlessly fight the crooks if they are to escape ruin.

Thus in some states laundry owners have organized and adopted the plan of certified laundries. Three inspectors are employed, each an expert in some phase of the business. When any laundry, whether a member of the association or not, passes 70 on a possible score of 100, it is given a certificate for one year. This means that it is authorized to use the term "certified laundry" with the copyrighted association seal. The Association's advertising warns the public of the risks it runs in patronizing non-certified laundries.

Formerly on entering a cab you knew not what you were letting yourself in for in the way of risk or charges. By forming a national association taxicab owners have been able to standardize the business so that in many localities by engaging a cab of a particular color you know you have an inspected vehicle, with a meter in good condition, in charge of a tested, sober, competent, and responsible driver.

In 1928 the chairman of the Federal Trade Commission estimated that the amount taken annually by fraudulent advertising was more than five hundred million dollars—the greater portion drawn from the sick, the poor and the ignorant through advertisements of medicines, cures, fake schools, and the like, although other credulous persons contributed heavily. Encouraging, therefore is the Truth-in-Advertising movement which represents the reaction of honest business men against the fakers and frauds who were undermining the faith of the public in all advertising whatsoever. A Model Statute making untrue, deceptive, or misleading advertising a misdemeanor has been adopted in nearly all the states. Moreover in over fifty cities Better Business Bureaus have been organized, controlled by local business men and aiming at

the harrying of men and methods which would rob the public of their money and their confidence.[1]

In the fields of professional and commercial practice ethical standards have probably changed more since 1921 than in any like period of the past. Only the great religious revivals afford an historic parallel. To be sure, many trade associations have adopted high-sounding declarations to flatter themselves and to please the public but have done nothing to back up their fine gestures. The test of ethical attitude in a business group is, of course, whether the group has set up machinery which punishes or casts out the crooked member. We cannot be sure how earnestly Rotarians mean the clause in their code which regards my vocation "as affording me distinct opportunity to serve society"; or how much conviction is behind the preamble to the "Principles of Business Conduct" adopted by the United States Chamber of Commerce:

> The function of business is to provide for the material needs of mankind, and to increase the wealth of the world and the value and happiness of life. In order to perform its function it must offer a sufficient opportunity for gain to compensate the individuals who assume its risks, but the motives which lead individuals to engage in business are not to be confused with the function of business itself.

No sociologist could ask for a better profession of faith—if such it really is!

Can the joint-stock company be professionalized? When it comes to making the large commercial corporation a tractable social servant, the difficulty of control from within becomes insuperable. The ultimate authority is, of course, the will of the stockholders, but in most cases the stockholders are too numerous and scattered, too ignorant of the business and too little acquainted with one another, to have a definite opinion as to the right or wrong of the practices of their corporation or to make such opinion effective if they had it. Their virtues do not extend to their cor-

[1] On the other hand, consider the policy of the American Association of Wholesale Opticians which in its 1921 meeting decided to carry on an advertising campaign to persuade the public to wear different types of glasses for different occasions, one type for evening dress, another for business, another for out-of-doors sports; the endeavor being to make people feel that any other style would be out of place. So we are to be propagandaed into uneasiness unless we have three or four styles of eyeglasses!

poration; their only trait which affects its management is their quite natural hankering for dividends.

Because in the end this incessant hankering triumphs over every other force within the enterprise, little is to be done by attempting to foster the professional spirit in the officers and managers of business corporations. It may just as well be recognized first as last that the structure of such entities furnishes a poor soil for disinterested motives, just as alkali furnishes a poor soil for orange trees. Regularly the corporation will follow the line of what appears to be maximum-profits-for-the-long-run unless it is controlled from without by means of law, railroad commission, public utilities commission, labor organization, shippers' association, or other outside agency.

INSTITUTIONALIZATION

When not even the profession meets its need society resorts to the *operative institution, i.e.,* a special organized personnel working under an authority, charter or constitution and provided with continuous support. Whether this support comes from taxes, gifts, or fees makes no great difference. The essential thing is that the institution is bound to render what is believed to be a service of public importance.

Shall the theater become a public institution? In our cities the social settlement and the Young Women's Christian Association, although they are independent of government, are supported by the public and controlled by public judgment. The theater, on the other hand, may be quite as potent in the community as these others, but it has not been recognized as a social institution. It is as yet little more than a shop for selling a certain kind of sweet, a sweet, moreover, which, like other candies, is often adulterated and unwholesome. Those who see the tremendous possibilities of the stage in refining and uplifting a people wish the theater to be something else than a mere "business proposition." Could it obtain a guaranteed support from the public, it could be taken away from the sordid and brutal profiteers so frequent now in the theatrical business and conducted by men of the grade of our city superintendents of schools.

Institutionalizing forest guarding. It is easy to see why a spontaneous social service is eventually handed over to a permanent operative institution. Occasional fires in public forests may

be handled by the settlers. When, however, the stretches of public forest are extensive, the value at stake is great, and settlers are few and scattered, it is found better to establish a fire patrol by men who are forest rangers and nothing else.

Institutionalizing food inspection. Social workers, women's clubs, and newspaper reporters may, from time to time, inspect in an off-hand, desultory fashion the food offered for sale to see whether it is clean and wholesome. As soon, however, as it is apparent that ordinary commercial motives will unload upon the public a great deal of bad food, it becomes wise to *institutionalize* inspection by creating a pure-food commission clothed with certain legal powers and provided with funds for maintaining a staff of paid inspectors. This permits the aroused public to transfer its attention to other matters, leaving physicians, district nurses, social workers, and dieticians to stand guard over the official inspection service and prod it in case it flunks its duty.

Institutionalizing vocational guidance. Young people, selecting among divergent lines of training in school or leaving school to go to work, have been swayed in their choice of occupations by chance, casual impressions, or the haphazard and often conflicting advice of their parents and friends. Of late, however, the momentous service of vocational guidance has been institutionalized by providing in the school system a department where the requirements, rewards and comparative opportunities of the different callings are known and where the youth's qualifications may be canvassed. The counsel he receives from the expert supplements rather than supplants such light as he may obtain from parents and friends on his problem of choosing a vocation.

The disease of institutionalism. As compared with haphazard volunteer service (unorganized charities, unpaid fire companies, "clean up" week, etc.) the operative institution economizes the attention of the public and insures steady and continuous service. On the other hand its specialized personnel is *liable to drift into a perfunctory and mechanical way of doing its work.* It seems as if professionals, who give all their time to a personal ministry, are sooner drained of their spontaneous interest and affection than volunteers, who give only their spare time to the work. The orphanage loses touch with child life, so that it is found far better to "place out" dependent children in individual homes. Teachers become routinary and lose their power to inspire.

A clergy becomes more intent on ritual, orthodoxy and observance than on kindling religious fervor. Professional charity workers develop a cold matter-of-fact manner which chills and repels the poor.

The remedy for institutionalism. The medicine for the malady is *personality*. Continuous dosing with personality dissolves the lime about the joints of institutions and makes them again supple and active. When the church has become ecclesiastical or creedal, make bishops out of its real saints, then stand aside. When the charity has become mechanical and forbidding, put at its head some Greatheart like Vincent de Paul or John Howard and give him scope. When schools have become lifeless, commit them to a Pestalozzi or a Montessori. The gifted in each field of service never allow mechanism to come between them and their ministry, but usually they know how to use mechanism for their purposes. In their hands the structure becomes again human and plastic. It may be, as Emerson says, that "an institution is the lengthened shadow of one man," but it need not be always the shadow of the *same* man. Under the stimulus of vital personalities an ossified or decadent institution may be, as it were, reborn, and start on a fresh career.

PART IX

SOCIAL REGRESS AND PROGRESS

CHAPTER

XLVIII. Ossification

XLIX. Decadence

L. Deterioration of Organs and Structures

LI. Transformation

LII. Re-shaping

LIII. Revolution

CHAPTER XLVIII

OSSIFICATION

In olden days the American common schools remained closed during the growing season in order that the farmers might have the help of their children. Thus originated the long summer vacation, and as the cities established their school systems they adopted it without question. There are many ways in which school buildings and grounds may be used during the summer to keep children happy and usefully occupied. But no; every June we close the schools of our cities and turn millions of children into the street—to hoe corn and "bug" potatoes!

In an early day in the level West the practice struck root of laying out roads on the section lines. Later the gridiron plan was adhered to even in rough country where it would be more economical to lay out roads according to the contour, so that they would follow the water courses or the water partings. To-day millions of loads are needlessly hauled over hill after hill on their way to market and thousands of hillside roads are washed away every season because men blindly follow precedent.

Ossification. These cases illustrate the truth that after a practice or institution has lasted two or three generations it will be kept even when the situation has so changed that it no longer fits. The first users are ready to modify or drop it if it does not suit their purpose; but after it has lived long enough to be venerated, it turns to bone and can hardly be altered. The process by which procedures and institutions lose pliancy may be called *ossification.*

CAUSES OF OSSIFICATION

Mental laziness. Most of us are loath to put our minds to a stretch for long. Little problems may challenge us like the series of situations presented in a game, but we shun big complex problems which call for sustained thinking. Hence, we shrink from recognizing a change in the situation before us and re-thinking our

task. Lazily we roll along in the rut of habit and precedent until a stone in the rut throws us out of it. Absorbed in their daily round, few pause to ask themselves: "Is this worth while?" "Am I doing any real good?"

Control of society by the old. Even the strong and enlightened, as they age, tend to stand by their earlier judgments and retain the emotional attitudes of their youth. So, if the elders control, the effete will be kindlier looked on and longer tolerated than if the young are at the helm. If education falls out of step with life, if knowledge expands beyond the creeds, if law lags behind the development of social relations, youth will notice it first and will demand changes which the old see no reason for.

The long-established comes to be sacred. In primitive society fear of the ghosts of dead ancestors—at a later stage fear of the ill-will of the gods—caused the settled ways to become hallowed. Wilfully to depart from them was perilous, no telling what calamity might befall you!

The authority of tradition. In a Chinese village near Peiping, founded in the Sung dynasty (73-420 A.D.), the police recently gave investigators data as to 360 families comprising 2300 persons. But the actual population of the village is about 3000. "After long discussion it was discovered that all those that were included in the official count were the members of the families who had been in the village for many generations. The 300 merchants, craftsmen and apprentices whose families had come to the village during the last 200 years were not counted as local residents, but only as temporarily residing in that place with their homes elsewhere."

Now, over much of the globe, ancestral tradition of this sort is rapidly losing power; by the end of this century, apart from a few millions of savages, there will not be a people on the planet intent on setting their feet exactly in the foot prints of their grandparents. For myriads the inherited patterns of life will be broken up, owing to the prevalence of power-driven machinery, cheap travel, air navigation, the telephone, the screen, the radio, the conquest of disease, the spread of education and many other boons still below the horizon. In the eloquent words of General Jan Smuts: "The tents have been struck, and the great caravan of humanity is once more on the march." The cultural spectrum will be longer for, while the brighter will rush to greet the Wondrous

New Age, many too dull to find their way about in the bewildering richness of the coming world culture, will prefer the leading strings of tradition. Nevertheless, social relations will change less readily than private life, social structures and organizations will lag behind the development of their functions.

Veneration of precedent. The long-established becomes an Ark of the Covenant which we fear to lay hand on lest we meet the fate of Uzzah. Our forefathers fought and bled for it; it has inspired heroic deeds, noble poetry and eloquence. How can a thing so cherished become a stumbling-block? In the face of the imperative need of church union the faithful cling to their denominational peculiarities because of the sacrifices these once cost. The monastic ideal, "uniformity of taxation," the "open door," *laissez-faire,* "a government of laws and not of men," inspire passionate devotion long after their value has become doubtful. The American Constitution has gathered such prestige that scholars who demonstrate the part special interests took in its shaping are vilified. Owing to the bloody struggles which have raged about it the Bible has come to be for many a kind of fetish. Its texts are relied on to resolve every doubt life presents and the "higher critics" who call in question the traditional date, authorship or meaning of certain of the Scriptures bring a tempest upon their heads.

ALLIES AND PROTECTORS OF THE OSSIFIED

The assumption that society is static. People like to imagine that society keeps to its track until some large sensible force—a war, a revolution, a law, a religious movement or a great invention—gives it a new direction. The fact is, society can never be stable while its base shifts and its base may be shifted by the piled effects of numerous small imperceptible changes—new methods of tillage, a shift from crop to crop, a gain of manufacturing on agriculture, cheaper carriage, the opening of new channels of trade, immigration, population increase, the unequal growth of sections and classes, the disappearance of the frontier, the rush to the cities, the access of women to industry, etc. Silently these unnoticed processes make society into something else than we imagine it to be, so that some of the wisdom of the past turns to folly and perhaps some of its folly turns to wisdom. Hence, each generation ought to check over their social heritage to see

whether each and every item is still valid; but never will they do this until they recognize that *all the time society is dynamic.*

Vested interests resist change. Persons whose bread-and-butter depends on an institution won't have it "mended or ended." Teachers of Latin and Greek are "up in arms" against overhauling the traditional course of study. For forty-five years far-sighted religious leaders have urged that economics and sociology enter into the training for the Christian ministry. Most of the divinity schools, however, have done nothing owing to the vested interest of the professors of the traditional subjects. The clergy are steadily losing leadership because many of them can offer nothing authoritative on the burning moral issues of their day!

Guild interest, then, blocks adaptive change. Certain persons have specialized in good faith, yet are in danger of losing their livelihood. Hard luck! One cannot well expect them to capitulate to anything less than mathematical proof of their superfluousness, which is impossible in the field of education. They are like players who protest against the game being changed to their hurt while they are playing it.

The dominant social class may resist change. In America the business element has long played upon a popular suspicion and jealousy of government inherited from our colonial stage when government was in fact an alien arbitrary agency over which the people had but slight control. Now that government has been made responsive to the public will such distrust is unwarranted; yet Business, seeking to stave off every restrictive measure that does not suit its purposes, fans continually there dying embers!

In a society being modified by as many inventions as ours is there is incessant need for the revising of old laws and devising of new laws. The sneers at "legislative tinkering" heard whenever a legislature or Congress attacks its problems in good faith emanate from certain selfish interests making "big money" out of abuses which are liable to be corrected by law.

The fact is, no element clamors louder for relief than Business when it is in a bad way; yet, as soon as Congress has passed the measures it is interested in, it wants that body to adjourn without heed to the demands for relief made on behalf of workers or farmers or other groups!

As fresh departments and agencies are added to government to

enable it to keep pace with the growing complexity of modern life, the practice of electing all public officials becomes a stumbling block. The "long ballot" betrays democracy by giving the actual selection of such officials into the hands of party "machines" and "bosses." It would have been given up long ago but for the fight put up on its behalf by the politicians.

The long retention of the "fellow servant" defense in suits for indemnity brought by injured employees exemplifies the power of the employing class over courts and legislatures. Its injustice had been conceded by all a generation before it was discarded.

The persistence of the county form of local government in our South after the victory of democratic principles there, can be accounted for only by the self-interest of a dominant class. Thomas Jefferson recognized in the New England township system the very foundation stone of democracy. In 1816 he wrote, "The article nearest my heart is the subdivision of the counties into wards (townships)." He realized that if the county was to be the smallest unit of government a few aristocrats would control. It was, in fact, the resistance of the planter class which prevented the setting up of the township system in the South.

While the dominant class thus causes society to appear at times more stupid than it actually is, in other cases it lends society a deceptive air of ready adaptiveness. When this class puts its weight behind a needed change, reform may be effected with startling suddenness. Good roads, zoning, banking reform, prohibition repeal, permanent tariff commission, could never have crashed so irresistibly through the jungle of popular prejudice but for the immense driving power of the organized business interests.

How the social elements react to change. Of the chief social elements the *intellectuals* have the least horror of change and the keenest sense of our need of it. The *learned professions* come next in openness to new ideas. The *commercial class* comprises many limber-minded business men who are hospitable enough to desirable changes which do not run counter to their interests. On account of their limited education the *wage-earning class* are often slaves to tradition. Their material interests, however, are not bound up with the inherited order and, once their minds have been set free, they stand for the rational and thoroughgoing adaptation of institutions to *present* needs. Owing to their dealing with *nature* rather than *man,* the *tillers of the soil* are

limited in their mental contacts. They follow their forefathers and stand for the inherited order save when the need of reform is sharply brought home to them by their own distresses. Here is one reason why farmers and workingmen, although they are the two wings of the great producing class and have common interests to defend against the class which lives from the ownership of property, are slow to coöperate politically.

Of all the classes the *propertied* is the least sympathetic with rational transformation. Its happy status rests upon prescription and vested rights. Since it shares in current production in virtue not of present exertion but of title from the past, it cannot afford to allow the past to be discredited. Its attitude toward effete institutions is, "Let sleeping dogs lie." Since most deep-going reforms are detrimental to *some* property interests, the propertied become excessively timorous and oppose all radical ideas. They grant you there are rotten timbers in the buildings our ancestors reared, "but," they insist, "once you begin to replace, you release strains you have not allowed for and some day down will come the whole structure on your head!" Domination by peasants, farmers, or the propertied therefore makes society behave like a stiff-jointed rheumatic, while the shifting of power from these elements toward intellectuals, professionals, businessmen, or wage-earners, makes society flexible and adaptable.

It is the conservative elements which keep in circulation certain slogans rationalizing the do-nothing policy—such as: "Let sleeping dogs lie," "You can't teach an old dog new tricks," "What was good enough for 'dad' is good enough for me," "Benjamin Franklin and George Washington got along without it, so can we," "If God had intended us to use this new-fangled thing, He would have mentioned it in the Bible."

Preventives of ossification. What can be done to spare society a burdensome accumulation of the effete?

1. *Get the talented at the steering wheels.* Men cling to forms void of meaning, to agencies without function, because they lack imagination and facility in constructive thought. To take things as he finds them and to do things as they have always been done is the recourse of the numskull in office. Mediocrity loves the groove. Therefore, *man key posts with the enlightened and gifted.* Perhaps the perfecting of mental measurements will enable us

some day to rip off the camouflage by which dunderheads manage to keep on in high places.

2. *Preserve the doer's freedom of initiative.* In a custom-bound time a single bold innovator may start something which will hearten others to break away from their outgrown past. One weakness of communal landholding in Old Russia was that farming came to be tied up with tradition because the clever peasant was not free to till his 20-30 strips according to his own ideas. So leave the individual free to experiment as he will provided he does not violate the rights of others or visibly hurt the community.

3. *Keep a balance between clergy and other intellectuals.* The Moslem world, a tenth of mankind, is held back by ignorant fanatical *mollahs* because there is no group competent to challenge their leadership. If lawyers, scholars and journalists were prodding Islam's clergy as they prod *our* clergy, the *mollahs* would have to be equipped with a genuine education.

4. *Apply critical scholarship to the genesis and history of institutions*—whether or not a particular institution was founded on error or misconception, whether the circumstances under which it arose or the situation to which it was adapted have materially changed. What utter lack of scientific interest implies may be gathered from the following extract from a letter from an Oriental official to a Western inquirer printed by Sir Austin Henry Layard in his *Fresh Discoveries at Nineveh and Researches at Babylon:*

My illustrious Friend and Joy of my Liver:

The thing which you ask of me is both difficult and useless. Although I have passed all my days in this place I have neither counted the houses nor inquired into the number of inhabitants; and as to what one person loads on his mules and another stores away in the bottom of his ship, that is no business of mine. But above all, as to the previous history of this city, God only knows the amount of dirt and confusion that the infidels may have eaten before the coming of the sword of Islam. It were unprofitable for us to inquire into it. . . . Listen, O my son! There is no wisdom equal to the belief in God! He created the world and shall we liken ourselves to him in seeking to penetrate into the mysteries of his creation? Shall we say, Behold this star spinneth round that star, and this other star with a tail goeth and cometh in so many years? Let it go! He from whose hand it came will guide and direct it. . . . Thou art learned in the things I care not for, and as for that which thou hast seen, I spit upon it. Will much

knowledge create thee a double belly, or wilt thou seek paradise with thine eyes? . . .

Thy meek in spirit,
IMAUM ALI ZADI.

5. The restless intellect is the natural enemy of the effete as sunlight is the natural enemy of green mold; therefore *preserve inviolate the right of free inquiry*. Grant no institution immunity from scrutiny and test. Let nothing be held so "sacred" that it may not be commented on by a competent person at the proper time and in a seemly manner. If only comparison and measurement could be applied in the sacrosanct fields!

The state examination system that prevailed in China until 1905 has been characterized by a modern Chinese historian as "the worst intellectual fetter that man has ever invented" because no aspirant to scholarly honors dared express any opinion of his own; "the slightest signs of originality or individual thought led to the automatic elimination of the candidate."

6. *Keep social institutions out of the grasp of religion.* Claiming to reveal the will of a perfect, therefore changeless, Being, religion is the most conservative of influences. Only in that rare manifestation known as *prophetism* does it disown its past. The more that institutions slip into its benumbing clasp, the harder it is to adapt them to changing conditions. One cause of the immobility of the Mohammedan world is that its law is derived from the Koran. Judaism, too, owing to the sacred character of the Mosaic law, allows no free development of rules to govern human relationships. Fortunately there has never been a "Christian" law. Only small communities have ever relied exclusively on Biblical principles and they became in time exceedingly unprogressive. Hence, the Christian peoples have had the advantage of two great plastic secular systems of jurisprudence—Roman Law and the English Common Law.

7. *Base right-and-wrong on human nature and the nature of society*. Instead of being fixed for all time by the apothegms of the venerable sages or the text of an ancient book, discriminations of right from wrong should follow changing conditions of social life and keep step with the march of our knowledge of mind and society. Rigid old ecclesiastical dicta as to the taking of interest, alms-giving, marriage, divorce, and human propagation simply cannot survive the light of social science. Let religion provide rules

of life for the individual and modify society by influencing its members. But its authority should end with the individual conscience; it should not lay down laws, institutions and policies for society.

8. *Let the learner study life as well as books.* It is not lawyers who call attention to the dead wood that cumbers the law, but outsiders. The protests against the traditionalism of creeds and church methods come not so much from clergymen as from intelligent laymen. The trouble is that the students of law and theology study books instead of life. Against the dictum of an eminent teacher of law, "The law library is the student's laboratory," it should be asserted that his laboratory is the world of human relations. Professional education would foster the liberal spirit if more of it were field work and less of it bookish.

9. *Test results by measurement.* Just as cost accounting brings to light the weak spots in a business, the exact measurement of results may bring to light the weak spots in social organization. Alternative methods of probation, of reformation of juvenile delinquents, of apprenticeship, of instruction, of sanitation, of poor relief, of social insurance, of industrial training, of factory discipline, may be tested by comparing their results. Although the method of measurement needs to be applied with caution, since it is apt to overlook or misread certain of the finer values, there should be incessant endeavor to substitute exact comparison for guessing in conflicts between old and new.

The non-material culture lags behind the material culture largely because it has not lent itself to test and measurement. How much easier it has been to get at the comparative merit of two types of milch cow, breeds of draft horse, or patterns of plow, than that of two techniques of teaching, ways of rearing children, or modes of worshiping God!

CHAPTER XLIX

DECADENCE

Social decadence is the raveling of a web, the crumbling of a wall, the sag of a structure that has rotted at the joints. In loyalty and team work, the decadent society is "on the down grade." Feeling for clan or caste or faction overrides feeling for the whole; perhaps even these subgroups are dissolved by the spirit of each-for-himself. Egoism may go so far, indeed, that the only group able to thrive is the *band, i.e.,* the group formed about a strong man and holding out immediate material advantages. Society decays with the weakening of the laws, customs, and beliefs which curb selfish behavior. The web of common, or interlocked, interests which enmeshes men gives way; there are more dissensions and fewer agreements, more discords and fewer harmonies, more clashings and fewer coöperations.

DETERIORATION OF THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF SOCIETY

Society rests on *land* and *people;* if either deteriorates, society sags like a house when its foundation crumbles in spots.

Adverse change of climate. We have long known that Northern Africa is drying and that the Sahara is widening. A school of geographers has arisen which brings forward abundant evidence of shifts from wet to dry or dry to wet caused by unexplained changes in aerial or oceanic currents. Thus:

Palmyra in the Syrian Desert is one of the best examples of a ruin showing evidence of change in climate. In the early centuries of the Christian era Palmyra was a great city as large as modern Damascus, which has a population of 150,000. Ancient writers speak with enthusiasm of its sweet water and beautiful gardens. Its caravans traveled all over Western Asia and it grew so wealthy that its rich citizens took pride in adorning it with wonderful colonnades and temples. To-day Palmyra is a vast desolate ruin in the midst of the desert and harbors a village of about 1,500 people. Its water is still derived from the old aqueducts but, instead of being sweet and abundant, it has a disagreeable odor of

sulphur and is so scanty that the people cannot get enough to irrigate even the small gardens on which they now depend. Such conditions, not only here but in hundreds of other places, seem to afford conclusive evidence that during the past 2,000 years the progress of great climatic cycles has caused the rain-fall and the population to dwindle. It may be that during the rainy portion of another cycle Palmyra will again become a great city.[1]

At the time of Christ and again about A. D. 1000, Guatemala and Yucatan appear to have been drier than now. Since then heavy rainfall has caused such a humidity that it has been impossible for a virile race to survive.

Many of the finest ruins and most of the more ancient ones lie back from the coast in a wilderness of dense forest and jungle. There agriculture is almost impossible. The difficulty of clearing the rank vegetation and getting it dry enough to burn before a new crop of lusty bushes grows up is enormous. Fevers, too, prevail most of the year. They are the worst types of tropical malaria, not to mention many other kinds. Foreigners are quickly attacked and it would be almost suicidal for a white man to attempt to live there permanently, even with all the appliances of modern medical science. The natives also, suffer terribly. . . . Here where the natives are so diseased and agriculture is so difficult, there dwelt an ancient race characterized by the qualities which we have defined as most essential to a high civilization. The Mayas of Yucatan and Guatemala, alone among the aborigines of America, carried to high perfection the arts of sculpture and architecture. The Incas of Peru, to be sure, made striking buildings but they had no idea how to adorn their simple structures with columns, rosettes, arches, gargoyles, pediments, and many other architectural devices which were universal among the Mayas. . . . The Mayas developed the art of writing and carried it to a pitch higher than that reached by the Chinese. . . . Their temples are great structures which sometimes rise three stories in height and have a length of three or four hundred feet. A single city often contained a score of noble buildings and extended over many square miles of territory. The most surprising thing about the Mayas is that they developed their high civilization in what are now the hot, damp, malarial lowlands where agriculture is practically impossible. For a thousand years there they lived and brought to fruition this wonderful civilization. The only explanation lies in a climatic change from conditions similar to those found in the dryer regions farther north to that of a super-abundance of rainfall.[2]

[1] E. Huntington and S. W. Cushing, *Principles of Human Geography*, pp. 368-371.

[2] E. Huntington, *Civilization and Climate*, 1915, pp. 239-243.

De-forestation and erosion. At her zenith Greece was a fertile, well-wooded, healthful, and very populous country with, perhaps, as many people as Pennsylvania. Two centuries later, at the time of the Roman conquest, the country was poor and but sparsely populated. All Hellas, according to Plutarch, could put in the field not more than three thousand fully armed troops. About the dawn of our era Strabo noticed that nearly all the mountains seen from the coast were denuded, while the valleys and plains were ravaged by malaria. What had happened was that the rush to the cities left the countryside short of laborers, so that pastures replaced tilled fields. Every summer, when the plain was parched, the herds were driven into the mountains where they browsed or trampled down the seedlings, the result being that in time the forest perished. Then the soil, no longer bound in place by living roots, washed down the slopes until the mountains died. Swamps formed and whole districts had to be abandoned on account of malaria.

The economic historian of Rome finds that

> to judge from the constant cries of distress reported in the early books of Livy, the fifth and fourth centuries were years of increasing poverty. To add to the desperate situation, the extensive forests which had ensured rainfall well into the summer and had helped husband the moisture in the dry season were ever giving way to the axe. The pressing demand for land resulted in the clearing out of every tract that could be made arable; the abundant population laid large demands upon the forests for lumber; and commerce carried Latin timber as far as Greece, now well stripped of trees. The de-forestation of the Volscian mountains on the south of the Campagna resulted in the ruin of that whole region, for the rains washed the mountain sides clear of soil, carried down the detritus into the flat plain below, choked up the courses of the streams, and turned what was once the garden spot of several large cities into malarial marshes, a pest not only to its own dwindling population but also to villages as far off as Satricum and Astura. Norba, Cor, Setia, and Privernum dwindled down to unimportant hamlets. The same process of deforestation of the Sabine Hills turned these also, into bare rocks. Precipitation decreased, the dry seasons grew in length, the rain that fell found its quick course to the sea, and Latium became gradually the semi-arid plain that it is to-day.[3]

The almost complete disappearance of the great family communities (*Zadrugas*) of Montenegro was caused, we are told, by

[3] Tenney Frank. *An Economic History of Rome*, 1920, pp. 56-57.

the persistent cutting down of trees in the Black Mountains, which had a disastrous effect upon the flow of the streams and, thereby, on the productiveness of the fields.

In China deeply gullied plateaus, guttered hillsides, choked watercourses, silted-up bridges, sterilized bottom lands, bankless wandering rivers, dyked torrents that have built up their beds till they meander at the level of the tree tops, and mountain brooks as thick as pea soup testify to the changes wrought once the reckless ax has let loose the force of running water to resculpture the landscape. What I observed in Shansi along the Fên River is typical:

> Once the tree cover is removed, the rains wash the soil from the hillsides and with it fill the watercourses and choke the valleys. Wherever a brook or creek debouches into the valley of the Fên, it has built with this wash a great alluvial cone, curving downriver, and along the crest of this cone runs the shallow gravelly bed of the stream that once loitered under high banks three or four fathoms beneath its present level. This cone has covered under silt and sand and gravel from a few score acres to several miles of the former rich bottom lands and they can never be recovered.
>
> Buildings are imbedded to the waist in the débris. Gateways that once one could ride a camel through, one can now only creep through on hands and knees. Twice we came upon majestic stone bridges which once spanned broad affluents of the Fên, but which now, their noble arches half silted up, stand unused amid fields of beans and rape, sad monuments of a bygone prosperity.[4]

From the once-wooded hills opposite Hong Kong the soil has been washed away till the country is nothing but granite boulders. North of the Gulf of Tonkin, it is said, not a tree is to be seen and the surviving balks between the fields show that areas once cultivated have become waste. Erosion stripped the earth down to the clay and the land had to be abandoned. One hears of districts, once populous, in which the mountains are dry, gray skeletons, the rich bottom lands lie smothered under silt, and there is now one family to four square miles.

Says Marsh in his *Man and Nature:*

> There are parts of Asia Minor, of Northern Africa, of Greece, and even of Alpine Europe, where the operation of causes set in action by man has *brought the face of earth to a desolation almost*

[4] Ross, *The Changing Chinese*, 1911, p. 271.

as complete as that of the moon; and though, within that brief space of time men call the 'historical period,' they are known to have been covered with luxuriant woods, verdant pastures, and fertile meadows, they are now too far deteriorated to be reclaimable by man; nor can they become again fitted for human use except through great geological changes, or other mysterious influences or agencies of which we have no present knowledge or over which we have no prospective control.

Soil exhaustion. In Rome ruthless overcropping brought on the turning of tilled land into pasture, the indebtedness and ruin of the Latin yeomen, the growth of great estates (*latifundia*), the formation of an urban populace, the exaction of a grain tribute from the provinces, the deliberate conquest of grain-producing countries, and the development of Rome into a huge parasite, living, as Seneca puts it, "on the spoils of all nations." But, since Rome sucked food from the provinces, the shadow of soil exhaustion presently fell upon them also. Sicily, Sardinia, North Africa, Spain, went the way of Italy, which in Sophocles' time had been a granary for Greece. Only Egypt, annually refertilized by the Nile slime, escaped exhaustion.[5]

DETERIORATION OF THE RACIAL BASIS OF SOCIETY

Society may decay because the make-up of its people has changed for the worse. Here are some respectable hypotheses but I warn the reader to be cautious in accepting them, for this is quaky ground!

Race displacement. After close study of Rome Tenney Frank concludes:

> What lay behind and constantly reacted upon Rome's disintegration was, after all, to a considerable extent, the fact that the people who built Rome had given way to a different race. The lack of energy and enterprise, the failure of foresight and common sense, the weakening of moral and political stamina—all were concomitant with the gradual diminution of the stock, which, during the earlier days, had displayed these qualities.[6]

The cityward flow. The glittering cities lure the brighter youth from the fields and tempt them to strain for the prizes of

[5] See V. Simkhovitch, "Rome's Fall Reconsidered," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. XXXI.

[6] "Race Mixture in the Roman Empire," *American Historical Review*, vol. XXI, p. 705.

success. But in the city they marry later, die sooner, and leave fewer children than their dull cousins on the "home place." Until the nineteenth century cities were sinks, their deaths always exceeding their births; nothing kept them up but the endless inflow from farms and villages. That of late deaths have been cut until the urban population of to-day can reproduce itself should not make us forget how for ages cities were blast furnaces in which the talented rose and became incandescent, but, nevertheless, disappeared without having replaced themselves.

Selective emigration. A strong and continued emigration, when it takes away the more hardy and enterprising, is likely to lower the quality of a people. The great outflow of Greeks, particularly after Alexander's conquests had opened all Western Asia to them, may have had something to do with the flatness of the Silver Age. The conquest and peopling of the Americas and the Philippines drained Spain of numbers she could ill spare. An outflow caused by persecution for ideas takes away cream, as we see from the record of the fugitive Huguenots and other hounded sectaries that founded certain American colonies.

Extirpation of the superior. Otto Seeck, historian of the later Roman Empire,[7] undertakes to account for the world-historic decline of ancient society by social mis-selection. The decay of ancient Greece, marked by a lamentable lowering of the standard in every department of culture, he charges to the ferocious party struggles between aristocrats and democrats. In these struggles, at each turn of fortune's wheel, the *élite* of the defeated party were banished or slaughtered. Thus we read of seven hundred families being exiled at one time from Athens, one thousand leading citizens executed at Mitylene, four thousand at Gela. In the course of generations of such savage work the contending factions drained Greece of her best blood, and left to her surviving insignificant and mediocre families an inglorious and decadent future. In like manner Seeck connects the decline of ability among the Romans, especially the notable decline in their courage and force of character, with the wholesale massacres of the Social Wars. Marius and Cinna murdered the aristocrats and their personal enemies by thousands, Sulla extirpated the democrats with equal ferocity, and the remaining noble blood was spilled under the proscriptions of the Triumvirs. Most of the bold were slain; only

[7] *Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt*, 1895.

cowards remained alive, and from their progeny issued the timid, characterless generations of the Lower Empire.

The European peoples which since the end of the seventeenth century have contributed the fewest great names to the world's beadroll have been Spain, Portugal, Austria, and Belgium—precisely those which were noted for their "religious unity," most encouraged religious celibacy, and went farthest in destroying as "heretics" such as, in Galton's phrase, "were the most fearless, truthseeking and intelligent in their modes of thought and therefore the most suitable parents of a high civilization."

Self-elimination of the superior. *Social achievement* may dissipate a people's original capital. On its up-curve a growing civil, military, and ecclesiastical organization draws together talent and creates brilliant centers of energy which attract the capable from rural huts and cabins as lighthouses fatally attract birds. In camps, courts, cloisters, universities, and capitals the *élite* are brought to a glow and feed the flam of civilization. The flower of the race is wasted in warfare, or trampled under in civil strife, or drawn to centers where, a prey to wants and ambitions which interfere with breeding, it becomes glorious but sterile, fecund in deeds, ideas and grace but not in children!

From data assembled by Sorokin [8] we discover a marked tendency of eminent families to die out partly from low fertility, partly from their greater risks. By the fifteenth century almost all the aristocratic families of the time of the Crusades were extinct. The notable families of the Middle Ages rarely lasted longer than a century. The French aristocratic families usually disappeared within three hundred years. Of 500 aristocratic families of the fifteenth century scarcely any exist to-day. Of 394 peers in England in 1837, 272 were created after 1760. In Nuremburg of 118 patrician families, 63 died out in the period 1390 to 1490. In Berne of 381 families, 148 died out 1717-1787. Of 1219 aristocratic families of Sweden 946 died out in a hundred years; 251 families lasted into their second century; 21 into their third century; only 1 family survived 300 years. A like extinction has been observed among patrician families of Augsburg, Geneva, Amsterdam, Hamburg, Venice.

[8] *Social Mobility*, 1927, pp. 357-9.

SUBJUGATION

Foreign conquest usually shatters the social organization of the conquered, frequently warps their character, and prevents them from maintaining a normal group life. Note the reputation for slipperiness the peoples have that have long lain under the blight of the Turk. On the Russian soul the Mongol yoke left scars which even after four centuries are still discernible. The Irish are very different from what they would be had they been left to themselves. The contrast in emotional tone between the East Indians, who have long been under an alien yoke, and the Siamese, who are still "running their own show," is impressive. The self-conscious East Indians are grave and tense; they have so often been "sat upon" by the alien in office that they go ever in dread of a rebuff. The Siamese, on the other hand, are all smiles, for they feel themselves masters in their own house.

INTERNAL CAUSES OF SOCIAL DECADENCE

Besides causes lying *outside of* society or *under* it, there may develop *within* society conditions which cause decay. In what follows there lurks much fog, for this matter has been by no means cleared up.

Increasing heterogeneity. When a people has come to be a hodge podge from engulfing floods of immigrants of diverse racial origin and cultural background (*e.g.,* the United States between the Civil War and the World War), or from incorporating population bodies differing from one another and the integrating kernel, its social clock is turned back. More crime results, increasing resort to harsh punishment, growing bitterness of industrial conflict, less faith in *government by consent of the governed,* fewer matters on which a true public opinion forms, increasing difficulty of regions, areas, and local communities getting together for team work!

Demoralization from shift of cultures. When recent immigrants are many and motley society is strained. For when an immigrant has sloughed off his old-home culture before he has been mastered by the culture of his new home, he slumps morally. To approach the strange culture he has to become tolerant of conduct out of line with his old standards; so he becomes *tolerant of his own conduct.* The old standards lose power over him, and until he completes the shift to the new culture he may be de-

moralized. Those who grow into the new as fast as they slough off the old escape this slump; but some are never gripped by the new culture at all, so they remain unreliable.

Here is the explanation of the fact that among nature peoples the emancipated young are found less reliable than the worshipers of old gods. From his own traditions and customs the native had certain values and controls; on taking over from missionaries and traders new customs he does not at once take over the new controls. In Polynesia the natives became utterly disorganized because they saw that certain things, such as eating forbidden fruit, could be done with impunity by the whites.

Unfavorable social surroundings. It has been pointed out [9] that in Honolulu the dependents, juvenile delinquents and criminals are disproportionately numerous in the areas inhabited by the poor of all races. Commenting on what happens when Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, Filipinos, Porto Ricans, and Hawaiians leave the plantation to live in Honolulu, Romanzo Adams observes: [10]

One of the ways through which city life tends to disorganize the people has to do with the location of residence. When a man is reasonably prosperous he tends to select his residence in a neighborhood of good repute and this means, for the members of the larger immigrant groups, a neighborhood in which the standards of his own people are maintained. But when a man falls below a certain level of economic success he may be under the necessity of living in the area of lowest rents. In such areas a family is pretty sure to meet the poorer families of other racial groups. Poor people have extra difficulties. There is more incentive to stealing and other sorts of delinquency and less influence of neighborhood sentiment for the maintenance of standards. Poor people are not able to choose their associates or those of their children. The families of these polyglot tend to destroy each the standards of the others.

Natural leaders dwarfed or intimidated. *Overgrowth of institutions* may kill liberty, weaken character, and intimidate the originative minds which might take the lead in movements to adapt society to changed conditions.

Take Spain. In the course of eight centuries of wars at once national and religious, loyalty and religious fervor grew to be master passions. Poverty and ignorance, the natural results of

[9] A. W. Lind, "Some Ecological Patterns of Social Disorganization in Honolulu," *American Journal of Sociology*, Sept., 1938.

[10] *Interracial Marriage in Hawaii*, 1937, p. 285.

incessant warfare, were favorable to the development of that unquestioning obedience to king and priest which became characteristic of the Spanish people. So the time arrived when state and church were able to work their will. The former, with long, exhausting, foreign wars on behalf of religion; the latter, with the expulsion of the Moors, the forced emigration of the Jews, and the extermination of most original variant minds by means of the Inquisition, so wasted the strength of the people that by the end of the seventeenth century retrogression was visible in all departments of national life. Population had shrunk, Madrid having lost half her numbers within a century. Much soil had gone out of cultivation. Seville had lost all but three hundred of her sixteen thousand looms; Toledo, all but thirteen of her fifty woolen manufactories. The fisheries had so fallen away that they could not furnish sailors for a few royal ships. Charts had been lost and Spanish pilots had become ignorant of their own waters. It was impossible to pay the army or to man the fleet. The upper classes knew nothing of science or literature and were unacquainted with the most momentous events outside their own country. All books, save books of devotion, were despised; no one collected them or consulted them. The French ambassador at Madrid summed up the state of education by saying: "In Spain science is a crime and ignorance a virtue." Even yet the Spanish mind bears deep traces of the long and emasculating servitude to which it was subjected by its blind loyalty to throne and altar.

Deterioration of national character. Once a social standpipe has been erected, a people's character is formed not only by its daily experiences, but also by the models set before it by social superiors. If these should become luxury-loving and soft, their traits might gradually sap the manhood of the people. In Sparta, on the other hand, the military ideal in time caused the egoistic type of character to prevail to such a degree as to make true society impossible. The *harmosts* or administrators sent out to govern segments of the Spartan empire were anything but worthy and admirable persons! Above all the mal-distribution and misuse of wealth have demoralizing effects. Summarizing Machiavelli's theory of decay the poet says:

> There is the moral of all human tales;
> 'Tis but the same rehearsal of the past:

First freedom, and then glory—when that fails,
Wealth, vice, corruption, barbarism at last,
And history with her volumes vast
Hath but one page.

The critical spirit releases egos. Among a people like the early Athenians, who had a strong folk religion and who in any case could not have survived without coöperation, the we-feeling is strong. In this period great artists like Aeschylus and Sophocles exalt the broad, simple, general, human qualities and glorify the heroic. The next generation, however, secure and prosperous, feels no such pressing need of team work. The great achievements of the past are piled before their eyes. The national art has reached sublime heights. The less original spirits are tempted to batten on the products of their illustrious predecessors, so that a host of parasites and imitators spring into existence. As for the stronger spirits, they find themselves at odds with national traditions. Perceiving that the heroes and gods of the old dramatists are mythical, they reject the naïve religious and patriotic ideas of the folk. Euripides takes this analytic critical attitude. In *The Frogs* Aristophanes sets him and Aeschylus against each other as representative of great opposed tendencies. The critical spirit of Euripides, his sarcasm, his ridicule, his fault finding, all help to dissolve the beliefs that hold people together. He stresses the qualities which distinguish him and other intellectuals from the mass, not the qualities they all have in common. Thus in Euripides' tragedies we discover that striving after effect and novelty which is the sure symptom of individualistic art.

In the following period the effect of the disintegrative critical spirit working upon a thwarted and war-worn people becomes manifest. Faith in one's fellows, in the high destiny of one's people, is gone. The accepted aim is to get the most out of life for one's self. Teachers make private life rather than public life the subject of inquiry and precept. The sentiment of patriotism is so weak that mercenaries make up the army. The ardor for liberty has died down. "How much better is it," exclaims Menander, "to be under a good master than to live in poverty and be free!" He also coins the maxim: "He who fights and runs away may live to fight another day." Politics is abandoned by the best classes, and the gifted retire to schools of philosophy. The lower natures become dissolute, the higher become aloof and self-centered. Having lost

its folk root the religion of this period is full of strange ceremonies and foreign gods. Temples are no longer built; it is house architecture which now develops. In a word, ancestors, posterity, the group, no longer give life its meaning. The aim is to get the most out of it for me and mine.

The instincts are set above reason. Of Cleon, the popular leader who led Athens into a disastrous militancy and imperialism, Aristotle says: "It is he, who seems to have done most to corrupt the people by means of their own instincts." A like manipulation of popular instincts and feelings is open to the modern newspaper owner. The newspaper has a great and growing power over the public mind because it fixes the perspective in which current events are seen by the reader. By controlling the distribution of emphasis in the telling of facts, by stressing day by day one sort of facts and keeping the opposite sort in the background, by giving the news which he wants noticed the front page and bold type, while giving the news he wants overlooked an inside page and nonpareil, the newspaper owner *manufactures* the impressions that breed opinion. If he controls a chain of important newspapers, he may make public opinion without the public being aware of it! Now what he will make it depends upon the conditions of competition in newspaper publishing. Consulting his own interest, the newspaper proprietor is tempted to curry favor with his readers by appealing to their prejudices rather than patiently build up in them a rational opinion. If he chooses the latter course, his trade rivals will quickly seize their opportunity to lure away his readers by taking the former line; so that, long before he will have educated the public to follow his lead, his rivals will have the circulation and advertising, leaving him with a small but select body of readers plus an approving conscience. In short, "actions which respond to the more primitive feelings and impulses, first thoughts, established prejudice, can be stimulated by the modern newspaper far more easily than action which is prompted by rationalized second thought."

The remedy is not the curbing of newspapers but *the strengthening of corrective influences*. The *pulpit* addresses our deeper selves rather than our easily stirred instincts. The *teacher* relies on knowledge rather than emotion as a means to social progress. The *book-writer* more often challenges the reader's intelligence than does the newspaper writer, so that book-reading steadies.

Adult education through university extension makes for rational judgment on public affairs. The spread of *community center forums,* where questions of public interest are discussed in a reasonable and responsible way, is another offset to the "yellow" newspaper.

Rise of privilege and caste. We-feeling quickly dies out if the social system is seen to embody plain injustice. Generally poor do not hate rich provided that society is still fluid and competitive. They comfort themselves with the hope, "Even if *I* can't get up, some child of mine will." But the pushful capables who have won to power or wealth try to throw down the ladders they climbed by in order to shield their sons and grandsons from being knocked off their perch by other climbers. As the successful thus wall themselves off and become a caste, a sense of injustice spreads among the masses.

We see now why a large and flourishing middle class is a guaranty of social health. It means plenty of stepping-stones leading from bottom to top. It insures a circulation of individuals which keeps hope alive in the ambitious youth of the lower orders. Such a middle class mediates between the extremes, allowing neither aristocrats nor populace to have its way with the other. It prevents the state from becoming a class state, and social institutions from becoming mere props of injustice. The dwindling of the middle class, leaving the people in two camps, poor and rich, is, therefore, an ill omen. On the one hand is a nobility of wealth that, having rid itself of every useful service to society, has given itself up to luxurious enjoyment; on the other, a rough, uncouth, unbridled, and irresponsible peasantry or populace—and no broad bridges leading from the one to the other. Neither camp feels that the other is a part of "us." Each feels that its interests will be sacrificed if the other gets the upper hand, and will therefore go to any length to gain and to keep power. The national society is dead, and in its place are "two states, the one of poor, the other of rich men; and they are living on the same spot and always conspiring against one another." [11]

Decadence in social culture. Social culture is as subject to decay as social organization is. A recent "manifesto" of the "futurist poets and artists of Italy proclaims

[11] Plato, *The Republic,* Book VIII.

War is beautiful because it fuses in harmony Strength and Kindness.
War is beautiful because it realizes the long-dreamed-of "metalization" of the human body.
War is beautiful because it "symphonizes" fusillades, cannonades, pauses choked by silence, and the perfume and odors of putrefaction.
War is beautiful because it completes the beauty of a flowery meadow with the passionate orchids of machine-gun fire.
War is beautiful because it creates new architecture, as the heavy tank. It creates the flying geometrics of the airplane, the spiral smoke of burning villages, etc.

If "war is beautiful" it will be so *no matter which side wins.* But the futurists give themselves away when they add:

War is beautiful because it serves the greatness of great Fascist Italy.

Oho! So it *does* make a difference in the "beauty" of war *whose* are the putrefying corpses, *whose* are the burning villages!

In the same vein a son of *Il Duce* remarks in his book on Ethiopia:

War is certainly educational. I recommend it to everybody. . . . War was a sport for us, the most beautiful and complete of all sports.

This glorification of reciprocal mass murder is as if one found in a roomful of scrofulous, hydrocephalus, or syphilitic children a "beauty" not visible in a garden of active and happy youngsters!

DISQUIETING TRENDS IN SOCIETY CAN BE ARRESTED

Review of what has been done in the more alert self-conscious societies to check decadence encourages. *A people can have whatever type of society it is fit for.* The reason that bull-fighting did not become the popular sport in the New World colonies peopled from Britain and France that it did in those peopled from Spain is that more of the citizens loathed it and kept it from getting a foothold. Or consider what the Franciscans, the Baptists, the Methodists, the Quakers, did to make *their* world better!

This being so, it is the social scientist's job to discover and point out mal-functioning social organs; to call attention to sinister trends in the volume of wife-desertion, juvenile delinquency,

lynching, news suppression, tax evasion, "racketeering," offerings of worthless securities, etc.; to set forth the remedies which may somewhere have been taken and to evaluate their results.

Reformers too often picture society as "going to the dogs," paint things so black that one doubts if anything can be done. This is a pity because every close student of society knows that certain reform movements of the past built up healing forces which still operate, that there are many social ills from which we as a people remain free, and that if only those of good will among us can be brought to coöperate our major ailments can be remedied.

As a rule healing comes only from those who themselves are sound in character, judgment and knowledge. A disorganized individual *may* help fight social disorganization, but probably he won't. In general, you cure a social ill by getting enough of the sound to accept and push through the right course of treatment. If the sound are too few you get hold of the young, so as to turn out a larger proportion of sound and wise.

In our society there is no lack of sound persons to put over such betterment policies as the experts recommend. All that is needed is to rouse them to the demoralization going on and induce them to put their personal influence and money behind the right remedies. The repression of industrial child labor, the unmasking of interested propaganda, the arrest of consumer gouging, the unveiling of deceitful advertising, the encouragement of body-building games and sports, as well as the combatting of liquor, "dope," gambling and prostitution—all are carried to final victory only by the sound.

CHAPTER L

DETERIORATION OF ORGANS AND STRUCTURES

No matter how well a social structure has been contrived it will "go bad" if not prevented from doing so. Unless attentively cared for, it will, sooner or later, succumb to one of the following diseases—

Patronage. Some one has to pick the members of a staff, and it is not easy to prevent that one from assigning the desirable post to kinsman or friend rather than to the best-qualified applicant. In China the claims of family are felt so keenly that every kind of public organization is vitiated by *nepotism*. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries nepotism was the cancer in the Papal States. Each pope felt that he could trust only those utterly dependent on himself, consequently he raised his own relations to wealth and influence. Each papal clan hurried to gorge itself before the next pope should supplant it with *his* hungry kinsfolk. Under Clement VIII the Aldobrandini, under Paul V the Borghesi, under Gregory XV the Lodovisi, and under Urban VIII, with unparalleled rapacity, the Barberini, enriched themselves.

Nepotism is the disease of well-endowed churches just as gout is the ailment of rich men. But the bestowal of places in return for money, political influence, or personal service makes a black chapter in the history of the state. In England over two centuries ago the policy of turning out all the lower officials to make room for party men was adopted by the very generation that originated party government. Under George III, who used it to get the better of the party system, the patronage abuse reached scandalous heights. Between 1820 and 1870 England went over to the "merit system," opened to competition 80,000 government positions, and laid the foundation for an unprecedented efficiency in her administrative departments. The United States was moving in the other direction, and in the third quarter of the nineteenth century the sacrifice of fitness in public servants to favoritism and party work reached its zenith. During the last third-century, however, great

progress has been made in freeing public office from subordination to private or party interest.

The patronage disease is not confined to government; *it may attack any structure with places worth seeking.* Business concerns, universities, churches, charities, and voluntary associations are by no means immune to it. Occasionally nepotism shows itself clearly in the salary roll of banks and life insurance companies. Fortunately the disease is a patent one; publicity, proper checks on the power of appointment, and scientific methods of testing qualifications and measuring performance will cure it.

Corruption. Inordinate greed in its personnel may cause a social structure to deteriorate. Outsiders who have an interest in seducing the servant tempt him with the prospect of secret illicit advantage. Under the terms "graft" and "boodle" Americans have in forty years become familiar with the means by which their agents are made faithless. For a bribe the alderman votes to present a valuable franchise to a telephone company, the supervising architect of the new city hall passes work "not up to specifications," the police ignore the existence of brothels, the promise of political aid influences the vote of the legislator. Contracts for public work are jockeyed into the hands of a favored firm instead of the lowest bidder. Inspectors are hired to shut their eyes to evils which it is their duty to report.

Not only *public* servants are unfaithful. Railroad officials withhold freight cars from coal companies along their line that fail to present them with blocks of stock. Buyers for retail firms swing orders to the wholesaler most lavish with gifts or entertainment. Officials take advantage of their inside knowledge to speculate in the securities of their company. A ring of officials taps the treasury of a railroad with bills for needless or fictitious repairs on cars. The directress of an old ladies' home gets admitted to the institution an aged family servant whom she ought to care for herself. In order to attract a gift of tainted money a church muffles its moral message, while in order to hold in line a restive donor a college denatures its teaching in ethics or economics.

"Red-tape." In the endeavor to forestall corruption administrators sometimes bring on a disease nearly as bad, viz., a complication of procedure which makes prompt action impossible. Thus a French commission cites the case of an officer who, having received permission to have made for him at the Old-Soldiers Home a pair

of non-regimental boots, found himself indebted to the state for the sum of 7 fr. 80, which he was very willing to pay. To render this payment regular there were necessary three letters from the Minister of War, one from the Minister of Finances, and fifteen letters, decisions, or reports from generals, directors, chiefs of departments and such like!

Indifferentism. Generally a *social structure* is less subject than is *an individual* to the enlivening prick of competition. People cannot turn from one health department or school system to another as they turn from one merchant or physician to another. The taxpayers, moreover, often have but the vaguest notion of what they ought to get for their money, so their dissatisfaction with the service registers itself in a smaller appropriation rather than in a "shake-up" of the organization. In the same way an ancient and renowned university will be patronized even if inept, and a church without a rival, dominating an ignorant and submissive peasantry whose whole mental outlook it controls, *e.g.*, the Catholic Church in the tropical countries of South America or the old Russian Orthodox Church, can with impunity sink into sloth. Whenever a structure is exempt from the natural penalty of poor service, this blight is likely to fall upon it.

Indifferentism is a senile rather than an infantile disease. So long as a social structure is on trial it will be put in charge of energetic persons who, by agitating for it or by previous volunteer service, have given proof of disinterested zeal and who will not tolerate listless subordinates. But after the service has struck root and made good its claims to support, after a certain good-will has been created and a guiding routine established, a type worms into it who thinks only of how much he can get out of it.

It is commonly assumed that a structure is safe from dry rot if it is under a vigorous administrator who will weed out the lazy and promote the zealous. This indeed is just what a man does in order to get good service from his own employees. But the bureau chief does not own the bureau and hence cannot be trusted to deal always with his subordinates according to their merits. In order to guard against inferior posts being treated as patronage the incumbent is made so secure in his tenure that an energetic chief cannot promptly rid himself of languid underlings who are clever enough to avoid downright provable incompetency.

Indifference is so quickly felt and resented that a structure

brought into direct relations with the general public will not be allowed to suffer long from this disease. A service like the police, fire fighting, street-cleaning, the weather bureau, the post office, or the school cannot go far in this direction without calling forth a storm of protests from influential persons. Save where there is a monopoly "cinch," indifferentism in a university is punished by loss of matriculates, in a clergy by loss of communicants, in a hospital by loss of patients. When, however, the sufferers from slackness are ignorant or lowly people—orphans, dependents, the ailing poor, the aged, borrowers, convicts, prostitutes, natives, negroes, or immigrants—the disease is not so promptly checked. So, also, when the structure is one that does not betray its sloth to the general public—a navy yard, an arsenal, a forestry bureau, or a customs service—the remedy must come from above.

In some cases *inspiring leadership* suffices to cure indifferentism. The tabulator yawning over his adding machine, the gymnasium instructor sweating over his awkward squad, may loathe his task because he fails to see its larger significance. Under a leader who can fire him with a vision of the meaning of it all he may thrill with pride in his work. It is said that the thousands of workers at Panama went at their daily task with a right good will because they felt it as part of a stupendous, everlasting achievement—the CANAL! Sometimes an effete church, university, or religious order has been roused from its torpor under the captaincy of a man of genius and ardor, who kindles cold routinary souls with a vision of the greatness of their opportunity.

Formalism. The dull person contents himself with *going through the motions* of rendering service without troubling to see whether the benefits intended are indeed realized. For example, a building ordinance is adopted by a city and an inspector is appointed to see that it is obeyed. At first he issues building permits on the basis of architect's plans submitted and later inspects the building to see whether the plans have been carried out as approved. But as the city grows he has less and less time for inspection, until at last he sits all day in his office issuing building permits on the strength of the plans which builders later change to suit themselves. Without realizing it he has become a pure formalist.

Courts of justice are very subject to this disease, because one litigant or the other has an interest in urging technicalities. Thus

comments an American observer upon the difference between the American and the British consular courts in China:

In the British courts the direct dive to the gist of the matter before the court, and the intolerance of technicalities is what astounds and impresses the American lawyer. The wearying, formal, perfunctory round of demurrers and motions is entirely missing. Mere technical objections are easily and impatiently waved aside, and exceptions to pleadings right speedily cured wherever possible without postponement. Hence, being unsuccessful in achieving any advantage, such objections tend to lapse into disuse.

Other formalisms of organs of justice are: record worship; the insistence on trying records rather than trying cases; the throwing of causes out of court because brought in, or taken to, the wrong court or the wrong venue instead of transferring them to the right one and saving all prior proceedings; inflicting "the monstrous penalty of a new trial" when the jury appear to have been influenced by improper argument by counsel or by confusing expert evidence, when the error might have been corrected very simply in an oral charge to the jury by the judge.

Institutions for dependent children are very subject to formalism, because the victims make no outcry and no one of influence takes a strong interest in the fate of the individual child. It seems incredible that a foundling asylum which loses 97 per cent of its babies should survive, yet experience has shown again and again that good people, pleased at going through the motions of succoring foundlings, will keep on with it. *A large orphanage* is just the sort of thing a formalist loves. The money laid out makes a brave show, the bigness of the charity is obvious, and the children, made spick and span, can be collected in one place to feast the eyes of donors and visitors. It is overlooked that children cannot be raised well on the wholesale plan, that the institution-child lags far behind other children in development, that the best parts of its nature atrophy from disuse, that all through life it will never stand for much nor alone, and that it would be infinitely better off if placed in a normal family, even if thereby the service to the orphan sank out of public view.

The formalist loves visible material relief of destitution—baskets of food and bales of clothing distributed to dingy women in shawls —but he never thinks of visiting the tenements to see how the

weekly dole at the poor-office affects the habits and morals of the poor. He sneers at charitable societies which dispense few groceries but waste their income in paying salaries to "a lot of trained workers who do absolutely nothing for the poor"—save to hunt a job for the out-of-work, overhaul the plumbing which has produced disease, arrange for the removal of the ailing family to a better neighborhood, persuade the landlord to wait for the rent, stand off the holder of the chattel mortgage, teach the mother to cook or earn, put the boy to a trade, or entice the children to the social settlement where they will get aspirations instead of alms!

The paradise of the formalist is the school, because it works with the mind, and the mind is something we know little about. In backward countries one comes upon such atrocities as making pupils learn by rote, parrot-like recitations of the textbook, primers made up of the sayings of sages, natural science taught without materials or laboratory. But look at our own sins. Children are set to work upon spelling-books full of strange words instead of studying the few hundred words which experience has shown they are likely to misspell. They are drilled in grammar instead of being trained in the correct use of their mother-tongue. They agonize over arithmetic operations which no one uses in real life. They pore over books instead of handling what the books tell about or doing what the books describe. They are made to labor over stuff utterly without use or interest—Latin prosody, for example—in order to "strengthen their mental faculties," although experiments show that facility gained in doing one thing is not transferred to the doing of other things.

Universities especially are liable to formalism because of their ability to bluff, browbeat or bully their critics. At the time of the French Revolution Oxford students were still required, in order to receive their certificates as trained thinkers, to repeat long "strings" of syllogist affirmations and denials on some question in moral or natural philosophy. Even in our own universities, goaded as they are by a sharp rivalry among themselves for gifts and students, we mark formalism in the abuse of the lecture system, in the endeavor to turn out examination passers, and in the refusal to grant the graduate student credit for supervised field work.

Obsolescence. The history of English charitable foundations is instructive as to the folly of regulating the present according

to the will of the past. Owing to changes unforeseen by the testator, thousands of the twenty-eight thousand perpetual charities brought to light by the great survey instituted in England a century ago had become useless or even harmful. Funds had been left to provide forever for superannuated wool carders; for teaching children to card, spin, and knit; for apprenticing the children of poor Protestant soldiers in Cork, a city in which for a long time there had been no Protestant soldiers; for conducting services in the French tongue in the Walloon chapel of Canterbury Cathedral, although the congregation had known no French for a hundred years; for disseminating the doctrines of a sect that had died long since; for repairing causeways and bridges in a wet district which had been drained to the point of no longer needing causeways and bridges; for the ransom of Christians held captive by the Barbary corsairs; for the relief of those imprisoned for debt; for leper hospitals; for doles to needy persons who will stultify themselves by repeating some prescribed religious formula; for schools with fixed courses of instruction reflecting the educational ideas of the Elizabethan period.

In 1851 Bryan Mullanphy established a fund to aid "worthy and distressed travelers and emigrants passing through St. Louis to settle for a home in the West." A few decades later for lack of beneficiaries the fund had piled up until it totalled a million dollars! An American university has an endowed lectureship on coal gas as a cause of malarial fever! Millions have been given in perpetuity for the support of orphan asylums although now everybody realizes it is better to rear orphans in homes rather than in orphanages. The spread of birth control has solved the problem of finding good homes that will take orphans.

Gifts in perpetuity exempt a social structure from the necessity of constantly justifying itself in order to win current favor and support. This is why the rich college or charity is likely to fall behind the times and do little good. Adam Smith, who knew well the English universities, characterized them as—

> for a long time the sanctuaries in which exploded systems and obsolete prejudices found shelter and protection after they had been hunted out of every other corner of the world. In general, the richest and best-endowed universities have been slowest in adopting those improvements [in science] and the most averse

to permit any considerable change in the established plan of education.[1]

This, to be sure, is but one aspect of endowments. While they make possible an obsoletism that would soon be the death of an institution with nothing to depend on but current support, they do maintain men who devote themselves to rendering valuable services which, nevertheless, fail to command a fair price, either because they benefit all alike or because those who receive them will not or cannot pay what they cost.

Any social structure will fall behind the times unless outside pressure forces it to keep abreast of its opportunity. Thus an old government office or bureau that can take its appropriation for granted wears a rut for itself, so that a "shake-up" may be required to get it onto the right lines. But then it will start to wear a new rut as deep as the old one, and, if swift change is going on all about it, in a score or two of years it will need another upheaval to adjust it to new conditions. Hence, the more rapidly society changes, the sooner it develops away from its structures and the oftener it should overhaul them or inject into them "new blood."

Various causes hinder a social structure from molding itself to the changing situation about it. One is the force of habit. This being strongest in the aged will be felt most when the structure is controlled by those who have grown old in it. If it is in a bad rut an outsider must be put in charge.

An organization composed of several parts resists needed changes in its functions or methods because of the extra trouble they involve. After the parts have come to work together smoothly an alteration in a single part to adapt it to an outside situation may necessitate a whole series of adjustments between this part and all the others. The worry and friction until the machinery is again in good running order accounts for the stiffness of all intricate human organization. The more complex a structure the greater the pressure needed to keep it near its point of greatest usefulness.

It requires much more intellectual effort or ability to redirect the work of a school system, a bureau, or a charity than to continue on established lines. To go on doing the same thing in

[1] *Wealth of Nations*, vol. II, p. 357.

the same way is the line of least resistance. A growing sense of futility will rarely rouse one to the exertion of studying his task afresh and devising new ways of tackling it. Often, indeed, mediocre minds are utterly incapable of originating a better adaptation of the structure to its opportunity, so that, unless able men are put in charge and given a free hand, the adaptation will not take place.

Finally an old, imposing social structure comes to have an atmosphere which in time affects nearly every one in it. One's subconsciousness becomes saturated with suggestions of the excellence of everything "we" do and the way "we" do it; of the greatness of the "institution" or "service" and its right to one's loyalty, of the bothersomeness of the pupils, orphans, patients, citizens, or enlisted men the organization serves and their ungratefulness for what "we" do for them; and of the ignorance, stupidity, and malice of the outsiders, who actually criticize "us" and want to change "our" ways. Steeped in this atmosphere, the man who is progressive in principle stands like a rock against reform in his organization; the man who pounces like a hawk on inefficiency anywhere else has no eyes for the red tape and circumlocution in his office; and the man with a keen sense of the absurd feels no twinge as he stores the toys given to the orphan asylum in the loft, "where they won't get broken," or provides for a furnace in the plans of a government building in the cane belt!

Absolutism. Absolutism is a disease of social structures *absolved from* obedience to the judgment and wishes of their time. It arises from the delusion that a structure may function better if it is subject to bygone wills rather than to living wills; whereas living wills are better if they are the wills of those who know and care most about the problem. The policy of an endowed charity hospital, for example, ought to reflect the judgment not only of the dead founder, but also of the living who best understand and are concerned about the relief of the ailing poor. This of course is altogether different from subjection to the state or to majority rule.

An unendowed institution will keep in step with its time owing to its need of attracting contributions; it is *the financially independent establishment* that is liable to be caught in an eddy. Ever since the church lost general control of charities, the favorite

form of government for a foundation has been the board of trustees which fills vacancies in its membership, *i.e.*, the co-optative or self-constituted board. The only alternative has been the board chosen by the religious body—which admits the sectarian bias—or by the state—which lets in the taint of "politics."

But the self-constituted board easily gets out of step with its generation. Any special tendency which may develop in it is likely to become intensified and fixed. The element which happens to be in the majority when a vacancy is to be filled picks a man of its way of thinking. He in turn helps to get in others of the same kidney, so that a passing bias becomes chronic. Just as the shifting of portions of the cargo in a listing ship hinders her righting herself and increases the list, so a mistaken temporary leaning in a board may be made lasting. It would be hard to invent a system surer to bring the institution under a clique and set it at odds with intellectual advance, moral progress, or social development.

The problem of the close corporation has been often met. We know what happened to the English rotten boroughs in 1832 and to the old governing bodies of the English municipalities in 1833. In 1853 England subjected the boards in charge of her thousands of endowed charities to a government body, the Board of Charity Commissioners. The French Revolution ended the autonomous establishments for public benefit in France and put education, poor relief, and other social-welfare concerns under the direct control of the state. In Germany the communities, corporations, and proprietors which carry on charities originally in charge of the church have been gradually losing their autonomy, since the state more and more interferes in their action or takes over their resources and responsibilities.

In this country the state has not asserted itself, but the public is becoming enlightened enough to resent the type of government provided for the great foundations of recent years. Such oligarchic control is the less excusable now that we know of a better way of choosing trustees. Recently one of our greatest universities provided that the faculty, the alumni association, and the board itself shall take turns in filling vacancies in the board of trustees. The only security that a public-service institution shall constantly reflect in its ideals and policies the best thought of its time is to found it on the intellectual-moral apexes in society.

Thus interest in the advancement of natural science apexes chiefly in universities, government scientific bureaus, and national scientific associations. Here then are the groups that should share in selecting the trustees of a scientific-research institute. Enlightened concern about public health comes to a head in public-health associations, anti-tuberculosis associations, medical societies and colleges, and like groups. Where are better sources of judgment as to who should have a hand in governing a medical-research foundation? There is little intelligent solicitude for the poor that does not express itself in charitable societies, charity-organization societies, and a host of other philanthropic groups. Generally those included in such groups work with a deep and unselfish interest and are ahead of, rather than behind, their time. If boards in charge of endowed orphanages, rescue homes, and free hospitals filled vacancies from names submitted in turn by these groups, it would be impossible for the management to continue long at odds with the best current knowledge and ideals. Let the board itself fill every third or fourth vacancy in its membership in order that unorganized or minor interests shall not go unrepresented.

Here then is a means of recruiting the governing boards of quasi-public institutions which insures their ready response to the best forces of their time. An alternative is for wealthy donors to cease to set up gifts in perpetuity but to provide that their whole fund, principal as well as interest, shall be expended within (say) fifty years. By that date others should be ready to "carry on" provided the cause has commended itself to the best thought of its time.

Perversion. Founders cherish the vain hope that their college, charity, or religious house may be kept to the charted course; but, alas, no human foresight can save from degeneration a structure that has high aims and puts a strain on ordinary human nature. Despite your checks and safeguards, in a few generations perhaps, it will have become the exact opposite of what was intended. Your beacon is now a will-o'-the-wisp, your rock of salvation a quicksand, your healing spring an infected pool. There is indeed no way to keep it true to its purpose *save to make it responsible to those in each generation who are spiritual brothers of the founder.*

The more brilliant its success, the sooner a movement becomes

infested with self-seekers. The higher a young religious order flames up, the sooner its pure fire dies in the inrush of cads. With rapid expansion the membership grades down, and after the pioneers and their disciples are gone the character of the organization changes. Three centuries after St. Francis his "Little Brothers" were "arrogant mendicants, often of loose morals, begging with forged testimonials, haunting the palaces of the rich, forcing themselves into families, selling the Franciscan habit to wealthy dying sinners as a funeral cloak to cover many sins."

As a structure expands the *administrator* is called to the helm rather than the *inspirer*. Thus Frate Elias, skilful organizer but no saint, succeeded St. Francis as head of the Franciscan Order. With the organizer comes less faith in *spontaneity* and more stress on *form* as embodying the founder's ideal. The life of the monastery is directed less by religious impulse and more by rules, the work of the research institute less by fruitful ideas and more by routine. Everything runs "as if by clockwork," only the one does not produce great characters nor the other great discoveries. While St. Francis lived the stern rule of absolute poverty was applied with "the genial concessions and exceptions he knew how to make," whereas half a century later, under St. Bonaventura, his monks had to follow a formal and lifeless discipline. To twirl the end of one's girdle cord, to sit with crossed legs, to laugh, to sing aloud, were all unworthy of Franciscan decorum!

When a body has won prestige and power it is a standing temptation to the unscrupulous to capture it and convert it to their purposes. Thus the popes of the Renaissance enriched themselves and their families by misusing the vast authority of the Catholic Church, while the representatives of the East India Company employed the great power of the company to build up their private fortunes by practising extortion upon the people of India.

As a body gains wealth and popularity, it holds its members by benefits, so that they will tolerate a concentration of authority which would wreck a young society. Masterful organizers who love power for its own sake magnify their office. In a religious organization control becomes established in the clerical order. St. Francis was a mere layman, but Albert of Pisa, the first priest to become head of his order, instituted that laymen should no longer be elected as officers. In England by the middle of the sixteenth century the charitable foundations were regularly in the

hands of monks and priests. The right of choosing officers in the English craft guilds was restricted to their liveried members, and later, control passed from them to a still more select body, the Court of Assistants.

Thus the body becomes machine rather than organism. Without voice the rank and file lose the genial we-feeling that once warmed their hearts. They stick to the organization for the benefits it gives or the opportunities it offers, but their loyalty is less pure than when it was truly theirs. Moreover, just as control slips away from them to a higher class, so may the benefits leave them. The Roman baths were originally intended for the poor, but under the Empire they became the exclusive privilege of the wealthy. The thirty-three endowed grammar schools of London were all metamorphosed to teach the children of the higher class. Harrow, one of the most expensive of English schools, was founded by a bricklayer for the free education of the ranks in which he had been born. Male trustees twist foundations left for the sexes equally, to the service of the male sex; the endowments of Christ's Hospital given for the most destitute classes and "for girls as much as for boys" were found in 1865 to be educating 1,100 boys and only 25 girls, nearly all from the middle classes.

Finally the structure becomes an end in itself. The university exists for the benefit of its dons. A local charity becomes the means of enhancing the social prestige of the ladies back of it. The courts of chancery instituted for the protection of orphans whose money was liable to misappropriation by unscrupulous relatives had become in Dickens' time a machine which sucked up all their money in interminable lawsuits, the lawyers being far more dangerous to the orphans than the guardians from whom the lawyers were to protect them.

Since the independent structure is never safe from perversion, society should beware of bestowing upon it favors and privileges. Let it have fair play, nothing more. An unmodifiable charter should never be granted. Buildings actually used for public worship, education, or relief may be left tax free, but the exemption should not extend to other property of a private corporation. The one-sided partnership, so common in some of our states, whereby the public furnishes an annual subsidy to be expended at the discretion of the private charity, has shown the ugliest tendencies and should cease. Public funds should never be given to an edu-

cational institution not under public control. No legitimate service should be withheld by the state in order that the field may be left clear for the private agency. The public asylum, hospital, clinic, school, university, library, or research institute should be set up in order to correct and spur the private institute. The self-constituting governing board should be looked upon with suspicion, and the state's right of visitation, report, supervision, and revision should never be allowed to lapse through disuse.

CHAPTER LI

TRANSFORMATION

Some changes in society *happen;* others are *willed.* Let us call the former *transformation;* the latter, *reshaping.* Now, the factors which *transform* may be distinguished as *static-dynamic processes, transmutations* and *stimuli.* Let us consider them in this order.

The accumulation of results from static-dynamic processes. Certain regular activities of man leave behind them unintended by-products which in time accumulate and bring on social changes. Hunting, by elimination of the less cautious creatures, eventually makes the game scarcer and shyer, so that the tribe may have to look for a supplementary food-basis. In the pastoral stage the continual escape of the wilder members from the herd and the resultant breeding from the more tractable perfects domestication and so paves the way to the adoption of agriculture. Disturbing, also, are operations which modify the physical environment, such as deforestation, the building of dykes, canals, drains, causeways, and roads. Mining, clearing, reclaiming, enclosing, as well as the extermination of pests, have a dynamic effect seeing that they lessen the material they have to work upon. The digging of the precious metals transforms society by making them in time so plentiful that the "money economy" supersedes the "natural economy."

History abounds in striking instances of large changes brought about by cumulative processes, i.e., those which left *a little more or less* of something. In the Dark Ages the short-sighted practice of rewarding military services with estates, which, at first granted for life, later became inheritable, eventually dissipated the resources of the Crown and led to feudal decentralization.[1] In the course of centuries the death-bed gifts to religious corporations caused a fifth of the soil of Europe to be accumulated in the "dead hand" and made the Church the richest institution on

[1] M. Kowalevsky, *Oekonomische Entwickelung Europa's,* vol. II, 1901-1914, chs. 1 and 2.

earth. The oppressive exercise of their justice-of-the-peace powers by the great proprietors of medieval Germany pressed down the peasants one after another into a servile condition, until at last free cultivators ceased to exist. The similar practice of Southern justices a few years ago in imposing on negroes arrested on petty charges excessive fines, and binding them to work at a paltry wage for the planter who paid the fine, would in time have subjected the bulk of the Southern negroes to forced labor had not the Federal courts intervened.

Transmutations. These are unintended changes due to the difficulty one generation has in accurately reproducing the copy set by its predecessor. The speech of our ancestors underwent the unnoticed sound-shiftings recorded in Grimm's law. Refracted through generations of scribes, pictographs shrivel into conventional ideographic characters. Natural gestures became fossilized into meaningless forms. Coins minted first as tiny spades or knives drift into unrecognizable shapes.

Human institutions and relations likewise glide insensibly into unintended forms. Presents freely given a chief pass into presents expected, even demanded, while volunteered help passes into exacted service. Bank-notes, issued as certificates of deposit of coin and redeemable on demand, come to be looked upon as real money, and circulate long after the tradition of the old right of redemption has been lost, and the original deposit dissipated. Often it is by an imperceptible process that lordship ripens into property. In India minor officers, courtiers, and servants "were provided for by being allowed to take, in individual villages, the whole or part of the Raja's grain." "In time these claims develop into a landlord right over the village." "The change from revenue-manager to landlord was accomplished in about a century." [2] An ethical religion tends to become external and perfunctory, owing to the fact that its *spirit* is more quickly altered in transmission from father to son than its *form*. The most sacred commands and the most authoritative ideals will be unwittingly deformed if they run counter to human inclination and have not been fixed in writing.

Since the word *evolution* is applied to a series of changes brought about by the operation of *resident* forces, social changes

[2] See B. H. B. Baden-Powell, *The Land Systems of British India*, 1892, vol. I, pp. 131, 186; vol. II, p. 224.

brought about by *static-dynamic processes* and *transmutations* may therefore properly be termed *social evolution.* These are what sociologists have in mind when they insist that society *evolves,* in fact cannot be prevented from evolving. A society may be so wedded to its institutions that it suffers no willed change—like the Greek city-state which decreed death to any citizen who should propose to alter its constitution—but it cannot arrest *social evolution.* Hence, it had better leave the door open to changes which *adapt* institutions to the new situations which social evolution has brought.

STIMULI

Now, there are other unwilled social changes the causes of which are to be sought not *in* society but *under* or *outside*[3] society. The growth of population, the production of the man of inventive genius, do not occur in the societal cycle but in the biotic cycle under it. The accumulation of wealth happens in the economic process which underlies men's social relations. The interaction of societies and the cross-fertilization of cultures illustrate how society may be pulled out of its orbit by outside forces. *We may call these factors of social change "stimuli" and their result "social growth."*

The growth of population. Increase of numbers changes adversely the man-land ratio, making it harder to gain a livelihood. This stress then incites to new ways of wresting a living from Nature. The advance from the hunting stage to the pastoral did not follow promptly the domestication of animals, for man seems to have first tamed animals for amusement rather than for food. It awaited the pressure of numbers. Again, it was food-shortage which made man pass over from herdmanship to tillage. There is evidence that the earliest cultivators of the soil were "strangers attached to the tribe upon whom the rough work

[3] The production of revolutionary social change by a *single* factor is illustrated by the spread of the eating of the intoxicating cactus *peyote* by the American Indians. In the last half-century Peyotism has spread from its Mexican source through all the Indian tribes to the Canadian border. *Peyote*-intoxication—which differs greatly from that of alcohol and other narcotics—has become the basis for an extraordinary movement among the Indians, almost displacing their old tribal religions and whatever tenets of Christianity they have embraced. To them it is a beneficent plant given by the Great Spirit as a release from oppression by the Whites.

of the community fell, and who would be the first to suffer from a scarcity of food."

By causing these economic shifts the growth of population brings on changes in social organization. The adoption of pastoral pursuits converts the savage horde into the tribe, institutes property, establishes male kinship, develops patriarchal authority, favors polygamy and wife-purchase, makes woman a chattel, causes captives to be enslaved instead of eaten, and substitutes the *wergeld* for the blood-feud. The adoption of agriculture even changes the nature of the social bonds, for "the land begins to be the basis of society in place of kinship." Agriculture breaks up the tribe into clans which become village-communities; while the back-breaking toil tempts to slavery, the slave trade and slave-raiding. Increase of population causes the land to be taken up until at last the poor man has no direct access to Nature but must work for wages. When this point is reached slavery and serfdom tend to disappear of themselves, for it is no longer necessary to own laborers in order to have enough of them. Population pressure compels some to resort to inferior soils, and this, by enhancing the value of the better tracts and increasing the landowner's share of the produce, gives rise to an *agricultural aristocracy,* which, as it withdraws itself from labor and busies itself with politics and war, comes to rule society.

The enlargement of demand in consequence of the growth of numbers often causes an *exchange economy* to take the place of *domestic husbandry*. In some districts the natural resources fall short in certain respects and the local population desire to supply their lack from the larger resources of other districts, sending out in return those products of their own which are to be had in the greatest abundance. Hence, arteries of communication are created which, in turn, promote the territorial division of labor. Besides thus calling into being merchants, markets, and movements of goods, increase of numbers causes local groups of craftsmen to spring up producing articles formerly demanded in quantities too small to set up currents of trade. In place of periodical fairs town now regularly exchanges with country.

The need of better security for goods on routes traversing many local jurisdictions creates a demand for royal protection and cements that alliance of burghers with king which is so potent in humbling the feudal lords. In his struggle with the barons the

king chooses from the burghers of the town his agents and servants, and the chief of these, ennobled by royal patent, take their places alongside the old territorial aristocracy.

The towns which arose in the Middle Ages to meet the economic needs of an expanding population gave rise to fresh social and political developments. The feudal manor stood for constraint; the town, for freedom. "City air makes free" became a legal maxim. Outside the town the workers were serfs and labor was despised; inside, labor was respected and the worker had pride in his work. Outside, fighting and working were distinct occupations; inside, one wrought or fought as occasion required. Outside was caste; inside, men were in free and fluid relations. Moreover, town life develops a social mind more impressible and plastic than that of the open country. Outworn traditions and narrow local sentiments meet and cancel one another. The shutters of the intellect are taken down. The mind becomes supple and alert. Freed from the net of kin ties and class fealty the *individual* appears. The town is therefore a hotbed, where seed-ideas quickly germinate. It places itself at the head of the social procession and sets the pace for the country-dwellers.

Less traditional than the country, the city appraises men according to some *present* fact, their *achievement* or their *wealth,* rather than according to their *ancestry*. It is plutocratic or democratic in temper, whereas the countryside believes devoutly in lineage. In the city, people consume, as it were, in one another's presence, and hence they vie in expenditure more than country folk do. This intensifies competition, whets egoism, and restricts the size of the family.

Increase of social mass reacts upon organization. As society spreads, distinctions arise between local chiefs and the head chief, between local priests and the high priest, which lead to the formation of hierarchies. Differentiation occurs between sacred and secular functionaries, between military and civil heads, and between judicial and executive offices. The heavier burden of business obliges the ruler to surround himself with helpers, who in turn require other helpers, so that the governmental structure becomes complex. Power is deputed and redeputed; comes into the hands of the leisured or the trained. The poor no longer have part in government. Says Mommsen: "Now that Rome had ceased to be a purely Italian state, and had adopted Hellenic

culture, it was no longer possible to take a small farmer from the plow and set him at the head of the community." [4] "Under Chlodovech and his immediate successors," we read, "the People, assembled in arms, had a real participation in the resolution of the king. But with the increasing size of the kingdom, the meeting of the entire people became impossible." [5]

Changing age make-up of population. In 1850 those of the American population under twenty were about six times as numerous as those over fifty. By 1930 this ratio was about as seven to three. When our population becomes stationary those under twenty will be actually less numerous than those over fifty. Of this change Paul H. Douglas observes: [6]

> America will rapidly lose its juvenile quality and youth no longer will be the main center of attraction. The old man and the old woman, instead of being the last leaves upon the tree, will become more and mort important in America. And who knows but that the psychology of senescence may in twenty or thirty years be more important than the psychology of adolescence? The problems of family psychology may be how to enable old people as well as young people to live in family life. Young people will no longer be able to ignore old people.
>
> As the fall in the birth rate causes population to approach the stationary state
>
> A great deal of the buoyancy which has characterized America because of the expansion of population will be removed . . . the boosterism of our real-estate owners and merchants will disappear from American life. . . . Children will be removed from that general spirit of quantitative optimism and there will be instead an emphasis upon the inner life and upon qualitative aspects of education, culture and character. . . .

The accumulation of wealth. General prosperity is a dynamic factor. Production expands not along the entire line of commodities but chiefly in the higher grades of goods, and in comforts and luxuries. This results in the transfer of labor and capital from certain occupations to others, from extractive industries to elaborative industries, from the fabricating of goods

[4] T. Mommsen, *History of Rome*, vol. II, p. 384.

[5] G. Richter, *Annalen der deutschen Geschichte im Mittelalter*, 1895, pp. 119-120.

[6] *Child Welfare Pamphlets, No. 38*, State University of Iowa, 1934.

to the rendering of services. There will be some shift of population from country to city and from centers and regions producing necessaries to centers and regions producing luxuries. So far as augmented production is widely dedicated to capital-building, the sacredness of property will be emphasized in morals and law, while there will be wider support of government as a property-protecting institution. With more goods to consume there is more dread of vice, so that morals are less concerned with restraining one from aggression and more concerned with fortifying one against temptations to over-indulgence.

In accumulation some will distance others, and these rich may become eventually a distinct social class. Almost inevitably great wealth translates itself into political power, legal privileges, and social prestige. "The heroes of the Homeric poems," says Maine, "are not only valiant but wealthy; the warriors of the *Nibelungen Lied* are not only noble, but rich. In the later Greek literature we find pride of birth identified with pride in seven wealthy ancestors." [7] Among the ancient Irish the nobles are in seven grades, distinguished chiefly by wealth. At the bottom of the scale is the Aire-desa and "the Brehon law provides that when the Bo-Aire has acquired twice the wealth of an Aire-desa and has held it for a certain number of generations, he becomes an Aire-desa himself." [8] Owning a horse, so as to be able to fight from horseback instead of on foot, has been the germ of every knighthood, e.g., the Greek *hippeis,* the Roman Equestrian Order, the Gaulish *equites,* and the medieval riders (*Ritter*), horsemen (cavaliers, *chevaliers, caballeros*), or knights.

With economic equality vanishes that primitive political equality of citizens based upon their equal value in defending the commonwealth. The poorer citizens slip into a position of economic dependence while clients and retainers multiply. "It is by taking (live) stock that the free Irish tribesman becomes the Ceile or Kyle, the vassal or man of his chief, owing him not only rent, but service and homage." [9] Meanwhile the rich give themselves up to martial exercises and war and, since they are well-accoutred and expert in wielding weapons, they often prove themselves more than a match for the *plebs.*

[7] *Early History of Institutions,* 1875, p. 134.
[8] *Ibid.,* p. 136.
[9] *Ibid.,* p. 158.

Wealth inequalities lead to civic inequalities. Service in the Roman cavalry, at first obligatory upon every man who could furnish two horses, became after a time a badge of superiority. Men of standing remained in the cavalry after they had become too old to fight. "Young men of rank more and more withdrew from serving in the infantry, and the legionary cavalry became a close aristocratic corps." [10] By the time of Sulla the dying out of the sturdy farmer class and the formation of an urban rabble had converted the Roman army "from a burgess force into a set of mercenaries who showed no fidelity to the state at all and proved faithful to the officer only when he had the skill personally to gain their attachment." [11] Finally the rich came to feel that it was a shame that they should have to do anything they disliked. In Cæsar's time "in the soldiery not a trace of the better classes could any longer be discovered. In law the general obligation to bear arms still subsisted; but the levy took place in the most irregular and unfair manner. . . . The Roman burgess cavalry now merely vegetated as a sort of mounted noble guard, whose perfumed cavaliers and exquisite high-bred horses only played a part in the festivals of the capital; the so-called burgess infantry was a troop of mercenaries swept together from the lowest ranks of the burgess population." [12]

Under great pecuniary inequality the notion establishes itself after a time that *human worth is measured, not by one's achievements or personal merits, but by one's scale of consumption.* This lifts pecuniary racing above all other forms of rivalry, and spreads a foolish luxury through the upper circles of society. Percolating down through the social strata artificial wants divert a large part of income from the service of real human needs. In all classes the craving for wealth is raised to an extravagant pitch, while everything else is lowered in value. Very clearly is this to be seen in the decline of the Roman Republic after the slave economy had wiped out the middle class. Says Mommsen: "To be poor was not merely the sorest disgrace and the worst crime, but the only disgrace and the only crime; for money the statesman sold the state and the burgess sold his freedom; the post of the officer and the vote of the juryman were to be had for money; for money

[10] Mommsen, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 379.
[11] Mommsen, *ibid.*, vol. III, p. 455.
[12] Mommsen, *ibid.*, vol. IV, p. 581.

the lady of quality surrendered her person as well as the common courtesan; the falsifying of documents and perjuries had become so common that in a popular poet of this age an oath is called 'the plaster for debts.' Men had forgotten what honesty was; a person who refused a bribe was regarded, not as an upright man, but as a personal foe." [13] There was "nothing to bridge over or soften the fatal contrast between the world of the beggars and the world of the rich." [14] "The wider the chasm by which the two worlds were externally divided, the more completely they coincided in the like annihilation of family life . . . in the like laziness and luxury, the like unsubstantial economy, the like unmanly dependence, the like corruption differing only in its scale, the like criminal demoralization, the like longing to begin the war with property." [15]

Wealth which wells up at new spots or comes into new hands is a great upsetter. The first full-fledged aristocracy develops on the basis of revenue from land. If, however, by the side of the territorial nobles there forms a considerable body of plebeian rich, the social structure is sure to be warped. It matters not whether the source of these fortunes be piracy, commerce, colonial exploitation, tax-farming, or finance; money is a power which assumes super-economic forms. The fall of the early Greek aristocracies was due to the fortunes made in commerce, shipping and manufacture. Absorbed in war and politics the Eupatrids were confronted by new men who by clearing and enclosure, sometimes by marriage, had become owners of landed estates. The assault of these upstarts on the political monopoly of the nobles began the movement which ended in democracy.

In the Middle Ages flourishing trading or mining towns bought of their lords special rights and immunities, and thus virtually ransomed themselves out of the feudal system. In France, when extending his authority at the expense of the feudal *seigneurs,* the king leaned constantly upon the class which had become wealthy by tax-farming, trade, and manufacturing. The strong trend toward democracy which manifests itself in the societies which have grown up in new countries outside of Europe, such as Amer-

[13] Mommsen, *ibid.,* vol. IV, p. 616.
[14] Mommsen, *ibid.,* vol. IV, p. 621.
[15] Mommsen, *ibid.,* vol. IV, p. 621.

ica, Australasia, and South Africa, owes much to the diffusion of opportunities to own property brought about by access to land.

The interaction of societies. The action of one society upon another by way of *commerce, migration,* and *war* is frequently a cause of social change. *Commerce* between societies hitherto self-sufficing makes them depend upon each other for certain goods. The balance of occupations within society is upset and this may lead to institutional changes. All through Asia trade with Europe and America is destroying the native arts. In the fifteenth century the demand from the Continent for English wool resulted in the conversion of fields into sheep pastures, the inclosure of much common land, the raising of rents, the eviction of customary tenants, an over-supply of labor and the freeing of the villeins from their hereditary bondage. Again, it is the rise of foreign trade which converts domestic slavery into capitalistic slavery. Negro slavery would never have gotten such a hold on our South had not Europe stood ready to absorb cotton in unlimited quantities and to pay for it with manufactured goods, which slave labor is so unfitted to produce.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, *emigration* played no small part in the transformation of European societies. The settling of vast fertile tracts by these emigrants, coupled with steam transportation, developed an overseas competition which, by depressing agricultural profits in the Old World, lessened the landlord's share of the produce. The rent receiver prospered less than laborer and capitalist, with the result that the political and social domination of the land-owning class was broken. The modification of American society by an extremely heavy immigration from Europe has already been referred to.[16] How much more should we have been transformed had we admitted Orientals as freely as we let in Europeans! The presence here of ten million Chinese and Japanese would have acted like a continental upheaval, changing classes, institutions, relations—everything!

Still more momentous are the changes brought about by warfare between societies. Fighting on the same side promotes not only political unity, but religious unity as well. So long as they dwelt undisturbed in the home they had won for themselves in Canaan, the children of Israel succumbed constantly to the seduction of the local Baal cults. But whenever danger united

[16] In chapter I. See also Ross, *The Old World in the New,* 1914, chs. ix-xii.

them against a common foe, their loyalty to Jehovah, the god of their nomad life, was revived. Their wars prevented their assimilation to the Canaanites and the consequent failure of their religious career.

War, moreover, creates kingships. The Hebrew monarchy began in this way. During peace Saul returned to his own estate and lived there with a few followers. David's conquests and successes, however, gave the monarchy that solidity which enabled his son Solomon to supplant the tribal with the civil organization, lay taxes, levy *corvées,* conscript troops, establish a court and create a new nobility. The Germanic invasions united the kingship with the leadership of the army, which had become permanent. The Crusades, which were preached under the auspices of the Popes, tended to aggrandize the papal authority within the Church. The grinding of people against people not only merges the civil with the military power, but may unite the state with the church, as occurred in Spain and in Russia.

Chronic and profitless warfare waged by levies of freeholders ruins the middle class. The exhausting duel between Israel and Damascus produced the evil state of things which aroused the reforming prophets, Amos and Hosea. The little farmers lost their lands during their absence in the field, and on their return debt crushed them into slavery. Great estates took the place of small holdings and the poor became dependent on the rich. Likewise in early Rome:

> The burdensome and partly unfortunate wars, and the exorbitant taxes and task-works to which these gave rise, filled up the measure of calamity; so as either to deprive the possessor directly of his farm and to make him the bondman, if not the slave, of his creditor lord, or to reduce him through encumbrances practically to the condition of a temporary lessee of his creditor.[17]

Sometimes a defensive struggle *raises* an oppressed class. Taking advantage of a military crisis which caused jailed debtors to be released to fight the foe, the Roman *plebs* extorted from the patricians the creation of tribunes to protect the rights of the plebeians. Moreover, remote military enterprises may waste and weaken the ruling caste. The Crusades rid Europe of many turbulent nobles whose presence made order and industry well-nigh

[17] Mommsen, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 349.

impossible. The decimation of the petty baronage under the pressure of debt, battle and disease, threw more power into the hands of the king's officials. Taking advantage of the Crusader's need of cash, the towns bought immunities of him, and the abbeys and priories took a mortgage on his estate.

Victorious warfare yields booty, captives, lands and tribute, and the disposal of these may upset the equilibrium of classes. Maine surmises that the capital which Greek eupatrids, Roman patricians, and Gaulish knights lent to commoners at such rates of interest as to force many of the borrowers into debt slavery and lead to violent social upheavals, may have originated in the seizure by the nobles of the lion's share of the spoils of war. In early Roman society much depended on whether the state land was let in great blocks at a nominal rent to the aristocrats or was allotted as homesteads to the commoners. The one policy strengthened the patricians, the other the plebeians, in their two centuries of conflict. More decisive for Roman society than even the state lands was the glutting of the labor market with those made captive by the incessant conquests of the State. It was the ruin of the middle class by slave competition that brought destruction on the Roman commonwealth.

The contact and cross-fertilization of cultures. A society may quit its natural orbit by borrowing institutions which have originated in some other society. The Christian Church, Roman law, the feudal tenure, parliamentary government, the jury system, and the feudal principle spread far beyond their original habitat. The centralized government of Louis XIV found imitators all over Europe. The spectacle of free institutions across the Channel was fatal to the Bourbons in France. The abolition of serfdom, as now the woman's movement and social legislation, spread largely by national example. A social evolution obeying resident forces only has disappeared from the face of the earth, seeing that to-day the germs of every new social arrangement are blown about the world, and peoples at the most diverse stages of culture are affected by the example of the advanced societies. In all Asiatic and North African countries the more stirring elements are agitating for schools, clinics, law codes, model farms, experiment stations, motor highways, recreation spaces, public water supply, public hygiene and broadcasting stations.

Usually, however, the peoples have rejected alien *institutions*,

but borrowed alien *elements of culture,* which, nevertheless, in time are likely to work social transformations. When a backward people is in contact with a highly cultured one, there occurs simple borrowing; but when the peoples are nearly abreast on different lines of development, one fructifies the other and a higher culture results. Just as the crossing of two strains may yield a progeny superior to either, so the crossing of two cultures in the minds of an *élite* may initiate a superior culture. One reason is that contact with a culture not too unlike one's own produces that open-mindedness so essential to progress. Another is that by retaining what is best in its own culture and replacing its poorer elements with superior elements from an alien culture, a people may create a blend surpassing both. Finally, the meeting in originative minds of dissimilar ideas or ideals may fecundate thought and produce a flood of inventions. Thus the meeting of Orient and Occident engendered neo-Platonism, and the mutual fertilization of Christian tradition and classic culture by the Revival of Learning produced the Renaissance.

The innovating individual. Ideas born of gifted minds deserve credit for most of the changes in society which are of a progressive character. In the main, such transforming ideas are either the *industrial-martial* inventions or the *religio-scientific* innovations, the reason being that these are *condition-making.* Since there is no herdsmanship without the taming of animals, no agriculture without the domestication of plants, no water communication without the boat, invention had much to do with that expansion of population or of wealth which I have shown to be so pregnant with social change. The inventions pertaining to warfare—chariot, armor, Greek fire, gunpowder, cannon, machine-guns, submarines—have been fateful for the survival of the more ingenious races and for all forms of domination.

Next in importance are the inventions which have facilitated transportation and communication—wheeled vehicle, boat, sail, compass, rail, steam, airplane, telegraph, telephone, wireless, radio. These call into being cities, promote diffusions and comminglings of races, hasten crossings of cultures and blendings of blood, abolish frontiers, make possible vast political units and supersede local association by national, even international, association. More than this, they accelerate progress by transmitting *everywhere* good new ideas which arise *anywhere;* so that every

section of mankind is served not only by its own inventive spirits, but by the productive geniuses of the human race. Last come the *condition-making* inventions embodied in languages, sciences, and speculations. Languages support the inter-mental activities by which like-mindedness spreads. Physical sciences further the progress of mechanical invention. Speculations about the Unseen determine to what extent men's groupings and institutions shall acquire sanctity by being bound up with the gods. The revolutions in ideas wrought by founders of religion reverberate in society almost as much as the revolutions in production wrought by mechanical inventors.

In some cases, however, a new institution or relation springs directly from the individual mind. The Hebrew prophets who originated worship without sacrifice, and the Reformers who proclaimed "justification by faith" consciously severed the tie that binds layman to priest. With his principle that the ties of kinship should be wholly subordinated to the ties of belief Mahomet gave a new basis to Arab society. Cæsar was a social inventor when he established the principle that insolvency shall not cost the debtor his freedom. So was St. Paul when he conceived that the gospel was for Gentiles as well as for Jews. So was St. Benedict when he devised the "Rule" that gave form to the thousand monastic communities of Western Europe. So was Hildebrand when he imposed sacerdotal celibacy upon the Church. Pythagoras, St. Francis, and Loyola originated new types of religious confraternity. Henry IV instituted the invalid soldiers' home. Grotius modified the relations of nations. Robert Raikes invented the Sunday school; Toynbee, the social settlement; Le Claire, the profit-sharing group; Raffeisen and Schulze-Delitzsch, the coöperative credit association; Pinel and Tuke, the modern insane hospital; Marbeau, the *crèche;* Howard and his successors, the reformatory; Barnardo, boys' work; George, the Junior Republic; Leverhulme, the "garden city"; the Hetheringtons, the "play school."

TRANSFORMATIONS OF OUR TIME

Ours is a tumultuously dynamic epoch. Never before has the bulk of mankind been required to adapt itself so quickly to great underlying changes.

In 1930 Professor W. F. Ogburn observed: [18]

Never before in the history of the world has there been so much change. The radio broadcasting has been a development of the past ten years. So also has been the auto-bus service. The good roads have come within the past twenty years. The electric refrigerators are a product of the past five years. The talking picture is only two years old. Moving pictures have developed within twenty years. The great growth of chain stores has taken place within the past ten years. The replacement of the horse on the farms by the tractor has occurred in the west since the war. Telephone service across the Atlantic is a result of the past three years. Transportation by air is a post-war growth. There were no investment trusts in the United States before the war. The era of great mergers in businesses and banks has been within the last decade. The use of color in decoration and clothing has been greatest in the past ten years. There has probably been more social change in the State of Virginia in the past ten years than in a thousand years in ancient Egypt, more than in two hundred years in the Middle Ages and more than in five or ten thousand years among primitive peoples not in contact with civilization. Society hitherto has been largely a relatively stationary society. Change was so slow, for instance, in Biblical times, that no one ever thought of living as changing at all. It was only in the eighteenth century that people began to write about changes.

These changes have not been all in the realm of mechanical invention and other widespread adoption. There are many changes in social organization and in our social habits. For instance, the family is undergoing profound changes, the birth rate is falling and the decline has been rather precipitous since the war. So that families are much smaller now than they were a generation ago or even than five years ago. Since 1900 the number of restaurants has increased four times as fast as the number of families. The number of house servants has declined while the number of waiters in hotels and restaurants and the number of bakeries has increased. Our religious life is changing. Churches are discussing consolidation. There are fewer doctrinal sermons. The churches are taking an active part in the social life of our cities. The emphasis is more on the ethical conduct of social groups. Puritanism is on the decline.

Particularly is the position of women changing in society. The loom and spindle have long since deserted the home. The laundry tub and the sewing machine have made an exit in many homes, while the broom and stove are used fewer hours. The hours of labor of women in the home are declining, especially in the homes where there are no children or where the children have grown up. One out of every four women who work is a married woman,

[18] Commencement Address before Randolph-Macon College, Virginia.

and one out of every eleven married women now works outside of the home.

Primary factors of contemporary social change. These are:

1. The wide introduction of machinery and mechanical power.
2. Great improvements in the means of transportation and communication.
3. The application of Science to the destruction of human beings in warfare.
4. Discovery of many means of combating disease and saving human life.
5. The cheapness of printed matter.
6. The social policy of universal education.
7. Adoption of the scientific method in all fields of inquiry.
8. The establishment of *evolution* as a universal process.
9. The discovery of means of contraception.

Secondary factors of contemporary social change. Roughly the derivations of these are:

a. The growth of cities; from 1, 2, 4, and 5.
b. The extensive fixation of capital; from 1.
c. Great-scale industry; from 1, 2, and a.
d. Appearance of a leisure class founded on income from industrial capital rather than on the profits of commercial capital or the rent of land; from b and c.
e. Immense displacements of population by voluntary migration; from 2, 5, and 6.
f. Intermingling of dissimilar races and discordant cultures; from 2 and e.
g. Rise in the plane of popular intelligence; from 2, 5, and 6.
h. A higher standard of living; from 1, 2, a, and g.
i. Weakening of the authority of religion; from 7, 8, and g.
j. The voluntary limitation of the size of the family; from 4, 9, g, h, and i.
k. Acquisition of political power by the popular classes; from g, h, and i.

Mechanization. The greatest single influence transforming human life, both individual and collective, in our time is *the machine*. Among its effects are:

1. The extinction of the great class of independent skilled craftsmen, living mostly under favorable and fairly decent conditions and generally satisfied therewith.
2. The appearance of localized aggregates of workers living un-

der inherently unfavorable and disagreeable conditions with which they are dissatisfied.

3. Transfer of production from the skilled craftsmen to the financial operator—the manufacturer—directing machines and unskilled machine tenders.

4. Waste of productive capacity by the recurrent conflicts of employers with organized employees.

5. Waste of productive capacity by the periodical stoppage or slowing down of industry in consequence of production outrunning the buying power of the public. Industrial depression, unemployment, misery and anxiety until the goods in excess are somehow cleared away.

6. The formation of combines and trusts with the object of regulating the supply and prices of commodities without regard to economic conditions or the interests of the public.

7. "The creation of a relatively small number of immensely rich men having, through their wealth, the power to modify the conditions of life of the community and to control and direct the mental states and actions of their fellow men." [19]

8. The capture by the capital-furnishing class of an increasing proportion of the entire product as the "earnings" of their capital.

9. The utilization of innumerable forces—economic, financial, social, and governmental—to protect and augment the share of the product going to capital-furnishers and to hold down the share going to labor-furnishers.

10. Lowering of the self-confidence and social status of the worker by hand or brain and exaltation of the pride and social prestige of the non-worker, i.e., the "investor" of capital.

Adjustments urgently needed. Ideas, standards, and policies are quite as real entities as cannon and motor trucks, for they determine men's actions. Unfortunately, it is not so easy to perceive when an idea, standard, or policy is out of date and deserves to be scrapped as it is to perceive when a machine or technique is out of date and deserves to be scrapped. Consequently the great majority of men are holding to ideas, standards and policies which they learned from their parents or adopted in their youth, but which are unsuited to the changed situation.[20]

[19] R. Austin Freeman, *Social Decay and Regeneration*, 1921, p. 167.

[20] To illustrate: the idea of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man might render supreme service in this era of race intermingling. But see how it is compromised by the diction of war and monarchy. The common appellations of Jesus are "Lord," "Lord of Hosts," "King," "Prince," "Master." The Christian life is represented as a warfare, or as the orderly working of a great royal household with "servants," "stewards," "messengers," "soldiers." Among our favorite hymns are "Onward, Christian Soldiers," "Fight the Good

In half a life time, so headlong has been our rate of movement, much which appeared to be wisdom has become foolishness.

For example, now that necessaries of life for the masses are in the channels of trade, the merchant should not expect to be left as free from regulation as he was in the days when trade was chiefly in superfluities for the classes. More and more a concern engaged in supplying the public with a necessary will be looked upon as a public instrumentality and will be obliged to accept certain responsibilities. Those who insist that it is purely a private venture can only make trouble for themselves and for others. A generation ago the courts began to recognize that certain businesses are "affected with a public interest." In the eyes of the sociologist *all* considerable enterprises supplying us with essential goods or services are "affected with a public interest," and may properly be restrained from furnishing that which is other-than-as-represented, from arbitrarily discriminating among their customers, and from extorting a profit out of proportion to the value of the services they render.

National egocentrism out of date. In these days of close-knit economic inter-dependence among nations and universal publicity, for a nation to cultivate the naïve egocentrism which prevailed in the stage of national self-sufficiency indicates that it does not realize what kind of a world it is living in. In a time when, owing to economic interlacement, war spreads like a forest fire, the statesman who contends for the ancient unqualified right of sovereign states to fight out their disputes without hindrance shows that he has not adjusted his ideas to the contemporary situation.

Danger ahead. The prospect before humanity is dazzling. Within living memory science and invention have put mankind in possession of the means of ridding themselves forever of plague, famine, penury, overpopulation, ignorance, superstition, priestcraft, fanaticism, despotism, slavery, and caste. They have only to do everywhere what is now being done with success somewhere. But

Fight," "Hold the Fort." Says Fairchild: "As embodied in the formulated sects of to-day, the Christian religion is essentially pastoral, patriarchal, militaristic, despotic and feudalistic, and therefore fails to appeal to the citizen of an industrial democracy as a vital and practical thing. All the paraphernalia of thrones, diadems, armor, and blood-red banners arouse no response in the mind or heart of the day laborer, the clerk, or the mechanic—they are symbols without significance." *Applied Sociology*, p. 321.

most men's ideas of human relations and responsibilities are those of an earlier and simpler time. In many ways their inherited traditions inhibit their seizing the opportunities for good will, peace, enlightenment, and social progress which beckon them. On the whole their conduct and policies have not been accommodated to the rapidly-developing social situation, so that at many points we perceive class animosity, national antagonism, or race antipathy growing up. To reach the promised land shimmering on the horizon our generation has to negotiate a perilous "knife-edge; and our generation *may fail!*

CHAPTER LII

RE-SHAPING

Must we be content with such betterments of society as come of themselves? Or may we put in a hand to bring about desired changes? Surely the latter! One purpose in the study of living forms is to find means of improving the useful species of plant and animal. We search for the laws of physical forces in order, by means of machinery, to harness them to the service of man. With microscope and tube and stain we probe the life history of microörganisms in the hope of devising means of protecting our race against these invisible enemies. Why, then, is it not legitimate to sound social phenomena in the hope of learning how to mold them to our wishes? We suppress smallpox, typhus, diphtheria, the bubonic plague—why should we not endeavor to banish such social maladies as prostitution, juvenile delinquency, child exploitation, trampery, mob violence, family disintegration, religious rancor and race antagonism?

Indeed, attack upon the maladjustments among us is the logical consequence of developing a social science; for what is the use of working out causes and effects, of discovering how certain things condition other things, if we are to do nothing with this knowledge? In this time of growing social consciousness and easy dissemination of ideas are we to rest content with such tardy, haphazard improvements as are brought about by blind social evolution? Either leave society in self-ignorance or be reconciled to endeavors to improve it by intelligent collective will.

This is not strange and untried doctrine. Long ago, before there was writing or record, the social will began to divert the natural course of things. One of the oldest controls of human relations is pair marriage. What a bold interference of the community with a private matter—yet few wish to abandon it!

The "do nothing" philosophy. The social philosophy which expects the state to protect its *individual citizens* in their rights but to ignore *the social welfare* would require us to let the slave

trade start up again, allow the lottery to return, leave untrammeled the circulation of salacious books and pictures, give free course to the sale of narcotics and habit-forming drugs, tolerate polygamy, let the Spanish bull-fight acclimatize itself among us, and fold our hands while saloon and bawdy house, gambling room and opium den, animated by boundless greed, do their utmost to break down the good habits which home and school and church have been at endless pains to build up. An alluring program!

Proof that the human will can deflect the current of social life is afforded by the outcome of successful foreign Christian missions. Many years ago, after investigation on the spot, I wrote of missions in China: [1]

> What of the young men leaving the mission colleges unconverted, yet imbued with Christian ideals? What of the bracing effect on the government schools of competition with the well-managed and efficient mission schools? What of the government schools for girls, which would never have been provided if the missionaries had not created a demand for female education and shown how to teach girls? What of the native philanthropies which have sprung up in emulation of the mission care for the blind, the insane, and the leper? What of the untraceable influence of the Western books of inspiration and learning which, but for the missionary translations, would not yet be accessible to the Chinese mind? Among Chinese who neither know nor care for the "Jesus religion," the changes of attitude toward opium-smoking, foot-binding, concubinage, slavery, "squeeze," torture, and the subjection of women, betray currents of opinion set in motion largely by the labors of missionaries.
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> In other words, the running of so many "heathen" into our religious molds is not the chief accomplishment. Over and above the proselytes won are the beneficient transformations, intellectual and moral, wrought in great numbers of people who do not affiliate with the Church. Then, over and above such transformations of individuals are the transformations wrought in the society and government of the Middle Kingdom—better treatment of slaves, of prisoners, of orphans, of wives, of commoners. In this the missionaries have a great part, though no man can say how much. Finally, over and above the transformations of society are the transformations wrought in the Chinese civilization.

Let-alone (*laissez-faire*) was a philosophy wrought out by honest European thinkers, eager for social progress, who thought

[1] Ross, *The Changing Chinese*, 1911, pp. 245-6.

nothing would help like the removal of such old class hindrances to the operation of beneficent social forces as imprisonment for debt, the established church, laws against the combination of workmen, protective tariffs, and restraints of trade.

However, it just suited the rising capitalist class to insist that their success came to them in a "natural" order and owed nothing to favoring laws and institutions. For them, possessing already the legal rights which their pecuniary interests required, it was good tactics to cry down the devising of legal remedies on behalf of tenants, or laborers, or consumers, or women, or minors; to insist on the futility of man's laws in the face of "nature's laws"; and to harp on the failure of badly-drawn laws, unworkable laws, and laws never enforced, to produce the results hoped for!

The discrediting of do-nothing. The let-alone social philosophy touched its zenith in the third quarter of the last century. Then its power over minds began to be broken down, partly by the success and extension of such bold enterprises of social reconstruction as the German workingmen's insurance legislation, partly by the criticisms of thinkers like Lester F. Ward, the great champion of building up the science of society for the purpose of giving people some control over their destiny.

Do-nothingism is now in utter discredit by reason of the successes which stand to the account of the interventionist policy. Among these are:

1. Universal education at the public expense.
2. Social insurance.
3. Public provision of libraries.
4. The public provision of facilities for recreation.
5. Restriction of the industrial labor of children and women.
6. Reformative treatment of juvenile and first offenders.
7. The setting up at public expense of health centers and clinics.
8. Public works to absorb the unemployed.
9. The conservation of natural resources.

Societies which have adopted these policies show no inclination to turn back, but rather move onward in this path. Continually they perfect and extend them while other societies, after looking into their results, adopt them. If these are not proofs of success what should constitute such proof?

Other controls of social phenomena too recent perhaps to be regarded as settled give strong indications of permanence. Among these are:

1. The extirpation of prostitution.
2. Housing regulation and city planning.
3. The social regulation of wages and hours in industry.
4. Compulsory unemployment insurance.
5. Instruction of the young on the subject of sex.
6. Sterilization of born mental defectives.
7. The setting up of a code of practice for each branch of business.

These daring experiments in the deliberate shaping of social destiny have not disappointed men's hopes. The peoples which have ventured on these measures have to an amazing degree added to their longevity and lessened their sickness, mortality and loss of infant life. Comparison of the heights, weights and intellectual performance of school children shows that those peoples have the brightest outlook for the improvement of the next generation over this, which have been the most courageous and enterprising in applying intelligence to the removal of acknowledged social ills.

Modern instances. A belated society endeavoring to "catch up" with more advanced societies may safely introduce changes in a wholesale way that a vanguard society cautiously groping its way toward the better would not be justified in adopting. The modernizing of feudal Japan by a little band of far-sighted men acting in the name of a revered Emperor is an impressive object lesson in social telesis. Still more recent is the case of Turkey which, under the control of a progressive Parliament and an iron-willed President of immense popular prestige, has in fifteen years accomplished:

1. The abolition of the Caliphate.
2. The freeing of the State from religious domination.
3. The closing of the old mosque schools, the centers of narrow and fanatical teaching, and the reorganization and secularization of education.
4. The abandonment of Islamic law and the adoption of a law code patterned on that of the Swiss.

   family on the basis of the equality of husband and wife.
5. The outlawing of polygamy, and the reorganizing of the

6. The emancipation of women.
7. The adoption of the Western calendar.
8. The suppression of Arabic script and the compulsory adoption of Latin script.

CANONS OF SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION

While many such examples encourage us to endeavor to remold society "nearer to our heart's desire," there is, nevertheless, little prospect of success unless certain precautions are observed:

1. *Reforms must not misread human nature.* Proposals for having women in common, which have cropped up among Utopians ever since Plato, ignore the stubborn fact of sexual jealousy. "Free love" has no future because of the general craving for the comforting sense of security in love. Of the sixty-odd experiments in community life which have been launched in the United States all failed save those on a religious basis, because not sufficient allowance had been made for the greed and selfishness of the ordinary unsanctified person. Attempts to live in one big building, the Fourier phalanstery, collided with the widespread yearning for domestic privacy. Proposals for the state guardianship of children have not met with popular favor because they outrage the parental instinct. A century ago Utopians like Charles Fourier and Robert Owen assumed that God made man good, hence his faults must come from living in a bad social system. If only his surroundings be made right, man's inborn bent for harmony with his fellows will insure the success of a communistic order. Since Darwin traced the descent of man from sub-man, however, we may not view human nature in so rosy a light. Man's disposition was evolved in his pre-human phase as a part of his equipment for survival and includes some instincts which clash with social harmony.

2. *Reforms must square with essential realities if they are to succeed.* The anarchism of Kropotkin and Tolstoi grew out of observation of the process of spontaneous human adjustment in the Russian rural village and is unsuited to the expanded economic society of to-day. Coöperative production has disappointed expectations because business management is more difficult than it was formerly supposed to be. The settlement of city families upon rural land fails, not from inherent difficulty but because not enough instruction, guidance and credit have been provided

for the inexperienced settler. The Russian Communists at first quite underrated the rôle of managers and technical experts in production and after letting them go were eventually obliged to lure them back into the factories by high pay and promise of a free hand.

3. *Intervention should be preceded by a close study of the situation it is proposed to control.* The ambition to create a "science of society" has had the effect of importing into the study of social conditions the methods of exact observation in the field, counting, measurement, induction, and verification, all of which had been worked out in the older sciences. As a result, the interventions of to-day are made not on the basis of brilliant dreams and "hunches," but on the basis of comprehensive, thorough, and impartial investigation. Whether it be a legislature setting up a system of vocational education, a religious denomination planning the resuscitation of the country church, a philanthropic association forging a program on behalf of the rural young people, a wealthy foundation confronting the problem of promoting public health, or a great industrial concern under the necessity of gaining the good will of its employees, policy waits upon the results of a survey of the situation by experts. Some of the great modern pieces of social legislation, prepared by commissions after elaborate testimony-taking, investigation, consultations with experts and deliberation, are veritable landmarks in scientific lawmaking.

Sociology is, however, not an exact science. Even our most pondered measures may have consequences quite unforeseen. Laws restricting the industrial labor of children, by raising the age limit and cutting down the hours of work as well as enforcing school attendance, have converted the workman's children from an asset into a burden. It is not surprising, then, that there has been a marked decline of births in the manufacturing towns. Workingmen's compensation was originally urged as a legal remedy; only experience showed its unanticipated efficacy in directing the employer's mind to the prevention of industrial accidents.

4. *A reform should be tried out on a small scale before being adopted on a large scale.* It is fortunate that the large number of commonwealths in the American Union permits one state to experiment for the other forty-seven. One state makes a new

departure—a minimum wage for women, abolition of private employment bureaus, "mothers' pensions," the "social evil," probation of adult first offenders, the juvenile court, municipal ownership, factory sanitation, the surgical sterilization of degenerates. Other states watch attentively the results of the experiment and "follow suit" if the results are encouraging. It is significant that reforms which have had the support of the leaders in social work have not failed at their try-out, but have been adopted, with some modification perhaps, by other states.

5. *The weaving of several reforms within the same field into a social "plan" is risky.* In its first phase a reform is brought forward as a remedy for a specific social ill which all agree should be corrected. Presently a number of sound reforms have been proposed for evils within a certain field, say that of credit. You want a remedy for pawn shops, for chattel mortgages, for crop liens, etc. Then someone asks, "Why not integrate all these into a single comprehensive plan for the supplying of credit in all the forms called for?" We have done just this in the field of education—and it is a success. But it should be pointed out that in your blanket plan you are not only linking acknowledged social ills, but are providing for a lot of things which are even now well handled. So your case for social intervention has ceased to be simple and clear.

6. *Every fundamental social reform should be the outcome of a social movement.* The most egregious failures in social therapy have been reforms introduced *from above* without that preliminary process of agitation by which understanding of and sympathy for the reform are created. The cause of popular education is not advanced merely by multiplying schools; usually there is need of a campaign which shall plant belief in and desire for education in young people and in their parents. Interference with the private habits of a people in order to promote their health is usually futile unless at least two-thirds of the people understand why the habits are bad. If the liquor traffic is some day suppressed it will be because of an immense prolonged agitation against drinking. The creating of playgrounds is by no means the chief task of the recreation movement; the main thing is the spread of the gospel of play.

CHAPTER LIII

REVOLUTION

Ours is a time of turmoil and upheaval. Never were so many peoples restless, critical and outspoken as in the two decades since the World War. What overturns—Russia, Finland, Austria, Germany, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, Italy, Turkey, Spain, China! The decade 1789-1799 was revolutionary for West-Europeans, but it left the Asiastics undisturbed; now a critical ferment is among many of the peoples of Asia, so that their rulers have to step gingerly.

What is a revolution? No revulsion of public opinion or reversal of popular attitude, be it never so great and sudden, is a revolution. A revolution is *an abrupt shift of the center of dominance in society,* a wresting of power from the dominant element by an emergent element. The chief thing involved is, of course, *control of the state,* for in modern society the state is the supreme repository and organ of power; it alone has the machine guns! Physical force always figures in a revolution, for never does a dominant element yield up power without a struggle, or at least a showdown.

Maladaptation and blockage. The type situation out of which a revolution hatches is this. Society is frequently called on to adapt itself, for it runs into new conditions, changes take place in the strength, position, prestige, or self-assertiveness of its constituent elements. Then, quite aside from underlying technological changes, mere growth in knowledge, or rise of critical thought may cause certain established institutions or relations to be looked upon with angry eyes. Political or social organs decay, *i.e.,* their purpose is lost sight of. They become effete from standing still while society moves on. They die and need to be swept aside in order that something more serviceable may be put in their place. During most of the past the only means of influencing government to heed the people's dissatisfaction has been the threat of revolution.

Provided thought and discussion are unshackled, in due course there grows up an overwhelming public opinion *against* serfdom, feudal rights, "enclosures," a savage penal code, a hereditary upper house, upper-class monopoly of government jobs; *for* separation of church and state; break-up of the landed estates, the "homestead" disposal of the public domain, public education, extension of the suffrage, the regulation of public utilities, etc. The time is ripe to make the needful adjustment and it could be made, peacefully, almost painlessly.

However, the powerholders may be too shortsighted, pig-headed or selfish to permit such adjustment to take place. If they deem it will cost their class too much, they stick at nothing in order to block it. Through the numerous means of control at their disposal they interfere brutally with the process by which adaptative changes are normally brought about. They gag critics, jail agitators, pillory spokesmen of the people, ride down and saber public gatherings, hound original and independent thinkers, hamper the free formation of groups and free selection of leaders; so that needed reform perishes in the womb. Thereupon the distress, the sense of injustice and repression, of multitudes of men grows and spreads until either the dominant class becoming alarmed stands aside, or else an upheaval occurs. The typical cause of revolution, then, is *the selfish blocking of greatly and generally desired social adjustments by the holders of power.* President Woodrow Wilson was right when he declared, "Repression is the seed of revolution."

Can revolution be engineered? Sociologists reject with contempt the theory, dear to beleaguered or refugee dominators, that revolutionary discontent is stirred up by the agitation of a few gifted but uncrupulous Utopians, soreheads, or power-seekers, whose inflammatory eloquence rouses people to revolt even when they are actually well-governed and have nothing serious to complain of. Bah! The bulk of men are not fools; they cannot be made discontented by vain imaginings nor can they be stampeded by seditious suggestions that clash with their upbringing, their settled habits and their intellectual leadership. Even sillier is the pretense that revolutions originate in sudden mysterious epidemics of mob madness!

What sets off a revolution? Not always is oppression at its worst just before the outbreak of revolution. Charles I of England

was brought to the block but his rule was mild and constitutional compared with that of Henry VIII, whose popularity never waned. The revolting American colonies were not worse off under George III than under his predecessors, but better off. The revolting French peasants of 1789 were far from being the most wretched peasants on the Continent. It was just because *the French bourgeoisie had been gaining in wealth, intelligence and social importance* that they resented more and more bitterly the monopoly of power by a throne and aristocracy they no longer revered. Still, the immediate precipitating cause of revolution, the thing that produces the popular ground swell, is likely to be *some disaster which produces widespread suffering and discredits the existing régime* such as a great dearth, national bankruptcy, or the loss of an exhausting war.

Transfer of the allegiance of the intellectuals.[1] It is a portent of revolution when in numbers the gifted writers, orators, artists, scholars, teachers, even clergymen, quit the dominators and at great personal sacrifice and risk take up the cause of the oppressed. They do this because the dominators have lost their confidence, their rule seems neither just nor wise. Adams, Otis, Lee, Franklin and many other leaders of the American Revolution distinguished themselves by their championship of colonial rights at least ten years before the Declaration of Independence. In France down to about 1740 none of the outstanding publicists challenged the existing social order or attacked the divine right of kings. Then set in a great intellectual movement led by the "encyclopædists" and philosophers, which so riddled monarchical, aristocratic, and ecclesiastical pretensions that the privileged were silenced; many of them even came to doubt their own cause! The transfer of the allegiance of the Russian intellectuals was gradual; Dostoievsky and Tolstoi hit tsardom harder than had Gogol and Pushkin, while Kropotkin and Gorki hit hardest of all. Edwards points out: "For decades before its final overthrow the government of the tsars was without a public apologist of even second-rate ability."

Not only are the dogmas, assumptions and arguments which prop the odious domination riddled, but the repressive class itself is stretched on the rack of pitiless publicity. "Its weakness and its failures, its ignorance and stupidities, its sins and its shames, its

[1] See Lyford Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolution*, 1927, Chap. IV.

vices and its crimes, its heartlessness and its frivolity are dwelt upon—not once or twice but a hundred and a thousand times. No class of people is ever subjected to such complete exposure and such terrific attack as the dominant class in a pre-revolutionary society." [2] Since the repressors rule not so much by numbers or personal force as by "front" and bluff, their assailants follow the tactics of exhibiting them as ridiculous. Now, a haughty, time-hallowed ruling class does not much mind being exhibited as tyrannical or unjust, but it winces at being shown as stupid or silly. Nothing annoys it like being pilloried as long-eared!

Besides the deluge of philosophical treatises, historical works, critical writings, pamphlets, poems, plays, and novels which formulate, justify and circulate revolutionary ideas among the educated, a vast deal of pot-house discussion and open-air debate goes on which spreads these ideas among the illiterate.

From "bourgeois" revolution to proletarian revolution. The American and French revolutions with the train of overturns that followed brought in the democratic epoch. But with the passing of absolutism and the spread of representative government revolutions are more and more coming to be economic and social in their aims. Shall the immense volume of capital involved in latter-day production be private property yielding its owners a perpetual income and releasing them and their descendants altogether from work? Or shall it be publicly owned, yield money returns to nobody and thus provide no support for a luxurious idle class? The Russian revolution of 1917 overturned the state controlled by the big land holders and capitalists and in its place set up an organization controlled by the Communist Party, dedicated to the interests of workers and peasants. In the twenty years since, a huge "bureaucracy" or "apparatus" has come into existence in order to direct production, for Marx's forecast that plenty of talent for this responsibility can be drawn right out of the ranks of labor has not been borne out.

The social myth. Revolutions owe much of their drive to what Sorel calls "the social myth," *i.e.*, a dream of "things as they might be" arising from *a fusion of the ideas developed by the revolutionary intellectuals with the elemental wishes of the repressed masses*. What gave the early Christians fortitude to endure the frightful persecutions inflicted upon them was the "millennial

[2] Edwards, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

hope," *i.e.*, their certainty of the imminent second coming of Christ. The Protestant Reformers saw themselves restoring to the world pure Galilean Christianity. The English Puritans, less than a tenth of the people, looked forward to a reign of the "saints," they being the saints. The social myth of the French revolutionaries was *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité* and they propagated it with an ardor and disregard of self truly apostolic. Fired with the vision of a new social order free from capitalist domination the Russian Communists, scanning the horizon, see signs of early proletarian uprising and oncoming "world social revolution" where the practiced eye detects nothing of the sort.

What the revolution consists in. Once the power of the dominant class is broken, the revolutionists proceed to strip it of all means of regaining power. The feudal lords are not allowed longer to keep "retainers" (armed men). The estates of the great-landowners are broken up into small holdings and disposed of to actual cultivators. The church is stripped of its vast landed properties, its monopoly of religion, and its monopoly of elementary instruction. The slaves of the planters are set free. The railroad companies are deprived of their power to fix rates arbitrarily. A hereditary upper chamber composed of title holders is abolished. Property qualifications for the suffrage disappear. The more odious of the former dominations are executed or banished.

Expectations and realizations. From contacts with revolutions at different stages there remains with me one clear impression, viz., *they cost more than their leaders anticipate.* While traveling in China in 1910 I talked with several who were to lead in the overthrow of the effete Manchu domination the succeeding year. They cherished glowing hopes of the progress China would make once the Manchu incubus was removed. The Americans in China were generally sympathetic with the idea of a republic in China but the British had no faith in the ability of the Chinese to work representative institutions then. The outcome vindicated the judgment of the British. In 1911 the revolution broke and soon the venerable dynasty which the people were in the habit of obeying disappeared. Since then developments have been anything but those expected by the revolutionists. There has been no genuine control of the people over government. Civil war has raged nearly all the time and the resulting misery is unspeakable.

In Mexico in 1922 (also in 1928 and 1936), while observing a

society which had just emerged from nine years of fighting and turmoil, I recalled the rosy predictions I had heard from young Mexican revolutionaries before 1910. They expected that, within a year after the blow-up, the Diaz régime with its creatures and followers would be disposed of so that the patriots would be free to devote all their attention to realizing a program of upbuilding and creation. Instead of one year it required *nine* years for Mexico to be unified again under one government. During this long unsettled period the habit of idling and fighting instead of working, of wielding gun rather than spade, of overriding morality and law and "running wild," became so widespread that it was difficult to build up forces that could cow the bandit element. Economically the country was prostrate like a man after a long siege of typhoid.

The latter half of 1917 I spent going about in Russia and watching the unfolding of the revolution. I talked with various leaders and noted their predictions of what would happen. It is quite too soon yet to balance the books of the Russian Revolution, but certainly the rearing of a new social order, based on public capitalism rather than private capitalism, has run into more difficulties than most of them expected.

Revolutionary "excesses". All deep-going revolutions throw off so many familiar curbs and restraints that the beast that lurks in us comes on top and inspires atrocities which have no relation to the revolutionary purpose or, indeed, to any rational purpose. In the sage words of Ellwood:

> . . . Now, there is always a tendency in an individual to reversion to simple animal-like activities following the complete breakdown of a habit. This tendency becomes more pronounced if the breakdown of the old habit is accompanied by violence. So in the social life, if the breakdown of old habits and institutions is accompanied by a struggle between classes, there is apt to be a reversion of the whole social life to a barbarous or even animal level; for fighting, as one of the most primitive activities, greatly stimulates all the lower centers of action. Hence, revolutionary periods give opportunity for the brute and savage in man to reassert themselves and to dominate many phases of the social life. The methods of attaining ends in revolutions are, therefore, often characteristic of much lower stages of culture. They are apt to be unreflective, extremely direct and crude. The resort to brute force is constant, and when attempts are made at psychical control it is usually through terrorism.
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> The violent seizure of power by one class, to accomplish its

ends, can rarely take place without bloody conflicts between classes. This releases, as we have already seen, the primitive instincts of man which civilization with such difficulty controls. Violence, therefore, can rarely be successfully employed in the higher stages of civilization without defeating the very ends for which it is employed. Its employment starts a process of rebarbarization which is absolutely destructive of those higher social values which civilization has so painfully built up, and by which men have slowly learned to regulate their conduct. If long continued, then, violence must result in the total destruction of anything worthy to be called civilization. The method of social change through revolution must be regarded, therefore, as involving too grave risks to be tolerated by an intelligent people, if it is avoidable.[3]

The good from revolutions. Lest the reader overlook the vast good which may come out of revolution let him consider the American Revolution. What it freed our Colonial forefathers from has been summed up by the Beards:

> The spirit of domestic politics, especially in the royal provinces, was distinctly altered by the sudden removal of the British ruling class—a class accustomed to a barbarous criminal code, a narrow and intolerant university system, a government conceived as a huge aggregation of jobs and privileges, a contempt for men and women who toiled in field and shop, a denial of education to the masses, an established religion forced alike on Dissenters and Catholics, a dominion of squire and parson in countries and villages, callous brutality in army and navy, a scheme of primogeniture buttressing the rule of the landed gentry, a swarm of hungry placemen offering sycophancy to the King in exchange for offices, sinecures and pensions, and a constitution of church and state so ordered as to fasten upon the masses this immense pile of pride and plunder. From the weight of this mountain the American revolutionists delivered the Colonial subjects of the British Crown. Within a decade or two after that emancipation they accomplished reforms in law and policy which required a hundred years or more of persistent agitation to effect in the mother country. . . .[4]

The successful Colonials rid themselves of (1) Royal restraints on the seizure and enjoyment of the trans-Alleghany vacant lands; (2) the quit-rents ($100,000 a year) paid by American farmers to the King and to the Penns and Baltimores; (3) the great Tory estates including Sir William Pepperel's Maine holdings extending

[3] C. A. Ellwood, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, 1917, pp. 176-181, *passim*.

[4] Charles and Mary Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization*, 1930, vol. I, p. 292.

thirty miles along the coast, the Phillipse heritage in New York embracing about three hundred square miles, the properties of the Penn family worth in round numbers about five million dollars and the Fairfax estate in Virginia stretching out like a province. The confiscated property of the Tories amounted to at least $35,000,000 which in our money would hardly come to less than three or four times as many dollars; (4) The system of entail and primogeniture. Within fifteen years every state had abolished primogeniture.

Considered relatively, therefore, the destruction of landed privilege in America by the forces unchained in the war for Independence were perhaps as great and significant as the change wrought in the economic status of the clergy [5] and nobility during the holocaust of the French Revolution.

Must revolutions occur? Revolution is so terribly costly and demoralizing that we ought to dread it as we dread smallpox. Is there any vaccine against it? Certainly there is. If society can insure itself against being bitted and ridden by a selfish class, what charm would the violent overthrow of government have for anyone not a fool or a knave? When there is unhampered public discussion and formation of parties, when all citizens may vote and their votes are "counted as cast," all resort to force to get rid of a bad government is vicious, since the voters can rid themselves of it at the next election. If the bulk of them are so naïve as to let "people rule" become a sham, they would not be clever enough to prevent a "people's revolution" from becoming a sham likewise. We must grant that even under genuine democracy remedies which the workers have dire need of but which the employing class stubbornly oppose are delayed for years by the veiled use of corrupt party "machines" and false propaganda by this class, not to mention the strangling of remedial laws by "court review"! But savage class strife has been avoided, there is no plotting to overthrow government, the "ins" do not employ terrorism against the "outs", the people continue to enjoy full political freedom, and no one dreams of "dictatorship."

Fascism and Nazi-ism, which have made such alarming inroads upon Europe's democracy, are not so much a bend in the stream of political development as the logical reply to the tactics followed by the Communists in Russia and intended for use elsewhere. The

[5] Charles and Mary Beard, *Ibid.*, p. 292.

dictatorship of the middle class is a natural reply to the Marxian doctrine of "the dictatorship of the proletariat." The legal privileges of the Fascist party is the reply to the prior legal privileges of the Russian Communist party. The arrogant brushing aside of elected bodies is the reply to the dissolution of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly by the Bolshiviks. The non-toleration of political criticism or opposition under Fascism is the reply to the same thing in Russia under Communism. This anti-people-rule development is logical and should have been foreseen by "class-struggle" tacticians, but it was not!

Whether the spirit of revolution is some day to become rife among Americans may be foretold by watching what happens to our agitative liberties. Should liberty of speech, press, demonstration, organization, etc., be seriously curtailed, many ills will be left untreated. Consequently popular discontent will grow and this will seem to warrant more and tighter restrictions—which will result in still grosser neglect of grave social ailments! For, once you enter this perilous path, you feel obliged to go on and on until at the end you find yourself facing revolution.

If our propertied and their allies withstand the critics and opponents of the current social order in every legitimate way but, nevertheless, leave intact the agitative liberties as received from our fathers, much will be said which they will not like and many policies adopted which may lessen their profits; but still they and their legitimate interests *will be safe*. Whatever political tendency comes uppermost, they need not go in fear of revolutionary violence.

If it is security that is sought, even those convinced that "social revolution to overthrow capitalism is inevitable" should be left unmolested and their party should have its place on the official ballot. Free institutions will take far more harm from muzzling them than from letting them have their say. For American post-war experience has abundantly shown that a legal ban on "subversive" doctrine does not work as intended. It is used not so much by honest patriots to hamper the propagation of revolutionary ideas as by unprincipled schemers to persecute the more trenchant critics of the class that is in the saddle.

PART X

SOCIAL PRODUCTS

CHAPTER

LIV. Culture Planes

LV. Standards

LVI. Groups

LVII. Institutions

CHAPTER LIV

CULTURE PLANES

The civilization of those Chinese who more than thirty centuries ago came down the valley of the Wei River—it has spread and spread until half a billion people in Eastern Asia light their tapers at its flame! Uncounted savage tribes and barbarian hordes have succumbed to its influence. Says Metchnikoff: [1]

Whatever these heterogeneous tribes have of civilized life, Kalmucks of the Russian steppes and Annamites of Tonkin, Tunguses of Siberia, Manchus of the Amur and the Ussuri, mariners of Fokien and Canton, emanates from one and the same center of civilization, the "Land of the Hundred Families." . . . Nor can one doubt that if Japan had not had the good fortune to light her torch at the fire of the Celestial Empire, she would perhaps have remained like the Philippines with their Tagals and their Visayas.

Nestorian Christianity came, flourished for a time and vanished. The Jews of Kaifêng-fu lost their language and their religion and became Chinese in all but physiognomy. The conquering Manchus have forgotten their language and literature. "China," it has been finely said, "is a sea which salts everything which flows into it."

Take the Near East. What wealth of contrast Homer would have noted in the country between Bokhara and Morocco! But the Saracen flood passed over it and now it has the sameness of an ancient beach from which the sea has ebbed. No sooner is one south of the Caucasus than the eye notes such characteristic "Eastern" features as

shaven heads and mustachios, instead of the full beard; the middle girt by the gay sash or the fancy ornamental belt; brimless caps of lambskin and huge black mantles of shaggy felt; embroidered heelless slippers or soft-soled boots; baggy cotton trousers tied in at the ankles; strings of beads for the man's idle hands to

[1] L. Metchnikoff, *La civilization et les grands fleuves historiques*, 1889, p. 321.

play with; merchants sitting cross-legged on beautiful hand-woven rugs; barefoot, veiled women and women draped with festoons of coins; finger nails and grizzling beards stained with henna; shepherds who look as if they live on locusts and wild honey; importunate beggars with the air of having an assured social position; diminutive donkeys, Biblical asses, camels of the desert and slow-moving oxen at the plow; piles of pomegranates, and long, sweet grapes; sacks of goatskin, with the hair turned inside, distended with wine or olive oil; draft animals bedecked about the head with beads to avert the evil eye; heifers treading out the grain on threshing floors; bricks of mud and straw drying in the sun; white-washed mud huts with flat roofs; domed *marabouts,* and Moorish architecture.[2]

Plane-making and plane-breaking. All down the stream of history diversifying forces have been at work and homogenizing forces have been at work; but for most of the time they have been out of balance. During the pushing out of the Roman frontiers and the diffusion of the classic culture the likeness-producing forces had the upper hand. After the break-up of the Empire and the decay of communications, *i.e.,* after the fifth century A.D., the diversifying forces came on top, as we see plainly in the development of a whole sisterhood of Romance languages out of Latin.

Could one have flown about the earth, say six thousand years ago, when the cultures of Egypt and Babylonia were but embryos, one would have seen thousands of isolated or nearly isolated kindreds, tribes and peoples, each with its more or less distinctive tools, weapons, speech, folkways, standards, and cult. Since then differencing forces have been active as well as assimilating forces, but for much of the time the latter have been stronger. The net result is that to-day we find mankind aggregated into sixty-odd political units and perhaps a hundred self-conscious nationalities, while nine-tenths of them speak some one of a score of leading tongues and adhere to one or another of half a dozen great religions. Doubtless, as the centuries pass, there will be fewer states, nationalities and tongues.

The extension of culture planes. In other words, communicating men in time are likely to gravitate into common planes of belief or practice. In early ages only those of the same group, the same stock, or the same valley fell into these common planes. But culture gains radiant energy until such an element as the

[2] Ross, *Russia in Upheaval,* 1918, pp. 51-52.

Arabic speech, the written characters of China, the religion of Islam, or the game of chess overcomes all rival culture elements in its neighborhood and draws myriads of people into one plane. While such planes have been extended and broken countless times, the improvement of the means of communication causes them to form on an ever vaster scale. Never before our time has a convention like the dress suit, a sport like tennis, or a convenience like the sewing machine been so widely diffused over the earth. Civilization, which once was *fluvial*—as on the Nile, the Euphrates, the Ganges, the Hoang Ho; then *maritime*—as on the Persian Gulf, the Ægean, the Mediterranean, the Yellow Sea; then *oceanic*—as was possible after Columbus and Magellan; has in a lifetime become *planetary!*

Generally peoples have been more alike than their habitats. Consequently, those elements of culture spread farthest which chord with human nature and those spread least which, bearing the impress of a particular geographical environment, are handicapped in appealing to men in any other environment. The imagery of Christianity is so foreign to the Eskimos that the translator of the New Testament into their tongue had to render the word "Sheep," wherever it occurred, by "little seals." What commends the Gospel to the Greenlander is, therefore, not its pastoral background, but its chiming with the better impulses of his heart.

If a truth like the rotundity of the earth wins assent, the resulting agreement never breaks up; but planes laid down by *relative* values shatter if something better presents itself. The use of bronze spreads until the smelting of iron is developed. Romanesque churches multiply until the Gothic type is perfected. After touching its perigee the Phoenician culture recoiled before the superior Graeco-Roman culture. After a certain expansion hieroglyphic writing gave way to the simpler alphabetic writing. The abacus conquered China and Russia, but its empire was doomed by the spread of the practice of "figuring" made possible by the invention of the cipher (0). The formal duel, after gaining vogue with the upper orders everywhere, has largely gone out owing to the decline of the military spirit and the growth of the influence of the popular classes.

Culture spread as affected by dominion. Some things are so good that they meet with favor and furtherance everywhere,

whatever their place of origin, *e.g.*, coffee, quinine, the cross-bow, the pulley, printing from movable type, the safety razor, afternoon tea. On the other hand, the boundaries between different religions, types of family, and moral codes curiously coincide with the limits of by-gone empire. Hellenic civilization took root wherever Alexander bore the Greek arms and stopped where he stopped. The line between Latin and Teutonic Europe is strangely reminiscent of the *limes* or frontier, of the Roman Empire. Islam went where the conquering Arab, Turk or Mogul bore it, rarely further. There would be to-day no penetration of modern civilization into Japan, India, China, Turkestan, the Caucasus, Northern Africa or the Soudan if some Western nation had not gone there sword in hand. Had not the United States become mistress of the Philippines how long would it have been before, on their own initiative, the Filipinos would have gained the benefit of such American blessings as public sanitation, compulsory schooling, equality before the law, the merit system in the public service, and representative government? Surely a century or two. So, sinister as modern imperialism usually is, it is not without redeeming features.

Why some good things need to be pushed. The reason why some good things spread of themselves, whereas other good things do not spread unless they have military or political backing or are subjects of propaganda, hinges on a distinction set forth by Keller: [3]

> It is not hard to demonstrate to an ignorant person in this country that he should learn to read and write; he can see that by living in this society. Similarly for his interest is it that he shall use the English language. Tests lie all about him and are immediate and decisive. But try to persuade him by abstract argument to give up the vendetta, to renounce anarchistic leanings, or to change his religion, and you fail. There are no immediate and decisive tests at hand. You cannot demonstrate that interest will be subserved by change; you cannot even secure visualization of evil consequences. . . . The more nearly custom represents direct reaction on environment in the actual struggle for material aids to existence, the more rational a test does it undergo; and, conversely, the more derived the societal forms the more clearly do they fall under the tests of tradition rather than reason. . . . You can persuade a savage of the inadequacy of his stone hatchet long before he can be made to see that his family system is capable

[3] A. G. Keller, *Societal Evolution*, 1915, pp. 131-136.

of being superseded by one yielding better satisfaction to his interests.

This is why superior drinks, foods, narcotics, materials, tools, implements, methods of production, and means of enjoyment make their way rapidly among peoples and races; while superior sex morals, forms of the family, upbringing of children, relations between parents and children, status of social classes, treatment of the weak, relief of the poor, types of recreation, and political institutions spread slowly or not at all. Since their merit is not so evident and appealing as that of a reaper or a bicycle, people reject them and persist in their bad old ways. Here is justification for the right type of foreign missions, for to-day along with the propagation of the elements of the Christian religion goes propagation of the best moral standards, family type, class relations, civic ideals, educational methods, and governmental policies in the country which sends out the missionary.

The missionary (in China) is the introducer of current Western standards. He instructs his schoolboys respecting bathing, spitting, the use of the handerchief, neatness of garb, the care of one's room, modesty in personal habits. He teaches the people to clean house and yard, to whitewash the walls of the home, to scour the floors of the school room or church. He enforces the duty of being humane to dumb animals, of sparing defective children, of educating daughters, and consulting the wife.

Unwittingly he reads into the Scriptures everything that has commended itself to the conscience of Christendom, and becomes, in spite of himself, the voice of his country and his time. The girls' schools in the American missions reflect American ideas as to woman's proper place. The industrial schools inoculate with American belief in the dignity of manual labor a people so disdainful of toil that every one exempt from it advertises the fact by wearing his finger-nails long. The notions of government taught in the mission colleges would have horrified those who Christianized the Irish and the Saxons. The place these same colleges give to natural science and scientific methods betrays the modern spirit, and would have scandalized St. Boniface or St. Francis Xavier.[4]

Religious missions, therefore, are an infinitely milder and cheaper means of disseminating the higher elements of a superior culture than dominion. The proper relation between force and persuasion is seen in the Far East, where the gun boats of the

[4] E. A. Ross, *The Changing Chinese*, pp. 246, 249.

European powers have procured for missionaries only the opportunity to live, work, and go about without molestation.

Social results of culture diffusion. The use of sewing machines on opposite sides of the Pacific of itself does nothing to better relations between East and West, but it may open a door to the introduction of non-material culture elements which *will* knit the hearts of their users. The more extensive sharing of techniques and processes hardly inspires good will, but it makes easier the kindling of good will, makes harder the keeping alive of inveterate animosities. Ferocious extirpative warfare is less likely to occur when combatants have much in common. Broad community of culture does not beget coöperation, but it makes peoples readier to coöperate when good opportunities to coöperate present themselves. We may liken the multiplication of culture planes between peoples to an amelioration of climate which causes the glaciers of misunderstanding and mistrust to retire from the peopled valleys to the remote and inhospitable highlands, where they do the least harm.

CHAPTER LV

STANDARDS

Behavior planes are laid through society not only by voluntary imitation, but also by social pressure. The doing, or abstaining from, something is believed to affect human welfare, so it is bound upon all. The behavior pattern society thus projects may be called *standard.*[1] Whether it is spread on the statute book and enforced by the police or is left to public opinion is of no great moment; *it controls!*

Standards are key products. A society's individuality comes out more in its standards than in anything else. The characterizing differences between medieval society and modern society, between Western society and Chinese society, betwen aristocratic society and democratic society, between capitalist society and communist society, are to be read in the standards of behavior which these societies respectively impose. Founders of religion, prophets, saints, reformers, orators, poets, and artists leave their mark chiefly by making or modifying standards. Tell me a people's behavior standards and I will sketch for you its social order.

Its standards constitute, as it were, a trestle by which a people rises farther and farther above its native promptings. If its higher standards should collapse, it would drop to the savage level; if *all* gave way, it would sink to the animal plane, for animals know not behavior patterns. Our inherited bents are, no doubt, much the same as those of our Neolithic ancestors; if we treat the weak or unfortunate better, it is owing to the standards we have been reared in. When by family tradition, early training, or group example, they have become "second nature," no social pressure is called for; when, on the other hand, they remain outside the individual's *psyche,* he conforms to them owing to the *sanctions* (of public opinion, law, or religion) behind them.

[1] I prefer this word to *mores* (suggested by Professor W. G. Sumner), because the latter is an alien unfamiliar word, and besides, its singular is unavailable.

Every close-knit group develops standards of its own. The boy's gang, the "underworld," the "sporting" circle, the "smart set," "Bohemia," "nigger town," the slum "beyond the tracks," the foreign settlement, the "peculiar" sect, the artist colony, the "conscientious objector" group, the religious community—arrives at norms of conduct which reflect its peculiar outlook or interest.[2] In India co-exist many divergent standards, since the members of each caste heed only the opinion of their fellow members, while general society is inchoate. On the West coast of tropical South America three strands make up the population—whites, *cholos,* and Indians. Every one notes the standards of his own element but ignores the standards of the other elements. The whites collectively fix the legal, political, and economic status of the Indians, but have practically no influence upon their behavior among themselves.

Active standards and sleeping standards. There are *sleeping* standards not thought about until some one violates them, and *active* standards bright with daily use. With us the taboos on incest, cannibalism, and dueling are asleep. Among our active standards are: a man should keep a promise made for a consideration received, a man should support his wife, a woman should stand by her husband in trouble, men should be chivalrous toward women, all should defer to the aged, "put up or shut up," "live and let live," "boost, don't knock," "don't flinch, don't foul, hit the line hard," "let the other fellow have his say," "if you play the game at all, play it for all it is worth." Besides such positive standards there are numerous taboos or "dont's": on the marriage of near kin, on the marriage of white with black, on sex intimacy outside marriage, on marrying for money, on tattling, "grousing," and "welshing."

Later taboos. In our time, there have met with some success efforts to put a ban on liquor selling, adulteration, misleading

[2] "The superficiality of this procedure of talking about 'Middletown's doing so' becomes here, of course, particularly apparent. There is no single Middletown pattern but many patterns, loosely aggregated in groups of individuals who come from such a subculture as that of the smart West End, who serve cocktails and go to the tolerant Presbyterian Church; or from such a subculture as that of East Twelfth Street and membership in the United Brethren Church where the members of a working class branch of the W.C.T.U. pledged themselves in 1930 'to pray for the Eighteenth Amendment that it be not repealed'; and so on through an infinite number of variants." *Middletown in Transition,* p. 175.

advertising, the wasteful use of limited natural resources, the working of young children in factories, "combinations in restraint of trade," arbitrary discrimination among the patrons of public utilities, black-listing, the use of violence in labor disputes, buying votes, the bestowal of public office for personal or party reasons, and the secret pledging of candidates for public office. Earlier in our social history were established taboos on drinking to excess, gaming, betting, the lottery, dueling, seduction, "free love," and African slavery.

Taboos going out. Whilst new taboos are set up, a fight is made on certain old taboos such as the "color line"; the ban on dancing, the theater, Sunday recreation, and the open discussion of social problems originating in sex. Those most active in undermining antiquated taboos may be doing their best to set up new taboos, their motive in both cases being the public welfare as they see it.

Throughout the Western Mohammedan world a sharp conflict is on between the Moslem fundamentalists and the modernizers who would sweep away such antiquated taboos as the veil, non-association of the sexes, and the ban on knowledge not in the Koran.

What standards do. No social product is more momentous than *the standard of living,* because it plays a star part in regulating propagation. It includes those things so keenly desired that, rather than miss them, people will forego or postpone marriage, or limit the size of their family. It varies from class to class and sometimes, among the capable and successful, the standard of living is so high that it actually checks their increase more than the increase of day-laborers is checked by *their* standard of living. From the social point of view the standard among the mass should be high enough to prevent their increase absorbing all the fruits of economic progress, while among the rising it should not be so high as to lessen the proportion in which they contribute to the next generation. It is a misfortune that for a generation American achievers have been under the spell of the "business" standard, which rates men according to *expenditure* rather than according to *personal worth.*

Said Professor W. F. Ogburn in June, 1929:

> We set up during the war a minimum subsistence budget of about $1200 for a family of five. Had people done as we in-

structed them to do in this budget they would have been well nourished and they would have had the necessary calories and the necessary vitamins. But when I took the budgets down to be analyzed by food experts who would make the appraisals as to the quality of food and as to the energy value of foods, I found a very curious thing; that people living in the United States in 1919 did not really get enough to eat until they got up around $1600 or $1700, sometimes even $1750, although they could have bought it, I am quite sure, if they had laid out the budget properly and had been willing to make necessary inhibitions, at somewhere around $1100. This goes to show that human beings will sacrifice on food in order to maintain standards.

We see the same thing in *funeral customs,* which oblige people to lay out on a funeral much more than they can afford lest their love of the departed be called in question!

Pattern types, the man-as-he-should-be, the woman-as-she-should-be, are active forces in society. Elsewhere[3] I have shown at length how by capturing admiration these types become personal ideals and direct the development of individual character. Each age gets its characteristic "slant" from the dominant pattern. In the sixth and seventh centuries A.D. the man-as-he-should-be was a religious ascetic. During and after the Crusades the knight was the man-as-he-should-be. The cardinal virtue was no longer *renunciation* but *measure, i.e.,* the avoidance of excess and extravagance in both actions and display of feelings.

"In modern English-speaking society," writes Sumner,[4] "the 'gentleman' is the name of the man-as-he-should-be. . . . It is a collective and social ideal. Gentlemen are a group in society who have selected a code and standard of conduct as most conducive to prosperous and pleasant social relations. Therefore manners are an essential element in the type. A gentleman is one who has been educated to conform to the type, and that he has the *cachet* is indicated by his admission to the group. Novels develop and transmit the ideal; clubs are the tribunal of it." "A gentleman of a century ago would not be approved now." "In the eighteenth century he patronized cock fights and prize fights and he could get drunk, gamble, tell falsehoods and deceive women without losing caste." "A gentleman of to-day in the society of a century ago would be thought to have rowdy manners. Artificial

[3] *Social Control,* 1901, Chs. XVII and XVIII.
[4] W. G. Sumner, *Folkways,* 1915, pp. 206, 207.

manners are not in the taste of our time; athletics are." "It appears now that he must have some skill at sports and games." "The sentiment *noblesse oblige* was once the name for the coercive force exerted on a noble by the code of his class. Now that fixed classes are gone and the gentleman is only defined by the usage and taste of an informal class, it is a term for the duties which go with social superiority of any kind, so far as those duties are prescribed and sanctioned by public opinion."

In old China the scholar was taken as the pattern. School teachers and pupils cultivated the scholar's stoop and those with good eyesight wore broad-rimmed goggles for the sake of the scholarly effect! The scholar shunned vigorous exercise lest he spoil his skill with the writing brush, so a frail and ascetic appearance was coveted. Pedants and book worms, myopes and recluses had to rule, largely by moral force, and, since their "long suit" is learning, they cried down bodily prowess. If the sturdy coolie sported fan and sun umbrella, it was not from effeminacy but because the common people formed themselves on the model of the *literati*. The ascendancy of the intellectuals damped the active and combative impulses of the Chinese.

Standards do not stay the same. One sure thing about behavior patterns is, *they will change*. Scientific advance, new thought, new leaders alter the popular notion of *what counts*. The Churchmen of the Middle Ages would cut us "dead," we are so little awed by virginity. The military orders of olden time would despise us for honoring obedience and personal loyalty no more than we do. The Puritans would give us up because we are bored by long sermons and "godly conversation." A century ago, who anticipated the present vogue of the athletic type? A century hence, the young may be as strong for mental hygiene and disciplinary moral exercises as now they are for physical culture!

Genesis of standards. Whence comes the new standard? Sometimes from *experience*. Newcomers to the range country become willing to hang horse thieves after experiencing the helplessness of being afoot in vast spaces. Hospitality becomes a sacred duty in a sparsely settled region because it is a boon to both hosts and guests. Fearful of becoming fat and soft the Britons stationed in the tropics develop the standard that tennis or golf must be played in the late afternoon even when, as at Jiddah

on the Red Sea, the golf course has to be laid out over the sand dunes! Among men of the sea, as a means of bringing home responsibility to captains, there has grown up the hard rule that the captain who loses his ship must go down with it.

Standards reflect changed conditions. Cheap sugar, the spread of machine operation, and automobile driving favor the growth of temperance sentiment. In accounting for the modern standard of decency Sumner observes that "the cheapening and popularization of luxury have made houses larger, plumbing cheaper, and all the apparatus of careful living more accessible to all classes. The consequence is that all the operations and necessities of life can be carried on with greater privacy and more ostentation of conventional order and decorum." "Therefore the standards and codes of all classes have risen and the care about dressing, bathing, and private functions . . . has been intensified." [5]

Some standards originate with an upper class. In tropical South America only the *gente decente* (decent folk) take care to safeguard the chastity of their daughters. As the masses rise economically and respond to church, school, and good reading matter, they will imitate the *gente decente* as regards the association of young people. In respect to bathing, outdoor sports, truthfulness of speech and aversion to boasting the English aristocracy have been pace-setters for the English and the Americans. *Bushido,* the moral code of Japan, originated with the *samurai.* The nobility of Russia were the channel by which Western standards got among the Russian people.

But standards may rise when leadership *departs from* an aristocracy. Sumner [6] points out: "Steam and machinery with the increase of capital and of power over nature which they have produced, have given social power to the lower middle class, as the representatives of the masses. This has brought into control the *mores* of those classes, which were simple, unluxurious, philistine and comparatively pure, because these classes were forced to be frugal, domestic, careful of their children, self-denying, and comparatively virtuous on account of their limited means."

The same author insists that Christianity first took root in the lowest free classes of the Roman Empire. It got its *mores* from them and in later times gave those *mores* authority and extension.

[5] W. G. Summer, *Folkways,* 1915, p. 451.
[6] *Ibid.,* p. 452.

Some standards may be traced to outstanding individuals—Pythagoras, Zoroaster, Buddha, Jesus, Mahomet, Francis of Assisi, Rousseau, Tolstoy, Gandhi; *or to élites*—the Prophets of Israel, the Essenes, the Stoics, the Christian Fathers, the Reformers, the Puritans, the Baptists, the Quakers, the Methodists, the Liberals, the Humanitarians, the Socialists, the Eugenists. The rôle of these has been much exaggerated, for it is easier to credit shifts in standards to such sources than to trace them to those obscure changes in the life or circumstances of the people which actually caused them.

Must standards possess utility? "Sacred" as the *mores* are always held to be, some of them are positively harmful as, *e.g.*, the taboos in India on the killing of venomous snakes, on the eating of food prepared by one of a lower caste, and the Egyptian folk taboo on the bathing of a baby until it is forty days old! Likewise the Indian customs regarding child marriage and widow remarriage are noxious rather than benign. Often public opinion stands behind customs which had their origin in some long-since-exploded belief regarding ghosts, goblins, or the evil eye. In various sects to-day religion puts itself squarely behind taboos on shaving, on cutting the hair, on the use of buttons, on the wearing of ornament, on bright color in dress, on eating flesh, on drinking alcoholic beverages, on smoking, on reading novels, on dancing, on visiting the "playhouse," on the wearing of short skirts or bobbed hair. Men's molding of religion comes out in the fact that almost everywhere the taboos binding women are far more numerous and onerous than the taboos binding men!

Nevertheless, after all these discounts, there remains a body of standards which are the fruit of collective experience and had some merit when they were adopted; but we may be sure that many of these will long outlive the conditions which gave them birth and meaning. This is why, the world over, wherever tradition is still powerful, *i.e.*, in (say) two-thirds of mankind, you find in force numerous social requirements which have no virtue now, and may never have had any!

The criticism of standards. Without the free play of criticism standards multiply like weeds until they choke life's channels. New taboos are added to old until one is no freer than the orthodox Jew, obligated to obey 613 commandments! However, when a standard is attacked is the reproach that it narrows one's

freedom? Or that obeying it burdens the obeyers more than it benefits society? Only the latter is a telling point.

Any clever youth can dissect standards to death, make them out to be arbitrary, nonsensical, or inconsistent. Without insight and a sense of social responsibility such a one is a pest, for he breaks down standards just to "show off" or to free himself from salutary restraints.

Two opposed types may be distinguished. Those who take standards seriously, live up to them under trying circumstances, propagate them, expose those who violate them and shame the public into enforcing the standards it professes to uphold; and those who regard standards as gyves, ignore them when no one is looking, flout them when they feel themselves strong with the public, and pour upon them ridicule and contumely. The former are the upbuilders, the latter the destroyers. There are times when the latter are so many and strong that there is a moral sag in society from its members feeling freer to give themselves up to their appetites and passions, heedless of the effect on others. Generally, the youth who boasts, "I have no need of your social compass, my own conscience tells me where north is," is headed for shipwreck.

The disintegration of tradition. What gives a social standard power over the reluctant is chiefly public opinion, its antiquity, and the influence of early education. In our time, however, the latter are uncommonly weak, because the startling changes in manner of life forced upon us by the economic results of mechanical inventions have obliged us often to junk tradition and ignore childhood teachings. Here is the prime cause of the raw individualism of our age, its ruthless self-assertion, its struggle-for-life ethics founded on a false Darwinism, and the elevation into dogma of that ancient maxim of the underworld, "Every man to look out for himself."

The break-up of moral traditions throws men back upon unschooled human nature and has its good side as well as its bad side. Writes C. H. Cooley: [7]

> It may obscure those larger truths that are the growth of time and may let loose pride, sensuality and skepticism; but it also awakens the child in man and a childlike pliability to the better as well as to the worse in natural impulse. We may look, among

[7] *Social Organization,* 1909, pp. 354-5.

people who have lost the sense of tradition, for the sort of virtues, as well as of vices, that we find on the frontier; for plain dealing, love of character and force, kindness, hope, hospitality and courage. Alongside of an extravagant growth of sensuality, pride and caprice, we have about us a general cult of childhood and womanhood, a vast philanthropy, and an interest in everything relating to the welfare of the masses of the people.

In lieu of guidance from social standards many good persons put their trust in the simple humanitarian touchstone: "Do what you like, *provided that nobody is harmed.*" This principle *sounds* well, but is it safe? A miscreant who has confessed to an atrocious crime falls into the hands of an enraged crowd. Why should they curb their vengeful impulses? His life is forfeit anyhow. Lynching him will save the state the expense of trying him, and strike terror to men of his ilk. It needs deep insight into the crowd *psyche* to warn the lynchers: "Hang malefactors to-day and in a few years you will be burning them. Lynch for murder to-day and ere long you will be lynching for larceny. Flout your courts by taking justice out of their hands and soon only second-raters will consent to be your judges."

In a legislature a group of life insurance companies used money to accelerate the passage of a needed amendment to the law on life insurance. The facts came out later in a law-suit and a certain farmer-legislator known as "Honest John" was shown to have accepted a sum for his support. He defended himself after this fashion: "Yes, I took that money and reduced the mortgage on my farm. But who was harmed by my taking it? Not the companies, for they are making no complaint. Not the public, for the law I voted for deserved to pass." Probably few of his constituents reflected that insurance companies which find themselves able to put through a good bill by the use of money will be tempted some day to put through a bad bill by the use of money; that the success of the insurance companies will encourage railroad, traction, and power companies to use money in order to gain their political ends; that if all through the underworld runs the whisper that money is floating about the legislature, the "gray wolves" and the "yellow dogs" of politics will go to any lengths in order to break into the legislature and get some of it!

No, for all we are so common-schooled and newspaper-read, few of us can safely dispense with guidance. More and more it

is an intricate and bewildering world we grope in. Society is getting complicated faster even than the public is being enlightened. Many questions of right and wrong are "tough," call for rare insight into human nature and society. As, year by year, human relations become more tangled, the questions we face are to the questions that stumped our grandfathers as problems in quadratic equations are to problems under "the rule of three." Well does Cooley observe: [8]

In a traditional order one is accustomed from Childhood to regard usage, the authority of elders and the dominant institutions as the rule of life. But in our own time there is for many persons, if not most, no authoritative canon of life, and for better or worse we are ruled by native impulse and by that private reason which may be so weak when detached from a rational whole. We find, then, that people have to make up their own minds upon their duties as wives, husbands, mothers and daughters; upon commercial obligation and citizenship; upon the universe and the nature and authority of God. Inevitably many of us make a poor business of it. It is too much. It is as if each should sit down to invent a language for himself. These things should be thought out gradually, coöperatively, each adding little and accepting much.

The perfecting of standards. While most of us need the support of social standards in skirting the abysses of life, these standards need not be arbitrary or antiquated. Social inquirers ought to test current standards from the rational point of view, *e.g.,* the "color line," the taboo on the marriage of near kin, the taboo on the wife earning money outside the home; they ought to formulate and push new standards called for by novel situations or new knowledge, *e.g.,* the obligations of the parent in to-day's society, the right of youth to be instructed respecting sex, the responsibility of the employer of young people, eugenic standards of mating, and taboos on the use of race poisons. In a sound society much thought and care will be given by the *élite* to preserving and propagating what are considered "spiritual values."

[8] *Social Organization,* 1909, p. 352.

CHAPTER LVI

GROUPS

Human groups are often among the end-products of our social processes. *Domination* begets large aggregates, such as realms and empires. *Socialization* prepares people to cohere when a motive for uniting presents itself. *Adaptation* smoothes away obstacles to the formation of a group, or makes the members more harmonious and coöperative among themselves. *Stratification* causes the we-feeling to spread among those of the same social layer. *Opposition* causes those on the same side of a cleft to stand together, from sympathy and in order to prevail. When two elements struggle, up to a certain point the blows of each pound the other into coherence; hence, *strife* (war) has from early times been recognized as the arch-consolidator. This is probably what the Greek philosopher Heraclitus had in mind when he declared, "Strife is the mother of all things."

Such processes are, however, not the only creators of groups; for at bottom there are just two things which are requisite for the formation of a group. If men are to feel themselves one and wish to be together by themselves, they must be aware of *essential traits*, common to them and setting them off from others. Then if, going further, they are to stand together and "make common cause," they must be aware of *momentous common interests* which are imperiled and which can be defended or advanced only by their joint efforts. Therefore, whatever marks certain persons off from others or gives them a vital community of interest, is a group-maker.

The blood bond. The first enduring human clot is the *kin group*. Even carnivores of the same litter are gentle to one another, brothers and sisters who have been together and played together from childhood are likely to get on peaceably. So the blood tie becomes the bond of the earliest stable groups. But this bond is a little too rigid, seeing that the kin group is frequently joined by runaways whom it ought to take in. So it is

made more elastic by the blood covenant and the fiction of adoption. Says W. Robertson Smith:

> The commingling of blood by which two men became brothers, or two kins allies, and the fiction of adoption by which a tribesman was feigned to be the veritable son of a member of a tribe, are both evidences of the highest value that the Arabs were incapable of conceiving any absolute social obligation or social unity which was not based on kinship.[1]

In order to unite all the members of the social group in an equal bond blood kinship is everywhere recognized as equally binding. It is something mysterious, like the drop of negro blood that shuts one out of white society in our South.

A third weak point is that being a *kin* means simply *having an ancestor in common.* But this notion is too pale and cold to bind together self-willed nomads. So the acknowledgment of kinship comes to imply not the mere recognition of common descent, but a realizing sense of identity. Again citing Smith:

> A kin was a group of persons whose lives were so bound up together in what must be called a physical unity, that they could be treated as parts of one common life. The members of one kindred looked upon themselves as one living whole, a single animated mass of blood, flesh, and bones, of which no member could be touched without all the members suffering.[2]
>
> Under such a system there can be no inviolable fellowship except between men of the same blood.[3]
>
> No binding precepts of conduct except those that rest on the principle of kinship.[4]
>
> No life and no obligation was sacred unless it was brought within the charmed circle of the kindred blood.[5]

How obligation was run into the kinship mold is shown by the "blood-covenant" in which persons make a life-and-death compact by tasting the blood of one another or some animal, by the "tie of milk" which unites the foster child to all the kin of the foster mother, by the ceremony of adoption, by the significance attached to the taking of food together, and by the inventing of

[1] *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia,* 1885, p. 51.
[2] *Ibid.,* p. 255.
[3] *Ibid.,* p. 254.
[4] *Ibid.,* p. 269.
[5] *Ibid.,* p. 269.

an "eponymous hero" as a make-believe ancestor to cement the alliance of two groups.

For ages untold people, as a rule, stuck tight to their kin group, faced grim risks and made heavy sacrifices for it, with a heavy heart shouldered responsibility on the behalf of remote, even scalawag, kinsmen—all in order that they might count confidently on their kin group coming to *their* aid when they found themselves in a "tight place."

The place bond. After men had ceased to rely on hunting or the pastoral life, and had settled down to till the soil, the place bond came to count for more in making groups than the blood bond. "*Neighbor*" became a word to conjure with. A man's natural succorers and defenders were his neighbors. Upon the local community devolved functions that in the hunting stage had been borne by clan, phratry, or tribe. The greater the danger of householders from sheep stealers, cattle rustlers, horse thieves, robbers, etc., the sharper their sense of dependence on one another, the more tightly they stuck together, the stronger their loyalty to the local group, the more they were willing to do on behalf of the group or its members.

After lasting some thousands of years the place bond has suddenly lost much of its old significance. The spread of security owing to the law-enforcing activities of local and central governments has greatly weakened a family's sense of dependence on its neighbors. The rural telephone has halved the time required for getting help in case of fire, sickness or molestation. With the arrival of automobiles and hard-surfaced roads the premium on *nearness* has well-nigh disappeared and propinquity has ceased to mean much. In the countryside three miles now counts for less than half a mile did a generation ago.

It looks as if the ancient natural grouping by *kinship* or by *neighborhood* is giving way to selective association. Disparity of culture holds neighbors apart, as we see in the aloofness of the artist colony or writer colony from the farmers of a picturesque New England valley or the fishermen of the Maine coast. Class lines divide so that, as in rural England, one lives in his class rather than in his neighborhood. Reading, giving the companionship of historical or imaginary characters, lessens social dependence upon neighbors. Correspondence and travel admit one to other circles than that of the vicinage. Once parish was coextensive

with local community and neighbors were co-worshipers; but now, thanks to sectarianism, half a dozen starveling churches will struggle to exist in a community which might furnish one good congregation.

Most of the literature which furnishes cultivated peoples with life ideals comes from gifted persons who for the sake of their personal development have had to break hampering ties—of kinship, of neighborhood, of religious fellowship. Their eloquent individualism stirs youth to rebel against inherited ties of every sort and implants a yearning for independence which unfits them to share in the neighborhood life. And yet without such sharing they cannot remain happy or, indeed, quite sane. Unwittingly the strong-winged geniuses tempt the weak to pitiful little flights from the home ledge which too often end only in disappointment and loneliness.

Likeness grouping. Groupings according to color and other external race characters are, of course, natural formations rather than social products. Groupings on the basis of dress, speech, and social habits are, indeed, products of association but the extension of planes of uniformity continually razes barriers of this sort. As sunderers of men extrinsic differences are on the wane.

It is a question to what extent the social population of the future will be cloven by *occupational* differences. In frontier society the useful callings are not sharply graded in social prestige. As society develops, specialization grows and occupation counts for more in rating men. At the same time various branches become professions, while even the skilled trades, taught in a systematic way, gain something of the dignity of the professions. Then, too, the latter-day tendency to see in the useful callings so many forms of social service forbids us to despise the socially necessary coal-heaver or street-sweeper because of the repulsiveness of his work. There seems little likelihood that occupation will ever again sunder people into castes such as we see still in India.

Diversity in knowledge, culture, and taste will continue to segregate men, but in an epoch of universal education it is impossible that they should rear such high barriers as the past knew. When all but the mental deficients have the equivalent of a high school education—as may well be the case among us within forty years

—there will be no stratum of "bumpkins," "boors," "clodhoppers" or "chawbacons" for the educated to look down upon.

Common-experience groups. Those who have become knit together by shared vivid experience tend to form a permanent group to perpetuate their intimacy. The Grand Army of the Republic was a vital factor in the lives of the Civil War veterans of the North. The American Legion renders the same service to the American combatants in the World War. Pioneer experiences often form the basis for strong durable groups. The class organizations and reunions of college graduates show no signs of dying out. Whether current social development is favorable to this type of grouping is not clear.

Fraternal groups. This type of association is waxing tremendously. In the United States to-day there are eight hundred different secret orders with some thirty million members. This includes members of vast organizations like the Woodmen and the Knights of Pythias and the Odd Fellows and the Daughters of Rebekah, each of which carries on its own roster more than half a million members. It includes the Maccabees who meet in "Hives," the Red Men who meet in "Tribes," the Prophets who meet in "Grottos," the Watchmen who meet in "Forts," the Stags who meet in "Droves," the Owls who meet in "Nests," and the Eagles who meet in "Aeries." It includes these new and rapidly growing secret orders, the Beavers, Lions, Serpents, Roosters, Orioles, Deer, Geese, Goats, and Bears. It includes organizations like the Elks and the Foresters and the Modern Order of White Mahatmas and the Concatenated Order of the Hoo-Hoo, the Christian Knights and Heroines of Ethiopia of the Eastern and Western Hemispheres, the Sheiks of the Mosque and the Iridescent Order of Iris and the Benevolent Order of Monkeys and the Hooded Ladies of the Mystic Den.

The motive?

> To live in a modern world and be an ancient; to live in a humdrum world and be a knight; to live in a gabby world and have a secret—all this is possible. It is the essence of fraternalism that it does its best to make it possible. . . . When the password is given and the inner door swings back, it is upon a world as different from the world outside as ingenuity can make it. . . . Lodge night for the Redmen brings out the tomahawks. Lodge night for the Shriners brings out the fezes. Lodge night for the Odd Fellows, when the Third Encampment meets, brings out

the purple gowns, the yellow belts, the miters and the breastplates. All over America six nights a week, from one to five million men and women are dressing themselves as brahmans, Pharaohs, cannibals, vikings, princes, furies, hermits, druids, Galahads, sorcerers, Maltese, and Tibetans.[6]

Interest grouping. Grouping dictated by interest will last. Men will not cease to struggle groupwise, until they have no closer community of interest with *some* of their fellows than with *all*. Nevertheless, the typical interest groups of to-day are not life-and-death affairs as groups were in the days of yore. The extension of the régime of law and justice does away with the necessity for such little compact sovereign groups as clan, *gens*, kindred, tribe, mark, gild, and vigilance committee. The general acceptance of the same ideas of right and the widening of the scope of operations of the machinery for realizing these ideas relieve one of the necessity of belonging to a strong group in order to get justice.

Just as the spread of the "King's peace" has taken much of the life out of the groupings of kindred or neighbors, so justice for strangers on the same terms as for nationals will take much of the life out of the nation.

Just as in history tribes have merged into peoples, and communities and provinces have merged into nations, so nations are bound to be merged into something still larger. Just as those who dreamed of One People were looked upon as bad tribesmen until the dream became reality; just as those who dreamed of One Nation were looked upon as bad citizens until the dream became reality; so those who dream of a supernational society will be deemed bad patriots until the dream becomes reality.

Invention and discovery condition interest grouping. Often it is the inventor who fires the train which breaks up an old order and leads to new groupings. For example, the incessant development of machine technique gathers workers into ever-larger production groups. As this goes on, in order not to be at a fatal disadvantage in bargaining with their employers, the workers form unions for the purpose of substituting collective bargaining for an individual bargain which has become one-sided and oppressive. Furthermore, in order to reënforce their holding-out power, all of the same craft in a given field of industry unite

[6] Charles Merz, *The Great American Band Wagon*, 1928, ch. II.

in one organization, so that approved strikers in one factory may be sustained by contributions from their brothers at work in other factories. Thus the organization of labor, with all that this implies in the way of solidarity, loyalty, and self-sacrifice for the common good, is really a by-product of large-scale industry, which is, in turn, a by-product of the machine.

The immense expansion of sea-borne commerce in consequence of the perfecting of the marine engine, the iron ship and the ice machine, sharpens the interest of all trading nations in the maintenance of international peace and the security of the seas. Very likely this new common interest will eventually beget certain forms of joint action among them. Again, the invention of such weapons as the torpedo, poison gas, the airplane, the dirigible, and the aerial bomb obliges the nations to enter into some more comprehensive organization for the restraint of disturbers of the peace if they do not wish to be blotted out one by another in some future war.

Quite unconsciously the finders of the germs of disease and the concocters of antiseptics and serums are molding with giant hands the near political future of the human race. The recent marvelous progress of the art of saving life—the blessings of which will soon be extended to all mankind—will for a time divide humanity into *swarming peoples,* producing constantly a surplus which must emigrate or starve, and *adapted peoples,* which curb their fecundity, raise their standards of living, and disallow mass immigration. This situation will cause the National State to be cherished until adaptive fecundity has so spread over the earth that a man's right to remove from one land to another will be as freely conceded as now his right to remove from place to place within his home land.

Groups as transmitters of the thoughts and purposes of the past. Thanks to the power of tradition and the stability of structures human groupings often *correspond to bygone conditions and aims rather than to living forces.* Not only do men stick together long after they have lost their reasons for sticking together, but they remain apart long after they have lost their reasons for remaining apart. Because they find themselves entangled in groupings which no longer answer to their present sympathies and interests they fail to come together in groupings which correspond to their actual needs. It is this power of the

past over human association which in many parts of the world keeps groups small and local, suited to means of communication, modes of travel, forms of economic life, and tactics of defense which characterized an earlier time.

The persistence of antiquated groupings is illustrated in the contemporary failure of kindred Protestant denominations to merge into a single organization in order to avoid wasteful competition and duplication of work in communities too weak to support several Protestant churches; this despite the fact that the principal causes of their separateness no longer exist, while their doctrinal differences mean nothing to the majority of their members and are trivial from the viewpoint of modern religious thought.

One would expect human groups to arise and pass away freely like vortices in a liquid, for they are supposed to project and to fulfil the changing purposes of their members. As a matter of fact, however, once an organized group has gained headway and traditions, it behaves as if it had a life of its own, for in a way it determines its members instead of being determined by them. How often a political party or reform association which has fulfilled its mission, instead of disbanding forthwith, casts about for new issues to justify its continuance. The dominating spirits cannot bear to relinquish the power which their control of the organization has given them. In one of our frontier states the "anti-horse-thief association" kept on with its annual meetings and banquets after horse thieves had ceased from troubling; then it gained a new lease of life as an organization to deal with the theft of automobiles!

Groups afford leverage for minority control. Because churches, nationalistic associations, and political parties play so great a rôle in pre-determining the reactions of the average man to whatever comes up, they afford the shrewd and masterful few a rare opportunity to mold opinion. Can any one doubt, for example, that from the last eighty years' conflict between science and faith, the Christian religion organized into ecclesiastical bodies, has emerged with far less damage than if it had been no more organized than the religions of Asia? Under the leadership of positive characters who love the tenets and past of their denomination, the churches have yielded little from conviction

and have revised their theology only when necessary in order to keep their hold upon the rising generation.

In the same way national parties afford the vested interests a rare opportunity to multiply their political influence. In view of the progress of manhood suffrage in Europe since the Revolution of 1848 it is really astonishing how little the ballot in the hands of the toilers has actually been used to modify property rights, inheritance, taxation, or the legal status of labor. When they saw the tidal wave of political democracy coming the privileged classes were in despair and never dreamed that they would be so little disturbed as they have been. Before the War very little had been done anywhere to correct the monstrous concentration of ownership, while the "rash experiments" which were expected to be launched as soon as the common people wielded the ballot never materialized. The explanation is to be found partly in the control of newspapers by the vested interests, but chiefly in their ascendancy over such opinion-forming groups as "society," the churches, and the political parties. The party, instead of being what it professes to be, viz., a fluid grouping corresponding to the play of popular interest and opinion, is really a tough centralized highly-organized body, taking in respect to a new political issue a position dictated by the watchful dominant element and indoctrinating the rank and file with this official view. Instead of the position of the party reflecting the view of the majority of its members—as is the bland accepted theory—the position of the majority of its members is likely to reflect the view of the party. Here is the secret of the fruitlessness of English political democracy as long as English politics was a series of sham battles between "Liberal" and "Conservative" parties under the "invisible government" of one and the same social class. Only when a formidable party arose, built and officered by *bona fide* representatives of labor, was privilege seriously menaced.

CHAPTER LVII

INSTITUTIONS

Social institutions are sets of organized human relationships established or sanctioned by the common will. The purpose of an institution may be illustrated by *marriage*. Among animals the sex appetite prompts to matings which no animal group attempts to control. But in the human group such foresight is arrived at that, in order to lessen the number of fights prompted by sex jealousy and to assure the better care and protection of children, endeavor is frequently made to direct *all* sex activity into an appointed channel, *viz.*, marriage. The attempt is made in the belief that a *cardinal social interest* is at stake, the socially approved form of sex relation is supported in every way, and all unauthorized sex relations are frowned on.

Elements of an institution. As a rule the institution involves:

1. *The underlying concept.* The institution sprouts from some widely-held idea that such-and-such a procedure will promote the survival or success of the group. It is intended to meet a *social need* or serve a *social interest.*

2. *The purpose.* This develops out of the underlying idea. The common will, which authorizes, perhaps even finances, the institution, settles its purpose and fixes the objectives to steer toward. A group activity, *e.g.* football, that gratifies participants in ways to which society does not object is still no institution, since it lacks a social purpose.

3. *Permanence.* Nothing for one occasion or to meet a single emergency is an institution. When an imposed activity or inhibition is so recurrent that it becomes a custom and this custom gains social approval and authority, it is an *institution.*

4. *The structure.* A framework of activities may be necessary in order to realize the underlying idea. Implicated in this framework are apparatus, buildings, and equipment; but the common practice of calling the housing edifice "institution" is absurd.

5. *The code.* With an institution go rules, written or unwritten, prescribing the conduct of those concerned. Take, for example, the family; not only does the law precisely define the rights and duties of husband and wife, of parents and children, but the local community has definite ideas of what is owing from each member of the family to each of the others and, in case of infraction, makes its disapproval felt.

6. *Authority.* Those who act in or for a social institution are invested by society with the authority necessary to effect its purposes; for, in the words of Cooley,[1]

> an institution is simply a definite and established phase of the public mind, not different in its ultimate nature from public opinion, though often seeming, on account of its permanence and the visible customs and symbols in which it is clothed, to have a somewhat distinct and independent existence.

7. *The personnel. Operative* social institutions function by means of a specialized personnel: teachers, clergymen, officers, officials, staffs, etc.; on the other hand, merely *regulative* institutions (betrothal, the family, rest days) have no such agents.

Varieties of institutions. Institutions can be grouped according to the basic social needs they serve. In the *economic and industrial* fields property, contract, inheritance, exchange, money, credit, interest, joint-stock companies, and labor unions are outstanding. They concern the economist. In the *political* field conspicuous are law, legislatures, courts, police, army, consultative bodies, administrative bureaus, municipal corporations, and political parties. More and more these have become organs of that comprehensive and supreme institution, the State. Consideration of these is the job of the political scientist.

In the *domestic* field one comes on such institutions as courtship, betrothal, marriage, divorce, the family. In the *religious* field are met such *quasi*-institutions as priesthoods, hierarchies, churches, creeds, theologies, public worship, devout observances, rest days, feast days, etc. In the *educational* and *scientific* field there occur schools, universities, libraries, museums, scientific institutes, research bureaus, learned societies, and the press in certain of its aspects. All these institutions concern the sociologist.

Genesis of institutions. In a previous chapter I showed how

[1] *Social Organization,* 1911, p. 313.

standards come into being; well, the needs which beget *institutions* are much the same. When in a given situation standard behavior does not avail to protect what society deems its interest, a piece of social machinery will be set up—the family, the court of justice, the police, the school, the health center. Seeing that, as a rule, maintaining an *institution* costs more in attention, authority and money than maintaining a *standard,* a conception of the *interest* of society, or of the dominant class, lies back of the institution more often than it lies back of the standard.

Institutions being but instruments are unmoral. The great humanists taught us to look upon every human being as an end-in-himself and denied society the right to sacrifice him without his consent. But an institution cannot be an end-in-itself any more than a motor or a tractor can be an end-in-itself. So we have the old dilemma, Was the Sabbath made for man or was man made for the Sabbath? Let us not value a current social institution by checking it against the corresponding institution of an earlier culture, or against its original form, or against one of its by-gone phases, or against an abstract moral code. It should stand or fall *by the quality and adequacy of the service it is actually rendering or is likely to render,* bearing in mind, of course, its *cost.* Well says MacIver: Social institutions "do not exist in their own right to overpower men but only to serve them and when they cease to serve no antiquity and no sanctity can save them from condemnation." [2]

Resistance of institutions to change. Effete institutions are hard to mend or do away with partly because they are enshrined in popular traditions, partly because the masses, until their minds have been limbered by school, newspaper and screen, are very fearful of change. In 1752, when the British parliament introduced the Gregorian calendar and the days between September 2 and September 14 were dropped, yokels gathered in crowds shouting, "Give us back our eleven days!" Sunday observance, originally religious, has come to be in some societies a social institution so favored that laws are passed on its behalf which violate the principles of religious freedom. Again, an important element in society may deem its security and dignity bound up with the life of a certain institution. A national church accumulates so much interested support that, as a rule, it cannot be disestablished

[2] *Community,* 1924, pp. 162-163.

save in connection with a revolution. Or take *monarchy;* thousands of influential families become dependent on the offices, sinecures, jobs, privileges, and honors dispensed in a royal court, while the entire wealthy class regard royalty as the crown of the leisure and splendor which assure them their exalted position. No wonder that almost never has monarchy fallen without a revolution!

Because many favor any set-up advantageous to themselves, no matter how great its shortcomings from the social point of view, *institutions tend to lag behind the needs and opportunities of their situation.* Only the recently founded or overhauled institution is actually abreast of its time. So we ought to be sociological enough not to scold when we find social institutions ten to twenty years out of date! What else can we expect? Our battle is to make sure that they do not lag *fifty* or *a hundred* years behind their time!

Since always there are persons making a living, a profit, or a prestige out of what an institution should do but fails to do, there will be *some* resistance to every move to bring a lagging institution up abreast of its opportunity. Such self-interested protest should not in the least halt or flabbergast us. Coolly we should disregard it, go ahead and make the needful alterations.

Recalcitrance against institutions. Wherever we look we see institutions flouted—smuggling by "respectable" persons, defiance of "blue" laws, the selling of degrees by bogus medical schools, the unbridled expenditure of money to win elections, lobbyists "hitting it up" with legislators, spouse quitting the lawful mate to live with the spouse of another. Probably ninety-eight per cent of such recalcitrance emanates from the headstrong, who put their own wishes above the claims of society.

Nevertheless, before claiming to be better than others, law-abiders and conformists should recognize that there *is* a minority who *conscientiously object* to bearing arms, to apprehending a runaway slave, to taking an oath, to paying tithes to a state church, to paying taxes when they are unrepresented, to seeking a permit before speaking in a public place. Such objectors flout not *all* institutions, but only those they believe to be unjust or tyrannical; their motives are not private, but moral or social. They look upon certain institutions not as innocent means of promoting the general welfare, but as mere tools of class domi-

nation or exploitation. Before condemning such conscientious objectors, we should remember that nearly every curtailment of class exploitation or enlargement of human freedom in the last five hundred years has come as the result of a high-minded heroic ignoring of some institution by a little handful of persons.

Religion ceasing to be a social institution. Throughout the West, religion, once a social institution, is coming to be a private matter, whereas education, once a private matter, is coming to be a social institution. In the Middle Ages the Church was looked to as chief promoter of concord and obedience and in many ways society favored it. But, since the Church cherished aims and ambitions of its own, it proved to be by no means a pliant, manageable institution. Moreover, certain later developments have sadly impaired its value as a social binder. Variation of doctrine has spread among the laity confusion and doubt. The splitting of believers into sects has made it impracticable to support religion with public money. The growth of diversity and of unbelief has lessened the efficacy of religious dogma in producing likemindedness. Consequently, we see modern society leaning less on the Church and more on the school.

The builders of the noble cathedrals which are the wonder and pride of Western Europe imagined that by rearing such temples to glorify God they made themselves safe against Paynim and pestilence, against blight and murrain. As a matter of fact, no such security was reaped, in the sequel it was science not faith that delivered men from these afflictions. Nevertheless, science has scanty resources for quieting the greed, jealousy, and hatred of men. There is great need of a religion of brotherhood to prepare man for the wonderful social possibilities opening before him. Such a religion, however, is too fine and sensitive to be propagated by society and worked as a social institution. Let it grow as it will, without any commitment or tie-up.

The world over, the progressive peoples are pinning their hopes to knowledge. When China launched the new education in the first decade of our century schools were set up in temples, and under lofty pillared roofs I found little fellows in queues reciting before the grim god of war, or Kuan-Yin, goddess of mercy. In South America as a rule the *colegio* or university is housed in an old convent. In the United States the great universities, palatial high schools and splendid public libraries that are

rising are as characteristic of the age as the cathedrals that rose in Europe between the twelfth century and the sixteenth. In fine, the school, once semi-private, has become a public institution, while the church, once a public institution, has become semi-private.

May individuals outgrow their need of institutions? Traversing the remote interior of China in 1910 I was impressed by the master rôle of certain venerated institutions, handed down from the sages of antiquity, in standardizing the cardinal human relationships, regulating behavior in the main situations life presents, and thereby preserving harmony and order in a badly-over-peopled land. It was easy to see that the marked peaceableness of the Chinese was due less to fear of the magistrate than to reverence for ancestor worship, marriage, patriarchal authority, superiority of elders, family property, family honor, etc. Without this reverence the Chinese would at once fall into chaos.

Nevertheless, individuals *may* develop beyond their need of institutions. In a rationally organized society the intellectual and moral *élite* are scarcely conscious of any restraint upon them from the side of institutions. The good father does not come up against laws intended to prevent the neglect or exploitation of children by their parents. Upon a well-mated couple the institution of marriage exercises no pressure whatever. If any section of the *élite* is continually running afoul of a certain institution, it is a sure sign that something is wrong with that institution. Institutions ought to be so well adjusted to society's actual needs that enlightened and conscientious persons will rarely find themselves hampered by them.

Importance of a knowledge of the course of development of institutions. Full knowledge of the past of our characteristic institutions immunizes us to chauvinism, cultural arrogance, and blind conservatism. It convinces us "of the lack of that uniqueness, divine revelation, perfection and permanence with which we are wont to clothe and adorn our institutions." [3] The impassioned champions of the privileged position of Latin and Greek in the college curriculum would sing rather small did they realize just why it was that at the time of the Renaissance the most humane and enlightened minds were all for making the ancient classical culture the basis of a liberal education. The extreme Sab-

[3] H. E. Barnes, *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences*, p. 350.

batarians would be chastened did they realize that for five centuries after Christ the "Lord's Day" (Sunday) was in no wise identified with the Jewish sabbath.[4] The fanatic churchmen who denounce civil marriage as no marriage would be sobered were they aware that nearly a thousand years elapsed before the Christian clergy undertook to marry people.[5] James Harvey Robinson points out: [6]

> We pay our taxes grudgingly as if they were still the extortions of feudal barons or absolute monarchs for their personal gratification, although they are now a contribution to our common expenses fixed by our representatives . . . to do justice to the anachronisms in conservative economic and legal reasoning would require a whole volume.

Criticism and testing of institutions. Ours is the most revolutionary epoch humanity has experienced. Never before has so large a proportion of the population been qualified to see their social institutions as they really are. Breath-taking is the speed with which there has been built up in the minds of Russian workers and peasants execration of the most venerated institutions of Old Russia. In Mexico the success of the revolutionists in discrediting the hoary institutions which served the exploiting classes by gyving the masses has been greater than one could have expected. In China the faith of myriads in the superiority of the traditional Confucian institutions has been destroyed by the stern teaching of events; in a generation there should be no freer mind in the world than the Chinese mind. Before the ferment in India ceases the power of antiquity over the Indian intellect will be broken; her intellectuals will be gaining their orientation from branches of knowledge most of which did not exist two centuries ago and several of which (*e.g.*, bacteriology) are altogether the product of the last two generations. Soon throughout the Moslem world the air-tight Mohammedan orthodoxy will fly to pieces under the blows of modern science and the leaders of Islam will be called upon to effect in three decades accommodations such as the leaders of Christendom have been allowed three centuries to make.

Never before were there at hand such facilities for *testing the*

[4] C. S. Moehlman, *The Story of the Ten Commandments*, 1928, Ch. XIV.
[5] G. E. Howard, *A History of Matrimonial Institutions*, 1904, vol. I, Ch. VII.
[6] *The New History*, p. 23.

practical results of institutions as there are to-day. The effects upon juvenile behavior of Sunday-school instruction or Boy Scout ideals—once a matter of vague impression—are made the subject of scientific observation and exact statistical methods. Police methods, law-court procedure and prison régimes are constantly examined from new angles. Never did our treatment of mental patients run such a gauntlet of intelligent criticism as now. Mental testing has given us means of arriving at a just appraisal of educational institutions. Questionnaires circulated among intelligent married couples bring out undreamt-of causes of conjugal dissatisfaction. The natural outcome of this scrutiny and criticism is not the collapse of institutions, but their speedier adjustment to their job.

SOME EMERGENT INSTITUTIONS

The research organization. In the last quarter-century it has dawned upon the advanced minds that, instead of being already in possession of the bulk of what it needs to know, humanity at present actually commands but a small fraction of the Knowable. Accordingly there have been created many non-academic organizations for the promotion of scientific research. Not only several of the larger cities have established municipal research bureaus, but in the national government have acquired great renown such research units as the Bureau of Standards, the Bureau of Chemistry and Soils, the Forest Products Laboratories, and, with the coöperation of the State governments, the Agricultural Experiment Stations.

Then there are the research organizations which have been set up upon various "foundations" and placed under the administration of self-perpetuating boards.

Typical of the various foundations which endow non-academic research are the Carnegie Institution (various fields), the Rockefeller Foundation (medical research, public health), Smithsonian Institution (science, exploration), Institute for Research in Land Economics and Public Utilities, the National Industrial Conference Board, National Bureau of Economic Research, Brookings Institution (economics, government), Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation (social science), the Russell Sage Foundation (social service), the American Foundation (political science), the Commonwealth Fund (government), the World Peace Foundation (international relations), the Institute for Social and Religious

Research, the National Geographic Society (exploration), Woods Hole Oceanographical Laboratory and Woods Hole Marine Biological Laboratory, Boyce-Thompson Institute for Plant Research (botany), Mellon Institute for Industrial Research (chemistry), Bartol Research Foundation (iron and steel), National Canners Institute, Legge Foundation for Agricultural Research, Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation and the American Medical Association Laboratories.[7]

The health center. The settler of two generations ago drew water from the family well, drank milk from home cows, ate bread from flour ground from his own grain and meat cured in his own smokehouse. Were he cleanly and careful he could insure his family a wholesome diet. But for all these things his grandchildren have to depend on the intelligence and conscience of others over whom they have no control.

Vastly more is known to-day as to the inlets of infection and the means of conserving health than was known seventy years ago before the discovery of bacteria and the rise of the "germ theory" of disease. It seems a great pity that housewives and mothers, infinitely concerned about the health of their dear ones, should not be made acquainted with the rapidly accumulating knowledge of how to keep well.

There are two very different roads to happiness. One well-trodden route is acquiring material sources of enjoyment—a better house, finer furnishings, a piano, a car, a radio set, a greenhouse. But this calls for more income and the struggle for more income often sets people at loggerheads; dividends can go up only at the expense of wages, bigger profits can be had only from higher prices. An alternative route to happiness is *better health* and wayfarers thereon have everybody's good-will, for they tread on nobody's toes. Whatever health the individual enjoys is his own, not filched; so everybody is willing he should have health.

Such considerations lie back of the 616 county health units which were in existence in 1935 and several hundreds of health centers maintained by the larger cities. Such a center may be defined as *an organization which provides and coördinates medical service and related social services for a specified district.*

The health center is an institution for the conservation of health through the dissemination of health information. It is not

[7] L. V. Ballard, *Social Institutions*, 1936, pp. 483-4.

an agency for the treatment of disease, but for its early discovery and prevention. It aims not so much to cure as to forestall ill health. To achieve these ends, it brings together, under a single roof if possible, all public and private health agencies, together with all the welfare and relief organizations working in a given district. Health activities are thus combined and correlated so that an effective and aggressive attack can be made upon disease and ill-health, especially from the standpoint of prevention. In other words, the health center is a sort of "department store of health." [8]

Ninety years ago *some* American communities provided a free public high-school, while others did not; now *all* places with a reasonable number of would-be pupils maintain a high-school. In the same way it is not open to doubt that in twenty to thirty years *every* county or city will have its "health center" or "medical center" where the ailing will be attended to without regard to their capacity to pay.

The recreation center. In the city the average family is totally unable to provide the play space its children need so that, if they are to play as growing creatures should, playgrounds will have to be provided by the community. There is, furthermore, the point that wholesome recreation is so vitalizing that public playgrounds can easily be justified as public health agencies; if it is sound social policy to set up health centers, it is equally sound to institute recreation centers.

The Methodist Episcopal Church in its *Discipline* of 1792 said:

> We prohibit play in the strongest terms. . . . The students shall be indulged in nothing which the world calls play. Let this rule be observed with the strictest nicety; for those who play when they are young, will play when they are old.

The Church took this attitude from excellent motives but, in the light of what we now know, we cannot endorse it. By keying muscles and viscera to their best tone play gives a sense of well-being, lessens pointless hankering and discontent, cuts down irritability, and braces one to meet shocks with good humor.

Play affords free vent to pent-up emotions, stirs age-old impulses to spontaneous bodily and mental activity, relieves blockage by opening fresh channels for self-effectuation and "unstops the fountains of human nature."

[8] L. V. Ballard, *ibid.*, p. 379.

Adult play is the means of reconciling the demands of our original nature, evolved through tens of thousands of years of primitive living, with the ever-more-artificial manner of life imposed upon us by our developing culture. The thirst for recreation crops up strongest among those farthest from nature—city dwellers, industrial workers, office workers. The husbandman, working with growing things out of doors and with domestic animals, is a glad child of nature compared with the man feeding metal plates to a punching machine for eight hours a day!

The play of adolescents and adults *socializes* because, being an absorbing *present* interest, it blankets the growling snags of old enmities and the smarting scars of ancestral fights which, if still heeded, might even now embroil people.

Wholesome recreation allays pointless inherited feuds, lowers barriers between jangling nationalities and confessions, Americanizes the children of the foreign-born and begets a neighborhood consciousness. It promotes good feeling between groups held apart by prejudice rather than by clash of interests.

In view of such benefits it is not surprising that 900 American cities are maintaining 8,000 playgrounds, an equal number of sets of tennis courts, 4,000 baseball diamonds, 1,700 athletic fields, 400 bathing beaches and 300 golf courses. The annual outlay is upwards of thirty-three million dollars.

These new institutions should spread rapidly seeing that with us late capitalism is developing in such a way as continually to concentrate purchasing power in fewer hands. In the banner year, 1929, one-tenth of one per cent of American families received about as much income as the 42 per cent which had incomes of less than $1,500! Very few Americans have so completely lost faith in the system of private economic enterprise that they wish to see economic life Sovietized. If, nevertheless, despite well-intended corrective measures, the distribution of income under the system of private capitalism continues to be as disappointing and indefensible as it actually is, there will appear a strong disposition to tap by high taxation the swollen private incomes in order to have the means of maintaining community institutions which will insure a bit of social dividend to the millions of worthy low-income families.

PART XI

PROJECTION INTO THE FUTURE

CHAPTER
LVIII. Foreshadowings of the Next Culture
LIX. Retrospects and Prospects

CHAPTER LVIII

FORESHADOWINGS OF THE NEXT CULTURE

Western culture—which with giant strides is coming to be the culture of the bulk of humanity—is changing at an unexampled rate and, in the years just ahead, may change still faster. Can we not divine some of the inserts likely to be made in the next lifetime?

The new picture of the past of our species. The astounding prehistory being made out, bit by bit, from the patient diggings and piecings and matchings of the archæologists so differs from the Garden-of-Eden story that our outlook is changing in many ways. We feel more sympathy with the primitive groups still to be found in out-of-the-way places, for we realize that culturally they are only where *our* ancestors were 4000-6000 years ago. Nor are we so sure nowadays that these primitives stick to their rudimentary culture because they lack the brains to take over and swing *our* culture; perhaps all that they need is *time!*

The limitless future. For two millennia zeal for bettering the human lot has been chilled by the Apocalyptic vision of the early Second Coming of Christ and End of the World. It has doubtless wrought more harm than any other religious belief in our ken. Why bother to do anything to better the human lot if any day now, *perhaps to-morrow,* the firmament will "dissolve with fervent heat?" All this needless terror, paralysis and frustration begotten by a scroll of disputed authorship dating from the first century of our era!

The earth-scientists agree that Terra has been here near two billion years, may well last another billion. The immense alterations we read in its strata are no longer referred to life-annihilating cataclysms, but to familiar everyday processes which continued for thousands of millennia. The geologist discerns no forces able to destroy our globe or spoil it for human occupancy; so, instead of toying with the dream of a New Jerusalem in the clouds, why not tackle the job of subduing Earth to our needs? The gravest

menace ahead seems not to be earthquake, tidal wave, or shift of climate, but *man himself!* If our species is abruptly wiped out, it will be because mad militarists *loosed some lethal agency they could not stop!*

Self-domestication. If man may count on a terrestrial future so immense that for all practical purposes it is *an eternity*, why should he not deliberately set about remodeling his species as, long before the curtain of history rose, he made over certain wild plants and animals to suit his purposes? For, compared with wheat or maize, camel or horse, man *is still a wild species!* No superior intelligence ever took him in hand and he has done little to domesticate himself. Granted he is not yet clear as to what traits to breed out of himself, what traits to build into himself; but, at least, transmissible defects ought to be got rid of. Since "elimination of the unfit" has been slowed down, should we not painlessly sterilize all born defectives who in earlier stages of society would have been pitilessly eliminated by Nature?

Conservation. The thought that this globe, which even now one could girdle in a flying week and which is every day a smaller theater for man's ambitions, will have to house our posterity for eons upon eons produces an abrupt reversal of attitude toward some abominations that lurk under our vaunted "economic freedom." How often in our time have we seen noble forests, age-built soils, ore beds, coal measures, oil reservoirs, natural-gas pockets, gutted in a single generation, valuable animal species all-but-exterminated! The whole sickening performance sanctioned and glorified as "business enterprise"! Stern-eyed "conservationists" will ere long lay a ban upon many business exploits which the public have been led to regard with indulgence, even admiration!

Futility of long-range prophecy. Ours is a poor time for budding Utopias onto the social reality! How idle it would be for us, whirled breathless down this mill-race of change, to try to divine what forms society will assume in the far future! Who with a reputation to consider will venture to forecast the tenor of human life even a century hence, let alone predict what it will be in a thousand years? To plot *now* the course our culture will actually take, *one would have to fore-know discoveries not yet made!* Look what inserts have been made since 1900—Mendel's laws of heredity, knowledge of vitamins, acquaintance with the rôle of the ductless glands, recognition of "over-compen-

sation" for a sense of inferiority, insight into "conditioning" and "escape" mechanisms, psycho-analysis, radio, automobile, airplane, —not to mention hosts of minor finds! Nor is there sign of inventive genius tiring, or technical progress slowing down; rather in the next future expect fresh lights to come even faster!

Tradition. While knowledge advances at such a rate a gripping tradition can no more grow up than a confining sheet of ice can form over a lake tossed by a gale. For nobody-knows-how-many generations our culture may seethe so furiously that crystals of authoritative ancestral tradition will be few. Hence, our anti-social impulses, instead of being held in leash chiefly by transmitted behavior patterns, as has been the case through most of the past, will be restrained, *if* restrained, by *devised* means, such as early training, pressure of public opinion, law, etc. And a tough job it will be! As the crime problem gets graver, society—with child clinics and scout troops and young-civilian camps—will insist on playing a larger rôle than now in the upbringing of youth.

Dogma. While the intellectual pot stays at boil dogma will gain little hold. In the early centuries of the Christian era churchly dogmas grew up as precise formulations of the truths deemed essential to man's eternal salvation. Even in the earlier phases of Science cropped up something like dogmas—crystallizations of what was considered to be irrefragable truth. But, now that the finding of radio-active substances has thrown into *pi* the list of chemical elements and the implications of the non-Euclidian geometry are realized, Science grows cautious of formulating ultimates, shrinks from putting forth "final" truths. Less and less, I trow, will the findings of science be couched in dogmatic form. For generations, perhaps, the higher intellects will be wary of dogma.

The passing of race delusions. Many current notions as to the mental differences among human races will be tossed on the ash-heap, for they rest on the fallacy that a race and its culture are one. The Ku Klux Klan guess that the great color races represent distinct and independent derivations from sub-human ancestors will yield posterity many a laugh. As Western culture is borne all about the earth hundreds of little local, tribal or regional cultures will wither, curl up and blow away. All the races of men will feel challenged to come out of their shells and show what they can do with this emerging world culture; probably few, if any, will be utterly "stumped" by it. In a century "pure savages"

will be but a memory and no considerable branch of mankind will be without its M.D.'s, Ph.D.'s and LL.D.'s.

Exaggerating individual differences. Human beings differ in many ways and some of their divergences have a large social significance. But we shall see differences in character and ability grossly overemphasized in order to justify the stupendous inequalities in fortune, prestige and power being produced. Thousands of talented persons will become lickspittle apologists and glorifiers of the wealthy; and one line they are sure to take is that our dollar kings, the stars of the first magnitude in the financial firmament, are where they are by reason of their immense personal superiority to their rivals and detractors. It will be contended that their success is owing to their rare insight, amazing acumen and uncanny foresight, that accident, chicane, skullduggery and "crust" had nothing to do with it. Our magnates need such advocacy and are able to pay well for it; so it will be forthcoming. A supreme effort on the part of honest intellectuals will be required if these success myths are kept from triumphing.

The passing of religious celibacy. As research continues to throw fresh light on human nature, we cannot go on holding with the Christian Fathers and other champions of asceticism that it is a simple matter to pluck up sex and throw it away like a noxious weed! In striving to get the better of our animal nature they came to advocate the utter uprooting of sex; hence, monasteries and nunneries! But we perceive now that sex has a colossal root system—tearing it out of the *psyche* may have strange and disconcerting consequences. So we shall come to recognize perforce that "marriage is an honorable estate," that love ennobles sex intimacy and makes it chime with even our highest ideals.

Education as illumination. In view of the "knife-edge" we have to negotiate, *one* aim of education is clear. Since vital components of our culture are being replaced at a dizzying speed, the utmost should be done to make easy the people's accommodation to the unfamiliar. Now nothing so smoothes the way for the acceptance of new culture elements as the spread of enlightenment. The ravenous intellects need to be shown how to interpret the new finds constantly made. This is why "the education of all at the public expense" has come to be a slogan of all fore-lookers, why the adult-education movement shows already the thews of a giant. Once minds have been lit up, improvements that might have been

blocked for centuries had the old darkness reigned, are adopted almost by acclamation.

Advancing into the shimmering horizon that opens before us, we should take pains to avoid the straggling formation of a desert caravan. For, in such a case, two things—both bad—are sure to occur: the fore-riders of the caravan will be suspected and persecuted by those behind them; the tail-enders will be cozened and exploited by those ahead of them. Therefore, in public libraries and extension centers, in open forums and by radio, the people should be helped to advance into the coming culture *as globally as may be!*

New tasks for the State. Many of the social gains ahead will add to the rôles of the State. The care of health, formerly quite a private matter, now calls for numerous public measures and policies. Natural resources cannot be conserved unless there is a power that can gyve the short-sighted or greedy. With overseas passage so cheap the overflow of the pullulating peoples would swamp the prudent peoples did not the state regulate immigration. Distracted amid the thousand-throated ballyhoo from the vendors of deleterious foods, drinks, drugs and cosmetics, what would become of the ordinary consumer if there were no anti-adulteration laws and no inspection bureaus to give him a little protection? Is it of much use for parents, clergy and teachers lovingly to knit moral principle into the soul of the young if the first amusement-promoter who happens along is at liberty to ravel it out at a sitting? Industrial conflict may breed anarchy unless the state enforces right standards in work places and sets up agencies for the obligatory settlement of labor disputes. Baleful, therefore, is any attempt to revive the old suspicion and jealousy of government inherited from the era of class domination.

The affrighting picture of a bull-headed, over-grown state confining us all in an ever-finer mesh of regulation, which the minions of worried capitalism are continually throwing on the screen, is sheer bugaboo. As the state is socialized, only those who intend something anti-social are restrained; so the number actually curbed by a fresh legal restraint may be very few. Sometimes a new law sensibly enlarges freedom, as when speed maniacs are forbidden to travel the public highway at faster than seventy miles an hour! When contagious disease cases are barred from public conveyances, a thousand times as many persons as are

hampered are relieved from anxiety. We are told that a million and a half pages of law are in force in this country. Well, you could print on five pages all the laws that have ever bothered *me!* Once the state ceases to be the tool of a dominating class and becomes the instrument of all who cherish social aims, there is small danger that it will intervene on trivial grounds to lessen public liberty.

Privileged lying. Advertising is a condition of rapid technical advance and rise in the public's standard of living. No one wants to ban it, but consumers are getting their backs up and the cozening of the public will not be allowed to go on forever. False or delusive advertisements are precisely as abominable and indefensible as false coins and false weights and measures. In time they will be curbed by fines and jail sentences just as the latter were curbed.

Proletarian dictatorship. The proposal that the hand workers run society looked better when Marx and Engels suggested it ninety years ago than it does to-day. For, as time goes on, the proletariat contains in its ranks a smaller proportion of the superior. The diffusion of school opportunities and the weakening of class barriers have enabled myriads of the brighter sons and daughters of worker families to make a place for themselves in business and the professions. It is not easy to see how a proletariat much of whose best blood is constantly flowing away to strengthen the opposing classes, will, by sheer weight of numbers, arrive eventually at a "dictatorship" over society!

Equality. The old excuses for steep social grading and class privilege—"descent," "noble" birth, "blue blood," "breeding"—have been discarded; yet the biologist's outlook on man does not favor equality of rating. Even after educational and cultural opportunities stand open to all, the differences among individuals in their value—potential or actual—to society are important *and are increasing!* After manifest personal merit has come to be the sole basis of social distinction the egalitarian dogma, having served its purpose, will follow aristocratic myths into the discard. Likewise will fade out the heresy of "equal pay for all"—a natural reaction to the grotesque inequalities that show up in the current régime. There is not the slightest prospect that in the society to come those who contribute services of extraordinary worth will be expected to be content with the pay of a shoveler!

"Equalization of opportunity" will remain an appealing ideal and generous aid will be given to remove handicaps that *can* be removed. But, while most will rejoice to see as many as possible fitted to make a showing in "the race of life," the slogan of "No prizes" or "Equal prizes for all" is not only distasteful now, but, on into the future as far as we can pierce it, it will be distasteful. There is a point beyond which egalitarianism loses its charm. The public loves to see a youth of merit like Lindbergh leap at one bound into fortune and world-fame. They want hazards, adventure, great prizes, in the offing lest life lose its savor and turn humdrum.

Thirst for security. Men resent being the prey of apprehension. In view of the threat of bombing from the air to annihilate women, children, and the aged, as well as combatants, and to erase from the face of the earth every noble work of man, the militarist's reliance upon the male's pugnacity to sustain endless international feuds and wars will prove futile. Within a few years political leaders who fail to gratify the cravings of the people for safety for their dear ones will be hurled sky-high by revolution. One may look for a revival of endeavors to substitute a régime of law for the present anarchy among the nations.

Private enterprise to be regulated. In later *laissez faire* days the industrial system became a Juggernaut. To allow employers to drive their workers as long as flesh and blood can stand and to require them to risk eyes, limbs, health, or life from removable hazards lurking in the work place or work process is so insane that only with difficulty can we realize that it prevailed everywhere a lifetime ago. Private initiative is, of course, very precious but it should be granted scope only when it consents to wear a regulative harness devised for the protection of other interests than those of capital which are involved in the processes of economic production. In Sweden I found (1934) that the employers have become resigned to conducting their enterprises without disputing the concern of the public in the way they are run.

Planned economy. Production according to plans worked out by the best engineers bids fair to take the place of the costly anarchy one sometimes finds under capitalism. Just as teachers can fit themselves into well-devised systems of public education without foregoing their individuality, just as physicians can fit themselves into a public health or "socialized medicine" program,

yet not lose their independence, so business men may fit their enterprises into a state-planned development of water power, or mining, or river navigation, or steel-making without giving up the seeking of profit. How far such planning can be carried without hobbling and discouraging private enterprise is not yet known.

Plutocracy is "on skids." By the end of this century mere Crœsuses should command less envy and adoration than they did in the mid-nineteenth century, when ideas of the social welfare were naïve and standards of ethical conduct rudimentary. As more people get their eyes open it comes to be widely understood that wealth-getting operations must always be subject to rules and that a fortune gained by violation of the recognized rules is a disgrace and not an honor. Between the rich and the respectable rich lines will be drawn that our grandparents never thought of drawing.

Guidance from sociology. As the analysis of society becomes more exhaustive, sound and trustworthy, its influence should broaden. The contingent of those who heed sociologists should grow at the expense of followers of other ways of looking at society. "Wishful thinking" and "rainbow chasing" will be discredited as the results of the scientific examination of society come to be more widely known. When thousands of reliable monographic studies of particular groups, communities and movements are available, intelligent persons should be less inclined to press toward some Utopia in cloudland.

Sociologists point out what are "social" interests and call attention to the types of behavior which damage such interests. Certain success tactics have been branded as "anti-social" and a growing public stands ready to condemn them, no matter how conspicuous the offender. On the other hand, sociologists looking for the major forces molding a social situation pay little heed to dreamy imaginings of a better society. Few social improvements will be brought about by general consent. Battles for social reforms will be won chiefly because those *for* put up a stronger fight than those *against!* As a rule, if the assailants of the intrenched *have* an advantage, it is in brains, zeal and science; the defenders are likely to be stronger in money, social prestige and tradition. The study of sociology ought to lead to a realistic outlook on society distasteful both to the extremists on the right and to the extremists on the left!

CHAPTER LIX

RETROSPECTS AND PROSPECTS

As yet sociology is far from competent to foretell the forms society will assume in the remote future. Limited as we are in insight, it would be rash to predict the face of society even a century hence, let alone half a millennium from now. In fact, it is foolhardy to attempt to pierce the social future further than forty or fifty years. We no longer dream of a perfect and final form which society will reach, then cease to develop. We expect that the course of society will continue to be determined by divers and fluctuating forces, some urging it forward while others hold it back, some deflecting it to the right while others deflect it to the left, some elevating it while others depress it.

Social development is not unilinear. We do not see society moving in a regular orbit or a pre-determined path. Not only do familiar forces change in strength or direction, but, from time to time, new forces appear. Nor dare we leave *the human will* out of the picture. The earlier notion that the evolution of society obeys immutable laws has been given up. To a very considerable extent the social future depends on what we are determined that it shall be. *Within limits* men can have the type of society they want. We part from those who insist that the development of society follows unchanging laws and from those who contend that man can mold society altogether to his liking. The truth is in between.

A stage of society is not born out of the processes and products which characterized the previous stage; for the course of society is extensively conditioned by changes in the *economic* sphere. If the succession of economies in the life of a people be represented by a-b-c-d-e, very likely there will be a series of social forms l-m-n-o-p corresponding thereto. Not that economic changes are the *sole* causes of social changes, but that their influence is very potent. Other factors that leave their stamp are: notions as to the significance of the sexes, theories of child-parent inheritance,

belief in ghosts, magic and witchcraft, religious conceptions, writing, scientific inquiry, etc.

This is why sociologists reject the hypothesis that the succession of social stages constitutes a closed series which is bound to be run through whatever the conditions and circumstances. If society B traverses different *economic* stages from society A, then the succession of *social* stages B will pass through is sure to be different.

Rôle of population pressure. Through much of human experience population pressure has been a molder of social destiny. Of late it has been a *growing* factor because, while miracles of ingenuity were performed in cutting deaths, practically nothing was done to cut births. Every advance in the art of keeping people alive outrunning advances in the art of extracting sustenance has tended to intensify population pressure. The fewer the lives lost by disease and accident, the heavier the toll that had to be taken by other factors, *e.g.*, toil, privation, mal-nutrition and periodical famine; for a balance *had to be struck!* Save when the arts of food-production were making rapid progress or when emigration afforded adequate outlet, a large part of the people had to live so wretchedly that their heightened mortality would balance the general excess of births, thereby keeping population in equilibrium with its food resources. It is *population pressure* that accounts for the chronic restlessness peoples have shown, their periodical upheavals and commotions, their overrunning neighboring areas, their encroachments on the range of weaker peoples.

With every new economic epoch, the density point at which population pressure begins rose. More could subsist on a given area by hunting than by gathering; by herdsmanship than by hunting; by hoe culture than by herdsmanship; by plow culture than by hoe culture; by a diversified economy than by a simple economy. Save for a few peoples that practised infanticide or abstention from conjugal intercourse during lactation, or just after there had been a great thinning of numbers by warfare, famine, or epidemic, the whisper, "Maybe not enough to eat!" has been with man ever since he came into view. Giant strides in food production or the industrial arts did not long spare human groups the recurrence of population pressure.

But the spread of family limitation ushers in a new dispensation under which humanity will no longer be shadowed by the menace of "too many!"

Sensitiveness to the social future. If society is to thrive a type must predominate that sees its future in a long perspective. For some with a keen social sense will not try to see more than twenty years ahead; whereas others are ready to evaluate present behavior from the point of view of their granchildren's grandchildren!

How do the conspicuous social elements compare in their feeling for the future?

Intellectuals, of course, feel the challenge of long vistas and wide horizons.

Religionists ever urge the overruling of present desires and interests for the sake of the to-come; but they value everything with reference to something mystical—salvation, holiness, the Last Judgment. In rational whole-hearted concern for man's mundane future the clergy are not outstanding.

From noting the long-time eventual response of their fields and herds to different treatments, the more intelligent farmers come to be willing to take long views ahead.

Business men, used to discounting the future at the current rate of interest, make poor guardians of the remoter social values. Too common is the attitude "Consider posterity? What has posterity ever done for us?" Their first impulse is to extract anything of pecuniary value—petroleum, ore, timber, coal, furs, fish—as speedily as possible, whatever the waste, lest their profits be eaten up by "carrying charges."

Educators, accustomed to think in terms of the oncoming generation they teach, are ready to hearken to the claims of the future.

Realizing that every form of life is liable to have its destiny altered by the forces playing upon it, biologists set great store by upkeep of species' vigor and abhor any trend that spells stagnation or degeneration.

Working within a corporation that considers posterity and plans a long way ahead, the more responsible servants of the State are likely to become permeated with its psychology and develop a sense of the social future.

Accustomed to make sacrifices for the continuance of their stock, parents are disposed to respond to an appeal to submit to present inconvenience for the sake of the social future.

The radius of our sensitiveness to the social future is likely

to be greatly extended by a higher education, particularly one in the field of the humanities and the social sciences.

The succession of group loyalties. There was a time when, in view of the relative importance to them of the two groups, men cared too much for their local community and too little for their county (district, duchy); later the county drew to itself too much loyalty in comparison with the feeling for the province or state. Then the latter came to attract some of the allegiance which should properly have gone to the nation. We are now in a stage when undue concern with parish or county or state, as against the just claims of the nation, is not common. But, while in some contemporary societies patriotism has bloomed into a religion, there is no strong movement for the appreciation of peoples outside the scope of the nation's interests. Thanks to nationalist education and agitation, countless wrongs committed against weaker peoples are justified on the maxim "my country—right or wrong!" It would be, of course, well-nigh as queer for a man to prefer strangers to his fellow countrymen as to care more for neighbor children than for his own; nevertheless, in the present stage of social development what is most needed is more citizens whose love of country is qualified by a love of justice. Stigmatized and spat upon by rabid "patriots," "internationalists" should be sustained by the realization that they are right in line with the historical evolution of the social sentiments and that posterity will justify them.

Break-up of the social foundations of pessimism. Pessimistic judgments as to the worth of human life, which have been so rife in the cultures of Asia, may be expected to vacate healthy minds in time because their social foundations are crumbling. Observe what is beginning to show plainly among the more advanced societies:

> The Oriental generalization that for the bulk of men existence means little beyond a meaningless round of toil, privation and anxiety is but recognition of what severe population pressure leads to. So long as human beings are produced at about double their rate of natural dying what other lot for the masses is to be expected? But the bringing of population growth under control makes possible a let-up in grinding toil, a broadening of the worker's leisure, a diffusion of opportunities for recreation and

play, the freeing of childhood from premature labor, and a great release from worry about one's daily bread.

Although most have not yet reached these shining goals, we are approaching them and can see plainly that they are attainable.

Such progress has been made in subduing disease that an ever larger quota are permitted to live out their natural term and die of some ailment arising from the aging of their tissues or organs. Thanks to the advance of surgery and anesthetics, lives that are but an endless torture are hardly to be found any more. Fatalism, which rests like a pall on the human spirit so long as men feel themselves helpless before the fell destroyers, is becoming rare now that all the great scourges but cancer have been fettered. A disease-free life for most of sound constitution who will observe a rational hygiene seems to be not far away. Eventually breeding will be restricted to stocks sound in every respect and constitutionally resistant to disease.

The ideal of "keeping fit" spreading from the recreation centers and playing fields, bids fair to impose a curb on over-indulgence in food and drink, sensuality and sloth. The growing recognition that there is no place whatever in one's physiological economy for alcohol and narcotics and the instruction of youth in the schools in the precepts of personal hygiene, should make a deep cut in the ravages of vice.

Grounds of hope for social progress. Even a stubborn realist has solid grounds for expecting a better future for Man;
a) Birth control banishes the over-population specter, which was drawing nigher with every fresh exploit in saving young life.
b) The rise in the social position of the female sex and the educating of girls equally with boys drain that vast morass of ignorance, superstition, unreason and reaction which women still constitute in many parts of the world.
c) The substitution of a modern education for tradition as the guide of life emancipates youths from the prejudices and narrow outlooks of their parents and turns their faces toward a radiant future.
d) The overcoming of disease has abolished the necessity of rearing big families; and mothers of four have vastly more time for cultural interests than mothers of eight. This should swell greatly the contingent that can be looked to for support

of rational and constructive measures. Even if but a tithe of the leisure that accrues to mothers by being freed from the tale of babies that grandmother bore (half of whom never grew up!) is directed to intellectual self-improvement, it will make a conspicuous difference in the volume of intelligence brought to bear on social problems.

e) Our new mastery of disease adds decades to the expectation of life of adults. Myriads who a hundred years ago were passing away in their thirties or forties are now living through their fifties into their sixties or seventies. That this but swells the horde of stupid conservatives is untrue. To be sure, age usually converts illiterates or ill-educated into Tories; but, as a rule, the educated do not turn bigot as they grow old. Able to interpret rationally what they experience and observe, many of them garner wisdom and come to take the long view.

f) It appears to be settled that school opportunities will be provided for everybody's children at the public expense. To realize this excellent intention, industrial child labor will have to be banished and school attendance enforced. Almost everywhere the public educational system from bottom to top is pervaded by social purpose and its diversity in content and technique as between times and places reflects honest differences in educational philosophy.

g) Caught in a whirlwind of change and obliged to make numerous shifts in a short time, many of us find the light gained in school two, three, or four decades back altogether too weak. So we may expect a great efflorescence of educational agencies for adults. In place of the slops offered by campaign "spell binders," "yellow" newspapers and trash magazines, there will be numerous serious, well-taught courses conducted under university extension, people's institutes, and schools for workers. This should produce a rise in the plane of civic intelligence.

h) Internal peace must be preserved if there is to be rapid social progress. "Dictatorship of the proletariat" is a dangerous doctrine for, if communists may grab power while still a minority, other minorities will claim an equal right to do the same; so you *may* get fascism! All minority dominations suppress the agitative liberties and crush opposition movements or parties. Tactics so high-handed provoke opponents to resort to force to overthrow the arbitrary regime; so the ever-present menace of

revolution: counter-revolution paralyzes the battlers for a better social future.

Under representative democracy, on the other hand, minority groups vie for power but do not resort to desperate tactics, for they are on equal footing with one another and with the government in appealing to the electorate. When every citizen has a vote and no one has more, you get maximum acquiescence in the electoral verdict. There is felt to be something sacred and final in the will of the voters as registered under "an honest ballot and a fair count." Hence, representative democracy holds the best assurance for the keeping of the social peace.

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